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LATIN AMERICA AND JAMAICA
(August 6–21, 1983)
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HAWAII, HONG KONG, THAILAND, BURMA, PAKISTAN, TURKEY, AND ITALY
(January 4–22, 1984)
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A REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

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CONTENTS

STUDY MISSION TO LATIN AMERICA AND JAMAICA (AUG. 6–21, 1983)

SCNAC–98–1–11

	Page
Introduction	IX
Foreword	X
Executive Summary	1
Mexico	8
The Committee's visit to Mexico	11
Field trip to the State of Michoacan	12
Meeting with the Attorney General of Mexico	14
Recommendations	16
Peru	17
The Committee's visit to Peru	25
Meeting with the Prime Minister/Foreign Minister of Peru	26
Meeting with the Minister of Interior of Peru	30
Meeting with Fiscal of Peru	32
Meeting with the President of Peru	33
Field trip to Tingo Maria in the Upper Huallaga Valley	35
Meeting with the Minister of Agriculture of Peru	36
Conclusions	39
Recommendations	42
Addendum	44
Bolivia	46
The Committee's visit to Bolivia	57
Meeting with the Foreign Minister of Bolivia	57
Meeting with the President of the Bolivian Senate	58
Meeting with the President of the Chamber of Deputies of Bolivia	60
Meeting with the President of Bolivia	61
Meeting with the Minister of Interior of Bolivia	62
Conclusions	65
Recommendations	66
Colombia	66
The Committee's visit to Colombia	76
Field trip to the Llanos Coca Growing Region	76
Field trip to the North Coast Marihuana Growing Region	77
Meeting with the Director of the National Police	80
Meeting with the President of the Central Bank of Colombia	83
Meeting with the Attorney General of Colombia	85
Meeting with the President of the Colombian Senate	88
Meeting with the President of the Colombian Chamber of Representatives	89
Meeting with the Minister of Justice of Colombia	90
Meeting with the Foreign Minister, Minister of Health, and the Colombian Ambassador to the United States	92
Meeting with the President of Colombia	96
Field trip to Cartagena	99
Conclusions	100
Recommendations	101
Jamaica	102
The Committee's visit to Jamaica	104
Meeting with the Prime Minister of Jamaica	104
Field trip to Marihuana Growing Areas	107
Conclusions	107
Recommendations	107

STUDY MISSION TO HAWAII, HONG KONG, THAILAND, BURMA, PAKISTAN, TURKEY, AND ITALY

(Jan. 4–22, 1984)

SCNAC–98–1–12

	Page
Introduction	111
Foreword	111
Executive summary	112
Hawaii	113
Hong Kong	114
Thailand	115
Burma	116
Pakistan	117
Turkey	119
Italy	120
Drugs in the Military—Pacific and European Commands	121
Hawaii	122
Conclusions and Recommendations	129
Hong Kong	130
Conclusions and Recommendations	133
Thailand	134
A. Country Team Briefing (January 10, 1984)	134
B. Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister General Prachuap Suntharangkun (January 11, 1984)	136
C. Office of the Narcotics Control Board Briefing (January 11, 1984)	138
D. Chiang Mai Field Trip (January 13, 1984)	140
Conclusions and Recommendations	141
Burma	143
A. Briefing by Ambassador O'Donohue and the Country Team	143
B. Briefing at Rangoon Psychiatric Hospital	146
C. Meeting with the Deputy Minister for Home and Religious Affairs and the Director-General of the People's Police Force	147
D. Meeting at the Burmese Foreign Ministry	148
E. Meeting at Burmese Ministry for Agriculture and Forest	149
Conclusions and Recommendations	150
India	152
Recommendations	153
Pakistan	153
A. Country Team Briefing	159
B. Meeting with the Secretary General of the Interior	162
C. On-Site Visit of the Gadoon Project	165
D. On-Site Visit to the Buner Agricultural Development Project	166
E. On-Site Visit to the Malakand Area Development Project	167
F. Tour of the Nasir Bagh Refugee Camp	168
G. Meeting with Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq, Administrator of the NWFP	169
H. Meeting with Gen. Iqbal Khan, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Acting Chief Martial Law Administrator	171
I. Meeting with Minister of Interior, Mahud A. Haroon	172
J. Meeting with Acting President Abdul Haleen (January 15, 1984, 11:15 a.m.)	173
Conclusions and Recommendations	174
Afghanistan	176
Recommendations	177
Iran	177
Recommendations	177
Turkey	178
A. Country Team Briefing (January 17, 1984)	178
B. Meetings with Turkish Officials	180
Conclusions and Recommendations	184

	Page
Recommendations for DEA	186
Italy	186
A. Briefing by Ambassador Maxwell Rabb and Staff at the U.S. Embassy, Rome	186
B. Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Arnaldo Forlani	188
C. Audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II, the Apostolic Palace, Vatican City	188
D. Meeting with the Guardia di Finanza and the Cabarinieri	189
E. Meeting with Prime Minister Bettino Craxi at the Palazzo Chigi	190
F. Meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti	191
G. Meeting with Italian Interior Minister Luigi Scalfaro	191
H. Call Upon the President of the Italian Republic, Sandra Pertini, the Quirinale	192
I. Meeting with Dr. Giuseppe Di Gennaro, Director, United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC)	193
J. Meeting with Italian Justice Minister Mino Martinazzoli	193
K. Call on Fr. Don Mario Picchi and the Italian Center of Solidarity, Drug Abuse Treatment Center	194
Conclusions and Recommendations	194
Drugs in the Military (1984)—Uniformed Forces—Pacific and European Commands	196
A. Honolulu, Hawaii	197
1. Unified Command—Pacific	197
2. Army, Western Command	198
3. Navy, Pacific Fleet	200
4. Marine Corps, Pacific Command	203
5. Air Force, Pacific	203
B. Rome, Italy	206
1. Unified Command—Europe	206
2. Army, Europe	210
3. Navy, Europe	211
4. Air Force, Europe	212
Recommendation	216
Special Report—Korea	216

STUDY MISSION TO LATIN AMERICA AND JAMAICA

(August 6–21, 1983)

SCNAC–98–1–11

INTRODUCTION

From August 6 to 21, 1983 the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control in furtherance of its responsibility to conduct a comprehensive and continuing oversight of the traffic and abuse of narcotic and psychotropic drugs in the United States, carried out a study mission to Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Jamaica. This part of the world is extremely important to any solution of the drug problem in the United States because all of the cocaine and 80 percent of the marihuana reaching our streets comes from there, along with about 34 percent of our heroin supply coming from Mexico.

FOREWORD

The following is a report on the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control's study mission to Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Jamaica from August 6 through August 21, 1983. The delegation consisted of six members of the Select Committee, two members of the Subcommittee on Crime of the Judiciary Committee and one other Member of Congress.

Members of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control who participated in the mission were: Chairman Charles B. Rangel of New York, Ranking Minority Member Benjamin A. Gilman of New York and Representatives Cardiss Collins of Illinois, Frank J. Guarini of New Jersey, Edolphus "Ed" Towns of New York and Tom Lewis of Florida. William J. Hughes of New Jersey and Harold S. Sawyer of Michigan participated respectively as the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Crime. Julian C. Dixon of California participated as a member of the Committee on Appropriations. Accompanying the Committee were John T. Cusack, Chief of Staff, Richard B. Lowe III, Chief Counsel, Elliott A. Brown, Minority Staff Director and Ricardo Laremont, Professional Staff Member. Accompanying the Subcommittee on Crime were Hayden W. Gregory, Counsel, Eric Sterling, Assistant Counsel and Charlene Vanlier, Minority Counsel. Also accompanying the Committee were representatives of several agencies of the executive branch. Mr. Rayburn Hesse, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotic Matters, Matthew C. Freedman, International Development Policy Advisor, Agency for International Development, Department of State, James M. Kenaston and Frank Shults of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control completed a two week study mission to Latin America and Jamaica from August 6 to 21 to inspect drug production and trafficking patterns and efforts to control the problem.

This part of the world is extremely important to any solution of the drug epidemic in the United States, because all of the cocaine and 80 percent of the marihuana reaching our streets come from there.

The House group visited five countries: Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and Jamaica; and met with the heads of state of four of those nations in addition to meeting with the concerned Cabinet Ministers and law enforcement leaders of each government.

They participated in helicopter on-site inspections of marihuana and coca cultivation, and additionally in Peru visited a raided coca paste processing facility. In Mexico they witnessed the fumigation of a marihuana field and landed in a large complex of several fields which were subsequently destroyed after inspection. They were shown numerous plots being planted with opium poppy which have been targeted for eradication when the crop matured.

The Committee found that Mexico was the only country where the government recognized its obligation to detect and eradicate the illicit cultivation of narcotic crops in its territory and demonstrated a national will and commitment to eliminate that cultivation.

By fumigating these crops with herbicide spray applied by helicopters, since 1975 Mexico has been successful in virtually eliminating marihuana production and has substantially reduced opium cultivation to where it is now responsible for one-third of the heroin entering the United States as opposed to three-quarters in 1975 when it recognized that the production of the opium poppy and marihuana had outstripped its manual eradication program.

On August 8, the delegation called on Mexican Attorney General Garcia Ramirez, where discussions centered on what improvements might be made in the Mexican eradication program to curtail narcotic crop cultivation, particularly opium poppy. There was agreement that additional and more advanced equipment to detect, fumigate, and verify results is needed in the Mexican aerial eradication program to further reduce heroin traffic to the United States.

Additionally the delegation felt a need for the speedy return to an effective joint program by DEA and the Mexican Judicial Police to prosecute major drug suppliers in Mexico on the basis of evidence and testimony developed in the United States by DEA.

The talks in Mexico had to do with strengthening and intensifying our joint efforts to continue progress against the production and traffic of narcotic drugs affecting our two countries. An effort which has already been enormously effective.

The field trips in Mexico were led by Special Assistants, Attorney General Carlos Madrazo and Jesus Antonio Sam Lopez who directed the aerial eradication force which consists of 46 helicopters and 21 fixed-wing aircraft. The visit with the Mexican Attorney General's aerial crop eradication program convinced the delegation that when a country recognizes its obligation under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 to eradicate illicit narcotic crops and has the national will and pride to do so, the problem of the traffic and abuse of drugs can be brought under control.

The Mexican Government, starting at point zero in late 1975, has built the world's finest aerial crop eradication program. Its size, professionalism, competence, performance, and experience make it the world leader in this technique, which the Select Committee regards as an absolute essential to destroying illicit opium poppy, coca, and marihuana cultivation. The work of the Mexican Government has been an enormous benefit to the people of the United States. As always, Mexico has been our "Good Neighbor."

The Committee arrived in Lima, Peru, on August 9, and commenced discussions with Cabinet level officials and law enforcement leaders culminating with a meeting with President Fernando Belaude Terry on August 10.

The delegation made a field visit to Tingo Maria on August 11 where they inspected coca cultivation. They visited a facility raided earlier in the day that converted coca leaves to coca paste, used for making cocaine. They inspected a pilot project experiment by the Government to eradicate the coca bush through a combination of cutting down and hand spraying herbicide.

The delegation found from their overflights that the illicit cultivation of coca in the Tingo Maria area of Peru was increasing at an alarming rate. New areas were being cut out of the jungle and burned to grow coca. This slash and burn type of agriculture is destroying vast sections of the land.

Historically Peru has been the only traditional producer of coca for legitimate purposes. At present 14 thousand metric tons of coca are allegedly needed for coca chewing by the native Indian population of Peru and for legitimate export purposes.

An additional 36 thousand metric tons of coca are grown illegally in the Cuzco and the Tingo Maria area of the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru. Most of this illicit cultivation began about 1977 and it continues unchecked.

The delegation was told that the severe economic recession and a combination of disastrous droughts and floods has drained the country's resources so greatly that it cannot organize and support the forces needed to effectively destroy the illicit cultivation and suppress the illicit manufacture and traffic of coca paste and cocaine.

The delegation found that while the Government of Peru seemed to understand its responsibility to suppress the illicit manufacture and traffic of coca paste and cocaine, it has failed to understand its obligation under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 to effectively license and control legal production, prevent illegal cultivation and uproot any illicit wild cultivation found in its territory.

The delegation suggested to the Peruvians that on the basis of its previous experience with similar situations and based on expert opin-

ion, that if it would develop a plan to progressively phase out illicit coca production, it was certain development assistance would be forthcoming from the United States, several other countries, and international organizations.

The delegation assigns the highest priority and greatest urgency to the Government of Peru in developing a plan to progressively phase out illicit coca cultivation and to vigorously suppress the illicit manufacture and traffic of cocaine in its territory.

Further, Peru should seek technical and financial support from the community of nations and international organizations to implement its program to end the uncontrolled production, manufacture, and traffic of coca and cocaine in the country, now so disastrously affecting most nations of the world.

The delegation arrived in Bolivia on Friday, August 12, and held a series of discussions on the problem with the uncontrolled production of coca and the illicit manufacture and traffic of coca paste centered in that country. Meetings were held with Foreign Minister Tamayo, Minister of Interior Roncal, Director Otazo of the President's Advisory Committee on Narcotics, and Police Commanding General Teran. Meetings were also held with a delegation of the Bolivian Senate under its President Julio Garret and with the Chamber of Deputies under its President Gualberto Claure. A result of this was a suggestion by the Bolivian legislators that an "Interparliamentary Commission" be formed between those bodies and the U.S. Congress to address our mutual problem with the production and traffic in coca substances. This proposal was very favorably received by the delegation, and is expected to be acted upon.

The culmination of the delegation's visit to Bolivia was a meeting with President Hernan Siles Zuazo. The delegation found that Bolivia now produces about 55 thousand metric tons of coca annually; that about 44 thousand tons are illicitly cultivated and 11,000 are for domestic coca chewing and legitimate export purposes.

Enormous quantities of coca leaf and coca paste are smuggled from Bolivia to Colombia for conversion to cocaine, and then smuggled to the United States and worldwide.

The Bolivian officials with whom the delegation met, including the President, recognized that since about 1977 the traditional cultivation of coca, which averaged about 10,000 tons, had dramatically escalated out of control, increasing 75 percent from 1977 to 1981 and is still increasing.

The Bolivian officials said that the political instability caused by the constantly changing governments has led to this situation. The return to a democratic government under President Siles, it was hoped, would produce the stability needed to make a start in bringing this situation under control.

An important first step in this direction was reached on the eve of the delegation's arrival at La Paz. On August 11, the United States Ambassador Edwin G. Corr signed a series of four agreements, with the Government of Bolivia that had been under negotiation since 1976. Two of the agreements have to do with providing assistance to reduce coca production to legal requirements, and for controlling that production. The other two agreements pertain to providing assistance

for drug enforcement to reduce and restrict coca production to legal requirements and suppress illicit manufacture and trafficking.

If political stability can be maintained in Bolivia, and if the Government develops these agreements in good faith, a start will be made in bringing the production and illicit traffic in coca products under control.

Meanwhile, as in Peru, the illicit production of coca leaf and the illicit manufacture and traffic of coca paste continues to increase. Powerful "Mafia-like" figures have emerged to influence and threaten the Government in the sectors of the country where the production and traffic takes place. They assume "warlord-like dimensions" over their areas of influence in which the Bolivian military and police forces are powerless. Severe economic recession trends and severe flood and drought conditions this year have also weakened the country's ability to address the coca problem. However, a dedicated implementation of the four narcotic assistance agreements made with the United States on August 11 to reduce coca production to legal requirements, and to enforce the laws against illicit manufacture and traffic, could within a few years bring the coca problem in Bolivia under control.

The delegation arrived in Bogota, Colombia, on Sunday, August 14, and the following day one group traveled to San Jose del Guaviare, where they boarded helicopters for overflight inspections of illicit coca production in the Llanos region. This is a new activity that has developed in Colombia during the past few years, it is now significant and is increasing at an alarming rate. The delegation saw vast areas of forest lands slashed and burned to cultivate coca. They saw thousands of acres under cultivation with high grade coca. The regions of the country where coca is grown are newly developed and populated. They include the Eastern Llanos and the Southern States of Cauca, Putumayo and Narino.

Coca production is now estimated at 15,000 tons annually, with the certainty that, if unchecked, it will outstrip Peru and Bolivia. Coca is a non-traditional crop in Colombia and its production is totally illegal. The delegation was impressed by the vigor and courage of the Special Anti Narcotic Units of the Colombian National Police who make a heroic effort to manually eradicate this coca production. They have neither the manpower, equipment, nor funding necessary to be effective. Only the application of the most modern helicopter aerial-spray fumigation technique would make it possible to eradicate the constantly expanding coca production in Colombia.

A second group of the delegation proceeded, by air, to Valledupar in the North Coast region where marihuana cultivation is extensive in the States of La Guajira, Cesar, and Magdalena. They learned that growers were shifting their cultivation from La Guajira to Cesar and Magdalena because their slash and burn technique has already exhausted the soil in much of the Guajira. The delegation inspected three large canyons where marihuana was almost total, plots ranged from one-quarter hectare to several hectares. The delegation saw in this one section an estimated 15,000 hectares of marihuana being grown. New plots were being prepared, and some were abandoned and the land eroding. The group landed at a base camp set up by the Colombian National Police to field units that climbed up to the fields to cut and burn the marihuana.

The extent of this cultivation, the delegation was told, had far surpassed the ability of the national police manual eradication team, and concluded they could not physically accomplish their mission. On the other hand, this huge concentration of marihuana could be eradicated in a few days by helicopter spray fumigation techniques.

On August 16, the delegation began a series of separate meetings with Colombian Government officials, including Director General Delgado of the National Police; President of the Bank of the Republic, Hugo Palacios Mejia; Attorney General Carlos Jiminez Gomez; President of the Senate. Carlos Holguin Sardi; President of the Chamber of Representatives, Cesar Gaviria; Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla; Health Minister, Jaime Arias Ramirez; the Colombian Ambassador to the United States, Alvardo Gomez Hurtado; and Foreign Minister Rodrigo Lloreda, which culminated in a visit with President Belisario Betancur.

The delegation learned that while the Government of Colombia recognized its responsibility to suppress the enormous illicit manufacture of cocaine in the country, it had not assigned the manpower equipment and operating funds necessary to address the problem known to exist.

It also became apparent that from 1973 to date, a small marihuana cultivation in the Guajira region for domestic consumption grew to enormous proportions for international trafficking due to the government's failure to develop a timely eradication program. While the Colombian Government was being pressed to begin eradicating this marihuana cultivation, an entirely new production of coca began in Llanos and the Southern States of the country.

The delegation perceived that the Government of Colombia does not seem to clearly grasp its responsibilities under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, which it has ratified, and which 157 other countries have ratified, to eradicate any illicit cultivation of marihuana and coca existing in its territory.

It has failed totally to do so by manual means, permitting it to increase to huge proportions. Now the only means of effectively bringing this illicit cultivation under control is by using helicopter aerial spraying. For several years now, Colombia has debated the health and environmental liabilities of this technique. Experts state the Colombian arguments are not scientifically correct. Additionally, almost all the marihuana and all the coca is produced in remote areas on national land. Ironically, the growers of marihuana and coca are destroying the ecology by their slash and burn agriculture, and human life by the drugs that are produced.

Chairman Rangel and the delegation urged the Colombian Government to urgently consider how it might use the herbicide spray technique, and said they would not urge any use of a chemical in Colombia that was not already being used in the United States. As is known, Colombia is a major agricultural country. It also uses "Paraquat" extensively for weed control in its legal agricultural sector, particularly on coffee. The delegation has difficulty accepting why it is reluctant to use it against marihuana in remote sectors of the country.

Representative Lewis (R-Fla.), a member of the delegation, invited several Colombian officials to visit Florida to witness the aerial spraying of crops with herbicide.

A commission in Colombia is now studying the issue and was expected to visit Mexico, Florida, Georgia and several other States to learn of the results of the application of Paraquat against marihuana in the United States.

The interest of the Bolivian Senate and Chamber of Deputies to form an Interparliamentary Commission to consider our mutual problem with the production and illicit traffic of coca and cocaine was described to members of the Colombian Senate and Chamber of Representatives. The Colombian legislators indicated an interest in this initiative.

Late on Wednesday, August 17, the delegation arrived at Cartagena. On August 18, they had an extensive briefing by the DEA Special Agent-in-Charge at Baranquilla on the maritime and air traffic in marihuana and cocaine from the North Coast of Colombia to the United States. There is no evidence of any diminution of this traffic; the production of marihuana and cocaine is huge and is still thought to be increasing. The price of coca and cocaine is falling, due to extremely heavy production and availability in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Colombian marihuana is available in unlimited quantities, is of high quality, and is at a price significantly below the price of the Mexican, Jamaican and Belize products.

On August 18, the delegation visited the Colombian Naval Base at Cartagena where they inspected two 105-foot patrol boats provided by the United States to combat the smuggling by maritime vessels of marihuana and cocaine from the North Coast of Colombia to the United States. One vessel, the C.N. Rafael De Castillio y Rada, was assigned to the Navy and the other vessel, the Olaya Herrera, was assigned to the Customs-Coast Guard.

The delegation was disappointed with the inability of the Government of Colombia to more effectively prevent the massive smuggling of marihuana and cocaine from its North Coast to the United States by sea and air. Particular disappointment was expressed by members with the performance of the two patrol boats, especially the Navy boat. The Customs boat made a fair amount of seizures and over 200 arrests. However, only four defendants were convicted and all of them subsequently escaped.

The delegation concluded that the foundation of any program in Colombia to bring under control the illicit production, manufacture, and traffic of drugs would be the herbicide aerial fumigation spraying of those crops while simultaneously assigning the manpower, equipment and resources to effectively strike at the enormous illicit manufacture of cocaine from Peruvian and Bolivian raw materials. The delegation expressed a desire to support increased enforcement assistance for Colombia if it moved in that direction.

The delegation arrived in Jamaica in the late afternoon of Thursday, August 19. On the morning of August 19, the delegation met with Prime Minister Edward Seaga of Jamaica; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hugh Shearer; the Jamaican Ambassador to the United States, Keith Johnson; Commander of the Jamaican Defense Force, Major General Robert Neish; and Commissioner Joe Williams of the Jamaican Constabulary Force.

The Prime Minister outlined a strategy that would indirectly address the problem of the heavy cultivation of cannabis in Jamaica by

"choking off" through enforcement, all other elements of the network necessary to move supply from grower to consumer. Unable to move or sell their crop, the Prime Minister thought growers would eventually stop, and begin growing marketable crops that the government would suggest in place of marihuana. This, in effect, was a restatement of the strategy followed by the Government of Jamaica with no success since the late 1960's.

Chairman Rangel said the delegation was pleased to learn of Prime Minister Seaga's effort to increase the enforcement efforts of his government to prevent the smuggling of marihuana from Jamaica, but expressed its concerns that unless a program was simultaneously developed to progressively eradicate the illicit marihuana cultivation, the other enforcement measures planned would prove futile.

Later, on the same day, on helicopter overflights, the delegation observed great numbers of fields cultivated in high quality marihuana. The perception was that marihuana cultivation is increasing as new irrigated lands in a vast reclaimed swamp area of the Negril and Brumdec regions are being turned into very high quality marihuana cultivation.

Information obtained indicated production of marihuana in Jamaica is thought to be about 2,100 metric tons. Much of it is consumed in that country, but substantial quantities are smuggled to the United States and represent about 10 percent of the marihuana consumed in our country.

The Jamaican authorities cooperate with the DEA in the development of seizures of marihuana and transiting cocaine and investigations affecting the United States, but the root of the problem is the failure of the government to eliminate the cultivation of marihuana contrary to its obligations under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961.

The delegation found that, notwithstanding a difference of opinion on how the illicit production of marihuana in Jamaica should be gradually eliminated, the objective of the Government of Jamaica was clearly to see this production ended in accordance with its obligation under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961.

The delegation is very hopeful that the Government of Jamaica will develop a plan which would provide for the progressive elimination of marihuana cultivation while simultaneously intensifying drug enforcement and smuggling prevention measures. Further, that the United States Government could provide economic and technical assistance in support of the Jamaican Government narcotic control program.

Based upon its hearings, field investigations, and discussions with government leaders in the United States and abroad, the Select Committee has every reason to believe that the production of narcotic and psychotropic drugs is increasing, rather than decreasing. Current estimates on the production of marihuana, cocaine, and heroin are derived from 1981 data.

This is impractical because planning and programs in 1983 are being based on 1981 data which is no longer relevant. There is no reason why data, especially estimates, cannot be kept current on a monthly basis.

There is an urgent need to improve the collection and delivery of reliable statistical information pertaining to the production, traffick-

ing, and consumption of illicit drugs. This information is critical to formulating a sound narcotics prevention and control strategy.

1. The Select Committee recommends that our State Department, the DEA, and other drug-related agencies, in consultation and cooperation with the drug producing countries and the concerned international organizations, work in concert to maintain reliable data on a monthly basis, on the area of illicit narcotic crops that are cultivated and eradicated worldwide.

2. The Select Committee urges the governments of Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and Jamaica as part of the plan they develop to gradually eliminate drug production, include a plan that would develop systematic aerial surveys of the illicit narcotic crop cultivation within their territory and that the United States assist governments to develop this capability.

MEXICO

Mexico began supplying small quantities of heroin to the United States, illicitly manufactured from opium illegally produced in its territory during the early 1930s. This opium production and the illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin to the United States increased substantially during World War II when European and Asian supplies were cut off. By 1950, heroin of French origin, manufactured from opiate raw materials originating in Turkey had about displaced Mexican heroin in the United States except along the Southwest border or near border States. This trend continued until mid-1972 with French heroin comprising 80 percent of the supply, Mexican 15 percent and Southeast Asian 5 percent.

Beginning in the late 1940s, Mexico utilized its army in annual campaigns to manually cut down and burn illicit opium poppy and marihuana cultivation. While Mexican heroin comprised only 15 percent of the United States supply, its marihuana crop is estimated to have furnished 95 percent of the traffic entering the United States.

The ending of opium production in Turkey and the effective suppression of illicit heroin manufacture in France ended the traffic from that country. This opened a marketing opportunity for Mexican heroin similar to what had developed during World War II when supplies from Europe were interrupted.

From mid-1972 through all of 1973, there was a dramatic decrease in the availability of heroin in the United States. By late 1973, supplies of Mexican brown heroin spread thinly over the entire United States in an effort to fill the vacuum. The traffic from Southeast Asia did not increase but continued at the level at which it had been operating. Meanwhile criminal organizations in Mexico scrambled wildly to increase illicit opium production and heroin manufacture for smuggling to the United States to take advantage of the enormous demand that had developed following the demise of the "French Connection." The supplies of Mexican brown heroin progressively increased in 1974, 1975 and 1976.

Alarmed at this development, the Government of Mexico with United States Government financial assistance, in November 1975, began to implement a poppy eradication program utilizing the herbicide spray 2–4–D applied by helicopter. This program began to immedi-

ately curtail the traffic in heroin from Mexico. Estimates of the quantity of heroin entering the United States from Mexico from 1975 through 1979, and the percentage those quantities contributed to the supply in the United States differ, but not substantially. For example, the estimate for 1975 was seven metric tons of heroin and 87 percent of the market. In 1979 it is estimated to have decreased to 2.8 metric tons and a 30 percent share of the market.

The National Narcotic Intelligence Consumers Committee after a number of revisions, has settled on a 1976 figure of four metric tons and 67 percent of the market to 1.0 to 1.2 metric tons or 30 percent of the market in 1979. Whatever the tonnage and percentage of the heroin market held by Mexico in 1976 was, there is a consensus that by 1979 it had fallen dramatically to about a 30 percent share.

The NNICC, in its report for 1980, shows a continuing downturn in Mexican heroin availability to 0.9–1.0 metric tons and a 25 percent share of the market. However, surprisingly in its 1981 report (the latest available) it revises that estimate to 1.5 metric tons and a 37 percent share of the market for 1980. For 1981 it reports 1.4 metric tons of Mexican heroin entering the United States for a 36 percent share of supply.

The current 1983 preliminary estimate of the Mexican share of the heroin market in the United States is about 36 percent. What this represents in metric tonnage, on the basis of the overall volume of heroin entering the United States, is debatable depending upon whether a total of four tons are entering the country as some analysts believe or 10 tons are entering as others believe. All agree overall heroin smuggling to the United States began escalating sharply in 1979, largely from Southwest Asia and more specifically Pakistan, and that estimating the heroin supply at four tons per annum in 1983 is unrealistic.

There is also a general agreement that during 1976, 1977 and 1978, the Mexican Government's opium poppy eradication program substantially increased the volume of poppy it destroyed annually, but from 1979 to date it has just managed to about stay even. This is a remarkable feat in itself and the Mexican Government is to be highly commended for the determination and effectiveness of its program. The Committee learned that a number of observers have felt for some time that the Government of Mexico has been achieving maximum effectiveness with its current levels of manpower, equipment and funding and that it is time for the United States Government to assist in providing the additional equipment and operational funding necessary to begin again to increase the percentage of the crop destroyed on an annual basis.

During the past year, all indicators have pointed to a noticeable increase in the quantity and quality of Mexican heroin entering the United States. This can only be taken as an indication of increased opium production in Mexico.

In launching its aerial herbicide spray eradication program, the Government of Mexico assigned equal priority to the destruction of the extensive illicit cultivation of marihuana in its territory, which like opium poppy, it had attempted to destroy manually for decades. Additionally, it regarded marihuana as the drug of choice in the coun-

try, the use of which had an adverse effect on the health and welfare of a great many of its citizens.

Mexico's domination of the marihuana market in the United States from the early 1930s through the mid-1960s was at least 95 percent. Up until the mid-1960s, marihuana smuggling from Jamaica had been insignificant but from that point on has held a 5 to 10 percent share of the United States market. Beginning in the early 1970's, Colombia became a new source. Beginning in late 1975, the Mexican Government began using helicopters to spray marihuana cultivation with the herbicide "Paraquat."

The large, easily detected marihuana fields proved particularly vulnerable to detection and the aerial application of herbicide spray. Beginning in 1976, a sharp decline in the volume and percentage of the market share of Mexican marihuana became evident. It has since declined annually to a point where it is now running under 5 percent. This is a most dramatic indication of the effectiveness of the aerial application of herbicide to destroy an illicit narcotic crop.

Regrettably, as Mexico began progressively eliminating illicit marihuana cultivation, Jamaica and Colombia had become significant suppliers and began filling and greatly expanding the markets formerly supplied by Mexico.

Mexico has historically recognized its obligations under the International Narcotic Control Conventions going back to 1912. It has been annually eradicating opium poppy and marihuana since the late 1940s. The Mexican Government has actively participated in the work of the United Nations in the development and administration of the narcotics control convention system since 1945. It has been a charter member of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs since 1946 and periodically a Mexican national has been elected to the International Narcotic Control Board, the body responsible for ensuring implementation of the narcotic and psychotropic control conventions.

Mexico has always taken the position that due to its geographic location, remote sectors of its territory could be used by criminal elements to sponsor the cultivation of marihuana and opium for conversion to heroin and trafficking to the United States. Further, that it would not tolerate this activity and would implement the necessary measures to detect and destroy this illicit cultivation.

The Government of Mexico also took the position that the cultivation of marihuana and opium poppy was not a traditional crop in the country used by farmers for subsistence. Instead it was cultivated by growers recruited and subsidized by criminals on remote sectors of land—often government owned; that this activity was totally illegal and in place of this cultivation no substitute crop or subsidy was needed or would be appropriate.

The Government of Mexico understandably has never appreciated the fact that because of its location and the vast remoteness of much of its land, the country is used to produce and supply heroin and marihuana to the United States. In a matter-of-fact way, it states that marketing opportunities in the United States is largely responsible for this. Notwithstanding, however, the Government of Mexico firmly faces up to the responsibility that regardless of why the illicit production and traffic of narcotic drugs is carried out in its territory, it has

a solemn treaty obligation to eradicate opium poppy and marihuana and to suppress the illicit traffic in opium, heroin and marihuana. If every government where illicit narcotic crop cultivation exists, understood and implemented their international narcotic control treaty obligations as Mexico does, the worldwide epidemic in the production, traffic and abuse of narcotic and psychotropic drugs could be quickly brought under control.

The Committee's Visit to Mexico

The delegation of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control arrived in Mexico City in the late afternoon of August 6 and met with Ambassador Gavin and his staff for a briefing of almost two hours. It covered the ongoing joint effort of the Government of Mexico and the United States to address the problem of the illicit production, manufacture and traffic of narcotic substances in Mexico affecting the United States.

The delegation learned that with the inauguration of President Miguel de la Madrid in December 1982, the Government of Mexico renewed its commitment by word and deed to continue to eradicate the illicit cultivation of opium poppy and marihuana and suppress the illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin. The Committee was told that unfortunately during the last 18 months of the previous administration, narcotic enforcement cooperation provided to the Drug Enforcement Administration by the Mexican Federal Judicial Police left much to be desired.

With the start up of the de la Madrid administration eight months ago, all of this has turned around and DEA is highly enthusiastic that its renewed cooperation with Federal Judicial Police will lead to substantial narcotic arrests, seizures and prosecutions on both sides of the border in the traffic affecting the United States.

Traditionally in Mexico when a new administration assumes office as President de la Madrid did in December 1982, the leadership, the supervisors and most of the personnel of the Federal Judicial Police are replaced. This break in continuity seriously disrupts ongoing investigations and prosecutions in Mexico. Additionally the new leadership and agents are for the most part untrained and inexperienced. This tradition has proven particularly disruptive of efforts to develop prosecutions of major narcotic sources of supply in Mexico on the basis of evidence and testimony obtained in the United States.

It was based upon a long, very productive history of utilizing this technique in France and Italy which have the same system of law as Mexico to immobilize the major violators and organizations supplying heroin to the United States. This program known as "joint prosecution" and given the code name "Janus" was developed by DEA in 1975 with the Mexican Attorney General's office and the Federal Judicial Police. When the Lopez Portillo administration took office in 1976, the breakdown in continuity resulted in a failure to effectively further a number of important "Janus" prosecutions. The New administration appears to be having the same difficulty in pulling together important joint prosecutions which are still pending from the two previous administrations.

The Committee was pleased to learn that the Mexican Attorney General's program to eradicate opium poppy and marihuana cultivation through herbicide spray applied by helicopters continues to operate effectively. At the time of our visit, the Attorney General's air wing for the detection, and eradication of poppy and marihuana and to support those operations consisted of 67 aircraft; 13 Bell 212s; 33 Bell 206 (which fly the eradication missions); 15 Cessna 206s, 2 Lear Jets, 1 King Air and 3 De Haviland Twin Otters.

Over a ten-year period the United States has invested $104 million in this cooperative narcotic crop eradication and enforcement effort with the Government of Mexico, and the latter has expended a larger amount as its share. The bulk of the United States Government expenditures has been for the procurement, operation and maintenance of the aircraft listed previously for the purpose of detecting and eradicating poppy and marihuana.

As set forth earlier in this report, all indicators point to the enormous success of this program. The Committee was briefed on helicopter spray eradication of opium poppy underway in the State of Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Durango and observed how they were directed and coordinated from the Attorney General's Air Operations Contract Center at Mexico City, utilizing modern communications and computer equipment and programming.

FIELD TRIP TO THE STATE OF MICHOACAN

Because of scheduling constraints, the delegation was unable to travel to the States where poppy was currently being eradicated. However, on August 7, they did participate in an overflight from Mexico City to the West Coast town of Zihuatanejo in the State of Michoacan, just over the border from the State of Guerrero. The working party boarded two Bell 212 helicopters and accompanied two Bell 206 helicopters due north of Zihuatanejo to two marihuana fields. One was about a half hectare on the flat ridge of a mountain. The Bell 206 equipped for spraying while covered by the second Bell 206 swooped in low and in two passes over the field applied sufficient Paraquat to eradicate the marihuana taking about 7 minutes to accomplish this.

The working party landed at the second site. It was in a remote high mountain canyon and was spread over several hectares that had in April or May been slashed out of heavy timber growth and then burned. Marihuana seedlings had been planted and the crop was said to be about three weeks short of maturity.

This was a sophisticated operation and included a seed bed. The cultivation was of the standard marihuana variety was of a vibrant high quality and remarkably free of insect infestation. Following the committee's inspection and takeoff, the site was sprayed by the Bell 206.

In the course of the overflight, several small plots of land which had just been planted for poppy, or were about to be planted, were pointed out as targets for eradication when the crop reaches sufficient maturity.

These plots were significantly smaller than those cultivated for marihuana. The Committee learned that in recent years poppy growers have begun to spread their crop over several small plots rather than

one large plot as had been the practice, prior to herbicide spray eradication becoming effective. The smaller plots are more difficult to detect and the grower has a better chance of bringing all or at least part of his crop to harvest. With the large plot, it was more vulnerable to discovery and the whole crop could be lost once discovered. In general, cultivating opium in a smaller plot produces a higher grade opium than the large plots that were grown in Mexico in the mid to late 1970s. The ability of the small poppy plots in Mexico, to both evade detection and produce a better grade of opium, may be responsible for the widespread reporting of increasing supplies of Mexican heroin of higher purity.

On August 8 the Committee visited the Mexican Attorney General's Flight Operations and Maintenance Center at Mexico City, a full tour and briefing of this outstanding facility, section-by-section was provided. The Committee members and staff were deeply impressed by their inspection of the operational center and the depth and quality of their briefing, the responses to questions and requests for information, which covered every aspect of flight operations and narcotic crop eradication.

Operating and maintaining on the average 46 helicopters and 21 fixed wing aircraft on demanding detection, eradication and support missions in mountainous terrain and difficult weather conditions is a challenge the Attorney General's Flight Operations Unit is effectively meeting. This unit, without question, represents the world's finest aerial narcotic crop eradication program. Its size, professionalism, competence, performance and experience make it the world leader in this technique, which experts regard as an absolute essential to destroying illicit opium poppy, coca and marihuana cultivation extensively cultivated in remote areas.

Only one problem is threatening the effectiveness of the aerial eradication unit. The technicians who are recruited, trained and gain impressive experience with the unit are part of the Mexican Civil Service. They are paid standard salaries which are either too slowly raised or not raised at all to keep up with inflation. As a result, they are too often successfully wooed by private industry in Mexico, which have the flexibility to offer salaries more commensurate with the inflation rate.

In discussions having to do with how much opium poppy and marihuana are eradicated annually, it developed that no reliable technique has been developed to measure the total production of poppy and marihuana each year in Mexico so as to determine what percentage is destroyed and what escapes destruction.

From 1975 through about 1978 the United States provided on a private contract basis for the Mexican Attorney General's office, a system known as "MOPS" or the "Multi-Spectral Opium Poppy Sensor." Utilizing a twin engine Aero Commander equipped with multi-spectral photographic capability, sectors of known poppy growing areas were photographed. The film was then developed at the unit's base at Hermosillo and the location of opium poppy plots detected were provided to the Attorney General's air unit for eradication. Following eradication, a verification flight could be made a few days thereafter to ensure the spraying technique had destroyed the poppy.

During the period it was utilized, the MOPS system did not impress the Mexican pilots. They felt they didn't need it; that it was far more effective for them to scout out poppy fields visually and either eradicate them on the spot or pinpoint them on their charts for eradication the next day or shortly thereafter. The MOPS system was a tactical tool and did not have the capability of high altitude overflight photographing to detect poppy cultivation over large land areas.

Beginning in 1977 a second generation program was initiated using a Lear Jet with high altitude capability and an electro optical capability, it failed operationally because it did not have the capability to detect the small opium poppy plots the growers had turned to to avoid detection and eradication. This system was experimentally operated until 1982 without success, when it was abandoned.

Considerable new technology has become available in recent years which would enable the Mexican Government, via high altitude overflights or satellite, to determine the extent of opium poppy and marihuana cultivation in its territory. Techniques have also been developed to use the "LORAN" navigation system to accurately pinpoint the location of poppy and marihuana plots.

MEETING WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MEXICO

On August 8, the Committee, with staff, called on Dr. Sergio Garcia Ramirez, the Attorney General of Mexico. Chairman Rangel told the Attorney General that the Committee had come to recognize and express the appreciation of the people of the United States for the remarkable work done by the Government of Mexico to eradicate the illicit cultivation of the opium poppy and marihuana. This had substantially reduced the traffic in heroin and marihuana from Mexico that had seriously affected the United States.

Chairman Rangel said the narcotic crop eradication program of the Mexican Government is an example to the world community and the United Nations on how a nation should implement its narcotic control obligations. He mentioned the difficulties and hardships that go with this work and expressed the deep sympathy of the American people for the loved ones of the brave aviators who lost their lives in the dangerous work of narcotic crop eradication.

Chairman Rangel went on to say that despite the heroic eradication work being carried out in Mexico, we have in recent months been seeing a noticeable increase of heroin originating in Mexico, additionally the purity is higher. This threatens our children, he said, and the Committee has come to Mexico in an effort to find out what needs to be done to more effectively eradicate poppy to curtail the illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin in Mexico, and how we might help bring this about.

Representative Gilman, the Ranking Minority Member of the Committee, commended Attorney General Garcia Ramirez on the competence, dedication and performance of his air wing. He then raised with him the problem of losing skilled technicians to the private sector due to the inability of the government to keep salaries up with inflation. He urged every effort be made to overcome this problem which could seriously hurt the air wing performance and suggested that the United States might help. Mr. Gilman next mentioned his

disappointment with the continuing failure of the Attorney General's Office and the Mexican's Federal Judicial Police to effectively develop the "Janus" program of joint prosecutions, to immobilize the major source of narcotic supply in Mexico. He indicated that after a slow start that he hoped the new administration would move to effectively implement this important program.

On the need for developing a way for the Mexican Government to perform aerial reconnaissance to measure the extent of poppy and marihuana cultivation and more effectively pinpointing it for eradication. Representative Lewis suggested that consideration should be given to utilizing satellite surveillance.

Attorney General Sergio Garcia Ramirez welcomed the Committee to Mexico and thanked the members for their commendations of the current work of the aerial eradication program and for the success that has been achieved going back to the beginning of the program.

The Attorney General said his government was proud of the great progress that had been made to curtail the illicit production, manufacture and traffic of narcotic drugs originating in Mexico. He pointed out, however, that the government was not complacent and that it recognized that the traffickers and gangsters have been responding to circumvent the measures we have placed in effect. He said there does seem to be some increase in heroin availability and that we shall have to redouble our efforts.

The Attorney General described the hardships, injuries and deaths that went with the hard work of the air unit in fumigating the narcotic crops. He said Mexico contributed manpower and a significant share of its very scarce resources plus great dedication. He praised the United States contribution of funding and expert technical advisors and said this cooperation brought success and was made possible because it was carried out between our two countries with the highest mutual respect and cordial friendship.

Attorney General Garcia Ramirez went on to say that we must intensify our campaign against the drug traffic and that his administration is proud of its accomplishments during its first six months when compared with the same period last year. He said his office has ambitious goals but that the organized illicit production and traffic of narcotics is very extensive and powerful. They have the means and are often successful in corrupting some of our men to work with them. We have strengthened our effort to prevent this.

In conclusion Attorney General Garcia Ramirez pledged an intensification of the Mexican Government's efforts to further curtail the illicit production and traffic of narcotic drugs in Mexico. He pointed out that his government will maintain its efforts and try to do more, but will not be able to do as much as it would like because of the serious economic and financial crisis it is undergoing.

The meeting with Attorney General Garcia Ramirez was followed by an audio-visual presentation on the work of the aerial narcotic crop eradication campaign. A discussion with questions and answers ensued. Deputy Director of the eradication campaign Licenciado Jesus Antonio Sam Lopez indicated that the Attorney General's office was receptive to considering experimental trials with any and all options that

might prove effective to opium and marihuana crop eradication. Two that were mentioned was a new spraying boom that accompanies the fixed wing agricultural crop dusting aircraft known as the "Thrush." The other is some form of a reliable production survey to detect and measure poppy and marihuana cultivation.

Recommendations

1. There is agreement both in Mexico and the United States that the availability of Mexican heroin has increased noticeably during the past year. The quality of this heroin in the way of purity and texture is also reported to have been improved. Increases in the quantity and quality of Mexican heroin have to be taken as indications of an increase in illicit opium production and heroin manufacture in Mexico.

Estimates of the percentage of heroin supplied to the United States from Mexico from 1979 through 1983 fall between 30 and 40 percent. This is a period of time when all indicators point to an upswing in overall heroin availability, largely due to increasing supplies from Southwest Asia, particularly Pakistan. It should be noted Mexico has maintained its 30 to 40 percent share of a steadily expanding volume of heroin in the United States since 1979. Following progressive annual increases in poppy eradication from 1976 through 1978, this leveled off in 1979. From that point on it is thought the Government of Mexico had not been able to increase the percentage of the opium crop eradicated. There is some reason to believe that from 1979 opium production in Mexico has probably—on an annual basis—increased gradually as growers moved to widely dispersed small plots.

The Committee recommends that the Department of State assist the Government of Mexico develop, as soon as possible, the capability to survey the extent of opium and marihuana production in its territory via high altitude aircraft or satellite. This would be for the purpose of detecting and pinpointing cultivation for eradication, verification of destruction and measuring whether production is increasing or decreasing annually, and how much may be actually produced.

The Department of State should determine as soon as possible whether the number of helicopters, particularly the 33 Bell 206 helicopters used for eradication are sufficient in number to enable the Mexican Attorney General's Office to begin again to progressively eliminate on an annual basis a greater percentage of the opium poppy crop. It is recognized that through an effective aerial survey of production they could better identify poppy fields, and that would make for a more effective utilization of the eradication aircraft. However, it just might be that more Bell 206s are needed to increase eradication effectiveness, and a determination on this should be made.

2. The Committee is concerned to have learned on its recent visit to Mexico that the narcotic enforcement cooperation extended to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) by the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) during the last 18 months of the Lopez Portillo administration was ineffective. This is a situation that should not have been permitted to exist more than a few weeks, let alone a year and a half. It doesn't appear to be a coincidence that during the period of time where there was a breakdown in cooperation between

the MFJP and DEA that a marked increase in the availability of Mexican heroin developed in the United States. Cooperation between the MFJP and DEA is reported to have returned to normal following the inauguration of the de la Madrid administration.

This Committee recommends that as an important first step in re-establishing productive narcotic enforcement cooperation between the MFJP and DEA that the program of joint prosecutions known as "Janus" and which has atrophied be revitalized. Cases that can be prosecuted should be and cases that can no longer be prosecuted should be closed out. Further a series of new joint prosecutions or "Janus" cases should be initiated to exploit existing evidence that could be used to prosecute and convict major sources of supply, heroin laboratory operators and the financial bankers of the traffic in both countries.

In Mexico it is not enough for the government to just eradicate the opium and marihuana crops. A vigorous joint narcotic enforcement effort by the MFJP assisted by DEA is needed to develop important heroin arrests and seizures in the traffic directed toward the United States. Clandestine heroin laboratories should be confiscated on a regular basis. The MFJP and DEA should also work together to prevent international traffickers from using Mexico as a transit base to smuggle heroin of European and Asiatic origin, cocaine and psychotropic drugs to the United States because of the ease with which they can penetrate the United States' 2,000 mile border with Mexico.

PERU

Coca leaf produced in Peru is the raw material responsible for about 45 percent of the cocaine entering the United States; of that cocaine, about 15 percent is illicitly produced in Peru.

For at least 2,000 years the coca bush has grown wild and been cultivated in Peru. The natives living in the high altitudes have traditionally chewed it for its mild stimulating effect to overcome the fatigue associated with high altitude and to benefit from its side effect as an appetite suppressant in an area where food is not plentiful. During the latter part of the 19th century, a German scientist successfully, through chemical process produce cocaine, a white crystalline narcotic alkaloid from the coca leaf for use as a local anesthetic.

From 1900 to about 1931, cocaine was widely abused in the developed countries worldwide for its euphoric, stimulating effect. A Narcotic Control Convention, prepared in 1925, limited the import and export "trade" of the coca leaf and cocaine to medical purposes and another convention signed in 1931, limited the manufacture of cocaine, to levels commensurate with medical requirements. By 1934 the problem of the illicit traffic and abuse of cocaine practically disappeared worldwide.

This came about as the result of ending the enormous, legitimate overproduction and availability of cocaine which had for decades been diverted to supply the illicit traffic. The control system imposed on the import and export trade in coca leaf and the difficulty of smuggling it, because of the bulkiness of the quantities needed to produce cocaine, prevented the availability of the leaf in countries where technical skills existed to transform it illicitly to cocaine.

Coca leaf continued to be produced in Peru for chewing by the natives and for legal international export. Following World War II, there developed in Peru an embryonic capability to illicitly extract coca sulfate, the basic alkaloid, more commonly known as coca paste from the coca leaf in simple, crude facilities using water, kerosene, sulfuric acid, lime and sodium or potassium permanganate.

Coca paste processing facilities are now scattered over the coca producing areas and are estimated to number several hundred. Small farmers growing one hectare or less of coca sell their leaves to traffickers who operate the paste processing sites. Larger growers operate their own facility for converting leaves to paste.

A trained and skillful technician using basic equipment, can produce 0.5 to 2.5 kilos of coca paste from 100 kilos of leaf, depending upon the alkaloid content of the leaves. There are 26 variations of coca (erythroxylan coca L) with an alkaloid content running from 0.5 to 2.5 percent. If the process is properly carried out, it will produce a coca paste that can be transformed directly on a one-to-one, or one-to-one point one basis to cocaine hydrochloride.

However, the operation of most coca paste conversion sites particularly in the recent boom years is so crude that they yield a poor grade of paste. Before utilizing it for conversion to cocaine hydrochloride, it is reprocessed with sulfuric acid, sodium or potassium permanganate and ammonia. Often as much as 2.5 kilos of poor grade coca paste is needed to make one kilo of high grade paste, known more commonly now as coca base or cocaine base and which can be converted to cocaine on a basis of one-to-one point one.

Cocaine hydrochloride is produced from coca paste or base in small clandestine laboratories using hydrochloric acid, ether and acetone. The cocaine is consumed locally or smuggled abroad, in the beginning, particularly to Cuba and Mexico. Coca paste was also smuggled abroad for illicit conversion to cocaine, particularly in Mexico City and Havana, mostly for consumption there and some smuggling abroad.

By 1965 organized trafficking groups in Chile began importing large quantities of coca paste from Peru for conversion to cocaine and smuggling abroad. particularly to the United States. This activity ended abruptly in the early 1970s following the collapse of the Allende regime. Organized traffickers in Colombia, who from the early 1970s, had begun competing with the Chilean groups, then became dominant in the purchase of coca paste and base in Peru, for conversion to cocaine in Colombia, and smuggling to the United States and worldwide.

Significant quantities of high grade cocaine, produced in Peru, continue to be smuggled to the United States, particularly to the West Coast cities of Los Angeles and San Francisco, where it is preferred for its superior quality to the Colombian product, which dominates the East Coast traffic.

From the end of World War II through the mid-1960s, coca leaf production for chewing and the legal production for international trade was well below 10,000 tons annually. It is thought that until the mid-1960s not more than one or two hundred kilos of cocaine were produced illicitly in Peru, during any one year, and that worldwide illicit manufacture and traffic was not more than 500 kilos annually.

In March 1961, under the auspices of the United Nations in New York, a plenipotentiary conference completed preparations of the

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which codified in one document nine previous international narcotic conventions that had been prepared from 1912 to 1953.

In addition to consolidating the provisions of the previous convention into one instrument, the Single Convention promulgated for the first time, provisions governing the cultivation of the coca bush and coca leaves and the cannabis plant, similar to what had been provided for opium production by the Protocol of 1953 and carried forward in the Single Convention.

On July 22, 1964 the Government of Peru deposited its instrument of ratification of the Single Convention. The treaty came into force in December 1964 and the requirements it levied on Peru as a coca producer were far reaching.

Article 26, paragraph 1, obligates any country producing coca to license its cultivation by growers and ensure that the entire crop is delivered to a government monopoly it was required to establish.

Paragraph 2, obliges parties to uproot coca bushes growing wild and destroy coca bushes illegally cultivated.

Also under article 4, paragraph (c), parties producing coca are required to limit the production of coca leaves exclusively to medical and scientific purposes.

The Single Convention also addressed the problem of coca leaf chewing under Article 49, paragraph 1(c), which states that a party may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, reserve the right to permit temporarily in any of its territories "coca leaf chewing." Under paragraph 1(e), the party may produce, manufacture and trade in the coca leaf for use in coca leaf chewing.

However, under paragraph 2(e), coca leaf chewing must be abolished within twenty-five years from the coming into force of the Single Convention. It came into force in December 1964, which would oblige Peru to end the practice of coca leaf chewing by December 1989. Under section 2(g), Peru would also be obligated to reduce and finally abolish the production of the coca leaf simultaneously with the reduction and abolition of coca leaf chewing.

From 1931 through 1965, the traffic and abuse of cocaine was not a problem in the United States. During that period the availability of cocaine remained at what might be termed the irreducible minimum. From 1931 through 1966, the annual seizures of cocaine totaled less than 10 kilos every year except 1949, when 13 kilos were confiscated.

In 1965, 16 kilos of cocaine were seized and increases in seizures occurred annually to 1970 when 103 kilos were seized for the first time in over 35 years. For 1980, total annual seizures amounted to 3,470 kilos and for 1982, the seizures totaled 5,697 kilos. The cocaine seizure rate for 1983 is running ahead of 1982.

From 1966, to date, when the illicit production, manufacture and traffic of cocaine resurfaced, coca leaf production in Peru at the very least has been responsible for half of all the cocaine trafficked and consumed in the United States.

During this period of time, coca leaf production in Peru has gone from an estimate of under 10,000 metric tons to 50,000 metric tons in 1981 and this production continues to expand to date.

What is ironical is that during a period of time when Peru was bound by the Single Convention to limit the production of coca to

legal requirements and to begin a phaseout of the practice of coca leaf chewing, the production of coca for the illicit traffic quadrupled and nothing has been done to begin the phaseout of coca leaf chewing by an estimated 1.5 million users, yet almost 19 of the 25-year time frame on this requirement has run out.

In 1964, in an effort to conform to the requirements of the Single Convention, the Government of Peru enacted a law prohibiting any new coca cultivation. However, it was not implemented.

ENACO (the National Coca Enterprise) meets the requirement of the Single Convention as "a government agency" responsible for the licensing of coca growers, the purchase of their entire crop and the safe storage and sale of this coca for legitimate purposes. In practice, ENACO has never functioned as it should under the Single Convention, which obliges it to only license levels of coca cultivation commensurate with legal world requirements, to ensure each licensed grower delivers his entire crop to the "agency," and to take or cause to be taken, the necessary measures to prevent illicit cultivation.

It is commonly heard in Peru that the estimated legal requirements for coca leaf in the country is about 14,000 metric tons annually. This appears to be what ENACO has been purchasing from growers in recent years. About 12,000 tons are said to be consumed annually by the 1.5 million indigenous coca leaf chewers. ENACO utilizes an additional 2,000 tons of leaves, a portion of which is exported for licit manufacture of cocaine and flavoring extracts abroad. The remainder is used to manufacture coca base and cocaine for legal export in a laboratory maintained by ENACO in Lima.

ENACO reports its legal export trade amounts to $50 million annually and that the domestic consumption of coca leaf grosses $100 million annually. It is estimated that about $850 million is earned annually in Peru on the illicit traffic export of cocaine and coca paste, placing this activity in third or fourth place, as a foreign exchange earner.

What is interesting is that on the basis of reports made by the Government of Peru to the International Narcotic Control Board (INCB), from 1976 through 1981, coca leaf needs for consumption averaged 7,314 metric tons. What is of further interest is that the consumption of coca leaf for chewing went from 6,745 metric tons in 1976 to 7,884 metric tons in 1981, at a time when this practice is supposed to be decreasing, not increasing, in preparation for ending it entirely in 1989.

What is also of interest is that from 1976 through 1981, the estimated world medical requirement for cocaine reported to the INCB, averaged 1,987 kilos. During this period, subtracting from Peruvian coca leaf production what is used for chewing, the remainder is sufficient to produce 273,333 kilos of cocaine per annum, or 136 times more than is legally needed worldwide.

ENACO appears to purchase about 9,000 tons of coca from the licensed growers which it securely stores and sells through legal channels for domestic coca chewing and the legal international trade. However, its licensing system is ineffective as a control mechanism, and it fails to ensure that licensed growers deliver their entire crop to the agency. In fact, it is widely reported that much of that licensed crop enters the illicit traffic to supplement illicit cultivation. ENACO pays

the equivalent of about $1.50 per kilo for coca leaf to the growers, which is about the same price paid by traffickers.

The bulk of the coca leaf produced in Peru has been traditionally grown in Southern Peru, along the eastern slopes of the Andes, between 1,500 and 6,000 feet above sea level in the Cuzco department. By the early 1970s coca production had begun a rapid expansion in the Cuzco area which reportedly still produces about 40 percent of the coca in-country.

A breakdown of estimated coca production in Peru by department is set forth below:

Department: Location	Production amount	Percentage
Cuzco: Southeast	20,000	40
Huanuco: Huallaga	13,000	26
San Martin: Huallaga	5,000	10
La Libertad: Northwest	4,000	8
Ayacucho: South Central	4,000	8
Puno: Southeast	2,000	4
Cajamarca: North Central	1,000	2
Others	1,000	2
Total	50,000	100

It is alleged that coca began to be produced in the 1940s, in the Upper Huallaga Valley, in the Departments of Huanuco, San Martin and Ucayali. When the 1964 law was enacted prohibiting any new coca cultivation, it was estimated that 2,400 hectares of coca were under production in the Upper Huallaga. However, by 1978, in a census taken by "ENACO," the official government coca monopoly, it was determined that coca was being cultivated by 6,000 families in 12,000 hectares of land in the region.

Information reported over a period of years to this Committee, indicates that beginning about 1977, organized cocaine traffickers in both Peru and Colombia, sponsored a dramatic annual increase in production throughout Peru, but that the Colombians were primarily responsible for the explosive expansion of production in the Upper Huallaga, and that they purchased the bulk of the paste produced there. The Select Committee has been informed that as of 1983 there are 35,000 hectares of land in the Upper Huallaga Valley under coca cultivation. Estimates on how much coca this can produce, range from 35,000 tons to 70,000 tons.

As stated earlier in this report in an effort to comply with the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, the Government of Peru enacted a law in 1964 prohibiting any new coca cultivation. At that time it was estimated that about 10,000 hectares were being cultivated by 13,000 farmers. As also stated, this law was never implemented. By 1978 the Government of Peru concerned with the dramatic increases in coca cultivation throughout the country, enacted Decree Law #22095, which expanded upon Decree Law 254 of 1964 prohibiting new coca cultivation.

It provided the following:

(1) Cultivation of coca in new areas is prohibited.

(2) Coca-producing lands not occupied and managed by their owners will be expropriated as part of the Agrarian Reform.

(3) In lands authorized for coca growing, the State will seize farms of over 10 hectares, partially or wholly planted in coca, by March 1980, if coca has not been eradicated. The State will seize farms of between 5 and 10 hectares, if coca crops have not been eradicated by March, 1981. A timetable for the eradication of coca on farms of less than 5 hectares will be established by the Ministry of Agriculture.

(4) All coca growers are required to register with ENACO. ENACO has the exclusive responsibility for the internal and external commercialization of coca leaves.

(5) The Guardia Civil and the Forestry Police are given responsibility for enforcing the law for the eradication or substitution of coca cultivation. The Peruvian Investigative Police (PIP) has the authority for the repression of illegal narcotics trafficking.

(6) A multi-sectoral committee is established to implement national drug policies.

(7) Strict legal penalties are established for violators of the law.

Following enactment of Decree Law #22095 in 1978, the register was closed with 25,000 growers licensed to produce coca on 18,000 hectares.

In 1980, Decree Law #22926 was enacted to give the Guardia Civil additional responsibility over coca cultivation and increase the legal penalties for violations.

Also in 1980, Decree Law #22927 recognizing the alarming escalation in the cultivation of the coca and the illicit manufacture and traffic of coca paste in the Upper Huallaga Valley, declared a "state of emergency" in the Departments of Huanuco and San Martin, and in the Province of Coronel Portillo in the Department of Loreto.

On the basis of Decree Law #22927, it was decided that effective March 4, 1981, all coca production in the "state of emergency" area, would be considered illicit. This included 6,600 hectares of licensed cultivation in the area, one third of the country's legal crop.

The Government's effort to enforce Decree Law #22927 declaring a state of emergency in the Upper Huallaga Valley departments, was designed to address the alarming expansion in the cultivation of coca and the illicit manufacture and traffic that had developed in the area. With considerable publicity, it launched and carried out "Green Sea No. 1 and Green Sea No. 2 that mobilized the Guardia Civil, the Peruvian Investigative Police, the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Enforcement results in the way of arrests, seizures of coca products and processing facilities, prosecutions and convictions were disappointing and had no deterrent or disruptive effect on the problem in the Upper Huallaga Valley. It is said only 60 hectares of coca was eradicated as cultivation flourished and continued to increase.

Further, once coca production in the "state of emergency" area was declared illegal in March 1981, ENACO no longer purchased the production of the 6,600 hectares that had been legal and all of that entered the illicit traffic.

In December 1982, the "state of emergency" was annulled in the Upper Huallaga Valley, and the 6,600 hectares that had previously been licensed as legal production, were reauthorized.

The impression should not be created that the Government of Peru has been totally indifferent to the effective control of coca production

and preventing the illicit manufacture and traffic of cocaine. The problem is: that the production and illicit traffic in coca and cocaine has outstripped the ability of the institutions of government assigned to control it. This has come about as a result of a failure to recognize the seriousness of the problem that was developing, and a shirking of national responsibility, marked by indifference, lack of direction and procrastination.

The Peruvian Investigative Police (PIP), is a 10,000-man force responsible for investigating all felonies, including narcotic offenses and has been cooperating with DEA and its predecessor agencies since 1949. The PIP has historically been regarded as one of the finest investigative agencies worldwide, particularly in narcotic enforcement. However, the explosive expansion of the illicit production, manufacture and traffic of coca and cocaine in Peru during the last decade has overwhelmed the ability of PIP to cope with the problem. Operating with no increases in manpower, equipment and operating funds, it is confronted by ever-increasing powerful, Peruvian and international narcotic traffickers, operating laboratories and networks for smuggling enormous quantities of coca paste and cocaine abroad via land, sea, and air.

The Guardia Civil is a 28,000-man force, responsible for crime prevention, investigations of misdemeanors and the investigation of all crime where the PIP does not have a presence, which is usually in remote rural areas.

The Guardia Civil, by law, is charged with enforcing the laws governing the cultivation, production, marketing, movement and possession of coca leaf. Because of its presence in rural areas, it is responsible for detecting and seizing the coca paste processing facilities that have spread across the coca producing countryside. The Guardia Civil is also obviously responsible for intercepting the movement of coca paste from the rural processing facilities to the urban areas where cocaine conversion laboratories are located, as well as the movement out of the country, of coca paste directly to Colombia onto that country via Ecuador and also to Brazil.

The Guardia Civil is a highly competent paramilitary Gendarmerie-type force, with a long and proud history. However, with no increase in manpower, operating funds and equipment, it is totally unequal to its mission to prevent the illicit cultivation of coca and the manufacture and traffic of coca paste in cocaine. The Guardia Civil is the agency responsible for eradicating illicit cultivation, a responsibility it obviously does not implement because of the government's intransigence.

The Guardia Republicana is responsible for immigration, border control, and the Customs services, and provides important support to the PIP and the GC in drug enforcement.

The Department of State narcotic assistance program has provided $3.2 million in equipment and training assistance to the PIP, Guardia Civil, and Customs. DEA cooperates with all three services in the development of narcotic investigations affecting the United States and in training and operational support.

In 1981 a special "Mobile Rural Police Detachment" was created by the Guardia Civil in Tingo Maria known as "UMOPAR." It has been

provided vehicles and radio equipment through the U.S. Government narcotic assistance program. It's mission is to control coca production by monitoring legal production and eradicating illicit cultivation. However, it appears to ignore illicit cultivation and concentrate its efforts on seizing coca paste conversion facilities and the illicit movement of coca leaf and paste.

Annually, on their own, the Peruvian drug enforcement agencies make significant narcotic arrests and seizures including coca paste and cocaine conversion facilities. They cooperate effectively with the DEA in developing investigations in the traffic affecting the United States and with the police narcotic specialists assigned to Lima by Canada and the Netherlands, as well as officers who visit periodically from the Federal Republic of Germany, other European countries and Australia.

The tidal wave of coca each year that continues to increase, overwhelms, demoralizes and corrupts government administrators, the police services, the court system, the agricultural sector, let alone the harm the abuse of coca leaf, coca paste and cocaine does to the health and welfare of at least 2 million of the 19 million citizens of Peru.

Beginning in the early 1970s, Peru began to develop a serious drug abuse problem among its youth, particularly in the urban area of Lima. It is estimated that nationwide 200,000 young people are smoking coca paste mixed with tobacco and the use of cocaine has also become widespread. The youth of Peru are the primary victims of the uncontrolled production manufactured traffic of coca and cocaine in the country. As a nation of 19 million, with 2 million inhabitants estimated to be using coca leaf, coca paste or cocaine, Peru has the highest per capita abuse of the drug worldwide.

Notwithstanding a valiant law enforcement effort to suppress the illicit manufacture and traffic of cocaine and meaningful cooperation internationally with all countries being affected by this traffic, these efforts have had no impact in curtailing the traffic in coca paste and cocaine originating in Peru. Quite to the contrary, we have seen a steady increase from the late 1960s, and since 1977 an alarming explosion in the traffic, particularly during the last year where availability dramatically increased and the wholesale price fell by half.

The crux of the problem in Peru is the enormous, uncontrolled production of the coca leaf which the government, through a variety of factors, has permitted to quadruple since 1964. Instead it should have been progressively phased out as the practice of coca leaf chewing was gradually reduced and ended by December 1989, as required by Article 49, of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961.

Effective narcotic control will not be possible in Peru until such time as the government brings the legal cultivation of coca down to the level of legitimate world requirements for cocaine and coca leaf chewing in Peru, and begins a program to gradually end the practice of coca leaf chewing and the elimination of the coca production for that purpose.

The generally accepted figure for coca production in Peru in 1981 was 50,000 metric tons or 50,000 hectares of land. Of that total, 14,000 metric tons were thought to be needed for legal requirements, 12,000 for coca chewing and 2,000 for the domestic and international pharmaceutical manufacture of cocaine.

Information available to this Committee is that 9,000 and not 14,000 tons is a more realistic estimate of the "legitimate" requirements of coca leaf; 7,000 for coca chewing and 2,000 for legal pharmaceutical purposes.

Whatever figure that might be established as the legitimate requirement for coca production in Peru, the remainder would be subject to eradication under the Single Convention and Peruvian law.

From the inception of U.S. Government programs of assistance. From 1978 through 1982, the United States has programmed $8.9 million to assist the Peruvian narcotics control program. Beginning about that time, taking into consideration signs that the production of coca may have been moving out of control, the U.S. Government began to provide assistance to programs that would enhance the control of the legal crop and facilitate crop substitution.

In August 1981, the United States Government signed two concurrent five-year project agreements with the Government of Peru, which would provide for the eradication of about 17,000 hectares of coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley, while an agricultural and rural development project was simultaneously developed to assist in the production and marketing of other crops.

The coca eradication and enforcement program is under the direction of the State Department Bureau of International Narcotic Matters and is programming to fund $15 million over a five-year period. The agricultural development project under the direction of AID provides for loans and grants of $18 million over a similar five-year program to finance a program of combined agricultural research and extension credits.

This Committee has had serious reservations on the feasibility of programs that concentrate on a single sector of coca leaf production in Peru and the Upper Huallaga Valley, when that sector, albeit an important one, is one of six. Unless coca is gradually eliminated in the other five sectors simultaneously, it will increase to meet any decreases that occur in the Upper Huallaga Valley.

The Government of Peru must develop a plan that will establish its legal coca requirements, license the number of hectares necessary to produce the legal requirement and then proceed to eliminate as soon as possible all unlicensed production.

The failure to do this seems to have already postponed the start up of crop eradication in the Upper Huallaga Valley scheduled to begin in 1982 and to date in 1983 has not been more than a few hectares involving old and deteriorating coca bushes.

The Committee's Visit to Peru

The Committee arrived at Lima from Mexico City on the early evening of August 9. That same evening, Ambassador Frank V. Ortiz hosted a reception in honor of the delegation, attended by five Cabinet Ministers, the leaders of the Peruvian Senate and Chamber of Deputies, the Narcotic Commission of the Senate, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Secretary General to the President, the Commanding General of the Guardia Civil, the Director of the Peruvian Investigative Police, the Director General of Customs and the Director of the Upper Huallaga Project.

Over a two-hour period, the members of the delegation and staff had an opportunity to meet and talk with the high-level officials listed above, in addition to many of their assistants and senior staff who were present. The Peruvian officials extended a warm welcome to the delegation and appeared most interested in discussing the problem of coca production and the illicit manufacture and traffic of cocaine with the Committee, with a view to determining how we might more effectively work together to bring it under control.

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER/FOREIGN MINISTER OF PERU

On the morning of August 10, the Committee called on Dr. Fernando Schwalb Lopez Aldana who holds the posts of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Relations. Dr. Schwalb was the Peruvian Ambassador to the United States for a number of years.

Ambassador Ortiz, who accompanied the delegation, in his opening remarks briefly described narcotic control cooperation between Peru and the United States, including joint efforts to suppress narcotic trafficking from Peru affecting the United States. The Ambassador stressed there was nothing more important than this type of cooperation. He also commended the recent arrest of some Colombian traffickers who had flown into a clandestine airstrip in the Upper Huallaga Valley and were intercepted by the Guardia Civil "UMOPAR" Unit as they were about to smuggle a large shipment of coca paste to Colombia. The Ambassador praised this work and the recent intensified efforts by the Guardia Civil to neutralize the clandestine airstrips. He also mentioned the Peruvian project in the Upper Huallaga Valley to promote crop substitution in place of coca and said the Peruvian Government was truly engaged in narcotic control.

Chairman Rangel introduced the delegation, which at this point included Senator Lawton M. Chiles of Florida, who was in Lima as a member of a study mission of the House Budget Committee under Chairman Jim Jones of Oklahoma to look into operations of the International Monetary Fund. Chairman Rangel said that the committee understood the problems that frustrated the ability of Peru to cooperate more effectively with the United States to curtail the production and traffic of coca and cocaine. He cited the limited funds available in Peru for this purpose, which was now compounded by the hard economic times facing the country and the floods and droughts that have occurred this year.

On the other hand, the Chairman pointed out that in the area of economic assistance, the Congress had a statutory responsibility to insure cooperation in narcotic control by a nation was everything it should be as a requirement for assistance. Mr. Rangel went on to describe the mood of Congress as one of frustration and growing impatience brought on by constituent complaints over the continuing entry into our country of increasing quantities of cocaine; that the delegation had come to Peru to try to obtain a better understanding of the problem and what might be done to control it. Further, the committee wished to lend its support to Ambassador Ortiz, in his efforts with the Government of Peru, to address this serious problem, that was having such an adverse effect on the United States and Peru.

Senator Chiles described the State of Florida, as not only the entry point for cocaine to supply the State, but also a primary entry point to supply the entire United States. He said the narcotic issue crosses over party lines and went on to describe the oversight responsibility of both Houses of the Congress concerning the laws governing foreign aid and trade and to determine how a country is cooperating in narcotic control as part of the eligibility requirements for aid and trade considerations.

Senator Chiles said Peru has a serious problem with the illicit production and traffic of coca and cocaine. Further, there are outside factors that have brought this about, but what is most important, is that Peru is cooperating to halt this scourge.

Senator Chiles added that the movement of cocaine by air and by sea must be stopped; but more importantly, the planting and cultivation of coca must be stopped because once the harvest of coca is reduced to coca paste or cocaine and enters the traffic, it is difficult and almost impossible to detect and confiscate. The illicit cultivation has to be located and destroyed, if the cocaine traffic is to be effectively curtailed.

Representative Gilman, the Ranking Minority Member of the Committee, associated himself with the remarks of Chairman Rangel and said he was aware of the commitment of Peru to controlling the production of coca and the cooperation provided in drug enforcement operations. However, he was concerned with the fact that no action appears to have been taken to date to phase out coca leaf chewing by 1.5 million people, when there is a requirement that this be done 25 years after the Single Convention has come into force which would be December 1989. Mr. Gilman also expressed concern with lack of progress with the Upper Huallaga Valley crop substitution program for coca.

Representative Lewis associated himself with the remarks of Senator Chiles concerning the narcotic traffic from South America directed to the United States through Florida. He said that the United States was ready and willing to provide the necessary assistance to bring this problem under control, what was needed to make our aid successful was wholehearted cooperation by the Government of Peru.

Representative Hughes said he was pleased with the efforts of the Government of Peru in drug enforcement, but that we all can do more. He was favorably impressed with the cooperation provided to DEA by the Peruvian police services and was encouraged by his talks with the officials in charge and the initiative they have taken to have DEA provide a training school in drug currency tracking, which is now underway in Lima.

In the United States, the Congress has amended the Posse Comitatus law to facilitate assistance by the military to suppress drug smuggling. Currently they are preparing legislation to strengthen the forfeiture laws related to drug trafficking, improved interagency cooperation on narcotic intelligence, enforcement, demand reduction, education, and increased penalties for violators.

Mr. Hughes said he had one complaint and that was the failure of the Government of Peru to initiate a program to eradicate illicit coca. He expressed appreciation for the law enforcement cooperation with DEA and urged that Peru use its forfeiture law against the land on which coca is grown as a deterrent to cultivation.

Representative Guarini said that notwithstanding our cooperative efforts, the production and traffic of coca and cocaine in Peru affecting the United States is worsening rather than getting better. The purpose of the Committee's visit is to try to find out what can we do and what can you do to turn this situation around. Representative Guarini said given the economic crisis Peru faces today, and the disastrous floods and drought, he could understand the problem Peru has with finding matching funds for narcotic assistance support provided by the United States. Recognizing this, he wanted to emphasize that drugs are the worst problem we now have in the United States and that Peru now has the problem. Mr. Guarini wanted to know what can Peru do to stamp out the source of the problem, the illicit cultivation of coca and said complete cooperation and a total commitment are going to be necessary to accomplish this.

Representative Dixon asked the Prime Minister for his government's evaluation of the impact coca eradication would have on the economy of Peru and the United States, since narcotics is now big business in both countries.

Representative Sawyer congratulated the Government of Peru on its law that would forfeit the title of land on which coca is illicitly cultivated. Mr. Sawyer asked what kind of incentive was being provided to farmers to give up coca cultivation.

Prime Minister Schwalb responded by welcoming the delegation and stressed the importance of finding out firsthand what is going on. He said that the big market for cocaine in the United States makes control of coca production in Peru difficult. The Peruvian Government feels the economic impact of the cost of its control efforts. We think there is a link between drug trafficking and terrorism, and we are trying to verify this, he said.

Prime Minister Schwalb invited the delegation to see the country and talk to everyone you can. Despite the success in renegotiating our foreign debt, current economic problems prevent us from committing funds to special campaigns against the narcotic traffic. Development projects must be continued particularly in the areas where terrorists are active.

The Prime Minister went on to say "the narcotic problem is very complex and that financial and technical assistance is needed to bring it under control. We understand your concerns about our slow progress on eradication, but you must understand we are doing the best we can; we do not have the resources and we do not like to be threatened. I know your problem in making appropriations but there should be no delays. We can do more, and I ask that on this question you take into consideration our underdeveloped status, the world depression which is seriously affecting us, and our good intentions which you can fully explore."

Prime Minister Schwalb again suggested the root of the problem was the big market in the United States; to overcome this, there was a need to re-educate people in the United States.

He described Peru as a free democratic country with nothing to conceal. He said he thought the delegation would find what is important; is that Peru wants to help solve the problem, but this is now compli-

cated by the natural disasters that have taken place (floods and drought).

Representative Gilman questioned assigning as the basic cause for the production and traffic of coca and cocaine in Peru, the market and demand in the United States. He said the United States is the victim of this uncontrolled production and traffic which is also seriously victimizing all the developed countries. Mr. Gilman added that this Committee has found that without exception, when a country becomes a center for the illicit production and traffic of drugs internationally—such as Peru—it too becomes a consumer and a victim of its own production. Peru, he said, is now in that position—a country with a serious drug problem and a heavy consumer of its own production.

Mr. Gilman went on to express appreciation for the strong statements of the Prime Minister as to the Government's position, but he feared this was not trickling down to the operational levels of the government.

The Prime Minister responded that it was and suggested that talks with the narcotic control officials would confirm this.

Chairman Rangel, said success was achieved in Turkey when the government simply prohibited the production of opium. Farmers moved to other crops, but certainly did not make the same income as they did from selling opium to traffickers. He said, as he understands it, the Government of Peru is saying substitutive crops have to be found to give coca producers an income equal to what they can earn from selling their coca to traffickers.

The Chairman said this concept of crop substitution cannot work. No way can pineapple substitute for coca, there is no one-on-one crop substitutes for coca. He added that we agree the problem of eradicating illicit coca production is complex, but calling for development funds without a plan as to how coca will be phased out and eradicated, cannot be sold to the Congress.

Prime Minister Schwalb replied that the phasing out of production and eradication was a difficult, complex problem to which Peru cannot find the answer or the resources.

Representative Hughes said that in his judgment, the key to phasing out coca production was implementation of the law that permits the government to seize and forfeit any land on which coca is illicitly cultivated.

Senator Chiles said the suspected connection Prime Minister Schwalb mentioned between terrorism and the drug traffic is similar to what we have been hearing in other Latin America countries and which have a Cuban connection.

Chairman Rangel pointed out that the production and traffic in coca and cocaine in Peru now poses a double threat to the country, it is suspected of supporting terrorism and has made Peru a consumer country.

Prime Minister Schwalb said that terrorism was diverting police attention and resources from coca suppression.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister again welcomed the delegation to Peru and wished it well on its fact-finding mission.

MEETING WITH THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR OF PERU

The delegation next called upon Senor Luis Percovich Roca, the Minister of Interior. He said he was happy to welcome the delegation. The narcotic traffic was affecting all countries now and he would appreciate their observations. He said it was of great concern to the Government and people of Peru that the narcotic traffic is increasing. He said Peru is intensifying its efforts to suppress the traffic and must take more effective measures to end its role as a source of supply country. Intensified steps must also be taken in crop substitution and eradication.

Minister Percovich mentioned that last week, the Guardia Civil, UMOPAR Unit 64, based in Tingo Maria, in the Upper Huallaga Valley, made an important seizure of a Colombian aircraft as it was about to take off from a clandestine airstrip with a load of coca paste bound for Colombia.

He said the Government is experimenting with crop substitution and so far 220 hectares of land formerly used for coca, have been converted to new crops. He said they are studying 26 different crops as possible substitutes for coca and that they needed to expedite this work and ensure more rapid progress for the future. Peru has been receiving financial assistance in this work and with continued United States assistance, he was hopeful Peru can achieve its goals.

Minister Percovich repeated that this meeting with the Committee was very satisfying for him. He went on to say this was the second time he had the honor to serve President Becaunde in a Cabinet position and that he had a deep hope that in his new position we can increase cooperation to overcome the curse of the illicit narcotic traffic on our citizens and the effect it has on terrorism.

At this point Minister Percovich turned the meeting over to Commandante Diomedes Vargas Barbosa, Commander of UMOPAR Unit 64, at Tingo Maria in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Commandante Vargas Barbosa stated that UMOPAR Unit 64 was established on May 14, 1980 at Tingo Maria to combat the production and traffic of coca, coca paste and cocaine.

He briefly identified the six areas in Peru where coca is produced, both legally and illegally, and then concentrated on the Upper Huallaga Valley, his area of authority. He said that while 12,000 hectares are registered to produce coca in his region, the actual number is about 45,000. He stated that in recent years there has been an "explosion" of coca production in the region and that it is "out of control."

He broke down the traffic into several categories, (1) the growers, who sell to (2) the coca leaf converters or paste makers, who sell to (3) the intermediate buyers, who purchase one to ten kilos of paste, for sale to (4) the large buyers, who in turn sell to (5) the "domestic movers", who use aircraft and boats to move large quantities of paste, to (6) exporters who use aircraft, boats and highways to smuggle paste abroad or to supply cocaine manufacturers in Peru for domestic consumption and the international traffic.

Commandante Vargas Barbosa said more and more clandestine airstrips have been cut out of the forest lands on the left bank of the

Huallaga river to facilitate the movement of coca paste to Colombia. Additionally, growers continued to slash and burn sectors out of the forest lands of the Huallaga to grow coca. He went on to say that a whole new psychology of life has developed in the Upper Huallaga Valley with many people now living almost entirely off coca trafficking activities.

Major traffickers are in the 20-to-30 age group and many are amassing large bank accounts. They have become the folk heros of the children who now seek to imitate them. The situation continues to worsen and UMOPAR is losing its ability to maintain authority in the area. Violence has increased—particularly murder and assault.

To combat this problem, the Guardia Civil and his UMOPAR Unit has a dire need for air support equipment (1) to detect and destroy illicit coca leaf drying facilities, (2) for herbicide spray operations against illicit coca, (3) to detect and immobilize clandestine airstrips. Radio equipment is needed to monitor the newest most highly sophisticated Japanese radio equipment used by traffickers, which has an almost unlimited number of channel variations. Ground-to-air search radar established at several strategic locations is also needed for the purpose of interdicting aircraft entering Peru from Colombia to pick up coca paste for smuggling back to Colombia.

Chairman Rangel thanked Commandante Vargas Barbosa for his excellent briefing and asked how did the government propose to bring under control what he had described as the increasing production of coca that has gone out of control. The Chairman said perhaps his understanding of the importance of the lack of any effective eradication of coca was different than what had come from the briefing.

Mr. Rangel said he failed to grasp how programs to educate consumers against the use of coca and cocaine and high-cost agricultural and rural development programs seeking crop substitutes for coca can have any effect without the Government of Peru enforcing the stringent laws that have long been enacted against illicit coca cultivation. Substitute crops, no matter how promising, cannot compete with illicit coca production. In the absense of enforcement, growers will accept substitute crops and still produce coca. Only when illicit coca production is eradicated will farmers stop growing it.

Representative Gilman commended Commandante Vargas Barbosa and the Guardia Civil for its excellent relations with DEA. He asked "how can we make the upper Huallaga project effective, how can we make it a show piece of narcotic control"? Mr. Gilman asked for their thoughts.

Minister of Interior Percovich Roca said you have to understand our strategy is to proceed in two ways. The first is to control the illicit traffic including the installation of radar to detect foreign aircraft coming in to pick up coca paste. The second is to intensify coca eradication through a combined crop substitution and eradication effort.

We plan to convince the growers to stop cultivating coca. Some have already accepted this. There is no alternative to this. The terrorism and violence the production and traffic of coca has created, must be recognized and control measures intensified. Only our severe economic problems prevent us from doing more, and more quickly.

MEETING WITH THE FISCAL OF PERU

The Committee next met with Miguel Cavero Equsquiza Fiscal of the nation and his deputy Cesar Elejalde Estenssoro Fiscal Supremo.

The Fiscal warmly welcomed the Committee and said its visit to Peru was a demonstration of the good relations that exist between our two countries on the basis of our democratic links. He mentioned the arrest of the Colombian traffickers in the Department of San Martin in the Upper Huallaga and said that the Guardia Civil and the PIP were getting good results but that they needed continuing technical assistance from the United States to effectively combat the problem, including radar to intercept foreign aircraft, boats for patrol purposes and aircraft to detect and neutralize the clandestine airstrips from which coca paste is being smuggled to Colombia.

Fiscal Cavero Equsquiza said the positive approach to the problem by the United States was welcomed, and very understandable, given the fact the United States is so affected by it.

Important work is underway, he said, and acknowledged that eradication of the illicit coca crop and suppression of the illicit traffic must be implemented, substitute crops must be used and the growers must be helped.

The Fiscal went on to say that plans were being made to use the Air Force to destroy the clandestine airstrips and that the criminals responsible for the narcotic traffic must be pursued. The Fiscal said he was calling for a national narcotic conference where all departments of the government would join and fight the problem. He also was advocating a regional approach to combating the traffic that would provide for meetings that would include Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia. He expressed his government's appreciation for the DEA school of instruction on the financial investigation of drug trafficking assets.

Chairman Rangel thanked the Fiscal for his remarks and said that "we are friends of Peru." He expressed appreciation for the efforts of the Guardia Civil UMOPAR Unit and for the narcotic enforcement cooperation that is ongoing between DEA and PIP. He said he recognizes the severity with which Peru applies its drug control laws, as he had learned, the authorities were holding an 82-year-old American woman on bail pending trial on a drug smuggling violation.

The Fiscal Supreme (the deputy to the Fiscal) Cesar Elejalde Estenssoro replied that Peruvian law required that it be administered regardless of age, when violations are encountered. He then went on to describe what he termed the power of the narcotic traffickers and the government's concerns over this possibility influencing the 1985 elections with drug money.

The Fiscal Supreme said that he had talked with the President the previous day and he could assure the Committee of the President's firm resolve to end the drug traffic. Lack of resources prevented a quick resolution of the problem. The Fiscal said it was difficult to persuade farmers to end this production of a crop with a high earning value. It is very tough to find substitutes, even high value replacements such as coffee, because they take time to be brought on line.

The Fiscal Supreme said what was needed in the Upper Huallaga Valley was the development of a "TVA" type project, although smaller

than the American original. He felt certain the implementation of such a project in the Upper Huallaga would make the people change and not grow coca.

Chairman Rangel asked whether there would be any eradication of coca before the proposed development was implemented and whether the Government of Peru was prepared to eradicate illicit coca cultivation simultaneously with rural and agricultural development project implementation.

The Fiscal Supreme responded that "we have the intention to make eradication more important." However, the problem is that if we eradicate without providing a substitute crop, the grower will move on to plant coca elsewhere. He did not explain why he would not also do that even when given a substitute crop and grow both. The Fiscal Supreme strongly advocated the development of a substitute crop program in the Upper Huallaga and described palm oil as one with great commercial value, particularly for export markets. He was convinced that if growers had substitute crops, they would stop growing coca.

Chairman Rangel said as he understood what the Fiscal Supreme had said about the problem of illicit coca cultivation the Government of Peru found it difficult to persuade farmers to stop the illicit growing of coca in favor of a variety of substitute crops already identified because they earn more from their illegal coca crop.

The government finds it politically difficult to go out and destroy the illicit cultivation the farmers refuse to give up in favor of less profitable other crops.

Chairman Rangel said the conclusion he draws from this is that until such time as some substitute crop is found, which will provide the grower with an income equal to the illicit sale of coca, the government in principle, will not require growers to stop growing coca and the grower has nothing to fear in the way of having his coca crop cut down or sprayed with herbicide by the government.

Fiscal Supreme Elejalde replied that it would take 25 years of eradication to make that technique successful. On the other hand if the farmers are provided with substitutes such as palm oil, they will abandon coca in favor of it. He added that with a TVA type project in the Upper Huallaga Valley, farmers would move into legitimate work.

In conclusion Fiscal Supreme Elejalde repeated his advocacy of intensified law enforcement action against the illicit manufacture and traffic and the need of Peru for logistical support for aircraft, radar, communication equipment and police vehicles.

Chairman Rangel said that we had a problem supporting illicit traffic suppression programs in countries where illicit cultivation is the root of the problem and where eradication is not included as an important element of the solution.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF PERU

The Committee met with Arg. Fernando Belaunde Terry, President of the Republic of Peru who said that "we worry very much about the drug situation." It is corrupting our society, and 90 to 95 percent of the cases in our psychiatric institutions are drug related.

He said that crop substitution was the main solution to the illicit cultivation of coca. Such a program, including eradication in the

Upper Huallaga would require about $200 million to implement over a four to five year period.

The President said they had a need for radar installation to detect aircraft coming into the country for coca smuggling purposes. He then returned to crop substitution and spoke of the value of producing palm oil, but this required considerable investment which they did not have. The President said they had several different ideas on crop substitution development but lacked the means to implement them.

Additionally he said they had lost $800 million this year due to the disastrous floods and droughts which in turn resulted in a $600 million loss in exports. The agrarian banks which are needed to finance crop substitution development are in dire financial straights due to the disasters in the north of the country. The President thought that the $200 million needed for crop substitution development in the Huallaga Valley could be spread over a four-to five-year period at an annual rate of $40 million to $50 million. This type of development could overcome the political and economic obstacles to substituting crops and eradicating coca.

At the conclusion of the President's remarks, Chairman Rangel asked Representative Gilman to speak first: Mr. Gilman said that he was somewhat concerned with the lack of progress made by Peru in complying with the Single Convention requirement, that the practice of coca leaf chewing be ended by 1989. Also that there did not seem to be any serious eradication of the illicit coca production, what eradication that was carried out seemed to be tokenism.

Mr. Gilman went on to say that he could not understand how additional financial assistance for development would in anyway help in the absence of a program to eradicate illicit coca.

On the positive, Mr. Gilman said the Committee wished to express its appreciation for the excellent cooperation provided to DEA by the PIP and Guardia Civil in developing investigations affecting the United States.

Representative Hughes commended the Peruvian effort to strike at the financial assets of drug traffickers by inviting DEA to provide a financial investigation training school. He mentioned that this school was currently underway in Lima and was an important step forward in developing a useful tool against the narcotic traffic.

Mr. Hughes next mentioned that the Peruvian Government's request for radar installations to intercept aircraft flying into the country to pick up coca paste at clandestine airstrips would not be practical unless aircraft were assigned to intercept the aircraft detected by the radar. He went on to say that he understood that the Air Force was resisting the assignment of any aircraft to the Guardia Civil for drug enforcement; that the Air Force wanted to control this type of activity, but that the Guardia Civil obviously needed an air interdiction capability.

The President said that the Guardia Civil makes many narcotic arrests in the jungles of the Upper Huallaga Valley. However, effective control was difficult because the area is so large. The jungle in the lower altitude, adjacent to Colombia and Brazil is used as the base of the traffic to those countries by air. Much of this activity centers around the city of Iquitos. The President thought the installation of a radar network would discourage this air smuggling activity.

Representative Lewis asked what plans the Government of Peru had to move farmers out of the illicit cultivation of coca. The President replied that the government had several development projects in the planning stage that would enable them to eventually phase out coca; that they wanted to do this as soon as possible and that he suggested Mr. Lewis talk with the responsible ministers to learn more of the details of the plans.

FIELD TRIP TO TINGO MARIA IN THE UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY

On the morning of August 11 the Committee proceeded by air to Tingo Maria where, at the airport, they were given a briefing on the coca control and eradication program known as "CORAH" and the rural and agricultural development program known as PEAH. The former is sponsored by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotic Matters and is established to support ENACO, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Guardia Civil UMOPAR Unit control the legal production of coca leaf, detect and destroy illicit cultivation and suppress the illicit manufacture and traffic of coca, coca paste and cocaine. The latter, PEAH, is funded by USAID and is responsible for developing programs within the Ministry of Agriculture for substitute crops for coca. At the briefing which was coordinated by Mr. Jack Rosholt of USAID, CORAH was represented by Manuel Ingunza, the Executive Director, and PEAH was represented by its Ramon Connejo. Commandante Diomedes Vargas Barbosa, the Commander of UMOPAR Unit 64, which is the enforcement element of CORAH, represented his unit.

The Committee learned that the crop substitution program of PEAH is in a research configuration at an agricultural experimental facility that has been set up and is operating.

As to CORAH we learned that there is no organized or structured program established as yet to identify legal from illegal cultivation in the region, and to eradicate the illicit cultivation, as required by law.

Further, there is no program to ensure that what is cultivated legally, is delivered to ENACO for licit channels.

The only eradication attempted to date was experimental, where aged coca bushes no longer providing worthwhile yields, were being cut down and sprayed with the herbicide 2-4-D by hand, at one site.

The entire coca control effort in the Upper Huallaga Valley was in effect limited to the efforts of the Guardia Civil, UMOPAR Unit 64, to seize and destroy the crude facilities used to convert coca leaf to paste, to seize and immobilize sites used for the drying of illicit coca leaf, to seize coca leaf being bought, sold or transported illicitly and to intercept the movement of coca paste and any cocaine encountered.

From the airport, in a convoy of several UMOPAR vehicles, the Committee traveled to a village where coca was being grown legally. Two large fields, of several hectares each, and the concrete slabs where the leaves were spread out to dry were visited. The delegation found the fields to be rich, level, agricultural land that would be capable of growing a variety of food crops that are now badly needed in Peru, due to disastrous floods in the Northern Coastal area and drought in the Southern Sierra region. Instead the land and manpower of the fertile Upper Huallaga is mostly devoted to coca, and Peru is depend-

ent upon foreign emergency relief assistance, for food for a large segment of its population.

Following the visit to the coca fields and drying slabs, the Committee proceeded to a remote site in the jungle, adjacent to a stream where a facility for processing coca leaf into coca paste, had been seized earlier that day. The individual who had been arrested for operating the facility, demonstrated the process. In 1982, a total of 178 similar coca paste conversion facilities were seized in Peru. Obviously, several hundred coca paste conversion sites must be operating in Peru, at any given time, to convert 35,000 to 50,000 tons of coca leaf to coca sulfate each year.

The Committee next visited a field of several hectares of coca bush which were being eradicated. This was an experimental operation, wherein the bushes were cut down to about one foot above ground. The stumps were then incised and sprayed with the herbicides 2-4-D contained in hand-held sprayers. It is worth noting, that the coca bushes selected for eradicating via the cutting down and herbicide spray technique, were aged and no longer providing worthwhile yields.

The delegation concluded that while the coca bush, like any bush, was more difficult to eradicate than poppy which is a flower, and the cannabis plant which is a weed, it is still very vulnerable to both manual and herbicide spray eradication. Additionally, since it is a perennial crop rather than an annual crop, once destroyed it requires two to four years before a new bush can produce.

On the return flight to Lima that afternoon, the delegation had ample opportunity, as they did on their arrival at Tingo Maria, to observe the widespread cultivation of illicit coca. Fields were also observed being prepared for planting in clearings that had recently been made. Slash and burn operations to prepare new sites for planting could also be seen. These observations confirmed statements that coca production in the Upper Huallaga Valley continues to increase.

MEETING WITH THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE OF PERU

In the late afternoon of August 11, following the return from Tingo Maria, Representative Gilman, the Ranking Minority Member with Representatives Lewis and several staff members of the delegation met with Minister of Agriculture Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller. The latter was accompanied by Dr. Victor Camacho, President of the Directorate of ENACO, the national monopoly for the control, purchase and sale of legal coca in Peru, and Engineer Eduardo Watson who heads his own consulting firm and was completing a project proposal for coca crop substitution in the Upper Huallaga Valley that involves extensive agricultural and rural development.

After welcoming the delegation, Minister of Agriculture Hurtado commented that he recognized that a major responsibility in assuming the position of Minister of Agriculture was being to bring the production of coca under control.

Minister Hurtado briefly mentioned the "CORAH" program underway with ENACO and the UMOPAR of the Guardia Civil to control the legal cultivation of coca and eradicate the illicit cultivation and the "PEAH" program to develop and promote crop substitution for coca underway with AID.

The important questions are: how can we cooperate in crop substitution, and how can programs of crop substitutions be rationally implemented. The difficulties in developing crop substitution in the Upper Huallaga Valley, he said, were bad communications, bad transportation, and the fact some farmers are engaged in the illicit traffic.

At this point Minister Hurtado turned the meeting over to Engineer Watson. The latter said his plan involved three basic steps:

(1) The planning phase to identify and develop viable and workable substitute crops.

(2) The gradual implementation of crop substitution which would include subsidizing farmers.

(3) The implementation of complementary measures, including eradication of coca and the prosecution of the growers who reject crop substitution and confiscation of the land on which coca is illicitly grown.

Engineer Watson said that while surveys indicated there were 170,000 hectares of arable land in the Upper Huallaga Valley, only 60,000 was being cultivated with an estimated 25,000 hectares of that in coca.

Mr. Watson enumerated a variety of commercial crops, food crops and forestry products that could substitute for coca. Their liability however, was the fact they would be new to the farmers, they would take time to bring on line and the lack of adequate communication and transportation in the Upper Huallaga would seriously hamper marketing. To overcome the latter, highway and bridge construction was included, as was significant rural electrification. The project envisioned expenditures of $300 million over a four-year period, Mr. Watson said that while the project would be "government supported and administered," it would be placed in private hands. There would be a minimum of Government Bureaucracy. The government's role would be to encourage agri-businesses which would buy local farmers production. He thought financial help might come from the World Bank, the Inter-American Bank and USAID, with the government creating the proper climate for private sector borrowing from the foreign financial sources for the agro-industry ventures.

Minister Hurtado felt that most farmers would turn to new crops from coca if markets existed. Farmers who did not, would be subject to crop eradication and personal prosecution.

Representative Gilman made the following points:

(1) There did not seem to be any support by the government for a public information program to inform growers of the great harm coca is doing to Peru and worldwide, and point out the obligation for Peru to limit this crop to legal requirements.

(2) Because the CORAH program has been ineffective to date, consideration should be given to transferring it from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Interior.

(3) No timetable has been established as yet to begin to eradicate progressively illicit coca cultivation.

(4) Granting the economic and natural disasters that have struck Peru in the last few years, the share of the country's budget assigned to bringing coca under control is still far too minimal, given the extent of the problem known to exist.

(5) The illicit production of coca and the illicit manufacture and traffic in coca paste and cocaine has reached such an extent, that it is breaking down and corrupting the agriculture, police and judicial systems of the country.

(6) Stricter oversight is going to be required on the part of the government to maintain the integrity of government institutions and prevent corruption.

Dr. Victor Camacho, Chairman of the Directorate of ENACO, the coca monopoly, responded. He said the main objective of ENACO is to control the legal production of coca and prevent diversion to the illicit traffic. This is done by a licensing system which was started in 1978 and involved 9,000 growers. He said that even the so-called traditional growers of coca in the Tingo Maria area has only been involved in this activity for a short time. However, he added that these traditional licensed growers are ethical and moral individuals who only sell their coca crop to ENACO.

Dr. Camacho stated that 80 percent of the legal coca crop purchased by ENACO each year is used domestically for coca chewing. The remainder is utilized for legal pharmaceutical and flavoring extract purposes.

He went on to say that crop substitution is the best way to implement eradication. He felt they were moving in that direction.

In response, Representative Gilman stated that in discussions on crop substitution, he was troubled by the fact that the government had no information on the number of illegal coca growers that existed. Mr. Gilman also expressed concern with the belief that substitute crops existed which could provide the growers earnings equal to what he could sell his crop for in the illicit traffic.

Mr. Gilman also raised the issue of coca leaf chewing and said that the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 required that practice to be phased out by 1989 and that it was his understanding Peru has done nothing to date to bring this about.

Dr. Camacho said he knew about this, but in point of fact, the people who prepared the Single Convention made a great mistake in classifying coca leaf as a drug. He said he knew that it was not a drug and that it should not be considered a drug.

Mr. Gilman responded that regardless of Dr. Camacho's opinion, 134 nations, including Peru, had ratified the Single Convention, which clearly identifies coca leaf as narcotic substance, subject to the requirements of the treaty and where coca leaf chewing is traditional it requires that it be ended within 25 years after the convention comes into force, which is December 1989.

Minister of Agriculture Hurtado Miller concluding our meeting by stressing that Peru was very concerned about the drug problem, not only because it finances the "Sendero guerrillas," but also because it adversely affects countries like the United States, which supports the development of Peru. While he did not feel Peru had a serious drug abuse problem now, he thought it could develop one.

Following the meeting with the Minister of Agriculture, Representatives Gilman and Lewis, with staff, made a courtesy call upon the Honorable Dagoberto Lainez Vodanovic, President of the Chamber of Deputies. They exchanged expressions of concern with Mr. Lainez

Vodanovic over the seriousness of the problem of the production and traffic of coca and cocaine in Peru and how it was so tragically affecting both countries.

On Friday, August 12, 1983, Representatives Collins, Towns, Sawyer and Dixon proceeded to Cuzco where they were briefed by General Arcos, Regional Commander of the Peruvian Investigative Police for the Cuzco Department.

General Arcos began by saying that his discourse would describe both the social and operational aspects of coca cultivation and police control of that cultivation in the Cuzco department.

General Arcos said that, within the Cuzco department, the city of Quillabamba was the principal center for coca cultivation. He also said that the cultivation of coca in the department of Cuzco was enormous. Although the Peruvian coca monopoly, ENACO, estimates that five million kilos (5,000 tons) of leaf coca are cultivated in Cuzco yearly, he is certain that actual production is at least three times that amount (15,000 tons). Also, whereas 15 percent of all the coca cultivated in Peru is grown in the Upper Huallaga Valley, 62 percent of the entire national coca crop is harvested in Cuzco.

General Arcos asserted that Peruvian officials have no police or governmental control over coca cultivation in Cuzco. He said further that, "we know what is happening in the Upper Huallaga; we don't know what is happening in Cuzco." He emphasized he does not have the resources to engage in effective police action in his area of jurisdiction. He specifically said he needed a larger PIP presence in Quillabamba (presently 15 officers are assigned there) and, second, because of a lack of intelligence, would need assistance in both intelligence gathering and analysis.

Conclusions

Peru has participated in the international narcotic control movement from its inception in 1912 to establish through a series of conventions, an international legal system that would limit the cultivation, manufacture and distribution of narcotic and psychotropic drugs to medical and scientific purposes.

The Government of Peru participated in the work of the League of Nations in its efforts to develop the narcotic control system and has been a member of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs from its inception in 1946 to carry forward the control system.

Peru was also one of the 40 countries to ratify the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 that were necessary to bring it into force. Since that time, 94 additional countries have ratified the convention for a total of 134. Peru, of course, participated in the plenipotentiary conference that prepared the treaty. Prior thereto from 1957 through 1961, the Government of Peru worked closely with the World Health Organization (WHO), the Permanent Control Opium Board (PCOB) now the International Narcotic Control Board (INCB) and the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs and its Secretariat, the Division of Narcotic Drugs on study and research that formed the basis for the provisions of the Single Convention that brought the cultivation of coca leaf under a licensing system that would limit its production to legal purposes and levels and required that the practice of coca leaf

29-222 O - 84 - 4

chewing be phased out 25 years after the Convention came into force.

The point of all of this is, that there is no country in the world, that on the basis of participation and experience in the international narcotic control system that should have a greater awareness than Peru of the objectives, requirements and obligations of the system and particularly the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961.

As stated previously in this report, Peru ratified the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 on July 22, 1964. The treaty came into force in December of that year.

To comply with its obligation under the Single Convention in 1964, the Government of Peru enacted Decree Law 254, prohibiting any new cultivation of coca and set about registering growers. At the time it was estimated that 10,000 hectares of coca were under cultivation in Peru. What is now known, of course, is that the Government of Peru did not implement its prohibition against new cultivation of coca.

From 1964 through 1976, coca leaf, cultivated in all six areas of the country where it was produced, expanded steadily. By 1978, the Government of Peru recognized on the basis of the concern expressed by the United States, Canada, a number of European countries, the International Narcotic Control Board and the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs over the volume of coca and cocaine originating in Peru, that the production of coca leaf in their country had moved out of control.

On that basis, the Government of Peru enacted Decree Law 22095, which expanded upon Decree Law 254 of 1964, prohibiting new coca cultivation. At that point the register for licensing the cultivation of coca was closed with 25,000 growers licensed to produce coca on 18,000 hectares.

However, as the Government of Peru had failed to enforce its prohibition against new coca cultivation after 1964, it failed again to enforce the reconstituted prohibition against new coca production of 1978. However, unlike the gradual escalation of coca production after 1964, all evidence points to an explosion of production from 1977 onward, amounting to as much as a 30 percent increase annually. As of 1983, total coca leaf production in Peru is estimated at anywhere from 50,000 to 250,000 hectares. Whatever it is, it is totally out of control and still expanding.

As is known the wholesale price of cocaine in the United States has in the first six months of 1983, fallen from $60,000 per kilo to $28,000. It is reliably reported that enormous quantities of coca leaf, that has become available, are being converted to coca paste and that such vast quantities of that substance are available, that there are insufficient technicians and laboratories in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador to convert it to cocaine. Coca paste is reportedly being offered for smuggling to the United States for conversion to cocaine to take advantage of the technical skills and chemicals available for that purpose in the underworld of the United States. In addition to the United States, there are 21 countries throughout the world which now report significant to major problems with the traffic and abuse of cocaine—half of which must originate with coca leaf production in Peru.

For almost five years now, the Government of Peru has been proposing to initiate crop substitution programs and enforce its prohibi-

tion against the illicit cultivation of coca. Because of the enormous increase of coca production in the Upper Huallaga Valley and because significant production in that area was not traditional, as it has been in the other five areas of the country, the Upper Huallaga was singled out as the area to commence crop substitution and begin eradication of illicit cultivation. However, to date, notwithstanding the fact the United States has made available $15 million in law enforcement assistance, Peru has failed to commence the eradication program it proposed to implement in 1981.

An agricultural development project, also funded in 1981, in the amount of $18 million, designed to provide agricultural research and extension help to increase agricultural opportunities to enhance the transition of growers to other crops, is in its initial phase.

The Government of Peru has now apparently changed its position that illicit coca production in the Upper Huallaga should be eradicated and that $18 million in research and extension help was sufficient to facilitate grower transition to new crops. Now we are told $200 million to $300 million is needed to develop a TVA-type agricultural and rural development program in the Upper Huallaga which over a five-year period would create an environment where growers, upon request, would begin on their own, to adopt new crops in place of coca.

In effect, the Government of Peru now wishes to provide thousands of illicit growers of coca with a rural development bonanza as a reward for ending an activity that has been illegal in Peru since 1964, and which the vast majority of growers only began producing about 1977 in the Upper Huallaga. Additionally, by all accounts, that area represents only 15 percent of coca production in Peru.

The Committee regards the concept espoused by the Government of Peru of development first and eradication later, as fatally flawed. Coca production, not only in the Upper Huallaga Valley, but in at least five other sectors of the country, has politically and economically taken over. Only a strong and determined implementation of the 1964 prohibition against illicit and unlicensed coca production can succeed. Farmers are continuing to abandon other crops, including food crops, to engage in coca cultivation.

Additionally, the progressive elimination of the illicit cultivation of coca or any narcotic crop in a country must be carried out simultaneously in all sectors of the country where it exists. If it is not, cultivation will increase in the sectors where eradication is not carried out to make up for the reductions caused where eradication is carried out.

The Peruvian Government's hopes for a $200 million to $300 million development project in the Upper Huallaga to encourage growers to give up coca is impractical. The enormous private investment capital they are hoping to attract would never consider risking investment in the lawless, violent environment of Peru's coca producing regions with its proliferation of clandestine coca paste facilities, illicit trafficking organizations, clandestine airstrips and destructive slash and burn agriculture.

On the other hand should the Government of Peru implement a program that would ensure the elimination of illicit coca production, with all its destructive side effects, there is every reason to believe foreign assistance and private investment would find these coca growing regions attractive for development assistance and private investment.

The Government of Peru should recognize that its illicit production of the coca leaf is responsible for at least half of all the cocaine trafficked and abused worldwide; that one out of every nine people in the country now abuse coca leaf, coca paste or cocaine, and these abuse patterns are rising. Land and hands that should be growing food crops are increasingly diverted to coca and Peru is losing the ability to feed itself. The production and traffic of coca and cocaine is turning vast sections of the countryside and urban areas over to criminal narcotic traffickers and their organizations which are, in turn, through corruption, force and the threat of force challenging the administration of the government in the control of its territory.

Recommendations

1. In accordance with the provisions of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, Peru should without delay prepare a plan that will:

(a) Establish the quantity of coca leaf that is required to meet its current coca leaf chewing needs and for its own and the international pharmaceutical and flavoring extract market.

(b) Establish the hectares needed to produce these legal coca requirements and then limit licenses to the number of growers necessary to cultivate the number of hectares that are needed.

(c) Progressively eliminate all other production of coca by the voluntary compliance of growers or eradication, if necessary, as soon as possible.

(d) A soon as the quantity of coca necessary for chewing, legal pharmaceutical, and flavoring purposes is established, the Government of Peru should initiate a program to progressively eliminate the practice of coca leaf chewing by December 1989 as required by Article 44 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. Coca leaf produced for chewing could then be commensurately reduced as required by the Convention.

The fact that Peru did not face up to its obligation to phase out coca leaf chewing beginning in 1964 and continued to produce large quantities of coca to sustain this harmful public health problem is the genesis of the current uncontrolled production and traffic of coca in Peru. Now the practice of coca leaf chewing has to be phased out, not only for the health and welfare of the pitiful users of coca, but also to reduce coca leaf production to lessen the risk of its diversion to the illicit traffic of coca ostensibly produced for chewing.

It should be noted that all countries that ratified the Single Convention, and which had at the time permitted (1) the quasi-medical use (eating) of opium, or (2) opium smoking, or the use of cannabis for non-medical purposes have under Article 49 ended those practices.

2. At such time as the Government of Peru proposes a plan and commits itself to reduce the licensed cultivation of coca to a level commensurate with legal requirements and which also provides for the progressive elimination of illicit coca cultivation within a reasonable period of time, the United States Government should commit itself to providing the financial and technical assistance that may be required by Peru, in the fields of agricultural development, administrative and

law enforcement, to limit coca production and traffic of coca, coca paste and cocaine.

3. On the basis of the Peruvian commitment and program to bring the coca problem under control, the United States Government should urge other American states, which are seriously victimized by coca production in Peru, such as Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chile to assist Peru along with the United States to the extent their financial resources will permit. The Western European countries which have also become victims of this problem, should also be urged to join in this assistance to Peru. The narcotic control organs of the United Nations and the World Health Organization can also provide valuable technical assistance support to Peru to enable it to bring its coca production and use problem under control in compliance with its obligations to the Single Convention.

Further delay and continued failure to control coca by Peru will bring an increasing illicit production and traffic of coca and cocaine in the country. This will, on a worldwide basis, increase the availability of cocaine, lower the price and spread the use of the substance.

On the other hand, by addressing the problem, Peru will improve the health of its people, bring stability to the countryside and create an environment for agricultural and industrial development and progress, supported by foreign assistance and international corporate investment.

4. If the Government of Peru continues its failure to prepare and implement a plan to reduce the licensed production of coca to legal requirements and ensure effective control of that production and the progressive elimination of the illicit cultivation of coca within a reasonable period of time, the following steps should be taken:

(a) A copy of this report should be transmitted to the President and the Secretary of State requesting an explanation as to why, on the basis of the findings reported herein the "Rodino Amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 should not be invoked with reference to Peru. It requires that the President shall suspend economic and military assistance to a country when the President determines that the government of such country has failed to take adequate steps to prevent illicit narcotic drugs and other controlled substances from being produced and processed in the country.

(b) An explanation should also be requested as to why the "Rangel Amendments" to the laws governing United States participation in the international development banks should not be invoked. They require that: (1) the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of the (Inter-American Development) Bank to vote against any loan or other utilization of the funds of the Bank for the benefit of any country with respect to which the President has made a determination, and so notified the Secretary of the Treasury that the government of such country has failed to take adequate steps to prevent illicit narcotic drugs and other controlled substances from being produced or processed in whole or in part in such country.

(2) The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the International Development

Association to vote against any loan or other utilization of the funds of the Bank and the Association for the benefit of any country with respect to which the President has made a determination, and so notified the Secretary of the Treasury, that the government of such country has failed to take adequate steps to prevent illicit narcotic drugs and other controlled substances from being produced or processed in whole or in part in such country.

(3) The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of the Asian Development Bank to vote against any loan or other utilization of the funds of the Bank for the benefit of any country with respect to which the President has made a determination and so notified the Secretary of the Treasury that the government of such country has failed to take adequate steps to prevent illicit narcotic drugs and other ocntrolled substances from being produced or processed in whole or in part in such country.

(c) An explanation should also be requested as to why the provisions recently amended to Section 1003(a) Section 481(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291(a)) by Senator Hawkins and Representatives Zablocki, Rangel, and Gilman pertaining to the suspension of assistance for failure to progressively eliminate the illicit production of narcotic crops should not be implemented.

Addendum

There is attached a translation of the plan outlined by Engineer Eduardo Watson under the aegis of Minister of Agriculture Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller in a meeting at his office with Representatives Gilman and Lewis and staff on August 11, 1983.

The Agrarian Bank of Peru and the Coca Problem in the High Central Huallaga Valley and Upper Huallaga

It is estimated that in the entire area of the former Tingo Maria Tocache-Campanilla settlement there are currently some 20,000–25,000 hectares with coca plantations (although there is not an exact estimate in this respect). The coca crops are principally on the hillsides located on both sides of the Huallaga River Valley.

The Peruvian State agencies are aware of the gravity of this coca problem and of the urgency of adopting measures immediately to deal with it.

The measures to control the production and illegal trade of coca are not only of a police nature, but also they should include both the eradication and/or replacement (as far as possible) of the coca plantations, as well as the effective agro-industrial, agricultural and 'mal husbandry development of the valley of the central belt, which has a potential agricultural area on the order of 170,000 hectares, in order to provide the possibility of a different occupation to the current rural population (about 100,000 persons) and to settle new inhabitants in an atmosphere different from the one that predominates in the area today.

The Agrarian Bank of Peru, understanding that it should participate in the agrarian actions that should be taken in the immediate future in relation to the coca problem, as a first step has hired a consulting firm. Watson Ingenieros, S.A./Engineers/to do a prefeasibility study with respect to said actions.

Said study will be submitted the first week of the coming month of September 1983, but from that advanced so far, the following opinions and conclusions can be extracted:

There is an enormous range of tropical plant species with adaptability to the ecological environment of the distinct zones that make up the area included in the study. In this diversity of species, there are some six species of plants producing long (hard and soft) fibers, there are also plants producing fibers for use by artesans and species for obtaining raw material for paper pulp (in this

case some four possibilities that are not forest extraction but rather crops), plants producing waxes (two species), plants producing rubber or gum (two species), plants producing resins, essential oils, sugar and starches, medicinal plants and plants which make possible the obtaining of products utilized in phytohygiene, plants used for smoking (tobacco), plants considered as species or producers of colorants and flavorings, plants for the preparation of drinks (coffee, tea and cacao) and food plants. Among these last ones there are tubers, grains (cereals and legumes), fruits, nuts and vegetables. In all, there are some 80 economical plants adapted to the type of humid tropic in the area in the study, some perennial, others biannual and others annual.

Of these approximately 80 possible economic crops, a few are plants already cultivated locally, the greater part being crops unknown in the area but established in other countries or regions. Another smaller part are crops of new species considered highly promising (after investigation of some aspects to make possible their cultivation).

In spite of the diversity of agricultural possibilities, actually cultivating these crops in significant amounts and with good economic success makes it necessarily obligatory to organize agroindustrial or commercial business entities of the private sector that will foster, organize, supervise, gather and process or market the production of the medium and small farmers, whether or not they have a base of their own crops. The State should create the conditions of stability, support and order in the rural environment so that an affirmation of these business entities will be achieved without which the agrarian development required in the area will not be possible.

Another essential aspect will be the production of propagation material (seeds, slips, shoots, etc.), in most cases an initial importation and partially continued in many cases of seeds or other plant material of propagation. That includes the creation of entities specializing in the production and/or multiplication of seeds and other plant propagation material.

In the region of the study there exists an extensive development of cattle raising, spread out and uneconomical, which will require an immediate improvement aimed at semi-stabled milk production.

With respect to forestry, it is possible to initiate a program of reforestation planned and technically well executed in the lands with slopes that make them inappropriate for agriculture. These programs would be based on select timber-yielding trees of the region and foreign species that have been tested in other South American humid tropic regions with respect to their adaptability (such as the Gmelina arborea, Pinus caribaea and Eucalyptus deglupta.) The products to be obtained would be sawed wood and paper pulp.

Agricultural and animal husbandry, agroindustrial and forestry planning that is carried out should consider that the current rural population is at a very low technological level and with a visible underdevelopment with respect to lifestyle and economy, with only a small proportion profiting from the benefits of the illegal traffic of the leaf and coca paste. The farmers of the area in general, due to their poor socio-economic level, are slow and negative with respect to changing the type of exploitation (crops and technology) that they have traditionally practiced. For that reason, promotional programs and extensive and effective agricultural programs administered by the state agencies (Ministry of Agriculture and INIPA), will be necessary, but a significant part of that could be done by private companies that, as was indicated in the previous paragraph, are necessary for the achievement of the agrarian development that it is hoped will be implanted in the area in the immediate future.

Rationally sized programs in rural housing and human health issues should also be implemented as the agrarian development progresses.

On the other hand, the completion of the paving, of the Tingo Maria-Tocache section of the Marginal Highway (which today has reached Pucayacu, near the Aspuzana River, some 100 km of paving lacking) and the construction of an additional bridge over the Huallaga River (opposite the Uchiza zone, probably in Puerto Santa Lucia) are necessary with respect to the volubility in the area for developing.

In the energy area, also fundamental for regional development, it will be necessary to take the extension of the high tension electrical line from Tingo Maria to Tocache (some 190 km). Already planned, for relatively short completion, is the high tension line Cerro de Pasco-Huanuco-Tingo Maria, interconnected to the entire ELECTROPERU electrical system.

A first step (next four years) in the development of the area under study, would be the development of only 60 percent of the potential agricultural area, that is, some 100,000 hectares and the necessary investment, calculated a grosso modo (which will have to be readjusted with more complete studies) would be the following:

	U.S. dollars
Research and extension programs and studies	20, 000, 000
Implantation of 20,000 hectares of oil palm (Elaeis) (at U.S. $2,500 per hectare)	50, 000, 000
Installation of palm oil extraction plants (at U.S. $2,000/hectare)	40, 000, 000
Implantation of 40,000 hectares of various permanent and semi-permanent crops (at U.S. $1,200/hectare)	48, 000, 000
Implantation of 35,000 hectares of annual crops (at U.S. $700/ hectare as annual agricultural loan)	25, 000, 000
Installation of diverse industrial plants	20, 000, 000
Livestock improvement (30,000 additional bovines)	9, 000, 000
Installations for animal husbandry and processing of cattle products	6, 000, 000
Rural housing program (approximately U.S. $300 per hectare developed)	30, 000, 000
Health and well-being of rural area	15, 000, 000
Paving of the Pucayacu (Aspuzana)-Tocache span of the Marginal Highway	8, 500, 000
Bridge over the Huallaga River (in Pto Lucia)	3, 500, 000
Extension of high tension electric line from Tingo Maria to Tocache	25, 000, 000
Total	300, 000, 000

Given the current fiscal situation of the country, the amount necessary for achieving the development suggested should be obtained abroad or more precisely from the USA (since the coca problem especially affects that country; in addition this contribution be taken not as simple assistance from the U.S. to Peru, but principally as an investment for the control of the production and traffic of coca).

For the handling of this investment, with respect to the sum to be dedicated to agrarian development, including the rural housing and health and well-being programs (U.S. $263,000,000) it would be deposited in the Agrarian Bank of Peru, who, acting as trustee, would carry out the financial handling. At the same time a high level Special Authority would be formed which would have the authority to decide upon the distribution of the expenditures authorized to the Bank to assign the respective sums to whomever it concerned and indicating to it the conditions and terms under which the investments should be made. The Bank would be responsible for the collecting of the amortizations (whenever they should be made) and interests (whenever they are considered appropriate) in the cases of loans to agroindustrial enterprises and the farmers. In addition, it will be up to the investments for the sums handed over in accordance with what is specified in each case. The Special Upper Huallaga Project will be responsible for the agricultural research and extension actions that may be considered as corresponding to the public sector (it being possible to reach an agreement with INIPA). The Special Authority to be constituted would have a President expressly named who would be a highly prepared professional familiar with the reality of the area and its problems and it would also be made up of three directors, two named by the Minister of Agriculture (one of which should belong to INIPA) and another named by the Governing Body of the Agrarian Bank of Peru. The three should be high level officials. The Special Authority would have a minimum of bureaucratic infrastructure and facilities, using those of the bank as much as possible.

In addition, the funds for the implementation of the transportation infrastructure (U.S. $12,000,000) would operate through the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and those assigned for the high tension electric line would be channeled through the Ministry of Energy and Mines.—Lima, August 11, 1983.

BOLIVIA

Coca leaf produced in Bolivia is the raw material responsible for 45 percent of the cocaine entering the United States. About 10 percent of that cocaine is also illicitly produced in Bolivia.

In Bolivia as in Peru the coca bush has grown wild and been cultivated for at least 2,000 years. It is traditionally chewed for its mild stimulating effect to overcome fatigue associated with high altitude. It also has the side effect of serving as an appetite suppressant in an area where food is not plentiful.

As in Peru, coca was traditionally grown by the number of farmers and on the land area sufficient to meet the domestic market for coca leaf chewing. During this century in addition to the traditional use of coca, mining companies in Bolivia began to provide it gratis to miners as part of their employment arrangement to relieve the weariness of their arduous labor. As is known during the 19th century in the United States, companies building canals and railroads provided their non-Chinese workers whiskey and their Chinese laborers opium as part of their work agreements. By the turn of the century this practice in the United States ended when medical and social advancement recognized that shorter working hours, better working conditions and proper food could prevent the fatigue that was thought to require opium or whiskey for relief.

Because Bolivia only produced coca to supply its domestic chewing market, the quantity of coca historically produced, until recent years, has been substantially less than Peru. This is because it has in general averaged only one third of the population of Peru and one third of the number of coca chewers.

Bolivia, with a population of about 6 million, is thought to have about 500,000 coca chewers. Peru, with a population of about 18 million, has about 1.5 million chewers. Because of its landlocked position, surrounded by Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile and Peru, and its traditional lack of communication and transportation, coca leaf production in Bolivia was just about ignored by the international pharmaceutical industry and the illicit traffic. All that was required by those entities was readily available and more easily supplied by Peru.

While Bolivia ratified the Narcotic Control Conventions of 1912, 1925, and 1946, it did not ratify the Single Convention of 1961 until September 23, 1976. By virtue of its ratification of the 1912 and 1925 Conventions, Bolivia was obligated to control the legal import, export, manufacture and distribution of opium and coca products, to limit their use to medical purposes and to suppress the illicit traffic. In theory, at least, it did so. However, traditionally Bolivia was delinquent in its reporting obligations to the League of Nations' and United Nations' bodies responsible for the implementation of these treaties. Additionally, Bolivia never actively participated in the work of the League of Nations Narcotics Advisory Committee, and the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs until the late 1970's. For decades this did not seem to matter much because the production and chewing of coca leaf in Bolivia did not adversely effect any other country.

Following World War II, underworld elements in Mexico City and Havana began obtaining illicitly manufactured cocaine in Peru. Subsequently, they began to obtain supplies of coca paste in Peru for conversion to cocaine in clandestine laboratories they set up in Mexico City and Havana.

By about 1955 as communication and air transportation to Bolivia improved, organized Cuban narcotic traffickers had, in concert with

elements in La Paz and Cochabamba, brought on line a significant coca paste conversion capability and an embryo illicit cocaine manufacturing capability. By the late 1950's Bolivia and more specifically La Paz and Cochabamba had become the major source for coca paste for the clandestine manufacture of cocaine in Cuba. This traffic with Cuba gradually ended between 1959 and 1960 when the Cuban narcotic traffickers in Havana and Santiago fled to the United States, Mexico and Colombia following the Castro takeover.

The collapse of the coca paste traffic to Cuba saw the beginning of a serious cocaine manufacturing and trafficking capability developing in Arica, Iquique, Antofagasta, Valparaiso, and Santiago, Chile. There is some evidence that the heavy cocaine traffic from Chile to the United States, that began developing by 1965, was motivated by pre-Castro Cuban underworld elements, by then firmly entrenched in the United States. Simultaneously there is positive evidence that Cuban traffickers settled in both the United States and Colombia, established a significant illicit cocaine manufacturing capability in several Colombian cities. This was supported by coca base smuggled from Bolivia and Peru from sources at least in the beginning developed by the Cubans.

The fall of the Allende regime in Chile ended the significance of that country as a center for the illicit manufacture and traffic of cocaine originating with coca paste smuggled from Peru and Bolivia. Colombia then became the dominant manufacturing center for cocaine and by the mid- to late 1970's the Colombian narcotic trafficking organizations no longer had any need for their original Cuban mentors except as customers, wherever they might be.

The Colombians proved to be aggressive developers of coca sources of supply and as they did in Peru, by instigating the transformation of the Upper Huallaga Valley from a small producer of coca into a major producer, they had very much the same influence in developing the Chapare region of Bolivia from a marginal producer into the region where as much as 80 percent of total Bolivian coca is reportedly produced. This percentage seems unusually high, given the fact significant coca production exists in three other "traditional" areas and three "nontraditional" areas of Bolivia.

Up until the great expansion of coca production in the Chapare from the mid-1970's, to meet the Colombian demand for coca paste, the Yungas region had traditionally been the major producer of coca for domestic chewing and what illicit manufacture and traffic had developed. The areas where coca is significantly cultivated are:

	Location
Traditional areas:	
Chapare	Central.
Yungas	West Central.
Apolo	Northwest.
Ayapaya	Central.
Nontraditional areas:	
Santa Cruz	Eastern Lowlands.
Beni	Northeast Lowlands.
Pando	Northwest Lowlands.

Estimates of the total metric tons of coca leaf now produced in Bolivia run from 50,000 to 62,500 with the most commonly given as 55,000. Whatever the total may be, and all indications are that it is still increasing annually, only 15 percent is reportedly converted into co-

caine in country, ranking Bolivia third in illicit cocaine manufacture behind Colombia and Peru. Cocaine is smuggled directly from Bolivia worldwide and also via Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Argentina. The 20 to 25 percent of the coca crop consumed domestically is in the form of coca leaf chewing, and the remaining 60 to 65 percent is converted to coca paste for local consumption and smuggling to Colombia, Brazil, Chile and Argentina for conversion to cocaine for use in these countries or smuggling abroad.

As in the case of Peru, the estimated 12,000 tons of coca consumed annually for chewing appears to be too high. It may actually not be more than 2,400 tons annually.

By 1970, the production and traffic of coca and cocaine in Peru and Bolivia, as well as the illicit manufacture and traffic in Chile and Colombia from raw materials originating in Peru and Bolivia, began to be recognized and brought about diplomatic pressure from the United States and the United Nations narcotic control bodies for Peru and Bolivia to take corrective measure.

While these efforts were unsuccessful in persuading Bolivia to ratify the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, they did result in the Government of Bolivia forming in 1973 "The National Directorate for the Control of Dangerous Substances" (DNCSP) to direct and coordinate the overall narcotics control effort. The DNCSP, established as an arm of the Ministry of Interior, covered all aspects of national control including the legal cultivation and distribution of coca leaf, the suppressing of the illicit cultivation and traffic of coca and cocaine, as well as drug abuse prevention, education, treatment and rehabilitation programs.

Narcotic control assistance to Bolivia began with a $200,000 U.S. AID Public Safety program from 1972 through 1974. This was part of a series of crash programs launched in several South American countries during that period to assist police services address the rising illicit traffic in narcotics originating and transiting that region. This was followed by a pilot project in 1975 sponsored by the State Department "Special Narcotic Fund" to a crop substitution program. In June 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with President Hugo Banzer of Bolivia at Santa Cruz where it was agreed to expand the pilot project. This meeting also led to Bolivia ratifying the Single Convention of 1961 as amended, on September 23, 1976.

In 1977 bilateral agreements were signed: (1) to expand investigations of alternate crops to coca; and (2) to provide assistance to the National Directorate for the Control of Dangerous Substances (DNCSP) for overall narcotic control.

The strategy of the substitute crop and narcotic control projects in Bolivia was the same in 1977 as it is today in 1983 to reduce coca production in Bolivia to legitimate requirements, to effectively control it and prevent diversion to illicit manufacture and trafficking.

Following the actual ratification of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and to date, it appears that no discussions were ever had with the Bolivian Government leadership on coming to a mutual understanding of their obligations under the treaty to reduce coca production to what was required to supply coca leaf chewers and the very limited international pharmaceutical market. How the Government of

Bolivia would implement its obligation beginning in late 1976 to gradually phase out coca leaf chewing and reduce the production necessary for that purpose on a regular basis, so as to end it entirely by December 1989, as required by the Single Convention, has never been considered.

As stated before, beginning in the early to mid-50's, coca leaf production appears to have gradually increased to meet a commensurate increase in demand for coca paste and cocaine. The bulk of the coca leaf produced up to some point between 1970 and 1975, was chewed domestically. However, from that point on, chewing requirements remained constant while demand for coca for illicit coca paste and cocaine manufacture escalated dramatically. From 1977 to 1981 coca production in Bolivia is estimated to have increased by 78 percent to about 55,000 metric tons. Reports indicate production is still increasing and the enormous annual increase in coca leaf production in both Peru and Bolivia as well as the coming on line of significant Colombian cultivation has flooded the market with an oversupply of coca paste and cocaine that decreased the price of a kilo of pure cocaine in the United States from $60,000 to $28,000 during the first six months of 1983.

By 1976 there was ample evidence available that coca production and the illicit manufacture of coca paste and cocaine was on the rise in Bolivia as a result of traditional coca growers expanding their production and farmers who never grew before, beginning production as well as cultivation, starting up in regions of Bolivia where it had not been traditional.

This could only be addressed by a government that recognized its responsibility to limit coca production to legal requirements to control that production, and prevent illicit cultivation. There is nothing on record that indicates the Government of Bolivia committed itself to this obligation, or that the United States Government made clear its expectation that Bolivia should do so. Instead we witness the greatest transition in Bolivian history from 1977 through 1981, and probably to date, of farmers abandoning traditional food crops to grow coca in both the traditional and non-traditional areas.

Ironically in 1977, 1978 and 1979, agreements were signed providing grant assistance to Bolivia to determine which crops could be grown in the Yungas and Chapare regions to facilitate farmers' transition to replacement crops for coca.

In 1976 a contract was concluded with the University of Florida to provide the agronomic and economic studies necessary to pinpoint the most practical and profitable substitutes for coca, on the basis of productivity and marketability in Bolivia.

This was based on the classic theory of replacing narcotic crops, which holds that there is no known single crop that can substitute one-on-one for a narcotic crop, since the crop substitutes cannot compete with what can be earned by selling a narcotic crop in the illicit market. On the other hand, the conventional wisdom is that if farmers are given one or more alternate crops that can provide a reasonable substitute income when they are prohibited from growing the narcotic crop, they are more likely to be satisfied and comply with the prohibition. This theory has never really been proven, nor has its corollary, that to

promote the transition to new crops from narcotic crops, extensive agricultural and rural development projects and programs are necessary to create an environment where farmers will willingly abandon their narcotic crops once the prohibition order is given. On the other hand, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that the one essential to farmers ending narcotic crop production and adopting substitute crops, is a firm order that the narcotic crop is, or is about to be, prohibited as of a certain date. If it is made clear to growers that they can no longer grow the narcotic crop and by doing so they risk having it eradicated and possible prosecution, they turn to a variety of substitute crops that they have been traditionally growing on their own.

Enlightened governments which have dealt with this problem successfully have taken the position that their responsibility is to inform the grower of their prohibition order and ensure that he no longer grows the narcotic crop. Further, they have no responsibility to provide him with a substitute because there are always a variety of substitutes, the farmer has rotated with the narcotic crop or traditionally grown simultaneously with it. Governments have also taken the position that their only concern is to ensure farmers do not grow the narcotic crop, whether he grows a substitute or nothing at all is the farmer's business, not the government's. Governments have found that farmers usually know on their own what substitute to grow, but that the government can be helpful in recommending certain traditional, as well as new alternate crops which might be more marketable and profitable to the farmers.

Regrettably, in Bolivia in 1976, the Government did not understand or chose to ignore its obligation to license and limit coca production to legal requirements, to prohibit any new production and provide for the eradication of the unlicensed production.

Instead, in 1977, the Bolivian Government set up an agency "Proyecto de Desarollo—CHAPARE-YUNGAS" (PRODES) to act as a counterpart to the U.S. sponsored University of Florida team. PRODES carried out many social and economic studies and working with the Institute Boliviana de Technologia Agropecudria (IBTA) set up at experimental stations pilot nurseries for the production of plant material seedlings for distribution to growers.

The experimental and study phase of the joint Bolivian-United States substitute crop development project, was essentially completed by the end of 1980. A wide variety of highly productive and marketable substitute crops were identified such as coffee, citrus fruits, cacao, tea, tropical fruits, spices and vegetables.

At this point in time the United States was considering a full scale agricultural diversification project with an estimated cost of $35 million over a five year period. However, consideration of this project was suspended with the military coup d'etat in July 1980.

Most observers believe no crop substitution program had any chance of success in 1980, nor do they think one can be successful now for the same reasons. The government of Bolivia has failed totally to implement the law to license and control the level of coca needed for legal domestic and international requirements, to prevent new cultivation, and to eradicate the enormous illicit cultivation that has developed, particularly between 1977 and 1981, when production more than tripled from 15,600 tons to 55,000 and is still said to be increasing.

What has developed in Bolivia since 1977 has been great numbers of farmers who had never grown coca, abandoning traditional food crops for coca, and farmers that had been growing coca, significantly increasing their production. In the absence of a clear cut declaration of a prohibition by the Government of Bolivia against all but the licensed cultivation of coca and any demonstration of implementing the prohibition, growers had no reason or incentive to abandon coca cultivation for the variety of substitute crops that had been developed. Actually the opposite was happening: multitudes of farmers were substituting coca for other traditional crops.

In March 1981, in recognition of the continuing increase in the production and traffic of coca and cocaine in the country, the Government of Bolivia formed a "National Council for the Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking." The Council was organized as a "super agency," independent of the Ministry of Interior, to oversee all narcotics control activities and the bringing under control of coca production. The DNCPS and the Department of Coca Registration and Control were placed under the direction of the Council.

The National Council for the Fight Against Narcotic Trafficking established in 1981, was somehow, in taking under its wing the DNCPS and the Department of Coca Registration and Control, supposed to solve a problem the latter two agencies had failed to solve since 1973. That was to establish and license the level of coca production necessary to meet the legitimate coca requirements of Bolivia, to control that production and provide for the elimination and eradication as necessary of all other coca production. In its two years of existence the National Council for the Fight Against Narcotic Trafficking has failed to initiate any measures to bring the production of coca in Bolivia under any form of licensing and control.

From 1976 through 1979, the State Department Bureau of International Narcotic Matters has provided $9.5 million in narcotic control assistance to Bolivia. No program funds were provided in Fiscal Years 1980 through 1982 as a result of the following sequence of events.

As is known, political instability is endemic in Bolivia which has averaged more than one government a year since the Republic was established in 1825. In July 1980 an Army leader, General Luis Garcia Meza, seized power. Several military officers linked to the cocaine traffic were appointed to high positions in the government by President Garcia Meza including Colonel Luis Arce Gomez, cousin of one Roberto Suarez. The latter is a powerful landowner in the Santa Cruz region. During the last decade in Bolivia, Roberto Suarez has developed into the "warlord" like leader of a "Santa Cruz Mafia" family he organized to promote the production of coca, coca paste and cocaine in the Chapare, Santa Cruz and Beni regions of Bolivia for smuggling and distribution abroad.

A sharp break in cooperative narcotic control efforts by the Bolivian Government with United States officials quickly followed Garcia Meza's takeover. Reports indicated that the narcotic production and trafficking activities of the Roberto Suarez and several other major trafficking organizations in Bolivia increased sharply under the new regime.

The United States Government refused to recognize the government of Garcia Meza, removed the Ambassador and the military mission, cut economic aid and suspended any new programs.

By August of 1981, severe economic difficulties brought on a junta of representatives of the three armed forces which forced Garcia Meza to resign. He was replaced by General Celso Torrelio as President. Continuing economic difficulties and the endemic instability of Bolivian politics brought about the replacement of General Torrelio by General Guido Vildosa Calderon on July 21, 1982. Two months later General Vildosa announced on September 30, 1982, that he would return the government to civilian rule and Dr. Hernan Siles Zuazo was inaugurated on October 10, 1983, and organized a coalition government which, notwithstanding frequent disruptive Cabinet crises, remains in office.

The regime of General Torrelio took some positive steps in drug control but they were not thought to be sufficient enough to justify the resumption of a substantial U.S. narcotic assistance package. Although the Government of General Vildosa committed itself to a number of anti-narcotics measures, nothing could be achieved during the two and one half months it was in office.

The Siles government has also committed itself publicly to reform and has taken some positive action: senior military officers implicated in narcotics trafficking have been removed or retired; civilian officials in charge of various anti-narcotics agencies have been removed for irregularities in the performance of their duties; and investigations for prosecution purposes of some major traffickers are reported to have been initiated. In this environment the United States Government has reestablished its cooperative narcotic control objective with the Government of Bolivia by assisting in a multi-year phased plan for the elimination of all coca not required for legal purposes and produced under a licensing and control system.

USAID non-narcotic assistance to Bolivia in FY 1981 totalled $10.5 million. For FY 1982 it is programmed at $10.2 million, and for FY 1983 at $10.5 million. In addition, a pre-1980 PL 480 Title III program, totalling $75 million, is still in effect. Of the $35 million balance existing in 1982, $10 million was obligated during the summer, leaving $25 million authorized but "on hold" under present circumstances. AID also has a $54 million loan program in Bolivia. All loans were made prior to July 1980. Of these, disbursements are still being made on $12 million, while outlays on the remainder have been frozen. Last, there are some $6 million in FMS funds authorized, but currently suspended.

On August 11, 1983, at La Paz, four Project Agreements were signed by the United States and Bolivia, wherein the latter committed itself to initiate a program in the Chapare region to gradually reduce coca production to what is required for legitimate purposes and to phase out and eradicate as necessary all other cultivation. The United States would provide assistance over a five year period to help Bolivia achieve this objective.

Additionally, narcotic enforcement training, equipment and operational support will be provided to the Bolivian National Police in an effort to develop an effective drug trafficking suppression program. The Select Committee is deeply concerned with reports it has received of the steady deterioration of the national police narcotic enforcement effort to the point where it is practically non-existent. Hopefully this will be corrected.

With the signing of four Project Agreements by the United States and Bolivia on August 11, 1983, the Bolivian Government has committed itself to a program of action to eradicate illicit coca cultivation. The project agreement on coca production control provides for United States assistance to a Bolivian effort to reduce the production of coca to levels of legitimate demand in five years.

The initial target is to reduce coca cultivation in the Chapare region by 4,000 hectares during the first two years of the project. This will be accomplished by programs of voluntary and mandatory eradication of illicit coca fields. Eradication efforts initially will be directed at absentee landlords and farmers who cultivate more than two hectares of coca. Once the Bolivian eradication teams are fully operational, an increase in the hectarage targeted for eradication annually will be negotiated when the agreement is renewed. If this program can be placed in operation, plans then call for it to be implemented in the Yungas and the five other areas of coca cultivation. Eradication operations would also be expanded to include the Yungas and other areas of illicit coca cultivation.

The agreement provides for the establishment of a new Directorate for Control and Reduction of Coca Cultivation whose specific purpose will be the systematic reduction of coca cultivation. Field operations will begin concurrently with enforcement efforts against traffickers and a companion project to control transport and marketing of licit coca. A Chapare Regional Development Project funded by AID is designed to help provide alternate sources of income for farmers as well as the infrastructure required for legitimate agriculture.

The field operations arm of the 100-man Control and Reduction Directorate will consist of 18 four-man teams which will be charged initially with targeting fields in excess of two hectares for systematic eradication. One member of each team will be hired from local farmers' organizations, and these organizations will be enlisted in efforts to secure voluntary eradication by farmers. Cooperating farmers who eradicate their illicit coca plantings will be paid a set fee consonant with the cost of required labor, and they will be given priority access to AID assistance. The cultivation of illicit coca by non-cooperating farmers will be subject to mandatory eradication by Directorate-hired teams of laborers, if voluntary eradication is not done by set deadlines.

United States funding for assistance and the costs of eradication, which is provided by the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters of the Department of State, is $5,180,000 for the first 16 months of the project.

Effective Bolivian Government control of the Chapare region is an essential prerequisite to success in narcotics control efforts assisted by the U.S. through the four Project Agreements signed in La Paz on August 11, 1983. The Narcotics Control—Enforcement Project Agreement provides for the National Directorate for Control of Dangerous Substances (DNCSP) to create, in addition to its other anti-narcotics units, a special strike force of 150 policemen which will be administered separately from other police forces. The entire force initially will be assigned to the Chapare, and will operate from a command center at Villa Tunari.

The strike force will act to reestablish sufficient police presence in the Chapare to inhibit and halt fabrication and trafficking in coca paste

and interdict the supply of coca leaf of narcotics traffickers. The overall task of DNCSP is to establish control posts at strategic points around and in the Chapare, operate mobile and permanent checkpoints to maintain order, and to put ten-man strike force squads into operation against narcotics fabricators and traffickers. The Guardia Nacional is charged with establishing routine police presence in Chapare towns as soon as the strike force has established general security.

In addition to taking the initial steps to impose law and order in the Chapare, the strike force will be charged with providing rapid reinforcement to regular police units and governmental agencies involved in enforcement and in coca control programs. In particular, the strike force will be charged with assuring compliance with laws and regulations governing coca crop eradication efforts. Additional duties of the DNCSP will include coordination with the Directorate for Control of Legal Coca to regulate licensing and control of transport of legal coca leaf, and a cooperative effort with the Bolivian Navy to patrol and control river coca trafficking in the Chapare.

The agreement calls for augmentation of the special police force with 200 additional DNCSP men during fiscal year 1984, expanded operations against trafficking in the Chapare, and establishment of a narcotics control police presence in the Yungas.

United States funding for assistance to this narcotics control enforcement effort is $2,470,000 for the first eighteen months of the project.

The cultivation and consumption of coca leaves has had considerable economic and cultural importance in Bolivia for at least 2000 years. The objectives of this US-GOB Project Agreement are: (1) to establish government control over the transport and marketing of coca leaves for legitimate, traditional use, (2) to develop a market system in which prices reflect supply and demand, (3) to prevent leakage from this controlled system to illicit traffickers, and (4) to determine the actual demands of the legitimate market.

Once licit demand is established, the Government of Bolivia will be in a position to devise a system for registering individual farmers for specific hectarage of licit coca cultivation, thus providing clear legal and enforceable distinction between licit and illegal coca cultivation. The system to be established for licensing and control of transport of coca leaves will provide for the confiscation of any coca cargo and transport conveyance which is not licensed.

The Directorate for Control and Fiscalization of Coca will be charged with overall responsibility for controlling legal coca and determining the level of licit demand. Under supervision of the Directorate, the National Federation of Campesinos will establish a cooperative to distribute coca for licit use to traditional leaf chewers. The objective will be to eliminate commercial interests which frequently work for narcotics traffickers. This controlled distribution will be managed through two regional markets to be established in or near La Paz and Cochabamba.

Transport control will be accomplished by licensing a limited number of trucks to transport coca leaf from the areas of production to the two regional markets. Further distribution of controlled quantities of coca leaf to legitimate end-users will be subject to similar licensing and controls. Compliance and enforcement responsibilities will be handled

29-222 O - 84 - 5

by specially designated narcotics police units. These units will be assisted under a companion project agreement which provides for control posts and mobile checkpoints to be established in the Chapare and the Yungas.

The Directorate will also be charged with conducting studies and maintaining distribution records to determine the level of legitimate demand for coca in Bolivia. The ultimate objective will be to reduce coca cultivation to the level required to meet that licit demand.

United States funding for assistance in controlling the transport and marketing of legal coca which is provided by the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters of the Department of State, is $400,000 for the first 18 months of the project.

The Enforcement—Special Investigations Project Agreement provides for the formation of a Special Police Narcotics Investigation Unit under the direct control of the National Committee for the Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking. This elite unit will be charged with investigating and apprehending major narcotics traffickers. The unit will be composed of not less than 10, two- or three-man teams of trained investigators, led by a ranking police officer. While the Special Investigation Unit will be headquartered in La Paz, the teams may be permanently located in other cities where intelligence dictates the need.

Each team will be qualified to conduct independent criminal investigations, evaluate intelligence, prepare dossiers on suspects, and control confidential informants. The teams also will establish close liaison with prosecutors to insure that sufficient evidence is gathered to successfully prosecute narcotics traffickers. In the course of their investigations the teams will, when possible, effect the interdiction of shipments of cocaine and other refined coca products and the apprehension of persons possessing these narcotics.

The Special Narcotics Investigation Unit will work cooperatively with other enforcement agencies, both Bolivian and United States. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) will provide formal and on the job training to enhance Bolivian investigative capability. DEA also will provide guidance and assistance to individual teams and develop an exchange of intelligence to insure the successful conclusion of investigations leading to prosecution of traffickers.

United States funding for the Special Narcotics Investigation Unit during the first eighteen months of the Project Agreement is $200,000.

The agreements with the Government of Bolivia to begin a program in the Chapare to bring the production and traffic of coca and cocaine under control is a step in the right direction. However, at this point in time, given the enormous illicit cultivation not only in the Chapare but in six other regions of the country, all of which are expanding, a program that only addresses the Chapare falls short of what is now needed.

Experience tells us that to bring illicit cultivation under a licensing system of control and to phase out and eradicate as necessary, illicit cultivation in a country, the program has to be implemented simultaneously throughout the entire country where the crop is growing or can be grown. If this is not done, legal growers in non-controlled areas increase production and illegal production will increase or start up in the non-controlled areas.

It is time for the Government of Bolivia with the technical and financial assistance of the United States to prepare and begin implementation of a plan that will provide for phasing down of coca production to legal requirements throughout the country. Success in the Chapare while ignoring coca production in six other regions will not reduce the illicit production and traffic of coca and cocaine originating in Bolivia.

This Committee is concerned that the program being organized to address the Chapare are not sufficient in the way of manpower, equipment and operating funds to get the job done. Also we see a failure to grasp the enormity of the problem of the uncontrolled production and traffic of coca, coca paste and cocaine that has developed over all major regions of Bolivia in the last decade and what it is really going to take to bring it under control.

The Committee's Visit to Bolivia

The Select Committee delegation arrived at La Paz from Lima on August 12, at 1:45 pm. following a comprehensive Embassy briefing led by Ambassador Corr, which included a description of the signing of the four agreements on narcotic control in the Chapare completed the previous day.

MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF BOLIVIA

The delegation met with Foreign Minister Marcial Tamayo at 3:00 p.m. The Foreign Minister warmly welcomed the delegation and said from his tour is Washington, as the Bolivian Ambassador, he knew of Chairman Rangel and Ranking Minority Member Gilman and of their special interest and work in drug control. Mr. Rangel introduced the delegation and described their congressional committee assignments in addition to their work with the Select Committee.

Foreign Minister Tamayo stated that the production and traffic of coca was recognized as a serious problem and that it had a corruptive and adverse impact on the national institutions of Bolivia. He felt the agreements signed the previous day were the foundation for correcting the situation. He praised the dedicated commitment of Ambassador Corr to developing and implementing Bolivian-American cooperative efforts in drug control and he had great hope they would succeed.

Minister Tamayo expressed his government's appreciation for the package of agreements which addresses the problem of the serious food shortages in Bolivia and the means of distributing food. He said the P.L. 480 (food) program was of great benefit to Bolivia.

Next, the Foreign Minister said the greatest problem facing Bolivia was the preservation of democracy. A solid power structure is needed to cope with the forces that would bring down democracy. He felt a power struggle was shaping up, brought on by forces which were bad and could prevent democracy from taking hold. Minister Tamayo went on to say the democratic government was now at a moment of crisis, he had a sense of outrage that this should be so. He was worried about the future and said after a long period of dictatorships, the country was unprepared to govern itself. He said he appreciated the fact that both Presidents Carter and Reagan understood Bolivia and concluded by

saying the candor of his remarks gave him a sense of relief; that he did not consider himself a typical foreign minister just making polite talk.

Chairman Rangel asked Representative Gilman to open for the delegation. Mr. Gilman said he was sorry to see that in Peru and Bolivia coca production was increasing; that there is a sense it is like a war pitting consumption against production. Mr. Gilman added that the delegation wished to make existing narcotic control measures between our two countries better and that the delegation welcomed the Foreign Minister's cooperation.

Foreign Minister Tamayo responded by saying he concurred with Mr. Gilman's remarks and the absolute need for international cooperation if we are to succeed. He said, two weeks ago he had attended a meeting of the Andean Pact countries held in Caracas, Venezuela. He had introduced a "special accord" calling for a common strategy to fight the drug problem that was unanimously adopted by the participating countries, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Bolivia.

Representative Hughes congratulated Foreign Minister Tamayo on the conclusion of the technical assistance agreements and said the police that would be trained would prove very valuable in combatting narcotic trafficking and terrorism.

As a means to assist Bolivia to strengthen its economic position so as to be better able to preserve democracy and address the illicit production and traffic of coca and cocaine, Representative Guarini asked if the delegation could be of help in supporting financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Foreign Minister Tamayo said his government did need support and that a visit by experts from the IMF to Bolivia was expected soon to take up this question.

Representative Lewis thanked the Foreign Minister for his warm welcome and asked what plans, if any, Bolivia had for eradication of illicit coca cultivation and whether other South American countries could help Bolivia, along with the United States to bring the coca and cocaine problem under control. As to eradication, Foreign Minister Tamayo suggested that Mr. Lewis raise it with the Minister of Interior, when they met, as he had more complete information on that. As to other South American countries helping Bolivia, Minister Tamayo said such cooperation was essential and that they were cooperating with each other through the Andean Pact and he thought that was the best way to do it.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOLIVIAN SENATE

At 4 p.m., the Select Committee delegation met with Julio Garret. He said you have come on important business and I have assembled the delegation warmly and welcomed the members to his chambers President of the Bolivian Senate at the Legislative Palace. He greeted seven important Senate leaders to meet with you.

Chairman Rangel said the delegation was happy to meet with the Senate leadership and brought greetings from the people of the United States and the Congress. He introduced Representatives Hughes, Guarini, Gilman and Lewis. He then said that the produc-

tion and traffic of coca and cocaine originating in Bolivia as well as in Peru and Colombia was destroying our country. It was straining to the breaking point our government institutions and corrupting our society and way of life; it is destroying our families and our children.

Senator Victor Andrade who had been the Bolivian Ambassador to the United States from the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt to John F. Kennedy was asked by the Senate President to act as spokesman for the leadership.

With eloquence and emotion he stated that Bolivia was now going through a critical period of time and that he would like to describe the current state of affairs as the Senate leadership saw it. Bolivia was now coming out of a military dictatorship, a police state, where liberty and human rights had not existed for almost 20 years. He said it is difficult for us now to find our way, we need sympathy and help.

Senator Andrade said, "you know our constitution and congress is the same as yours" and then fondly recalled his longstanding working relationship with Senators Tom Connelly and Arthur Vandenberg of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He said, "the congress gives substance to Democracy. If there is no congress, or no legislature, the people are without power and there is no control over the executives. We want above all to keep our democracy."

As to the coca, Senator Andrade said, as it is known, it is pre-Colombian and historically up until about 20 years ago amounted to a small production for chewing by the people in the high altitudes which he described as a "harmless consumption." Now the cultivation of the coca leaf has spread tremendously and an illicit manufacturing and trafficking problem has developed. Senator Andrade said all of this came about as a result of the market that developed for cocaine in the United States and elsewhere abroad. It is a problem for both our countries.

Representative Gilman said he wished to emphasize how destructive the production and traffic of coca and cocaine is to both our countries; destroying families, causing death and violence, filling our jails and corrupting our police.

Representative Guarini said that, "Of course, the United States must do more to persuade people not to use cocaine, but that our experience with drug abuse convinces us the source of supply must be dried up. Abundance of supply, as now exists in Bolivia, creates a scourage and the problem of abuse will continue to exist.

"We want your recommendations as to how we can work together to eliminate the source of illicit coca via crop substitution and eradication where necessary. We would like to know what kind of action we can expect in this direction."

Senator Andrade replied that action programs were the responsibility of the executive branch to conduct. "Further we here in the Senate do not have any idea of the scope of your visit. If it is to cooperate on narcotic control we might agree upon a joint commission that could conduct a survey to orient our two governments. What you have raised here today needs more than one meeting.

"If we want to see what is going on, why not nominate two members from each Congress? We would welcome it." Senator Andrade then added that he had proposed a bill for such a joint commission.

Chairman Rangel agreed with this suggestion and Ambassador Corr said he thought one Senator and one Deputy from that chamber could go to the United States, that he would be happy to coordinate this proposal with Chairman Rangel. On that note the delegation concluded its meeting with the Bolivian Senate leadership.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES OF BOLIVIA

The delegation then moved on to a meeting with Gualberto Claure, President of the Chamber of Deputies of Bolivia and the six deputies that form his leadership. The welcoming remarks and briefing the Honorable Gualberto Claure gave to the delegation, eloquently describing the three related problems of politics, economics and narcotics that are strangling Bolivia, are quoted in translation verbatim:

Honorable Representative Charles Rangel and Honorable Members of the U.S. Congressional Delegation who honor us with your visit:

It is a high honor for me to offer you the official greetings of the House of Representatives of Bolivia and bid you a cordial welcome to this land which just a short time ago regained, by the effort and struggle of its people, a democratic process which we are ready to defend and consolidate, relying on the support and understanding of the international democratic community.

As that giant of democracy and freedom, Abraham Lincoln, stated, "Democracy is the government of the people, by the people and for the people."

We are convinced of this. For it was our people who, by their sovereign will, made its possible to establish a democratic government and we, as legitimate recipients of the mandate from such popular will, are seeking the means which will allow us to make the people truly represented in the Parliament and in the Government. It is both for and with this will that we shall develop a political project which will make it possible to have the rule of justice and freedom.

However, the severe economic crisis which this country inherited as a heavy burden from the dictatorships is placing obstacles in the path of the free development of popular and national aspirations. The hunger which threatens Bolivian homes, a deteriorated national system of production, corruption that was introduced in the past into government agencies, etc., do not exactly make an encouraging picture, one which would enable popular sovereignty to be fully exercised. There cannot be freedom without bread, nor sovereignty without the capacity of the State for self-determination in the economic and political fields.

Thus, we have received a great task with the popular mandate: to emerge from the crisis, preserving the purity of democratic institutions and rights. In this task we know that we are not alone, as we were not during the heroic resistance to General Garcia Meza's dictatorship. We had next to us the solidarity of people such as yours, Honorable Representatives, and that of democratic governments who made us regain our hope in the possibility of a world where peace may be the rule for the ample benefit of the human race.

But there is something else which is important to emphasize. And that is the fact that in Bolivia one of the sinister arms of the dictatorship was large-scale narcotics trafficking. Therefore, in order to defeat the enemies of democracy it is necessary to do away with criminal activity in the production, the distribution and the use of cocaine. In this field, however, it is wise to point out that solutions are not simple.

Mankind has in the use of narcotics drugs one of its most dangerous scourges. And it is not only an ethical problem, for its usage is linked to an extensive network which goes from production, to distribution, and to possession, all of which are criminal activities. Also, due to its characteristics, its treatment involves other related crimes. Society needs mechanisms to protect itself, and thus cannot be reduced to the simple repression of the narcotics traffic.

We must start from the premise that while there is consumption and demand, in such measure will the production be encouraged and will it overcome all formal controls? What must be solved are the problems which drive a significant number of people to drugs. This involves prevention and rehabilitation, in the understanding that we are dealing with a health problem caused by various needs.

A second aspect is control of production, a matter which, for countries in whose territory the raw material is produced, becomes a more complex problem, beyond mere attempts at eradication.

From ancient times, the indigenous people of our nation have used the coca leaf as a stimulant and food complement, without ever producing or consuming cocaine. The leaf was also used for medicinal purposes and religious ceremonies. That is why its usage was linked during millenia to economic and religious activities, thus becoming a cultural tradition which is hard to eradicate without causing severe socio-cultural disruption. There will have to be a long process of transformation of values.

However, under the argument of providing for the needs of traditional consumption, there lies concealed the criminal activity of those who produce the raw material for cocaine. This activity has reached such a level that the borders between production for traditional uses and those for criminal activities are extremely fluid and hard to define. All of this, Honorable Representatives, convinces us that there is a very urgent need to design a coherent plan which will allow the evil to be attacked in all its levels and implications, affecting neither the national interests, nor those of whom, until recent times, were engaged in producing coca leaves legally, for traditional uses, which are neither harmful nor criminal.

That is why we have delivered from Parliament to society the legal instruments which will make it possible to face this scourge.

It shall be the general consciousness of the citizens, however, as well as the international support of those involved in the same task, that will allow us to meet this great challenge which history has placed in our path, in order to build a stable and durable democracy.

Honorable Representatives, once again I welcome you and I tell you sincerely to feel at home, for this is the house of democracy and freedom.

Thank you very much.

At the conclusion of Sr. Claure's remarks, Chairman Rangel expressed the delegation's appreciation for the warmth of his welcome and the clarity of his explanation of the problems confronting Bolivia, particularly the production and traffic of coca.

Mr. Rangel went on to say this problem is a tragedy for both countries and it was the hope of the delegation that by working together, a way might be found to withstand what looks like a future disaster for both of our countries if this situation is to continue. Chairman Rangel then mentioned the meeting with the Senate leadership where a proposal for an interparliamentary group or commission be put together to consider ways to bring the complex problem of that production and traffic of coca under control. Mr. Rangel said the delegation was very interested in this idea and concluded his response to Sr. Claure by saying that he and the delegation felt very much at home in the Chamber of Deputies because it is like the House of Representatives where the people govern.

In response to Chairman Rangel, Chamber President Claure said, "We support the idea of a joint commission. No one is against it. We are very worried and concerned with the narcotic problem which is corrupting the whole of our society."

Chairman Rangel welcomed this support and said Ambassador Corr had already offered to firm up and coordinate this proposal.

Representative Hughes said this was an excellent idea and one that could be built upon throughout the region.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF BOLIVIA

The Select Committee delegation then moved on to a meeting with President Hernan Siles Zuazo in the Cabinet Room of the Presidenial Palace. After a brief exchange of greetings, Chairman Rangel told President Siles the pleasure his delegation had in meeting with the leadership of the Bolivian Senate and Chamber of Deputies. He de-

scribed the proposal for a special joint parliamentary commission that had come up, which as a start could be bilateral between our two countries and then could expand into a regional configuration.

Chairman Rangel went on to say that the delegation comes to Bolivia as one democracy to another. Notwithstanding our own economic setbacks, we want to support Bolivia, with economic assistance to help overcome the damages done by the twin disasters of floods and drought, over a wide area of the country. These disasters have been a setback to the democratic process because of the way they strain it. Chairman Rangel said:

We are sympathetic to your struggle to gain the economic and political stability which democracy needs. Our Ambassador, Ed Corr, is a great friend of the Bolivian people and we have come to support him in the cooperation he is developing with your government in narcotics control.

The drug problem in both our countries is bringing death, destruction and corruption; a way to bring this under control is of the utmost importance to the Congress of the United States and our Select Committee. The very least in the legacy we leave our children should be, "Together we tried."

Chairman Rangel then introduced his delegation, Representatives Gilman, Lewis, Guarini and Hughes.

President Siles said it was a privilege to meet with representatives of the greatest democracy in the world and to discuss what is a problem for youth throughout the world.

Discussions on the problem of narcotic trafficking at the recent Andean Pact meeting at Caracas resulted in Bolivia and the other member countries agreeing by unanimous vote to take up joint action to eliminate the traffic.

President Siles said:

We are going to continue our efforts. We have information which is very painful to us on how far coca growing has advanced in our country. We are conscious of how difficult it is to detect and convert these people from coca growing, many have been corrupted, but overall the people of Bolivia reject the narcotic traffickers and the political leaders and those in the Army and police who have been corrupted by them. We have a movement underway in Bolivia demanding that the Police defend the people and fight the Mafia.

We have signals that our planned efforts to reduce the coca crop will produce difficulties, but I believe it will be accepted without victims or bloodshed, we have the means to accomplish it in that manner. You in the Congress can understand that we must make a common effort to help our people and for this we need the help of the United States.

We are thankful for the peaceful transition of our country from dictatorship to democracy. Now we must consolidate the democratic process. I must say, with much regret that after human rights were returned to our people, this provided the narcotic traffickers with much more freedom of movement.

We have a saying that poverty with treachery is twice poverty. Our democracy is without precedent in this century. Yet some of our leaders get rich and take advantage of freedom.

In conclusion President Siles said he was confident that with the help and support of the United States, Bolivia could reduce and control coca production and curtail narcotic trafficking.

MEETING WITH THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR OF BOLIVIA

On the morning of August 13, the delegation met with the Minister of Interior, Mario Roncal, Rafael Otazi, the Director of the National Committee to Fight Narcotics Trafficking and Mario Teran Gral, Commanding General of the National Police.

After greetings by Minister Roncal, Chairman Rangel introduced Representatives Lewis, Gilman, Guarini and Hughes, and asked Mr. Gilman, the Ranking Minority Member, to open for the delegation. Mr. Gilman said the delegation had come to Bolivia with a heavy burden from the American people, the families of our nation and around the world. Narcotics, in the form of cocaine is destroying families and this problem is not just unique to the United States.

Mr. Gilman said the delegation was happy to hear about the agreements signed on August 11, which provide for United States assistance to Bolivia to reduce and control coca production. A way must be found, and quickly, to reduce coca production to legal requirements and eradicate illicit cultivation.

Representative Gilman went on to tell the Ministry of Interior that President Siles' statement to the delegation was heartening, the Foreign Minister's statement was strong and the statement by the leaders in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies were most encouraging and had led to a proposal to form a joint parliamentary commission on the narcotic problem. We are hopeful that Dr. Otazo's competence will convince farmers to grow other crops. We saw a problem with this in the Tingo Maria area of Peru earlier this week. Farmers are not growing other crops and the government is not eradicating their coca.

"We eradicate in our country," Representative Gilman said, and suggested that, "Minister of Interior Roncal should recognize that the world is watching Bolivia. We offer help in developing narcotic control programs, and are committed to conducting an effective war against narcotics."

Chairman Rangel associated himself with Representative Gilman's remarks as did Representative Hughes. Mr. Hughes went on to say that the narcotic trafficking activities of the so called "Mafia families in Bolivia" are reminiscent of the narcotic war lords that operate in the Thai-Burma border areas of the "Golden Triangle" and defy the internal security forces. Mr. Hughes said Roberto Suarez heads up one of the Bolivian Mafia families. He may not be top of the Mafia heads, but he is certainly the most flamboyant.

Mr. Hughes hoped that on the basis of the narcotic enforcement assistance provided through the new agreements, Minister of the Interior Roncal would be able to reach out against the likes of Roberto Suarez.

Ambassador Corr said the lack of the most basic police equipment has prevented the police, at least up until now, from implementing effective narcotic enforcement.

Representative Hughes said that civil order is absolutely essential before narcotic control can be placed in effect.

Ambassador Corr said that Minister Roncal and his Under Minister have taken measures to deal with Roberto Suarez to inhibit and disrupt his narcotic trafficking activities.

Representative Lewis contrasted the beauty and tranquillity of La Paz with what had been the beauty and safety of Miami up until just a few short years ago when it became the gateway for the entry and distribution of cocaine and marihuana in the United States.

Mr. Lewis predicted that unless the production and traffic of coca and cocaine is brought under control in Bolivia, La Paz will become a scene of crime and violence that would threaten its future development as has happened with Miami.

He went on to say that the growing abuse of cocaine and the smoking of coca paste will destroy the minds of the youth of Bolivia from which the future leaders of the country must come:

The disease of drug abuse transcends all lines of our societies; it can and will destroy us if we do not prevent it from doing so. We must have the unlimited cooperation of your country and can expect no less.

Representative Guarini said that he associated himself with the remarks of his colleague and stated that he hoped that the agreements just signed could be implemented as soon as possible as a start in bringing about solutions which are long overdue in Bolivia.

Minister of Interior Roncal said the solution to the problem required a multitrack effort involving international enforcement, education and treatment carried out in close cooperation to ensure attainment. He said:

As we sit here and talk, the problem is getting worse day by day. We must mutually find what must be done and cooperate to accomplish it.

Minister Roncal said it was regrettable that the delegation did not have the time to visit the Yungas region to get an impression of the coca fields and the farmers growing it.

He said the problem of coca production in the Yungas was the worst and in effect involved solving three problems: Crop substitution; eradication; and enforcement. To make this possible, he saw the need of substantial financial program support from the United States. He said every dollar spent in such support would come back many fold:

We look forward to such a project, we are respected and experienced and can implement it, and we have the respect of Ambassador Corr.

Minister Roncal went on to say that the morale and will of the nation was committed in solidarity to solve the drug problem which it now considers a threat to the institutions of the country. For too long Bolivia only focused on the drug problem as a criminal activity, now the country is recognizing that the problem involves complex social and economic factors since many families make their living growing coca. Minister Roncal said:

I have discussed this issue with Ambassador Corr. The families growing coca should be offered sufficient technical and financial aid necessary to ensure they adopt new crops and have markets. The Ambassador's tenacity in working out the new agreements has been like, what we call in Bolivia, "a flea in the ear." The difficulties we must now face are inherited from past national disasters. We have been achieving some results in arresting narcotic traffickers, but our police have lacked the resources to be effective.

However, we hope the special police program that is part of the agreements will provide the training and resources the police need to fight the traffickers. We are pleased by your visit and with the signing of the agreements.

I want to assure you that we will carry out the will of the government in the implementation of the agreements, we will do this for both countries and for our youth. We have made an irrevocable decision to carry out all the projects necessary to eliminate the narcotic traffic.

Mario Teran Gral, the Commanding General of the National Police, said:

Bolivia proposes to carry out a comprehensive plan that would reduce coca production to levels necessary only for traditional chewing in Bolivia and world pharmaceutical requirements, but this would have to be done with the cooperation of the United States in crop substitution to help farmers with other crops. Reports that there are 5 million cocaine users in the United States means consumption there is by no means small. Bolivia does not like to be recognized as

one of the leading producers of coca and cocaine and intends by its actions to erase this image.

Dr. Rafael Otazo Vargas, Director of the President's Advisory Committee on Narcotics, welcomed the delegation and said he was very pleased and very happy to have it visit Bolivia. He said:

You represent the people of the United States and their interest in our narcotic problem. We also welcome today our distinguished friend, Ambassador Corr.

Dr. Otazo continued:

The new agreements open important doors for bigger and better cooperation by a big brother with a smaller brother. It is an important new demonstration of our two countries identifying with each other and our mutual high ideals.

We are not a poor country, to the contrary, we are rich in the resource of our 5 million people, and rich in our natural resources and the fertile soil of our land. Our problem is that we have badly administered all of this through the centuries.

The narcotic traffic is now stronger than the state. It now involves 300,000 individuals in every aspect of this activity from planting in the fields to trafficking the coca and cocaine. All of this is due to the desire to make more money.

Farmers are abandoning their traditional cultivation in the alto plane (high plains) to migrate to the coca growing areas to cultivate or work in the coca fields. The traffickers are exploiting the poor peasants and we must prevent this.

Much of this has been motivated by international traffickers and up until now we have had a very limited budget to work against it.

All of this began just like a small cancer cell, the government encouraged it and some men in the government were even partners with the traffickers. Bringing this situation under control and how to eradicate the overproduction of coca is a difficult problem for us. One that concerns us greatly. We pledge to you that the democratic regime will do it, we are working quietly. The agreements are a great step forward.

During the course of these discussions, Commanding General Teran of the National Police who sat next to Chairman Rangel, shared with him his thoughts on what would be needed in the way of technical and financial assistance to enable the government to control the production and illicit traffic of coca and cocaine throughout the entire country. In short it would require assistance to enable the government to replicate in the other traditional and non-traditional areas of the country, programs similar to what is now scheduled for the Chapare.

These talks at the Ministry of Interior concluded discussions with the Bolivian Government leaders and the following morning the delegation departed La Paz and proceeded to Bogota, Colombia, following a refueling stop at Lima.

Conclusions

Estimates on the quantity of coca being grown annually in Bolivia range from 55,000 to 62,500 metric tons. Reports also indicate that coca production in Bolivia continues to increase on an annual basis over four traditional and three non-traditional areas of the country. A program is about to be launched in the Chapare, one of the major producing areas to be followed, if successful, by similar programs in the other areas. The Select Committee has serious doubts that, even if the program in the Chapare meaningfully reduces coca cultivation in that region, overall coca production in Bolivia will decline because with no control programs in the six other coca growing regions, production will increase in them to replace what is lost in the Chapare.

The Select Committee has a perception that the Governments of Bolivia and the United States have failed to agree on the magnitude

of the illicit production and traffic of coca and cocaine in Bolivia and what must be done to bring this under control. The illicit production and traffic of coca in Bolivia so tragically affecting the United States makes this by far the most important issue affecting relations between the two countries. It is also, in the judgment of the Committee, again by far the most challenging of a number of problems that threaten the country's fragile democracy, internal security, and the progress and welfare of its people.

The Committee is particularly concerned that the enormity of the coca problem in Bolivia which continues to grow and which so seriously threatens the health and public safety of both countries is not being given the priority and attention that is going to be required to bring it under control.

Recommendations

1. The Select Committee welcomes the suggestions made by the leadership of the Bolivia Senate and Chamber of Deputies to form with appropriate counterpart members of the United States Congress a joint committee that would meet annually or semi-annually to consider the cooperative efforts of the United States and Bolivia, to address the problem of the traffic and abuse of coca and cocaine in both countries and to find the ways and means of reducing the production of coca leaf in Bolivia to legal requirements and ensuring that coca cultivation be licensed and controlled in accordance with the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961.

2. The Department of State should organize a small expert committee that would cooperate with a counterpart group organized by the Government of Bolivia to establish the quantity of coca leaf required annually by Bolivia for its legal chewing, pharmaceutical, and flavoring extract market. The joint committees would then prepare a comprehensive plan to eliminate as soon as possible, throughout the country, all other coca not required for legal purposes.

The committee could then begin developing appropriate programs to gradually eliminate coca chewing in Bolivia by December 1989 in accordance with the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. This is a subject which apparently no one in Bolivia wishes to discuss. As in Peru, it is the root of the disaster which is now upon us. Coca leaf production ostensibly carried out to supply the so-called harmless chewing of the leaf, began supplying the illicit traffic 25 years ago. While the chewing consumption was stable, more and more was grown ostensibly for chewing, but actually to supply illicit manufacturing and trafficking markets.

The chewing of the coca leaf is a primitive, antiquated, debilitating practice, harmful to the individual and the public health and has considerable genocidal overtones. It is time this practice be addressed, particularly in Peru and Bolivia.

COLOMBIA

About 75 percent of the cocaine entering the United States is clandestinely manufactured in Colombia from coca paste smuggled from Peru and Bolivia, where it is converted from coca leaves produced in those countries. Since 1981, Colombia has brought on line its own coca

leaf and coca paste industry to augment the raw material supply from Peru and Bolivia. It is estimated that Peru and Bolivia supply about 45 percent each of the total coca paste processed in Colombia with the remaining 10 percent now coming from domestic coca leaf production.

The clandestine production of marihuana in Colombia is also responsible for 75 to 80 percent of the marihuana entering the United States.

Colombia is located in the northwest corner of South America. It is the fourth largest country on the continent in both the size of its territory and its population of 27.6 million. It is bordered by Venezuela and Brazil to the southeast, Ecuador and Peru to the southwest, the Caribbean Sea and Panama to the north, and the Pacific to the west.

The smuggling of contraband in and out of Colombia is a heritage that goes back to the Spanish colonial period and is said to be accepted as a part of the Colombian way of life.

Notwithstanding this long tradition of smuggling, a wide variety of consumer goods in and out of the country including automobiles, electrical appliances, luxury goods, tobacco and alcohol products to avoid customs and excise duties, the extensive Colombian contraband smuggling network did not become involved in the drug traffic until the mid to late 1960's. The fact that marihuana and coca have not been traditionally cultivated in Colombia in any meaningful quantity is probably responsible for this.

Small pockets of marihuana cultivation have been known to exist in the country, particularly in the Guajira peninsula and the Turbo area of the North Coast for domestic consumption. The coca bush also grew wild in other pockets of the country and there are reports it was also cultivated in small quantities for indigenous consumption.

Following the Castro takeover in Cuba in 1959, a large number of drug traffickers fled Cuba and settled in the United States, Mexico and Colombia. In the United States they began to ply their trade and began importing and distributing marihuana, cocaine and heroin from Mexico. By the mid- to late 1960's, Cuban criminals in Colombia had established a cocaine manufacturing capability in several cities in Colombia in concert with Colombian criminal associates. The Colombians learned how to transform coca paste to cocaine from the Cubans, and were also introduced by them, to coca paste suppliers in Bolivia and Peru, from whom the Cubans had been purchasing coca paste from the 1950's to fuel the laboratories they had operated in Cuba prior to Castro.

From 1965 through 1973, the cocaine traffic to the United States increased from a non-problem to one of major significance. The cocaine was smuggled mostly from Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia in that order of volume. It was produced from coca paste originating in Peru and Bolivia from coca leaf grown in those two countries. Following the fall of the Allende regime in Chile, that country effectively suppressed the heavy illicit manufacture and traffic of cocaine that had been directed to the United States and other international markets. Following this, Colombia emerged as the dominant illicit manufacturer of cocaine, supplying an estimated 75 percent of the traffic to the United States and about the same level to Canada, Venezuela, Mexico and Western European countries.

Once introduced to the illicit manufacture and traffic of cocaine, traditional Colombian skills in the operation of clandestine smuggling ventures resulted in there not only obtaining sources of coca paste in Peru and Bolivia, but aggressive development of an increase in the number of sources and the volume they could supply. By 1976, in addition to the market pressure they had created for increased coca leaf production in Peru and Bolivia, Colombian narcotic trafficking networks established direct personal contact and communications with criminal counterpart groups in Peru and Bolivia to encourage and motivate the expansion of coca cultivation in both countries for conversion to coca paste to supply the expanding number of cocaine laboratories developing in Colombia.

Some observers believe that since 1977 the cultivation of coca leaf in Peru and Bolivia has increased by about 30 percent annually and may still be increasing at about that rate. This enabled the Colombian underworld to increase the illicit manufacture and traffic of cocaine to the United States, Canada and its South American and Western European markets correspondingly.

The Colombian cocaine traffickers, with few exceptions, gained entry to the narcotic trafficking organizations in the United States, particularly in Miami and New York, through their Cuban associates. Within a short period of time they were dealing directly with their American counterparts. Following this, through both legal and illegal immigration, they eventually established a sufficient number of their people in most major cities to set up organizations, not only to receive the smuggled shipments of cocaine, but to carry out its wholesale distribution to increase the profits of their organizations.

Another striking demonstration of the Colombian underworld's foresight and ingenuity in developing their illicit narcotic manufacturing and trafficking industry, has been the development and rapid expansion of their own coca leaf cultivation in the southern departments of Cauca, Putumayo and Narino and the eastern plains departments of Meta and Vaupes. It is in the latter region where the development of coca production appears to be rapid and extensive. It is estimated that as of 1983, 15,000 hectares of coca are now under cultivation. The leaves are reported to have ½ to ⅓ less alkaloid content on the average than Peruvian and Bolivian leaves. This would mean that ⅓ to ½ more leaves would be needed to produce a kilo of high grade coca paste, or base, from the Colombian product, than the Peruvian or Bolivian. The Committee is informed that coca production in Colombia is not intended to displace the production in Peru and Bolivia, but to augment it to ensure that the Colombian narcotic trafficking organizations can continue to increase their markets. There is also concern, on the part of the Colombians, with the growing capability in both Peru and and Bolivia to convert coca paste to cocaine hydrochloride. The Colombians fear this would reduce their access to unlimited coca paste supplies and they would begin to lose cocaine markets to the Peruvians and Bolivians.

The Colombian entry into the illicit traffic of methaqualone, is another dramatic example of the sophistication and remarkable ability of the Colombian underworld to rapidly dominate any aspect of the international drug traffic it chooses.

Methaqualone, known also as Quaaludes, supors, parest and mandrax is a depressant prescribed to induce sleep. It has, however, a hypnotic side effect which apparently combines with its depressant properties to cause a euphoria and a perceived aphrodisiac effect in some users. During the late 1960's and early 1980, this drug became widely abused by young people on a worldwide basis.

After numerous overdose deaths traced to the use of methaqualone, the United States Government, in 1982, utilizing the flexibility provided by the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, moved speedily to raise methaqualone from the relatively liberal control of a "Schedule IV" substance to the more stringent control of "Schedule II." Manufacturing quotas were drastically reduced, and the legal distribution and prescription of this drug were brought under a much stricter system of control.

However, many countries, some of whom had, and still have, a far more serious abuse problem with methaqualone than the United States, had neither the interest nor the legal or administrative means to end the diversion of this drug from licit stocks. In the United States, as diversion from legal channels was turned off, the abuse of this substance was substantially curtailed.

However, small quantities began to be smuggled in from abroad and then in wholesale quantities in hundred kilo lots from Mexico, and subsequently, Colombia. By 1983, it is estimated that 36 metric tons of methaqualone would be smuggled from Colombia to the United States, amounting to about 90 percent of the illicit consumption in the country.

Investigation determined that Colombian narcotic traffickers organized the movement of large quantities of methaqualone powder through the Free Port of Hamburg, which they promptly diverted to clandestine entableting facilities for production into counterfeit "Quaalude" tablets. It was determined that the methaqualone powder originated in the People's Republic of China and Hungary. Ironically, the Colombians also arranged for the shipment of methaqualone from these same sources via Hamburg to Colombia through the United States and the Free Port in Panama, using the subterfuge of false labeling. The methaqualone entableting facilities are located in Medellin, Barranquilla, Santa Marta and other locations along the North Coast.

The Quaalude tablets are smuggled to the United States mostly by small private aircraft and, to a lesser extent, by contraband smuggling vessels.

As a result of cooperative international control efforts initiated by DEA, the availability of methaqualone powder in Western Europe was substantially reduced. Colombia, for its part, informed European suppliers of methaqualone in 1982 that pursuant to the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, it would no longer accept imports of methaqualone without a pre-import certification. As a result, the illicit production and traffic in Quaaludes in Colombia, diverted to the United States has reportedly been reduced by about 55 percent.

The development of the large-scale production of marihuana in Colombia for trafficking to the United States, Canada and to other foreign markets, seemed to come out of nowhere in the early to mid

1970's. From the early 1930's through the late 1960's the organized traffic in marihuana was supplied almost exclusively from Mexico. By the late 1960's Jamaica, which had been supplying small quantities of high grade marihuana since the 1950's, began to supply significant quantities, particularly to Florida. Traditionally, marihuana that was smuggled from Jamaica, was brought in by merchant seamen, and passengers arriving on scheduled airlines, concealing the marihuana in their baggage or on their person to circumvent Customs controls.

Beginning in the late 1960's, small organized groups that came together in the Miami area, in concert with criminal associates in Jamaica, began to smuggle marihuana in hundred pound to half ton quantities, via light aircraft from clandestine airstrips, to similar strips in Florida. They flew non-stop or refueled in the Bahama chain. Small vessels in the form of motor and sailing yachts, fishing trawlers and small inter-island freighters were also used, loading up in coves and off the beaches of Jamaica for delivery directly into the inlets and canals of South Florida or off-loading to small craft that came out from shore to pick up. Sometimes the boats from Jamaica would rendezvous with the boats from Florida in remote islands of the Bahamas for direct transfers, or marihuana brought in by air or sea from Jamaica would be off-loaded and stored on a remote island for pickup by aircraft or boats coming out from Florida.

While this smuggling activity from Jamaica was concentrated on South Florida, some smugglers using aircraft, private yachts and fishing boats, did begin penetrations up the Atlantic coast and around the Gulf of Mexico as far as New Orleans. In addition to bringing in considerable quantities of marihuana, it demonstrated to the smugglers how easy it was to penetrate the United States coastline and the U.S. Customs control system, with marihuana-laden vessels and aircraft. This marihuana smuggling activity from about 1969 was not lost on Colombian traffickers, who by then were beginning to move significant quantities of cocaine into the area. By the early 1970's reports began to be received of independent smugglers, usually on yachts, picking up marihuana off the North Coast of Colombia. This type of activity developed slowly, and reports of aircraft being utilized in this work were also subsequently received.

In 1974 and 1975, the Government of Jamaica, alarmed at the breakdown in public safety caused by the massive production and traffic of marihuana in the country, joined hands with the United States, in what was known as "Operation Buccaneer." It involved a vigorous program of marihuana eradication by the Jamaican Government, the closure of the clandestine airstrips and effective joint United States/Jamaican narcotic enforcement operations. This dramatically curtailed the production and traffic of marihuana from Jamaica for several years.

Late in 1975, after valiant efforts for many years to manually eradicate marihuana and opium poppy, the Government of Mexico initiated an aerial herbicide spray eradication campaign that was to prove remarkably effective.

By 1974–75 as marihuana supplies from Mexico and Jamaica were heavily curtailed, Colombian operators had established a foothold in the marihuana traffic to the United States. From the late 1960's, in remote sections of the Guajira peninsula, they had been developing a

highly organized production and traffic of marihuana and had brought on line, airstrips capable of handling heavy four engine transports of the DC–7 and Super Constellation type, as well as loading facilities for large sea-going "motherships" to carry multi-ton quantities of marihuana, respectively by air, to clandestine airstrips on our coasts and deep in the interior of the United States and by sea for off-loading to small craft off our coasts.

Since 1975, and continuing to the present time, an enormous, highly organized and incredibly sophisticated traffic in marihuana from Colombia to the United States, by air and sea, has developed. The aircraft and the "motherships" carrying out this traffic, have grown in number and size, and the volume in the traffic in marihuana is estimated at 15 to 60 thousand tons annually.

In addition to the health menace and social breakdowns, marihuana abuse brings to the United States, the air and sea borne traffic from Colombia has corrupted large segments of the general aviation, marine, and seaside communities of the United States from Brownsville to Key West to Northern Maine and from San Diego to Seattle.

All of this, in its wake, has spawned violence over once tranquil areas, a wave of drug-related crime, death and destruction along the airways, waterways, and highways of this country.

Investigation indicates that about 90 percent of the Colombian marihuana is smuggled by sea and the remainder by air. Cocaine is smuggled from Colombia via private aircraft, commercial aircraft, air cargo shipments, air and sea passengers, merchant seamen, and contraband smuggling vessels. Traditionally, cocaine smugglers tend to exclusively deal in cocaine. Marihuana smuggling organizations at times smuggle cocaine and methaqualone.

Current statistical estimates on the Colombian share of the cocaine, marihuana and methaqualone traffic in the United States, the volume of drugs involved and the dollar value F.O.B. Colombia are set forth below:

Substance	Percentage of total	Tons	Dollar value
Cocaine	75	36–45	324 to 395 million.
Marihuana	75–80	15–60	528 million to 2.1 billion.
Methaqualone	50	20	20 million.

The Narcotics Unit of the Judicial Police, numbering about 150 agents is the principal narcotic investigative arm of the Colombian Government. It has offices in Bogota, Barranquilla, Cali, Medellin, Pasto, Popayan, Florencia, and Villavicencio. The Judicial Police under the direction of the Attorney General is responsible for criminal investigation. The narcotic unit is mandated to develop investigations leading to narcotic arrests and seizures and the prosecution of the violators involved. The personnel, training and professionalism of the Judicial Police Narcotic Unit is good, however, it has since its inception been understaffed, and not been provided the equipment, operating funds, direction and support it needs to effectively confront the powerful and affluent Colombian narcotic trafficking underworld. This, in turn, detracts from the initiative and morale of the unit.

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For a period of time, in the late 1970's, the Colombian Army was brought into narcotic enforcement with particular emphasis on attempting to suppress what had become in the Guajira region and the North Coast in general an uncontrolled production, and traffic of marihuana and its smuggling abroad via a proliferation of clandestine docking sites and airstrips. In 1980, the Army was withdrawn from this when it was alleged that efforts to address the problem had only resulted in corrupting the Colombian Army.

The National Police (F–2) which is an element of the Ministry of Defense, was then designated as Colombia's primary narcotic enforcement agency. It is composed of 3,047 officers and men who are well trained, highly motivated, professionals. Its manpower, equipment, and operating funds are vastly superior to that of the Judicial Police Narcotic Unit, but still not equal to what is required to effectively impact against and deter the narcotic trafficking activity of the major organizations through arrests, seizures, and prosecution.

In January 1981, the National Police organized a "Special Anti-Narcotic Unit" (SANU) totaling 1,100 individuals organized into 11 paramilitary tactical companies of 110 to 115 uniformed men, and eleven intelligence units. This has been a step in the right direction and these units have been producing productive results, in the way of seizures of cocaine, marihuana and methaqualone. They have also increased efforts to manually eradicate coca in the eastern plains of the Llanos and marihuana in the Guajira and Magdalena departments of the North Coast. While these efforts are commendable, they are little more than pilot projects or tokenism and have no impact on the problem.

In 1981, the Colombian narcotic services reported the seizure of a total of 3,310 tons of marihuana, 66 million methaqualone tablets, 349 kilos of cocaine and 58 cocaine laboratories. In 1982, they seized 3,409 tons of marihuana, 41 million methaqualone tablets, 881 kilos of cocaine and 277 cocaine laboratories. The rate of arrests in this activity was poor and the follow-up prosecution and conviction of the violators, particularly of the leaders and major figures, has been very poor and totally ineffective as a deterrent.

Colombia's national drug law decree 1188 of 1974, provides an adequate instrument for the prosecution of narcotic violators. However, the rules of procedure needed to implement the narcotic law, as well as all other laws, is reported to be obscure and cumbersome to apply, and severely hampers the administration of justice. Narcotic prosecutions in Colombia, particularly against major violators and organizations have been totally ineffective to date.

Briefly stated, narcotic, enforcement in Colombia is ineffective because the authorities fail to develop a sufficient number of narcotic arrests and seizures and the evidence necessary to prosecute the violators, particularly the important ones. Those they do arrest and charge, frequently are not prosecuted, or if prosecuted, soon evade conviction on technical rules or procedural grounds.

Civil or Napoleonic Law countries, such as Colombia, rarely, if ever, agree to the extradition of their citizens to another country to face prosecution for a crime committed in the other country. This is because their law, in most cases, provides for the prosecution of their citizens, by their courts, for crimes, committed abroad.

In March 1982, a new extradition treaty between Colombia and the United States took effect, and includes a provision for the extradition of Colombian nationals to the United States to face prosecution for crimes committed in the United States. No one has yet been extradited and it is thought before anyone is, the Colombian Supreme Court would have to rule on the constitutionality of extraditing Colombian citizens.

What all of this highlights is the absolute failure and total indifference of the Government of Colombia, to prosecute great numbers of their nationals in their own courts for major narcotic violations, committed in and outside of Colombia, in the narcotic traffic directed to the United States. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and the narcotic enforcement arms of several other countries, have sufficient evidence and testimony available, for the use of the Colombians to prosecute in their courts, several hundred major violators. The Colombian police services and judicial authorities have shown no real interest in following up on this.

Another glaring example of the Colombian Government's lack of interest in developing investigations that might disrupt the drug traffic, involves tracking the movement of "narcodollars." The dollar value of Colombian narcotic trafficking is estimated at $2 billion per annum. Of that, $500 million is thought to be monetized in country. Colombia has the laws and mechanisms to control the movement of currency and exchange through the "International Exchange Control" (Superintendencia de Control de Cambios). Over a period of years this agency has been provided precise information on numerous occasions by the DEA on the movement of "narcodollars." No results have ever been reported, nor is it known if any investigative action was ever taken.

United States support of Colombian narcotic enforcement efforts began in 1973 and has involved training, technical assistance, and financial resources to upgrade Colombia's capabilities in drug enforcement, crop eradication, the judicial process, drug intelligence collection and drug abuse prevention programs.

In 1979, as a result of growing frustration over continuing escalation of the traffic in cocaine, marihuana and methaqualone from Colombia, the Congress mandated a $16 million program for Fiscal Year 1980 for Colombia.

In May 1980, a project agreement for about $2 million was signed with the Colombian Customs Service, under which a 105-foot patrol boat for drug interdiction efforts off the North Coast was procured.

A second project agreement totaling over $13 million was signed with the Ministry of Defense in November 1980. It provided for narcotic enforcement training, communications, equipment, vehicles, spare parts, fuel, and logistical support funding to increase the National Police and SANU's drug interdiction capability. Also included was $2 million for a patrol craft for the Colombian Navy, similar to what had been authorized for the Colombian Customs, to augment the Navy's drug interdiction capability on the North Coast.

The FY 1983 program budget for Colombia amounted to $2.06 million and was dedicated to maintaining existing programs previously initiated. For FY 1984 assistance in the amount of $7.9 million has

been programmed. This is in anticipation of the Government of Colombia agreeing to adopt a program for the aerial herbicide spraying of marihuana and would include helicopters and spraying equipment for that purpose.

The Fiscal Year 1984 program also envisages the provision of vehicles, small boats for riverine operations, radios and logistical support.

The Government of Colombia agrees with the measures that are required to bring the uncontrolled illicit production, manufacture and traffic of narcotic and psychotropic drugs under control, but they have not taken the necessary steps to implement the measures which are:

1. The illicit cultivation of marihuana and coca must be detected and eradicated.

2. Effective measures are needed to prevent the movement of increasing quantities of coca paste and base from Peru and Bolivia entering Colombia.

3. An effective program to detect and seize illicit coca paste and cocaine manufacturing facilities must be developed which should include implicating and successfully prosecuting the operators and financiers of the activity.

4. A substantially expanded and intensified narcotic enforcement effort must be developed to effectively suppress the traffic in cocaine, marihuana, and methaqualone within Colombia and prevent its smuggling abroad.

5. Increased efforts must be made to prevent the movement of methaqualone powder into Colombia and to detect and seize methaqualone entableting facilities in the country and to implicate and successfully prosecute the operators and financiers of this activity.

The reason for the Colombian failure, after more than 10 years of urging by the United States to take the necessary measures to control the enormous production and traffic of drugs in their territory, is open to speculation. In open forum, they defend their lack of zeal and performance, with a dialectic argument which describes the illicit production and traffic of drugs from Colombia, as something created by demand in the United States and thus basically a U.S. problem. They argue that the United States is not seriously addressing its demand problem and insist, notwithstanding evidence to the contrary, that the United States is not eradicating its own marihuana cultivation.

This argument, of course, is made by all countries at one time or another, where for one reason or another the country has become a major supplier of narcotics or psychotropics. It flies in the face of 12 international drug control conventions completed between 1912 and 1972, which are based on the simple concept that if the production, manufacture and distribution of these substances are not by law strictly limited to medical and scientific purposes, they will unfortunately be abused by people in direct proportion to the volume of their availability.

It is for that reason that treaties require that the legal cultivation, manufacture, distribution, dispensation and consumption of narcotic and psychotropic drugs by law, be under a control system and be limited to medical and scientific purposes. The Single Convention on

Narcotic Drugs of 1961, which Colombia ratified on March 3, 1975, and, as amended, is currently the binding instrument on this question, further requires parties to eradicate illicit cultivation and to suppress the illicit traffic. Nowhere in the 12 conventions is "the demand for drugs" addressed because the system is based on the premise that if the conventions are universally adopted and faithfully applied, there will be an insufficient illicit supply of drugs available to create and sustain demand.

On August 7, 1982, Belisario Betancur-Cuartas was inaugurated as President of Colombia, following his election in May of that year. Prior to his being elected and subsequent to his taking office, Mr. Betancur made few statements regarding the direction his administration would take on the narcotics problem. In a December 1982 piece in Newsweek magazine, he is quoted as expressing the opinion that narcotics are a problem of the United States because of the high demand and consumption there.

In the course of President Betancur's visit to Washington in December 1982, the State Department reports that President Reagan expressed concern about the production and trafficking of cocaine and marihuana in Colombia affecting the United States. In response, President Betancur expressed his government's willingness to continue to cooperate with the United States on narcotic control programs.

It is said that privately President Betancur expresses strong disapproval of the illicit production and traffic of narcotics in Colombia and can be expected to address this problem in a firm and resolute way. Observers believe it will fall to the Betancur administration, after a decade of procrastination by other administrations, to adopt the aerial herbicide spraying of the enormous cultivation of marihuana and coca in the remote areas of the country where it is found and which is considered the most effective and practical by experts, or in lieu of that, organizing and equipping the army and national police to carry out a massive manual eradication campaign, so as Colombia might meet its obligations to the Single Convention.

Experts believe the following narcotic related developments in Colombia will, before long, persuade the Betancur administration to initiate the necessary measures to bring the narcotic problem under control:

1. Drug abuse which became an identifiably serious problem in Colombia by the mid-1970's is escalating sharply. There is heavy drug abuse, particularly in the large cities of Bogota, Barranquilla, Cali and Medellin. The problem is concentrated in the 13 to 25 age group and the use of marihuana during school hours is reported to be heavy. One drug sweeping the country is known as "Bazuco" which consists of the chemical residue left in extracting cocaine hydrochloride from coca paste. It is mixed with marihuana or tobacco and smoked.

2. Narcotic related violence has become pervasive throughout Colombia, including the rural and remote areas where marihuana and coca are produced and trafficked.

3. Evidence of insurgents utilizing the production and traffic of drugs as a means to fund their causes is increasing.

4. There is a growing awareness and resentment on the part of the law abiding population of Colombia, that the pervasive corruption of

the narcotic traffic has penetrated all levels of Colombian society and political institutions.

5. There is a growing awareness on the part of the informed public that the impact of the narcodollars has thwarted the governments efforts to control inflation. The traffickers have invested heavily in real estate, boosting construction and real estate costs to very high levels, distorting the economy and frustrating fiscal and monetary management to the detriment of the general population.

The Committee's Visit to Colombia

The Select Committee delegation arrived in Bogota, on the late afternoon of Sunday, August 14, and was provided an in-depth briefing by Ambassador Lewis A. Tambs and his staff on the narcotic control activities of the Colombian Government and U.S. efforts to support them.

FIELD TRIP TO THE LLANOS COCA GROWING REGION

On August 15, the delegation divided into two groups. One, composed of Chairman Rangel, Representatives Gilman, Guarini, and Dixon, with staff, flew via a Colombian Air Force aircraft southeast from Bogota to San Jose del Guaviare in the heart of new coca growing regions. Following a briefing by Colonel Jaime Ramirez Gomez, Commander of the Colombian National Police, Special Anti-Narcotic Unit (SANU), the delegation was escorted by Colonel Ramirez on an extensive overflight of the intense coca cultivation in the vicinity of San Jose el Retorno.

Colonel Ramirez indicated that the SANU concentrates its forces in the North Coast region, where marihuana has been extensively cultivated for about 10 years, in the area near the border with Panama, where marihuana is also produced, and in the Eastern Llanos region centering around San Jose del Guaviare where coca is produced and trafficked.

In the Guaviare area there are about 1,500 men of the National Police regular units and the SANU, who work together to suppress the illicit production and traffic of coca, and cocaine.

The National Police objective in these areas is to eradicate cultivation, detect and destroy illicit coca and cocaine processing facilities, and immobilize the clandestine airstrips. In the Llanos region there are 249 authorized airstrips and an estimated 2,000 illegal strips.

The National Police units face difficult operating conditions. In addition to hostile growers and organized traffickers, insurgent guerrilla groups infest the region and have developed links with the traffickers.

The most notorious insurgent organization known as the FARC, is known to have 7 units or "fronts" in the San Jose del Guaviare area, with an average of 150 men per front. There are reports that the traffickers and the FARC mutually assist each other to evade police detection.

The traffickers are well armed and well equipped with sophisticated motor vehicles, boats, aircraft and radio communication systems. The FARC are said to be armed with weapons and equipment supplied

from Cuba and originating in the U.S.S.R. and the Peoples Republic of China.

The delegation found the SANU personnel it observed to be impressive well-trained and highly motivated professionals, who, not withstanding low, pay, the heat, malaria and other tropical diseases that threaten them, perform courageously.

The Llanos region has only in recent years been settled to provide land to landless people, and to develop agricultural pursuits. Regrettably, the settlers were persuaded to produce coca by trafficking organizations and this has only become significant since about 1980. This production is rapidly expanding, is totally illegal, and it is disappointing that the Government of Colombia is permitting it to become so entrenched.

Colonel Jesus Carmana Lopez the local Commander of the National Police at San Jose del Guaviare, described the excellent working relationship between the SANU and the regular National Police units to strike at the illicit cultivation and traffic of coca and coca paste in the region.

The impression was created that the SANU, even when fully supported by the regular National Police units, in the San Jose del Guaviare region, is totally inadequate to an eradication campaign against the massive production of coca in the Llanos, due to lack of manpower, equipment, operating funds, and clear directives to move forward to eradicate any illicit coca or marihuana found.

Notwithstanding the fact that coca production in this region is only three to four years old, the concerned police officers were talking about the socio-economic needs of the growers; that outright eradication would be a disaster for these "poor people;" that any eradication program must include some form of subsidy for the growers or a crop that would produce an income equal to coca. When asked what crops these people grew before they began growing coca, a few short years ago, and how they managed to farm and exist before that, the police indicated they didn't know.

The police atttiude is understandable. Their job at forcing an end to such cultivation would be made easy if a miracle substitute crop could be provided to growers, to equal their coca income, or a subsidy could be provided in place of their growing coca. Neither of these alternatives is possible. The Government of Colombia must simply assume its obligation under the Single Convention to inform the growers that coca production is prohibited, and then eradicate the production that is not cut down by the growers.

In the course of the briefing by Colonel Carmana, Chairman Rangel asked how the United States might be of assistance to the National Police in their work in the Llanos. He replied that they need equipment in the form of aircraft, vehicles, boats and funding to purchase weapons. However, he reported the best support would be in the form of programs that would improve the socio-economic conditions of the people in the region. He did not explain why they would then give up producing coca, which is so lucrative for them, without being obliged to do so.

Chairman Rangel next asked, considering the odds the National Police faced, were they able to achieve any success at all? Colonel

Carmana replied that most of their success is limited to interdicting the chemical precursors necessary for the manufacture of coca paste and cocaine. However, it was pointed out that this success is limited, because the traffickers and their insurgent allies control so much of the area, including the rivers, the river ports, airstrips, and roads, most of the traffic of precursors in, and coca paste and cocaine out, can circumvent the police controls.

The helicopter overflight uncovered heavy concentrations of coca clustered in fields, that had been slashed out of the jungle growth and burned prior to planting. According to Colonel Ramirez, the field hands who cultivate the coca are paid the equivalent of $8 to $10 per day for their work, which is double what is paid for other agricultural crops. The owner of the crop is reported to earn a 200 percent profit on his investment.

The Committee delegation came away with the perception that very little in the way of the manual uprooting of the coca bush is carried out in the Llanos. Much more could be done than is being done, but given the manpower and equipment available, it would fall far short of what is required to have any impact on reducing production, particularly since it is still increasing. Manual eradiction of coca in the Llanos and other pockets of production in Colombia would require the equivalent of an infantry division with full helicopter lift and motor vehicle support.

In lieu of this the Colombian National Police seems to prefer, as the most practical means of curtailing the problem, the use of aircraft, boats and vehicles to prevent the movement into the Llanos of the chemicals needed to produce coca paste and cocaine, and to prevent the movement out of cocaine via aircraft and boats, through an unlimited number of avenues of escape that would require an army to seal off.

Meanwhile, as much as 15,000 hectares of coca sits out in remote jungle clearings, exposed and vulnerable to destruction, by the application of herbicide spray, which could be applied by a few helicopters in a matter of a few days or weeks.

The delegation found the National Police sensitive to the question of using helicopter-applied herbicide spray, indicating this was a decision that would have to be made at the highest level of the government on the basis of ecological and health feasibility studies which have been underway for sometime.

FIELD TRIP TO THE NORTH COAST MARIHUANA GROWING REGION

On August 15, a second group from the Committee delegation, composed of Representatives Hughes, Sawyer, and Lewis with staff and Embassy representatives, flew to Barranquilla in the U.S. Air Force aircraft. There they transferred to a Colombian Air Force DC–4 and flew to Valledupar, a provenciaí city in the Cesar Department, which lies between the other two major marihuana producing departments of the North Coast, La Guajira and Magdalena. The group then flew in a National Police helicopter over the marihuana growing zone along the Venezuelan border, east of Valledupar, known as the Serrania Perija. The marihuana is cultivated in a network of mountain valleys

and canyons which link up with each other. The delegation overflew several of these valleys and canyons and sighted many more in different directions. The size of the plots and the extent they had been spread over the area was enormous and covered mile upon mile. The slash and burn technique was used to cut plots out of the forested mountain slopes, upland ridges and flat spaces, and these were burned prior to planting. As the soil nutrients are exhausted, after about 3 years of cultivation, the growers abandon the plot for a new one they have prepared through the same slash and burn technique. Severe erosion damage could occur soon in many abandoned plots. If allowed to continue it will not take long for this primitive technique to destroy the forest, land and water resources of an entire region.

The land on which the marihuana is being cultivated is uninhabited and no other crops were observed. Crude shelters were seen which are apparently used when the growers are planting, inspecting, or harvesting the crop.

In the lower and more accessible sectors, a few small isolated farm houses were seen with small vegetable gardens and farm animals visible. A National Police SANU group was operating in one of the sectors of this mountain valley maze and the helicopter transporting the delegation flew in to observe them cutting down and burning several hectares of marihuana on a flat ridge. The helicopter could not land because of poles sunk into the field by the grower apparently to prevent helicopters from landing. The marihuana was about ready for harvest, the field appeared to be very productive and to be of high quality. As the marihuana was cut down with machetes, it was piled up and burned.

From the field under eradication, the helicopter proceeded in the direction of the valley entrance several hundred feet below where the SANU group was working, to their base camp. Discussions were had over what had been observed. The SANU eradication team would spend several days cutting down and burning as much marihuana as physically possible and then would return to Valledupar and another group would be rotated in. The police officials on the scene estimated that at least 15,000 hectares of marihuana were growing in this sector of valleys and that their eradication efforts were only capable of eradicating a small fraction of what is being cultivated. They candidly confirmed what was evident, that given the paucity of manpower and equipment they had for eradication, their work had no meaningful impact on curtailing or deterring the production of marihuana in the Serrania Perija sector.

The delegation was astonished at the enormity of the marihuana cultivation it had witnessed and the estimate given that, in this sector alone, about 15,000 hectares were under cultivation. This is because there was only reported to be 17,000 hectares of marihuana under cultivation in all of Colombia. Taking into consideration the production in La Guajira, Magdalena, the Turbo area along the Gulf of Uraba, and the production on the Pacific Coast, overall marihuana production in Colombia surely must be 3 to 4 times greater than the estimated 17,000 hectares. Curiously, notwithstanding the fact this enormous cultivation of marihuana in the Serrania Perija is adjacent to the Venezuelan border, the National Police reported that they had no

reports of any marihuana cultivation taking place in this same mountain valley network across the border in Venezuela.

From the base camp of the SANU eradication team, the delegation group flew back to the airport at Valledupar. A huge former U.S. Air Force DC–6 was observed there, being held following its seizures in a marihuana smuggling attempt to the United States several months ago. Back at the National Police headquarters in Valledupar, the delegation was shown a large number and variety of trucks, automobiles and four-wheel drive vehicles seized in connection with marihuana smuggling. The group returned to Bogota in the late afternoon and met with Chairman Rangel, and the group he had led to the Llanos as well as Embassy officers. Both groups reported that they were appalled at the magnitude of both the coca and marihuana cultivation that they had seen, and further, that they were favorably impressed by the professionalism, dedication and courage of the young National Policemen eradicating coca and marihuana and conducting enforcement operations to seize coca, cocaine and marihuana and to arrest traffickers. Members of the delegation expressed the opinion that if the Government of Colombia assigned sufficient manpower and resources to the National Police and developed an effective crop eradication program, the National Police could implement it and could also greatly increase the effectiveness in narcotic traffic suppression.

MEETING WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL POLICE

On the morning of August 16, one group of the delegation led by Chairman Rangel, which included Representatives Gilman, Hughes, Lewis and Sawyer, met with Major General Victor Delgado, Director of the National Police. The Director was accompanied by his staff and greeted Chairman Rangel and the delegation warmly. He welcomed them to Colombia and to the headquarters of the National Police. He said that a joint effort is going to be required to bring the drug problem under control.

General Delgado mentioned that sadly the son of the Minister of Defense had died suddenly the previous day and the Minister would not be able to meet with the delegation as planned. He said that he was at the disposal of the delegation and had arranged for an extensive briefing by Colonel Jaime Ramirez Gomez, the Commander of the National Police Special Anti Narcotics Unit (SANU).

Colonel Ramirez described the recognition by the Government of Colombia by 1976 of the seriousness of the traffic in marihuana and cocaine that had been developing and the need to organize enforcement operations to suppress this activity. Priority was given to the Guajira region which was by far the most important production area for marihuana and for its smuggling to the United States, Canada, and Europe.

According to Colonel Ramirez, the Governments of Colombia and the United States agreed to intensify their joint narcotic enforcement efforts. Colombia realigned the narcotic enforcement and control efforts, and cooperation of the National Police, the Customs Service, Special Prosecutions and the National Council on Drug Abuse to come under the coordination of the Ministry of Defense.

Priority was given to eradicating the production of marihuana in the Guajira and suppressing the illicit traffic in the region. This included preventing the embarcation of marihuana aboard vessels and aircraft for smuggling abroad.

By December 1978, when this did not prove as effective as hoped, the Government of Colombia demonstrated its total seriousness to the problem by assigning responsibility for bringing the illicit production and traffic of drugs under control of the Army, particularly for operations in the Guajira.

In December 1980, another change was made and responsibility was assigned from the Army to the National Police. The Army would back up the National Police and the latter service with equipment and logistical support from the United States would organize a Special Anti-Narcotic Unit. Thus far, it is composed of 11 companies and 11 intelligence, units, Colonel Ramirez said.

Colonel Ramirez provided the statistical record of the first 30 months of the SANU operations from January 1, 1981, to July 1, 1983. It included the seizure of 7,691 tons of marihuana, 2.3 tons of cocaine, the destruction of 17.9 million marihuana plants and 40.8 million coca plants, the seizure of 1 ton of methaqualone powder, 5.6 million methaqualone tablets, and 305 coca paste and cocaine conversion facilities. (Unfortunately during this period, reports indicated cultivation continued to increase and the traffic to the United States did not diminish. In fact, the price of cocaine fell 50 percent in the last 6 months, a primary indicator of increased supply.)

Colonel Ramirez reported the arrest of 2,769 Colombians and 45 foreigners, the seizure of 23 aircraft, 8 ships, 484 motor vehicles, 1,617 weapons, 129 radios, 101 compacters for baling marihuana, and a large number of tractors, outboard motor boats and irrigation and laboratory pumps.

Colonel Ramirez said the Colombian Government was proud of this effort; that the program was by no means static; its activities are growing steadily. He said his government was directing its efforts to developing the enforcement and judicial means necessary to fight the narcotics traffic. It was their objective to control, and eventually eliminate the problem of narcotics in their country.

Chairman Rangel thanked General Delgado and Colonel Ramirez for the very informative briefing. He said he brought to them the greetings and best wishes of the people of the United States. Mr. Rangel went on to say that "the delegation had come to strengthen the ties our two great nations have had and express our gratitude for your work in narcotics control."

Chairman Rangel described for General Delgado the field trips, the two groups of the delegation made to the coca growing region of the Llanos and the marihuana growing in the north near Valledupar under the auspices and guidance of the SANU. Mr. Rangel praised Colonel Ramirez, and the dedication and courage of the young policeman working in hardship and danger, to eradicate marihuana and coca by hand and pitting themselves against the illicit traffickers to make narcotic arrests and seizures.

He went on to tell General Delgado that Colombia could count on the support of the United States to fight this terrible disease that is

corrupting its national institutions and way of life. Mr. Rangel said the delegation appreciated the enormous frustration of the National Police at not being able to arrest and bring to justice the traffickers who are destroying the nation.

He said the participants in the two field trips compared notes and concluded that the cultivation of marihuana and coca had increased to a point where the situation was almost hopeless, notwithstanding the dedication of the National Police. As bad as it is, the delegation is convinced there are solutions, if we both do what is right instead of politically expedient.

Mr. Rangel said, "we know that the narcotic traffickers lobby to prevent implementation of the 1982 extradition treaty signed between our two countries and against the use of the aerial spraying of herbicides to eradicate marihuana and coca." He added, "we want you to know that we would not ask you to use any chemical until we have proven that we are using the same chemical on our land." Chairman Rangel then introduced the members of the delegation and the staff to General Delgado and his staff and asked Representative Gilman, the Ranking Minority Member, to speak.

Mr. Gilman expressed his appreciation to Colonel Ramirez for his excellent briefing and commended his work to General Delgado for the excellent field trips he had organized for the delegation. Mr. Gilman said,

> Unfortunately, the narcotic traffic is driving a wedge between our two countries because of Colombia's position as a center of narcotic production and traffic.
>
> We are here to help. It is a war, children are dying, our police are being killed and corrupted, it is eating away the roots of our society. Please be frank and candid on how we can help to bring this terrible problem under control.

Representative Hughes said he appreciated the efforts the National Police had been making and he understood the difficulties, and that for 10 years now, the United States had been pressing for more effective action. The 30 month campaign of the SANU is impressive and apparently successful, and he congratulated General Delgado for that.

Mr. Hughes said,

> The magnitude of the marihuana problem on the North Coast is enormous. One has to see it to realize that you have the "granddaddy of all marihuana fields." Your police are good, well-trained, disciplined; they welcomed us and briefed us on the problem. Our Ambassador and the DEA representatives have told us of the fine cooperative narcotic enforcement activity carried out with the National Police and that is important, and we appreciate it.

However, Mr. Hughes said he had come to the conclusion, on the basis of the extent of marihuana cultivation he saw in the north, it was impossible to eradicate manually. He said that they saw new cultivation in old fields that had previously been manually eradicated.

Representative Lewis said he was impressed with the extent of the marihuana cultivation on the North Coast. "It is growing like oranges and sugar cane in Florida." Mr. Lewis said that he would like to issue an invitation to General Delgado and the Minister of Defense to come to Florida to witness the eradication of marihuana by chemical spray.

Representative Sawyer said he associated himself with the remarks of his colleagues and added that he too, was deeply impressed with the magnitude of the cultivation of marihuana he had seen on the North

Coast. He said that "attempting to eradicate it by hand was like trying to scrub the United States Capitol with a toothbrush."

General Delgado said he wished to say a few words in response. He stated that although they had not been able to eradicate the marihuana and coca cultivation, they have plans whereby they think they can prevent it from entering the illicit traffic and leaving Colombia. They would appreciate the delegation's help in support of agreements for narcotic law enforcement assistance which should make their efforts stronger and more effective.

He also thought stronger laws were needed in the United States which would prevent powerful Colombian Mafia drug traffickers, when arrested in the United States, from being given the opportunity to post bond and then flee from jurisdiction to escape prosecution.

General Delgado went on to say that the Minister of Defense had asked him to state that the "Government of Colombia is ready to continue the fight against the narcotic traffic with all force." The National Police is part of the Ministry of Defense and will lead the fight.

In conclusion, General Delgado paid tribute to the work of the DEA in Colombia and to the Embassy for its longtime help and support to Colombia on the problem. He urged the strengthening and expansion of cooperative narcotic control agreements to attack the problem that affects both countries, and said 80 percent of the Colombian people have nothing at all to do with drugs and that the Government would continue to try to bring the problem under control.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF COLOMBIA

While Chairman Rangel and a group of the delegation met with the Commanding General of the National Police, Representative Frank Guarini, at the request of the Chairman, led another group, which consisted of Representatives Collins, Dixon, Towns, and staff, at a meeting with Hugo Palacios Mejis, President of the Central Bank of Colombia to discuss the movement of currency related to the narcotic traffic.

Mr. Guarini began the discussion with a description of the Members and their backgrounds and an overall explanation of the purpose of the visit. He indicated that the Committee was especially interested in the issue of money laundering and pointed out that banks, both in Colombia and the U.S., if not the world, play a key role in facilitating illegal narcotics trafficking.

Mr. Palacios responded by giving a general explanation of his bank's role in Colombia and a description of foreign exchange policies of Colombia.

The Central Bank of the Republic is the equivalent of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, with not quite the degree of power. There is presently a move headed by the Central Bank toward "Democratization" of the banking industry in Colombia. This is an attempt to limit the maximum control of bank stock to 20 percent. This will result in the breakup of financial groups, banks owning industries, prevent inside loans, and other poor banking practices.

With respect to foreign exchange, Mr. Palacios made the following general points:

First. Every Colombian has a legal duty to change foreign currency. They must surrender to the bank all foreign currency.

Second. He appreciates that this is not desirable because it is more profitable to sell foreign earnings or currency on the market rather than the bank, due to inflation.

Third. However, that is a clear violation of the law. There are two agencies responsible for enforcement—one is the Export Administration and the other is the Department of Exchange Controls.

Fourth. These agencies are independent of police—sanctions can be up to 200 percent of the violation. If the fine is not paid, then the violator may be sent to jail.

Fifth. It is not his main duty to exert any pressures on banks or to police them. He carries out the long-standing law since 1976, he assumes others operate in good faith.

Mr. Dixon inquired whether the practice of laundering and, therefore, the connection between narcotics trafficking and banking was a serious problem.

Mr. Palacios replied that it was a serious problem. It corrupts people by suggesting a living can be made outside the law. It demoralizes those who are honest, and it robs from the people.

However, from an economic point of view, he does not view it as very serious. The volume of money laundering is exaggerated. According to Dr. Humbuto, an independent economist, narcotics proceeds are about 10 percent of all foreign income. Foreign income is reflected the greatest in tourism and services.

In 1976, which was the peak year, the Tourism and Services Account reached $500 million. Even if narcotics reflected 50 percent of those dollars it would only mean $250 million.

Mrs. Collins inquired as to reporting requirements for those dealing in foreign exchange.

Mr. Palacios stated that everyone must submit documents showing where earnings come from and what banks they deal with. There are businesses where there is some degree of a paper trail. Some people will try to hide income by "over-invoicing" exports, e.g. export 10,000 bananas, but report that they exported 100,000 bananas, and report that they received payment for 100,000 bananas.

Mr. Guarini pointed out that laws can be avoided. Money can be washed in real estate and construction with the assistance of banks. He further inquired about the unusually large number of banks in San Jose Guaviare, in the Llanos region. In San Jose, not being a major metropolitan city, was there a connection between the large number of banks and the high degree of coca production and trafficking in that region?

Mr. Palacios said that while he could not specifically respond, whether the large number of banks in San Jose del Guaviare are related to the coca and cocaine traffic, in general, one can make that assumption.

Mr. Guarini then asked if there were any constructive suggestions for the United States. Was there a better formula that could be developed for stamping out this laundering practice?

Mr. Palacios stated that first the entire worldwide banking system must cooperate. Presently there are regulations in some countries

which prevent the disclosure of information to other governments. This, of course, facilitates the masking of unsound or illegal practices. This aspect of the problem relates not only to narcotics trafficking, but to general banking principles.

There is a movement in Geneva to promote a more cooperative attitude by those authorities in all countries, which is a necessary first step.

In Colombia, they have recommended that no permission be given to any Colombians to invest abroad if the government does not have a good controlling authority, or if it is not willing to cooperate with Colombian supervising agencies.

If the same requirements were asked of authorities of other countries, this would help significantly.

In addition, he adopts the recommendations of the Cook Committee of the Bank of International Settlement. Essentially, the Committee recommended that if a country does not adopt regulations which provide for the exchange of banking information, then you stop doing business with them.

Finally, Mr. Guarini inquired if the banks of Colombia were required to report to the authorities the deposits of large amounts of cash transactions, as in the case of the U.S. for transactions over $10,000.

Mr. Palacio answered that is not a requirement in Colombia, but acknowledged that it would be helpful if such a requirement existed.

The United States should also increase its efforts to control the illicit importation and distribution of drugs from Colombia by American traffickers and, equally important, reduce consumption of drugs by bringing it under stricter control.

MEETING WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF COLOMBIA

At 10:15 a.m., the whole delegation came together to meet with Attorney General Carlos Jimenez Gomez. After a welcome by the Attorney General, Chairman Rangel introduced the delegation and described their standing committee assignments in the House of Representatives and the responsibilities that were involved.

Mr. Rangel went on to say,

We have to eradicate the disease of narotic trafficking and abuse that is destroying our countries. We know that you are aware how serious the problem is. We have seen the fields and were shocked at the enormity of the cultivation of coca and marihuana that we have seen. On the positive side, we were impressed and encouraged by the dedication and courage of the young policemen trying to eradicate the crops manually and attacking the illicit traffic of marihuana, coca and cocaine.

We have come to lend support and strengthen our cooperative efforts and to find a way to untangle a problem which permits the most powerful criminal elements to escape the law.

We appreciate and understand the difficulties caused by the powerful lobbying effort of the organized narcotic traffickers against compliance by the Government of Colombia with the 1982 extradition treaty with the United States, and the use of the aerial application of herbicide to eradicate marihuana and coca.

We want you to know that we are not asking our Colombian friends to use any chemical until you are satisfied we are using it. We come here as lawmakers and several of us are lawyers and former prosecutors. We understand your problems and difficulties. The drug problem is worsening and we have to do more, even if it involves taking political risks in Colombia and the United States, if we are going to bring about solutions.

We are the representatives of two democracies seeking to work together to solve a common problem. We would like to hear your recommendations on what we should do together to be successful. If we continue to fail, we risk a total breakdown of our national foundations, communities and virtually the entire free world.

Attorney General Jimenez states that he was pleased to welcome Chairman Rangel and his delegation and hoped this meeting would be productive.

It is very important for the Attorney General of Colombia to have contact with you. It doesn't matter what the role of the Attorney General's office is now or in the future. The important thing to understand is that the Attorney General's office is a reflection of public opinion.

The Attorney General went on to say that he recognized the absolute need to struggle against the narcotic traffic,

Not only because it is a problem, national and international in scope, but because we are now seeing in Colombia the impact of consumption on a national level. The domestic consumption of drugs is a clear sign of the depth of the problem.

We see farmers abandoning their traditional crops to grow coca and marihuana. In some sections of the country traditional agriculture is actually disappearing and the farmers are building their way of life around a different base, that of illicit narcotic crops.

In response to this he is incresing the participation of the Judicial Police in narcotic enforcement and is intensifying the role of the Attorney General's office in narcotic enforcement, not withstanding the fact the National Police have the basic responsibility in this area.

Attorney General Jimenez said, "we have success in this work," and added that he planned to arrange a meeting with DEA Special Agent in Charge Phelps to discuss mutual goals because he is convinced of the need for cooperation and dialogue.

Representative Gilman said,

We recognize the complexities of developing narcotic prosecutions, but it was hoped the Attorney General could intensify and expand his efforts in that area, because, up until now, it has been disappointing.

He added,

Experience has convinced us that to achieve narcotic control, enforcement, eradication, and education programs must be implemented vigorously. We are here to urge the high officials to end the flow of the narcotic traffic from Colombia.

We are interested in the new special narcotic unit in the Judicial Police.

Mr. Gilman told the Attorney General, and said he hoped to follow its development through Ambassador Tambs.

Representative Hughes said,

We are stepping up our narcotic enforcement efforts with tougher laws on the forfeiture of assets, tougher bail laws and extradition treaty reform. The extradition treaty signed by Colombia and the United States has great value to both our countries. Mr. Hughes said he was astonished at the enormity of the marihuana plantations he had seen in the North Coast region. We have the same problem in California and some other states. Eradication is a technical and engineering problem, but certainly the crop has to be controlled at the source.

Representative Lewis said,

Our observations have convinced us that the National Police manual eradication campaign cannot keep up with the production. By fumigating the marihuana and coca with herbicide, you may be protecting the sovereignty of Colombia from the narcotic traffickers.

Mr. Lewis then invited the Attorney General to come to Florida to see chemical spraying and mentioned that a similar invitation had been extended to General Delgado and the Minister of Defense. Attorney General Jimenez said he appreciated the inviation very much and would consider it.

Representative Guarini said,

You seem to have adequate laws, but enforcement is not satisfactory. There seems to be confusion with three police elements assigned to drug enforcement involving procedural problems and overlap. If there is a will, as we are told, to eradicate the illicit cultivation of marihuana and coca, why can't the means be found?

Attorney General Jimenez replied that the problem of the illicit production and traffic of narcotics is something that happens in many countries, and has great social and political consequences, but that the cultivation had to be destroyed. Mr. Guarini asked,

Why aren't laws enforced? Granted, evidence is difficult to obtain, but we are told when it is presented against narcotic violators, it runs into procedural discussions and legal technicalities, which results in the traffickers escaping prosecution or conviction and continuing their activity without interruption.

Attorney General Jimenez said he would like to discuss the herbicide question. He said the Attorney General's Office represents an important aspect of the feelings of the people on the question. The Government of Colombia adheres to public opinion to maintain its democratic institutions. To proceed against public opinion on any matter only results in accomplishing nothing, even if the public does not express its opinion. We need to calm public opinion.

"We have to have certain scientific proof that the use of herbicides against narcotic crops is safe, then the public will be assured, and support it."

Chairman Rangel asked if Attorney General Jimenez doubted that scientific evidence is available now, that the use of herbicide applied under scientifically approved procedures, to destroy narcotic crops is safe.

Mr. Rangel said he has seen the limitations of manual eradication in Colombia and again asked if the Attorney General doubted that scientific evidence was available on the harmlessness of herbicide spray eradication when the prescribed procedures are followed.

Chairman Rangel said he was having difficulty understanding how an Attorney General implemented his constitutional responsibility to apply the laws of his country based on public opinion. He added that, at a point where public opinion is at odds with the government, the elected public officials must respond and decide whether they do what is popular or what is right.

In the United States, our Attorney General, under the constitution, must enforce all the laws of the land, with or without the support of public opinion. Collectively we must educate our people that we must enforce our laws in concert with our national and international obligations.

Chairman Rangel said,

Given the magnitude of the illicit cultivation of marihuana and coca in remote areas of Colombia, the delegation was convinced it could not be contained and reduced by manual eradication. Only the use of some chemical sprayed by helicopter or aircraft could effectively eliminate this cultivation because of its magnitude, spread over remote sections of the country.

Attorney General Jimenez said that he was convinced of the magnitude of the problem and that it required new methods for solution. "Further, we are looking at all different avenues."

Chairman Rangel said, "if you want information, we have it."

The Attorney General concluded by saying, "we will work on the problem."

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE COLOMBIAN SENATE

The delegation next proceeded to the Capitol Building where it met with Carlos Holguin Sardi, President of the Colombian Senate, who welcomed the members. Chairman Rangel said, "it is a pleasure for our delegation to meet with elected officials; we find meetings with legislators particularly helpful." He then asked Representative Gilman to introduce the delegation and make the opening statement.

Mr. Gilman said, "we, in the House of Representatives are closest to the drug problem and to the people. We know what it does to families, the police, the community and the country. This is a war we are fighting."

Chairman Rangel said,

> There is very little time left if we are to avoid having this problem destroy our societies. On our field trips to the Llanos and North Coast, we were shocked at the extent of the cultivation of coca and marihuana. We are convinced that the current manual system of attempting to eradicate marihuana used by the National Police is hopeless.
>
> We face the same problems you do, and have had some public opinion problems as you have, on the use of herbicides. We would never recommend that you apply any chemical to your soil that we were not using now in the United States. Representative Lewis has invited the Minister of Defense, the Commanding General of the National Police, and the Attorney General, to Florida to examine the use of aerial fumigation techniques on crops. We can provide all the scientific evidence available on the safety of herbicide utilization, when they are professionally applied. We understand and share the political sensitivities involved on this question, but want to work together with you on it.

Senator Holguin said he wanted to thank the delegation for its visit, that it was very useful. "Ambassador Tambs had furnished data on your background and on your districts. As you know, other members of the Senate will be joining us at lunch." He said the Senate was currently in session and was working on legislation which prevented him from spending as much time as he would like with the delegation. As a former Minister of Justice, he is aware of the problem. He recently returned from a "Leader Grant" trip to the United States where his interest was centered on "air agreements." He said the delegation could be assured of the complete cooperation and support of the Senate and Chamber of Representatives against this plague assaulting our countries.

He believes the narcotic assistance agreements to further cooperation have been very helpful. He is deeply concerned with the power of the narcotic traffickers in Colombia; that drug money is being used to support some politicians; that this question is now being debated in the Colombian Congress.

He said there is the will on the part of the Government of Colombia, to fight the narcotic traffic which is so seriously affecting the United States.

As to public opinion on the drug problem, recently there have been some shifts. The first involves widespread public concern over the outbreak of Bazuco abuse sweeping the countryside. Heretofore, public opinion believed that cocaine produced in Colombia was only exported. They have now finally come to realize that drug abuse in Colombia is a severe national problem.

Public opinion is now beginning to realize that the narcotic traffickers want to get into politics and gain political office in Colombia. Many newspapers are reporting these developments and the dangers of these trends.

The elected representatives have the decisiveness and will to fight this scourge. The political parties are united in their support for drug control.

Senator Holguin said, although he was not an expert on drug control, he was encouraged to know herbicides are being used in the United States.

In conclusion, Chairman Rangel mentioned to Senator Holguin that talks in Bolivia had resulted in a proposal, that consideration be given to holding an interparliamentary meeting of Congressmen from Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Jamaica and the United States to quantify the problem of the production, traffic and abuse of drugs and what cooperative steps might be taken toward a solution. Senator Holguin agreed this proposal should be considered.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE COLOMBIAN CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES

The delegation then moved on to a meeting with Cesar Gaviria, the President of the Colombian Chamber of Representatives, and seven of his colleagues.

Chairman Rangel thanked Chamber President Gaviria and his colleagues for interrupting their busy legislative schedule to meet with the delegation, as the members know what this means. "We will be brief because we shall have more time to talk when we get together at lunch."

Mr. Rangel said:

> We find that our best meetings are with our elected colleagues. You have your legislative responsibilities as we do, but we come here today to urge that we somehow get together, in mind and spirit, to fight the disease of the traffic and abuse of narcotics corrupting our societies.
>
> We do not have much time together, but let me tell you about a wonderful idea proposed by our colleagues in Bolivia, which proposes that an interparliamentary commission be formed to see how we can come up with answers to this terrible problem. Ambassador Tambs will follow up with you on the feasibility of this proposal.

President Gaviria agreed the proposal should be considered.

At the request of Chairman Rangel, Representative Gilman introduced the members of the delegation and told Chamber President Gaviria, "we are mutually confronted by an immense problem and that we must work together to find a solution."

Chairman Rangel said the delegation has learned of resistance in Colombia, to implementing the 1982 extradition treaty with the United States, and the use of herbicides to eradicate marihuana and coca cultivation.

Mr. Rangel told Chamber President Gaviria and his fellow representatives,

> We would never ask you to use a chemical that would harm your soil or people, and we would not expect you to support this unless we convince you that we use them, and they are safe and necessary to control marihuana and coca cultivation. Mr. Lewis has invited several officials of your government to study the aerial application of herbicides in Florida on crops.

Chamber President Gaviria thanked Chairman Rangel and the delegation for their visit to explain the narcotic problem affecting our two countries. He deplored the power of the narcotic traffickers in Colombia and their money, the heavy use of which influences political campaigns. This is a question Colombia is now looking into. He said they appreciate the ideas and invitations brought by the delegation for cooperative action to control the problem.

The Committee Delegation were guests at a luncheon hosted by the Presidents of the Senate and Chamber of Representatives. During the luncheon, Chairman Rangel made the point to the leaders of the Colombian Senate and Chamber of Representatives that in the United States, the Congress reflects public opinion and the Attorney General enforces the law, whether it is popular or not. The Congressional leaders told Mr. Rangel there is no Colombian public opinion about the use of the herbicide Paraquat, and that only a few Colombian congressmen are opposed to using the herbicide.

Other members of the delegation and staff reported lively give and take discussions on the "demand" for drugs in the United States, to cultivation and traffic in Colombia, and on the relationship of the feasibility of using herbicides to destroy marihuana and coca, with the Colombian Senators and Representatives with whom they sat at lunch. It pointed up the frustrating lack of direction and coordination of the Colombian government on this issue, and the confusion, misinformation, and lack of factual data that persists. For the most part, the Colombians displayed an emotional objection to the use of herbicides to eradicate marihuana and coca, which argues that the United States, by suggesting that the most effective way to destroy extensive, illicit marihuana and coca cultivation is by aerial-applied herbicide spray, violates Colombian sovereignty. The Colombian argument created the impression that herbicides, and spraying, are alien to their land, and it would be unfair to bring this technique into the Colombian countryside to destroy marihuana and coca, cultivated as a result of the demand for these drugs in the United States.

The facts, of course, are that Colombia is an advanced, and very productive agricultural country that uses herbicides and aerial crop spraying extensively. In the end, the Colombian officials state that they have an open mind on the question, that they are not ruling it out, and that they have conducted scientific studies of the consequences of the use of herbicides on the soil and on public health, and are now in the process of making a decision on whether herbicides should be used to eradicate narcotic crops.

MEETING WITH THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE OF COLOMBIA

At about 3:00 p.m., the delegation met with Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, who welcomed the members and expressed great satisfaction on being able to discuss the narcotic problem. Minister

Lara who had assumed his post two weeks previously, opened by explaining the role of the Ministry of Justice, in cooperation with the Attorney General, and the National Police of the Ministry of Defense, to address the problem of the illicit production and traffic of drugs in Colombia. He provided statistics which indicated Colombia had eradicated and seized more drugs in the first six months of 1983 than in all of 1982. One striking statistic he provided, which reveals the breakdown of the Colombian Judicial system, is that of the 27,500 individuals incarcerated in Colombia, 5,000 have been convicted of a crime, and 22,500 are being held pending trial.

Minister Lara said priority is being given to the arrest and prosecution of traffickers. He pointed out that Colombians once believed that all drugs in the country were destined for export and consumption abroad, now they are finding out that their success in curtailing exports has created a domestic market and widespread drug abuse. Minister Lara added that Colombia has accepted the United States Government's invitation to send a team of experts to Mexico and Georgia to study the use of paraquat.

He went on to say that Colombia is taking every possible step to end this problem, it is trying, and will succeed in ending this traffic.

Chairman Rangel stated that the field trips of the delegation to the marihuana and coca growing areas were incredible experiences. Upon the return of the two groups, they compared notes and agreed the production of coca and marihuana was enormous. On the positive side, they were impressed by the dedication and courage of the Special Anti Narcotic Units under Colonel Ramirez. However, under the existing manual method of eradication and the paucity of their manpower and equipment, their efforts are hopeless as a means to solve the problem.

Mr. Rangel went on to say that from everything the Committee has heard, Colombia is experiencing considerable difficulty in prosecuting and convicting drug traffickers, because of legal technicalities and cumbersome judicial procedures. He said that we encounter similar problems in the United States and periodically we reform our laws and streamline procedures. He urged the Minister of Justice to consider taking similar steps as a means to improve narcotic enforcement effectiveness.

Chairman Rangel said the delegation has perceived a problem in Colombia, in understanding the United States position on the use of Paraquat in Colombia, to eradicate marihuana. He went on to say, "we would never suggest Colombia use any chemical which the United States is not prepared to use and which, when used with proper controls, would not effect the people of Colombia.

However, the Attorney General has told us that his office in carrying out government policy, must reflect public opinion; that the public is not yet convinced that Paraquat is safe." Mr. Rangel said, "I told the Attorney General that under our system, Congress reflected public opinion, and our Attorney General enforced the law, popular or unpopular.

Mr. Rangel went on to say, that at lunch, he had discussions with a number of members of both houses of the Colombian Congress. He shared with them the Attorney General's remarks on his obligation to consider public opinion. They said there was no public opinion on this; that the Congress was not concerned with this matter one way or the other; that it was a matter for decision by the executive branch. Mr.

Rangel added, "these apparent inconsistencies are probably due to our not fully understanding the Colombian system of government."

Minister of Justice Lara responded that while the Government of Colombia was open to suggestions, it had a sovereign responsibility to make its own decision on Paraquat. It was Minister Lara's opinion, that what the Attorney General was referring to as public opinion, was the large number of newspaper articles on the dangers of Paraquat, as well as a widely circulated report prepared by the Minister of Health, which also described the dangers of Paraquat.

Minister Lara added that despite the negative elements of the use of Paraquat, the Colombian Government still had an open mind on the subject. He mentioned the scheduled visit of a Colombian team of experts to study the use of Paraquat in Mexico and Georgia.

Minister Lara went on to say, the drug problem is rooted in poverty, growers produce marihuana and coca because it earns more for them than vegetables. It also is closely linked to the guerrilla movement, he said.

Minister Lara concluded his remarks by saying that Colombia was aware of its international responsibility to prevent the illicit exportation of drugs from its territory, and would commit the resources necessary to eradicate illicit cultivation, and would cooperate with all countries. He promised to support the Colombia-United States "Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty" when it comes before the Chamber of Representatives for ratification.

MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, THE MINISTER OF HEALTH, AND THE COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

The delegation next moved on to a meeting with Foreign Minister Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo, Minister of Health Jaime Arias Ramirez, and the Colombian Ambassador to the United States Alvardo Gomez Hurtado.

Foreign Minister Lloreda welcomed Chairman Rangel and the delegation and said that the President would be coming, "meanwhile, let us start." He introduced the Minister of Health and the Colombian Ambassador to Washington. Chairman Rangel introduced Representative Gilman and asked him to introduce the delegation, which he did.

Chairman Rangel then described the two field trips to the coca fields near San Jose del Guaviare and to the marihuana cultivation near Valledupar. Following that, he said:

The two groups met to discuss their findings. They found they were deeply impressed with the hard work and dedication of the young policemen manually attempting to eradicate marihuana and coca under conditions of great danger and hardship. However, given the enormity of the cultivation they were attempting to destroy, their manual cutting down and burning of this cultivation is hopeless.

Additionally, we have perceived from our talks that there has been some communication breakdowns between our governments, which have created difficulties and misunderstandings apparently over the extradition treaty, and the mutual legal assistance treaty, also the need for improvements in the criminal justice system and how to implement narcotic crop eradication. Now we have learned of another apparent communication breakdown which involves the Attorney General telling us that public opinion is convinced that Paraquat is not safe. We

have a problem understanding this because in our country our Attorney General must enforce the law, and not respond to public opinion, but in Colombia the Attorney General responds to public opinion.

At lunch we met with many members of the Senate and Chamber of Representatives and they told us, in Colombia this issue is strictly an issue for decision by the executive branch; that on such matters the Congress in Colombia does not exercise as much influence as does the Congress in the United States.

On the issue of herbicide use to destroy narcotic crops, we would not ask Colombia to do anything we would not do. That same holds true on the extradition treaty and the legal assistance treaty.

Minister Lloreda responded that Chairman Rangel had summed up a number of aspects of the problem quite well. He would now like to sum up his government's position.

Continuing close cooperation between Colombia and the United States is essential to bringing about a solution to a problem which has brought social havoc to the United States and now more recently has come to Colombia with the consumption of bazouca. So, as we now see drug abuse in our country, you are beginning to produce a lot of marihuana in your country.

We, as a producer country, have now become a victim and money is at the root of all of this. It is corrupting the institutions of both countries and it is in the United States where the money action takes place. The laundering is done there; not much narcotic money movement takes place in Colombia.

We do our best to fight the traffic, but it is difficult because of the enormous financial assets of the traffickers and their ability to use it to corrupt.

While Colombia is reported in the United States to be responsible for the major proportions of cocaine, marihuana and methaqualone entering your country, a high percentage of that traffic only transits Colombia, and the basic raw materials originate in other countries.

Colombia has made real progress in organizing to fight the narcotic traffic by enacting an updated national narcotic control law in 1974, establishing a National Narcotics Council, and ratifying all the current international drug control conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1972. Colombia is cooperating on narcotics with Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela. We have ratified the extradition treaty with the United States in 1982 and are currently moving to ratify the legal assistance treaty.

Last year Dr. Giuseppe Di Gennaro, Assistant Secretary General of UNFDAC visited Colombia at which time our National Narcotics Council adopted strategies on narcotic enforcement, education and prevention, treatment, research and international cooperation that coincide with the strategy adopted by President Reagan in 1982.

With regard to the aerial application of the herbicide Paraquat to destroy marihuana, the National Narcotics Council is not in accordance with the use of this technique. The Minister of Health has officially given the same opinion. Minister Lloreda said he had already discussed this issue very frankly with Vice President Bush; that Colombia cannot do what the United States is unwilling to do. Colombian public opinion is convinced that the aerial application would result in the poisoning of the atmosphere and water resources. This creates a major political obstacle to Paraquat. He accepted the Colombian Government's willingness to accept an invitation to visit spraying programs in Georgia and Florida to exchange scientific data on Paraquat's health effects. He also hoped to talk to Mexican officials on their experience with the aerial spraying of Paraquat.

In conclusion, Minister Lloreda praised the Colombian Government's effort to detect and eradicate marihuana and coca, to suppress the illicit production and traffic of narcotics, particularly the work performed by the Special Anti Narcotics Unit with operational commands in the most critical zones of the country.

Lastly he said his government is alarmed at the increasing drug consumption and reports of a constant increase of marihuana production in the United States.

Health Minister Arias expressed his government's recognition of the need to bring narcotics under control and Colombia's willingness to cooperate. There were, however, political constraints against the use of Paraquat. He raised the stigma that still remained from the use of herbicides in Vietnam. He mentioned the existence of reports by the World Health Organization and the American Academy of Medicine containing negative findings on Paraquat's effects on public health.

Minister Arias went on to concede, however, that medical opinion on Paraquat's safety is mixed. Further, while the Ministry of Health cannot recommend the use of Paraquat at this time, it is willing to study it and other herbicides for possible aerial application. He then provided Chairman Rangel with a several page computer printout of abstracts of scientific literature, mostly originating in the United States citing the pros and cons of Paraquat.

(Comment: This computer printout of abstracts of reports concerning the safety and health risks of Paraquat and other herbicides is being reviewed for relevance to marihuana eradication programs by the Select Committee scientists. In some cases the actual reports have been obtained, and many of them appear to be animal studies with tenuous relevance to human health and safety. Others are based upon computer simulations that, used arbitrarily, established assumptions and input data.)

Ambassador Gomez followed up on Minister Arias' remarks and emphasized the issue of the aerial spraying of herbicides is not closed. He added that the previous Minister of Health would not recommend the use of Paraquat, but for now the question is being studied.

Ambassador Gomez expressed a certain sadness and disappointment that the subject of narcotics and the illicit traffic from Colombia has become a one issue phenomenon between the two countries. He said whenever he is introduced to someone in the United States as the Colombian Ambassador, the person inevitably mentions that it is their understanding that Colombia is where most of the narcotics entering the United States come from. He said this reaction is totally out of proportion to the realities of the problem and out of balance with the true state of relations between our two countries. He felt this impression of Colombia resulted from criticism of Colombia's narcotic control efforts by the Congress and by the press which he thought were unfair. Ambassador Gomez said Colombia is doing the best it can with the resources available to it. Even if the current study of utilizing Paraquat results in a decision not to use it, he said that would not justify a criticism of Colombia's narcotic enforcement efforts.

He stated Colombia has the will to fight the narcotic traffic. The government is well aware of the threat posed by the narcotic traffic to Colombian youth and its democratic institutions. However, the government is obliged to work within those institutions and remain responsive to public opinion.

Chairman Rangel urged the Ministers and Ambassador Gomez to visit the marihuana and coca fields that the delegation had seen the previous day. He said he thought this would bring them to an ines-

capable conclusion "that you are not succeeding with your manual eradication program, to continue to rely on it is hopeless, and you are not even making a dent in this production which is continuing to increase.

Regrettably, from everything we have seen and can learn, your efforts to enforce your laws prohibiting the cultivation and traffic of marihuana and coca are not producing the desired results. Manual eradication is simply not working; do you agree more is needed?

Minister Lloreda said the problem of cultivation is one of great proportions and complex social issues. However, he agreed it needed to be eradicated. He reported that his government had the will to do it notwithstanding the political sensitivities involved. "We appreciate this candid exchange of views," he added and mentioned that on the question of eradication, the delegation must be even more concerned with public opinion in the United States. Minister Lloreda said, "we must do something new, maybe it will be Paraquat."

Chairman Rangel apologized for what he called the parliamentary approach to the problem.

We are simply concerned with learning how our government can be of assistance to Colombia to find a way out of its illicit cultivation predicament. We are not here to make suggestions on what should be done, but to offer help to you, to do what your government thinks should be done. I would be offended if some Colombian Congressman made suggestions on what my government should do.

Representative Gilman said,

Our dialogue has been constructive and our bonds are being strengthened. Tragically, Colombia has now become known for cocaine and not coffee. We are in effect now engaged in a war against the production and traffic of narcotic drugs to protect our young people. We are up against ruthless and resourceful criminals using the most modern and sophisticated equipment to traffic drugs in huge amounts and earn billions with which they corrupt our police and institutions in the process of destroying our society. We must get a handle on this problem.

Representative Hughes said he felt that,

We in the United States were not doing a good job in demand reduction and in drug abuse prevention education.

As to narcotic enforcement, he also thought

We could do better and we're moving in that direction to strengthen the laws reform. However, the drug traffic is increasing and will destroy our societies just like it did in China, a country that fought two wars to defend itself from the opium traffic.

Mr. Hughes went on to say,

The marihuana cultivation in the North Coast Region is the worst ever. The National Police are making a dedicated and courageous effort to eradicate it by hand, but they recognize the futility of their efforts. The use of aerial herbicide spraying is a scientific, technical question that has become involved in controversy. The decision on its use should be decided on a technical and scientific basis.

Representative Lewis said the delegation was very fortunate to have had these meetings and the ones with the Congress.

For our part, we were overwhelmed with what we have seen, marihuana is growing in enormous quantities on the North Coast as openly and as densely as oranges and sugar cane is produced in Florida. This production is like a deluge and it is your problem and ours; we are in it together. I invite you to come to Florida to see the techniques used to aerial spray crops with herbicide.

Representative Sawyer said he saw mile upon mile of marihuana under cultivation on the North Coast, but that, unfortunately, the dedicated efforts of the small number of National Policemen attempting to eradicate it by hand was hopeless, and, in his opinion, their effect was the same as someone trying to scrub the Capitol of the United States with a tooth brush. He thought an effective program of eradication and illicit traffic suppression would have to be developed; that all our efforts need to be expanded and strengthened.

Representative Towns said, "it is the youth of both countries that is our most precious resource and they are being wiped out by drug abuse." Crop eradication is essential, but he thought the Colombian Government ought to be more active in promoting crop substitution. He said everything should be tried.

Representative Guarini said,

> You know we come as a friend to Colombia, we have come to offer help and support to you, to do what needs to be done. We hear Colombia referred to as a funnel for the bulk of the drugs affecting the United States.
>
> Experts tell us the aerial application of herbicide could effectively eradicate marihuana and coca. There are some people who oppose the use of herbicide as unsafe, others state it is harmless to people and the ecology when applied scientifically and professionally. I tend to agree with the latter assessment. When we see what marihuana and coca are doing to youth, as well as the corruption and destruction it brings to our society, the weight of argument is on the side of using the herbicide. We ask you to move as quickly as possible to make your decision, there is a great deal of restlessness in the United States on this issue. We know continued failure to eradicate marihuana and coca is damaging to your people also.

Representative Dixon stated that,

> Given the great problem with the production and traffic in drugs in Colombia which we all agree exists, we have a long way to go toward bringing it under control. During the last three days in Colombia he has not seen, nor has anyone said, that Colombia has a comprehensive program to bring this problem under control.

He went on to say that the importance of this problem to the people of Colombia and the United States has to be understood. He thought some form of public information announcement by the Attorney General to address the problem of public concern over the use of herbicides might be helpful in that regard.

Minister Lloreda said,

> We can do a lot more. The problem is hurting the United States and us even more. Colombia now has a terrible international image, because of its drug traffic, particularly in Europe. We are not happy with this, and we are determined to correct it, but this is a long term problem which will not yield quickly to solution.

Ambassador Tambs brought the meeting to a conclusion by pointing out that the threat to Colombia's democratic institutions includes more than just the infiltration of narcodollars into politics. The growing links between Colombian insurgents and the drug traffic mean that the very preservation of a free society is at stake. The Ambassador also cited his considerable personal experience with drug affected students. He said this plague threatens the destruction of the future achievers and leaders of our societies.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF COLOMBIA

The Committee delegation next proceeded to a meeting with President Belisario Betancur.

President Betancur welcomed the delegation warmly and Chairman Rangel thanked him for taking the time from his heavy schedule to meet with the delegation.

President Betancur said he was greatly impressed with the progress made in his meeting with President Reagan. He said their one-hour talk covered the Caribbean, Central America, bilateral relations and drugs. He said he found it striking that they could speak about a number of issues and end up with the relationship of one human to another, one from North America, and one from South America.

The principal responsibility of governments is to look after their people and to seek to increase their standard of living. Experience tells us that in government, the legislature and executive branches should work together, but they often do not. He spent many years in the legislature and misses it.

During his conversation with President Reagan, they discussed problems in the Caribbean and other areas and how to approach them.

President Betancur said his conversations with President Reagan were as cordial as they possibly could be. But he and President Reagan were candid and truthful with each other.

"There is a plaque on this building with the words of Simon Bolivar, which state, 'The best friend of the person who governs is the person who tells the truth.' "

President Betancur said the relationship between President Reagan and him has clarity, and that this is very important for this period of time. He said he believes they have established a relationship based on the mutual respect they have for each other, and that which exists between our two countries. He said while of course Colombia is smaller than the United States, they are juridically equal.

President Betancur said their conversation moved on to the threat posed by the drug problem. President Reagan told him of the danger drugs were posing to our people, the terrible inroads it has made on American society. President Reagan said all countries have some victims, sometimes they have differences. President Betancur said he recognized that President Reagan and he were in agreement on this terrible subject.

They agreed that this is a serious problem that must be attacked at the root. After they had agreed, and after they rejoined Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Lloreda, they asked them to work out a comprehensive full plan of attack.

President Betancur said,

While agreements to cooperate already existed, they needed to be improved upon and our cooperative efforts speeded up.

As the Foreign Minister has said, the Government of Colombia has no issue with a foreign country more important than this.

The problem of the production of drugs is more serious here than in the United States. However, the great consumption of drugs in the United States creates a market which stimulates production here.

Traditionally consumption here was not a problem, now it is widespread. In former times the only thing that existed was a little marihuana use at artistic gatherings. There was no open selling, it was all clandestine.

Two years ago, while on a lecture visit to Washington, D.C., he was openly approached by a dope peddler in Farragut Square. He purchased some marihuana so he could later show some friends, Members of the U.S. Senate, see what you can buy openly in Farragut Square.

Also when in the United States, he saw a television program which showed the open sale of marihuana on Park Avenue in New York City. President Betancur made the point that this form of tolerance is playing free and easy with freedom versus the abuse of freedom.

With reference to the influence of narcodollars on the Colombian economy, President Betancur said that "most of the money generated stayed in the United States, where U.S. financial institutions provide laundering facilities. The money that comes back to Colombia does not benefit, but damages the economy. He said, "it brings no economic gain to Colombia, only vexation." One significant impact has been in real estate, driving the price of a house up from $150,000 to $1 million. This has happened in Bogota, Barranquilla, Cali and Medellin. The construction industry has also been distorted by drug money and our financial institutions have been adversely affected. Worst of all, the narcotraffickers with their drug money are getting involved in national politics, they are trying to elect people. Tonight they are debating this problem of "hot money" (narcodollars) in the Congress. This is a greater danger than the economic threat, and I have passed instructions to my Ministers to get to the bottom of this and to bring it to the attention of the nation.

Colombia is not interested in drug money and the drug trade, we want to work with all countries to erect a wall to stop this traffic. Three weeks ago at the Caracas meeting of the Bolivarian countries, we agreed to have a joint working group to exchange information and knowledge and to make common cause against the traffic and abuse of drugs.

Colombia is a country of 28 million people, and has a long history of respect for human rights.

Colombia has been independent for 170 years and in that time has only had two periods of military rule, one lasting two years, the other, four. Colombia has a long history of respect for the individual, for civil rule, and will not tolerate anything to do with drugs.

Rest assured, your visit is welcomed, we have the same concerns. All doors are open to you.

Chairman Rangel in response, said,

Mr. President, your eloquence has not been lost, even in translation.

We were inspired by our meetings with our colleagues in your Senate and Chamber of Representatives. We have been exchanging thoughts and ideas with your ministers. We hardly need to tell you that the problem of the traffic and abuse of drugs can cripple our institutions. Mr. President, we are particularly happy to be meeting with you as a former member of the Congress. We understand your severe economic problem, and because of that, not being able to move as fast as you would like against the production and traffic of drugs. We respect your position.

We would never ask you to violate the sovereignty of your citizens, or use chemicals or do anything we would not do. We appreciate your difficulties because the traffickers in our country also make effective use of propaganda. The fields of coca and marihuana, that we have seen, stretch as far as the eye can see.

We were greatly impressed by the young policemen of the National Police Special Anti Narcotic Unit attempting to eradicate this cultivation by hand. We came away convinced that we have lost the battle if we restrict ourselves to the tools we are now using. We found all the Colombian officials with whom we came in contact open-minded and dedicated to bringing this terrible problem under control. We, in the Select Committee are a group of people who have come to you to say thanks, and to offer our help and assistance.

At that point, Chairman Rangel introduced the delegation: Representatives Gilman, Guarini, Hughes, Lewis, Dixon, Towns, and Sawyer.

Chairman Rangel went on to say that he hoped, as a result of our talks and cooperation, we will see improved results. He praised the narcotic enforcement effort of Colombia, carried out with limited resources. He also mentioned the suggestion of the Bolivian Senate and Chamber of Deputies members, that an interparliamentary conference be formed to consider the drug problem, that there was some Colombian interest and the idea would be considered.

Mr. Rangel thanked President Betancur for the whole-hearted reception in Colombia, he has given to Ambassador Tambs. He concluded by saying, "we are here to support the mutual friendship of our two democracies," and as a token of esteem, Mr. Rangel presented President Betancur with a plaque commemorating the United States House of Representatives, which he said he hoped would help to remind the President of his fondly remembered days in the Colombian Congress

President Betancur said his eloquence fails him in comparison to Chairman Rangel and he must brush up. He said he thinks often with longing of his old days in the legislature and yet he knows there are some members over there with equal longing, coveting his office.

Following the meeting with President Betancur, the delegation attended a reception at Ambassador Tambs residence where, for about two hours, they had an opportunity to again meet with the Colombian Cabinet Ministers and the leadership of the departments and agencies concerned with narcotics control. Informative and very helpful discussions continued. Deep concern and frustration on the part of the delegation persisted over the enormity of the production and traffic of drugs in Colombia affecting the United States, as well as the lack of a structural, comprehensive program by the Government of Colombia to address the problem. However, the delegation took hope from what they perceived as a realization by the Government of Colombia of the enormity of the problem, and that some formula had to be found in partnership with the United States to bring the production and traffic of drugs under control.

FIELD TRIP TO CARTAGENA

Following the reception, the delegation departed for Cartagena on the North Coast where it arrived at about 11 p.m. On August 17, the delegation was given an extensive briefing by the DEA Resident Agent-in-Charge, assigned to the American Consulate at Barranquilla, to assist the Colombian narcotic enforcement services develop investigations of the traffic affecting the United States from the North Coast region.

Cooperation in developing investigations of mutual interest, and exchanging narcotic intelligence between DEA and its Colombian counterpart agencies are good, and some tangible results in the way of narcotic arrests and seizures, both in Colombia and the United States result. However, the manpower, equipment and operating funds assigned to the North Coast by the Government of Colombia is not sufficient to have any meaningful impact on the enormous traffic of marihuana, cocaine and methaqualone continually smuggled from that region to the United States by sea and air. No effective action has ever been taken to immobilize the great number of clandestine air strips used by the hundreds of aircraft from light single-engine planes to

huge DC–7's and Super Constellations. Similarly, no action has ever been taken to shut down the great number of clandestine loading docks put together along the North Coast for loading the "motherships" with marihuana. This epitomizes the lack of resources assigned to suppressing smuggling from the North Coast.

An example of this traffic was the seizure on September 21, 1983, of a DC–7 aircraft at Castle Dale, Utah, and 12 tons of marihuana it had just delivered on a flight from Colombia via Mexico. Eleven men were arrested in this operation, all from Florida, nine of whom had come originally from Cuba as refugees.

On the morning of August 18, the delegation proceeded to the Navy Yard at Cartagena where they were received aboard the two 105-foot patrol boats provided to the Government of Colombia through State Department international narcotic assistance funding during Fiscal Year 1980 for drug smuggling interdiction along the North Coast. One vessel, the "Rafael de Castillio y Rada" is assigned to the Colombian Navy and the other, the "Olaya Herrera" is assigned to the Colombian Customs-Coast Guard.

Briefings were provided aboard each patrol boat beginning with the Navy vessel. It would appear this first class modern vessel, which is, in reality, a small fast gunboat, is fully integrated into the Colombian Navy Caribbean Command with additional support responsibility assignments in the Pacific. Its narcotic interdiction patrol activity appears to be incidental to its Navy role. In about two years of service, it has only brought under control and searched 15 vessels, seizing one kilogram of cocaine, some residue of marihuana, and some dollars.

The Customs-Coast Guard, "Olaya Herrera" has achieved better results during the same period of time, inspecting a total of 1,184 vessels, seizing a total of 49 tons of marihuana, and 219 tons of coffee.

From 1979 to date in 1983, the total Customs-Coast Guard operations involved the inspection of 8,893 vessels, and seizures amounted to 232 tons of marihuana, $337,388 in currency, and 165 arrests.

Given the cost of these patrol craft, at $2.0 million each, it would appear their utilization in drug interdiction in the most heavily trafficked area in the world has not been very productive. The obvious lack of dedication to interdiction patrol by the Colombian Navy vessel points up again what has been known for some time; the first class and highly regarded Colombian Navy with its headquarters and the bulk of its vessels based at Cartagena, in the center of the North Coast, does little or nothing to prevent the massive marine smuggling of drugs from the coast of Colombia. Lack of resources for fuel and vessel upkeep is given as the reason for this.

Conclusions

The Select Committee Study Mission to Colombia in the meetings and briefings it had with a host of Colombian officials, from President Betancur down to the young policemen cutting down marihuana and coca in the fields, found a consensus of the magnitude of the production and traffic of marihuana, coca, cocaine, and methaqualone in Colombia.

This problem is the number one issue between Colombia and the United States and tends to detract from, and adversely influence, all

our mutual activities, and threatens our friendship and respect for each other.

The Select Committee Delegation came away with a perception that Colombia recognizes this and that this situation cannot be allowed to continue. Somehow, together we must find a way to develop a comprehensive program that will enable Colombia to eradicate the illicit cultivation of marihuana and coca; to curtail the smuggling of coca paste and base from Bolivia and Peru; to effectively detect and seize the illicit processing facilities used to produce coca paste, cocaine and methaqualone; to suppress the internal and export traffic of these substances; to expand and intensify its ability to arrest, convict, and incarcerate drug traffickers, particularly the major violators and financiers; and to cooperate more effectively with the narcotic enforcement agencies abroad of countries being affected by drug smuggling from Colombia.

The Committee, in reviewing what the Government of Colombia is doing, or not doing, in its drug control efforts, is struck by the lack of any structured comprehensive plan to address simultaneously the complex problems of cultivation; the smuggling of coca and methaqualone raw materials from abroad; the illicit manufacture of cocaine and methaqualone tablets; and the internal and export traffic of those substances and the enforcement and prosecution of narcotic traffickers.

The United States operational strategy, and materiel and technical assistance to the Government of Colombia also seems to have lacked an orderly comprehensive approach to identify with the Government of Colombia what is needed to be jointly accomplished and how to go about doing it. United States Government assistance to Colombia goes back more than ten years, yet during that period of time, the drug problem has gotten progressively worse.

Over the last decade, cooperation and assistance program emphasis has run from extensive narcotic enforcement training, to agency reorganization, to shifts in responsibility from police to army and back to police, to an extradition treaty, to a mutual legal assistance treaty, to patrol boats for the North Coast, to the SANU concept, and now almost total concentration on assistance to support the herbicide eradication of marihuana and coca. The eradication assistance package, as important as it is, even if adopted and successfully implemented, may not have any impact on reducing the cocaine traffic which is still mostly sustained by raw materials from Bolivia and Peru, nor will it curtail the methaqualone traffic.

What is needed is a mutually agreed upon definition of the problem that exists, and a comprehensive plan by the Government of Colombia on how to bring it under control and what the United States, other interested industrial nations, and the international organizations might do to assist Colombia technically and financially to implement its plan.

Recommendations

1. The United States must assist Colombia to find a way to develop a comprehensive program that will enable it to eradicate the illicit cultivation of marihuana and coca; to curtail the smuggling of coca paste and base from Bolivia and Peru; to effectively detect and seize

the illicit processing facilities used to produce coca paste, cocaine and methaqualone; to suppress the internal and export traffic of these substances; to expand and intensify its ability to arrest, convict, and incarcerate drug traffickers, particularly the major violators and financiers; and to cooperate more effectively with the narcotic enforcement agencies abroad of countries being affected by drug smuggling from Colombia.

2. The Committee urges the Government of Colombia in its drug control effort to develop a structured, comprehensive plan to address simultaneously the complex problems of cultivation; the smuggling of coca and methaqualone raw materials from abroad; the illicit manufacture of cocaine and methaqualone tablets; and the internal and export traffic of those substances and the enforcement and prosecution of narcotic traffickers.

3. The United States in its narcotic control assistance to the Government of Colombia must develop an orderly, comprehensive approach to identify with that Government what is needed to be jointly accomplished and how to go about doing it. This has been lacking. United States Government assistance to Colombia goes back more than ten years, yet during that period of time, the drug problem has gotten progressively worse.

4. When the Committee delegation met with President Betancur on August 16, 1983, he told the members that at his December 1982 meeting with President Reagan, they had agreed that the drug problem is serious and that it must be attacked at the root. After they had agreed on this, and after they had rejoined Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Lloreda, they asked them to work out a comprehensive, full plan of attack. President Betancur said, "while agreements to cooperate already existed, they needed to be improved upon, and our cooperative efforts speeded up."

The Select Committee endorses and support President Betancur's proposal and requests that Secretary of State Shultz implement it by establishing a small expert committee to work under the direction of the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, to develop a plan and program of implementation with a counterpart committee appointed by the Government of Colombia. If these joint expert committees can prepare and begin implementation of such a comprehensive plan, as envisaged by President Betancur, not only would our mutual drug problem be moving toward solution, but Colombia would be meeting all the legal requirements on its drug enforcement obligations to remain eligible for U.S. foreign assistance and U.S. support in its dealing with the international financial institutions.

JAMAICA

As described earlier in the portion of this report on Colombia, beginning in the 1950's, high grade marihuana traditionally grown for domestic consumption in Jamaica, began to be smuggled to the United States in small quantities by merchant seamen and airline passengers, concealing the marihuana in their baggage, or on their person.

Beginning in the late 1960's, small organized groups in the Miami area, in concert with criminal associates in Jamaica, began to smuggle

marihuana in hundred pound to half ton quantities via light aircraft from clandestine airstrips to similar strips in Florida. Small vessels in the form of yachts, fishing trawlers, and small inter-island freighters were also used, loading up in coves, and off the beaches of Jamaica, for delivery directly into the inlets and canals of South Florida, or off-loading to small craft that would come out from shore to pick up. Sometimes the boats from Jamaica would rendezvous with the boats from Florida in remote islands of the Bahamas for direct transfer, or marihuana brought in by air or sea from Jamaica would be off-loaded and stored on a remote island for pickup by aircraft or boats coming out of Florida.

In 1974 and 1975, the Government of Jamaica, alarmed at the breakdown in public safety caused by the massive production and traffic of marihuana in the country, joined hands with the United States in what was known as "Operation Buccaneer." It involved a program of marihuana eradication by the Jamaican Government, closure of the clandestine airstrips, and effective joint U.S./Jamaican narcotic enforcement operations. This dramatically curtailed the production and traffic of marihuana from Jamaica for several years.

While the bulk of the Jamaican marihuana traffic has been diverted to the United States, significant quantities are also smuggled to Canada via the Maritime Provinces, and surprisingly also to the United Kingdom.

Following the downturn in the production and traffic of marihuana in Jamaica, in the mid-1970's, through eradication and enforcement, by about 1980, it had reportedly returned to its previous level. It is estimated that 1,000 to 2,000 metric tons of marihuana are now being smuggled annually to the United States from Jamaica, and that this amounts to a 10 to 15 percent share of the market in the United States. It is being brought into South Florida and other points along the Gulf and East Coast, mostly by vessel, but also via light aircraft. The Bahamas are also still being used as a staging area and rendezvous point for transfers, or for the refueling of the vessels and aircraft. There is also evidence that Jamaica is used as a staging area for the smuggling of cocaine into the United States from Colombia as other countries in the Caribbean and Latin America are also used.

In very recent years, operators in Jamaica have begun to process hashish and hashish oil from marihuana. Hashish is the resin of the plant and hashish oil is a liquified concentrate of hashish. It takes about 650 pounds of marihuana to produce one pound of hashish and about 3,300 pounds of marihuana to make one pound of oil. In 1982, 200 pounds of hashish and 160 pounds of hashish oil originating in Jamaica were confiscated in the United States.

The International Narcotic Control Board in its report for 1982 made the following comment,

> Jamaica is not only a major transit staging area for traffickers, but also the important producer of cannabis (marihuana) in the Caribbean. The Government is aware that the country's very economic and social fibre is menaced by the pervasiveness of drug production and trafficking, as well as by serious local abuse. The situation requires urgent counter-measures, including eradication of illicit cultivation.

Marihuana cultivation is fairly widespread and can be found at some level in almost every parish (district) of the country. The

heaviest production is generally found in the marshy areas of the Negril and the Great Morass in the west, in the Martha Brae river area of Saint Elizabeth Parish Morass, and along the Black River.

Jamaica, following independence in 1962, ratified the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and has participated as a member or observer in the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Government of Jamaica for over 20 years has been well aware of its obligation under the treaty to prevent the illicit cultivation and traffic of marihuana in its territory.

The Committee's Visit to Jamaica

The Committee delegation arrived at Kingston, Jamaica in the late afternoon of August 18.

At 7:00 p.m. the same evening, Ambassador William A. Hewitt gave a reception at the Embassy Residence for over two hundred people, including the Prime Minister, his cabinet and all the officials of the government concerned with narcotics control. Members of the delegation were able to meet with them, and begin discussions and an exchange of information on the production, traffic and abuse of marihuana in Jamaica. At 8:30 a.m., on August 19, Ambassador Hewitt and his staff provided the Committee delegation with a briefing on the problem of the production and traffic of narcotic drugs in Jamaica affecting the United States, and the efforts of our government to assist Jamaica address this problem.

MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAMAICA

On the morning of August 19, the Committee delegation met with Prime Minister Edward Seaga; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hugh Shearer; the Jamaica Ambassador to the United States, Keith Johnson; Commander of the Jamaica Defense Force, Major General Robert Neish; and Commissioner of the Jamaican Constabulary Force, Joe Williams.

Prime Minister Seaga warmly welcomed the delegation to Jamaica, and said he hoped the members would enjoy the hospitality and pleasant weather of the country. He said he wanted to thank all of them for their assistance and support in legislating the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), because it means a great deal to Jamaica, and all the participating nations. He said he was particularly grateful for this Congressional support at this time, because he knew the difficult economic conditions created pressure in U.S. Congressional Districts for domestic assistance programs.

Prime Minister Seaga outlined a strategy that would indirectly address the problem of the heavy cultivation of marihuana in Jamaica by "choking off," through enforcement, all other elements of the network necessary to move supply from growers to consumers. Unable to move or sell their crop, the Prime Minister thought that growers would eventually stop and begin growing alternate marketable crops the government would recommend in place of marihuana. This, in effect, is a restatement of the strategy followed by the Government of Jamaica, with the exception of the "Operation Buccaneer" period, with no success since the late 1960's.

The Prime Minister said that the production and traffic of marihuana in Jamaica does not have a significant beneficial impact on the country's economy. However, poor farmers growing the crop in remote rural areas do benefit.

He defended Jamaica's narcotic enforcement effort and said that legislation now before parliament would put teeth in the laws that would enable the police to be more effective.

This would include the right to close down the illegal airstrips on private land, and to confiscate and forfeit aircraft involved in drug smuggling. An inspector general post would be established to root out corruption. A revenue board would be formed to improve financial and tax controls, with a special focus on the tax evasion and currency manipulation of the illicit narcotics traffickers. Crop substitution would be emphasized as the way to eliminate marihuana cultivation. Failure to date, to be more effective in curtailing the illicit cultivation, traffic, and export of marihuana, was caused by severe shortages of manpower, equipment, and operating funds.

Prime Minister Seaga reaffirmed Jamaica's longstanding commitment to cooperate with the United States to interdict the drug traffic from Jamaica.

Chairman Rangel thanked Prime Minister Seaga for the warm welcome he and the members of his government had extended to the delegation and introduced the members. He then thanked Prime Minister Seaga for his expressions of appreciation for the Congressional support on the CBI, and wanted the Prime Minister to know that on the CBI question, Jamaica really sold itself and took a leadership role in the all-important Rostenkowski initiative. He added that the delegation was pleased to learn of the Prime Minister's efforts to increase and expand the enforcement efforts of his government to prevent the smuggling of marihuana from Jamaica. However, Mr. Rangel expressed concern that unless a program was simultaneously developed to progressively eradicate the illicit marihuana cultivation, the other enforcement planned, would prove futile.

Representative Gilman stated,

> The business of narcotics is huge and that the traffic directed to the United States is increasing. We are finding that the countries which have traditionally been the producers are now becoming consumers and the victims of their own production. Jamaica, he thought, could begin to experience this with cocaine in addition to its serious marihuana abuse problems.
>
> Drug abuse in the United States is tearing our families apart, causing crime and violence and corrupting our institutions. It is a $90 billion business, earning close to what Exxon earns. We must get a handle on this problem.

Prime Minister Seaga thanked Mr. Gilman for his remarks and said he agreed with his evaluation of the problem.

Chairman Rangel asked how we could help. The Prime Minister said, "provide us with equipment that will enable us to prevent marihuana from leaving Jamaica. That will permit us to suppress the illicit traffic and smuggling."

Representative Gilman said, "enforcement efforts to suppress the illicit traffic and smuggling must go hand in hand with crop eradication to be successful."

Representative Guarini expressed concern over a magazine report alleging that narcotic traffickers have been able to make use of Jamaica's

international airports by corrupting the airport officials. He also urged the Prime Minister to take steps to close down the illicit airstrips that existed on government lands as no new legislation was required to do that.

Representative Sawyer expressed concern that while the use of cocaine was not a problem in Jamaica, that drug was transiting Jamaica and getting through to the United States, and that disturbed him.

In a discussion that ensued with references to woefully inadequate sentences handed down in Jamaica on narcotic traffic convictions, Representatives Dixon and Lewis suggested that mandatory sentence laws be legislated. They said this had a salutary effect in California and Florida respectively.

Representative Towns said that, "any narcotic control plan adopted in Jamaica would have to include the gradual elimination of cultivation, or it could not possibly be successful. If the cultivation of marihuana is not addressed, it is not possible for the police to suppress the traffic and smuggling of marihuana. They can't keep up with it. They just can't confiscate a sufficient quantity each year to control and reduce the problem."

Prime Minister Seaga said that cooperation with DEA was excellent and positive enforcement results are achieved regularly to the benefit of the United States and Jamaica. "In September," he said, "the Jamaican Defense Force and Constabulary would develop a joint exercise with the U.S. Coast Guard, in an effort to intensify marihuana smuggling interdiction efforts between Jamaica and the United States."

Assistant Prime Minister Shearer said the Jamaican Constabulary Force cooperates on a regular basis with DEA, I.C.P.O., Interpol, the DEA El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and the FAA in Miami and Oklahoma City in joint efforts to suppress the traffic and smuggling of narcotic drugs.

Chairman Rangel summarized the delegation's impressions on the magnitude of the narcotic production and trafficking problem it encountered in its visits on this trip to Mexico, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. He said the purpose of the visits was not to tell other governments what to do, but to identify more effective ways of working together to bring a solution to a mutual problem.

He went on to say that the delegation had come prepared to support Jamaica's Narcotics control program, but that based on what he had heard thus far, he was unable to affirm that such a program existed. He cited the legislative provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Caribbean Basin Initiative and said that the delegation had felt it necessary to stop over in Jamaica to share it concerns.

Representative Guarini stressed that the importance was not just one of having laws on the books, but rather one of effective enforcement.

Representative Lewis expressed great concern at the proliferation of uncontrolled flights entering and leaving Jamaican airspace to smuggle marihuana. He said this was a frightening threat to commercial aviation and could result in a major air tragedy. On that ground alone the government should be able to enact legislation to enable it to close down these airstrips.

Representative Hughes questioned why the government could not move to eradicate some of the extensive marihuana cultivation on public lands. The Prime Minister replied that the lack of government response was not constitutional, but one of practical considerations. Following some eradication by the government in the Brumdec area recently, the marihuana growers retaliated by burning nearby sugar cane fields. Without the means to prevent a repetition of this, the government has to be cautious in its marihuana eradication, lest innocent sugar cane growers be financially hurt.

As the meeting drew to a close, Chairman Rangel again expressed concern that the lack of plan that would provide or the progressive elimination of marihuana cultivation and illicit traffic and smuggling suppression posed potential problems for Jamaica in terms of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

Representative Sawyer told Prime Minister Seaga, "Your people have an interest in the Caribbean Basin Initiative; our people, in preventing narcotic production and traffic."

Chairman Rangel asked whether Jamaica had ratified the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Ambassador Keith Johnson responded that Jamaica had. Mr. Rangel said in that case there would seem to be some question as to whether the Government of Jamaica was in compliance with the treaties obligation to prevent the illicit cultivation of marihuana.

FIELD TRIP TO MARIHUANA GROWING AREAS

On the afternoon of August 19, the delegation took a helicopter overflight from Kingston to Montego Bay, and explored, at very low altitude, the extensive well-organized marihuana cultivation on public lands in the vicinity of Brumdec and the Negril. This widespread marihuana cultivation appeared to be of a superior quality. The delegation also observed several clandestine airstrips including one of about 4,000 feet. Coves where vessels are loaded were also spotted.

Conclusions

Jamaica is a classic example of the production and traffic of narcotics linkage with the problems of an underdeveloped agricultural and economic base. Future agricultural and economic development is a hostage to the uncontrolled production and traffic of marihuana with the violence, destruction, and corruption it creates and sustains. The pervasive abuse of high potency marihuana in Jamaica is debilitating and detracts from the energy and industry of its users.

Until such time as the production, traffic and abuse of marihuana can be brought under control in Jamaica, it will continue to be a serious deterrent to the great potential for development and prosperity of Jamaica as well as to its public safety and security.

Recommendations

1. The Government of Jamaica has expressed its determination to eliminate the illicit production and traffic of marihuana and prevent the country from being used as a transit country for the smuggling of cocaine and other narcotics to the United States and other countries.

Jamaica is now on the threshold of a new era of agricultural and economic development under the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

Because of the relatively compact size of this island nation and the positive attitude of its government, it is recommended that a single program of assistance be developed that would address as one the three inter-related problems of agricultural and economic development, and narcotic control.

This recognizes that any assistance for agricultural and economic development risks failure without the production and traffic of narcotics being brought under control. Correspondingly, agricultural and economic development will greatly enhance the achievement of lasting narcotic control.

STUDY MISSION TO HAWAII, HONG KONG, THAILAND, BURMA, PAKISTAN, TURKEY, AND ITALY

(January 4–22, 1984)

SCNAC–98–1–12

INTRODUCTION

From January 4 to 22, 1984, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control in furtherance of its responsibilities to conduct a comprehensive and continuing oversight of the traffic and abuse of narcotic and psychotropic drugs in the United States, carried out a study mission to Hawaii, Hong Kong, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, Turkey, and Italy. The nations visited by the Select Committee are essential to the control of heroin entering the United States. Southwest Asian heroin (Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan) accounts for approximately 50 percent of the United States heroin imports; Southeast Asian heroin (Burma, Thailand, and Laos) accounts for approximately 16 percent of the supply. Hawaii, Hong Kong, Turkey and Italy serve as major transshipment nations for heroin destined for the United States.

In Hawaii and Italy the Select Committee also inquired into the current levels of drug abuse within the Pacific and European commands of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and the Air Force; as well as the current programs and practices of the military services to combat drug abuse within the ranks. A major issue that the Committee also examined in Hawaii was the domestic cultivation and traffic in marihuana in that State and efforts by Federal and State law enforcement agencies to combat that growing threat.

FOREWORD

The following is a report on the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control's study mission to Hawaii, Hong Kong, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, Turkey, and Italy from January 4 through January 22, 1984. The delegation consisted of four members of the Select Committee, and four other Members of Congress.

Members of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control who participated in the study mission were Chairman Charles B. Rangel of New York, Ranking Minority Member Benjamin A. Gilman of New York, Representative Daniel K. Akaka of Hawaii, and Representative Frank J. Guarini of New Jersey. Representative Louis Stokes participated as a member of the Committee on Appropriations, Representative George W. Crockett, Jr., of Michigan participated as a member of the Committee on the Judiciary, Representative Harold S. Sawyer participated as the Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, and Representative Harold Rogers of Kentucky participated as a member of the Committee on Appropriations. Accompanying the delegation were John T. Cusack, Chief of Staff of the Select Committee; Richard B. Lowe III, Chief Counsel of the Select Committee; Edward H. Jurith, Counsel to the Select Committee; John J. Capers, Jr., Investigator; Richard J. Garon, Minority Staff Consultant to the Subcommittee on Interna-

tional Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; James P. Rowan and Debra M. Cabral of the Office of Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill; Catherine Ramsay, Staff Assistant to the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and Charlene Vanlier, Associate Counsel, Subcommittee on Crime, Committe on the Judiciary. Also participating in the study mission were representatives of several agencies of the executive branch: Ernest E. Garcia, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs); Richard Castrodale, Legislative Liaison for International Narcotics Matters, Department of State; Col. Karl Lauenstein of the Department of Defense; and James M. Kenaston of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control conducted a 2½ week study mission to Hawaii, Asia, and Rome from January 4 to January 22, 1984, to inspect opium and heroin production and trafficking patterns and efforts to control those problems. In addition, the Select Committee also examined the current levels of drug abuse within the Pacific and European Commands of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force. A major issue that the Committee also examined in Hawaii was the domestic cultivation and traffic in marihuana in that State and the efforts by Federal and State law enforcement agencies to combat that growing threat.

The study mission consisted of four members of the Select Committee and four other Members of Congress. Members of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control who participated in the study were Chairman Charles B. Rangel of New York, Ranking Minority Member Benjamin A. Gilman of New York, Representative Daniel K. Akaka of Hawaii, and Representative Frank J. Guarini of New Jersey. Representative Louis Stokes of Ohio participated as a member of the Committee on Appropriations, Representative George W. Crockett, Jr. of Michigan participated as a member of the Committee on the Judiciary, Representative Harold S. Sawyer of Michigan participated as the Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, and Representative Harold Rogers of Kentucky participated as a member of the Committee on Appropriations.

In addition to Hawaii, the group visited Hong Kong, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, Turkey and Italy; and met with the heads of state and concerned Cabinet Ministers, narcotics control officials, and law enforcement leaders of each government. In Rome the delegation had the eminent privilege of a private audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II. The delegation shared with the Pope its admiration for his strong positions against drug abuse and the power and influence of the Mafia in Sicily. His Holiness delivered a special message to the delegation on the threat drug abuse presents to the family and society.

During the study mission, the delegation participated in on-site inpections of poppy cultivation and opium harvesting, as well as opium crop substitution projects, along the Thai-Laotian border. In Pakistan the Members visited crop substitution projects sponsored respectively by the State Department's Agency for International Development in

the Gadoon area and by the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters in the Malakand area. In addition, the delegation visited the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) agricultural development project in Buner, Pakistan. The delegation also toured the Nasir Bagh Afghan Refugee Camp outside of Peshawar, Pakistan.

Hawaii

The Select Committee received an extensive briefing from Federal, State and local narcotics enforcement officials in Honolulu on January 5, 1984. The delegation concluded as a result of the briefings that Hawaii serves as a major transshipment center for Southeast Asian heroin entering the United States. To combat this threat, Federal law enforcement presence in the State of Hawaii must be strengthened. Proposed reductions in Customs personnel in Hawaii will have a devastating effect on the ability of the Customs Service to perform necessary inspections for narcotics contraband entering Hawaiian airports and terminals. Similarly, DEA is in need of increased manpower to combat a growing heroin wholesale distribution network reportedly flourishing in Honolulu, and to develop international heroin conspiracy cases based upon information obtained from narcotics arrests and seizures made in Hawaii.

Federal enforcement authorities must be vigilant to insure that Hawaii does not become a transshipment point for South American cocaine destined for the West Coast. While this threat is presently seen as minimal by Hawaiian law enforcement officials, the potential for this to develop exists due to available air transportation from South America via Fiji and Tahiti into Hawaii. The increased pressure being placed on cocaine traffickers in the Caribbean may force them to develop alternative routes for their shipments.

Likewise, Federal law enforcement must give careful attention to the infiltration of Hawaii by foreign organized criminal groups engaged in drug trafficking. The possibility for foreign criminal groups, particularly from Japan, to utilize Hawaii to traffic drugs to the West Coast is increasing. Recent investigations in Hawaii have revealed attempts by some Japanese crime groups to smuggle heroin into the United States.

The cultivation of marihuana is becoming accepted as a way of life in the State of Hawaii, particularly on the outer, rural islands. This illicit activity is creating a massive underground economy that has the potential of corrupting the State. An aggressive Federal campaign is needed, including military assistance and equipment, to eradicate marihuana production in Hawaii. The U.S. Postal Service was identified as a frequently used channel to ship marihuana from Hawaii to the mainland U.S. The Postal Service must reassess its current policies limiting the use of detector dogs to ferret out parcels of marihuana being mailed from Hawaii. The Postal Service, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, should determine when the assistance of detector dogs in postal facilities would be permissible under the current law of search and seizure. The Committee is pleased to note that shortly after it returned to Washington, the Postal Service and DEA announced the completion of "Operation Pelè" which

used drug detector dogs to uncover packages suspected of containing marihuana in U.S. mail from Hawaii. Hopefully initiatives as Pelè will continue.

The Hawaiian State legislature and court system must become more vigorous in combatting the production of marihuana in the State. The existing penalty structure and sentences meted out only serve to foster the permissive attitude in the State about marihuana production.

Finally, drug trafficking intelligence available to narcotic enforcement units in Hawaii must be enhanced. All agencies operating in Hawaii, particularly the Customs Service and the Coast Guard, should seek to obtain more narcotics intelligence from other Federal and/or State enforcement agencies to enhance the performance of their narcotics missions. Top priority should be given to the development of the Long Beach, California center of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) to increase narcotic smuggling intelligence in the Western Pacific.

Hong Kong

After meeting with Hong Kong narcotic abuse and law enforcement authorities, as well as with American Consul General Burton Levin, DEA Resident-in-Charge Robert J. Furey, and other consulate personnel, the delegation concluded that while Hong Kong may not be a major heroin transshipment point to the United States, it facilitates narcotics trafficking by serving as a financial center of this illicit industry.

Acting as the financial and banking center for the Far East, Hong Kong has few foreign exchange controls and has strict laws and regulations guaranteeing the privacy and confidentiality of bank deposits and records. The United States has a great interest in conducting financial investigations of drug traffickers in concert with Hong Kong authorities. However, the present structure of Hong Kong law operates against this type of joint activity. For example, existing Hong Kong law requires a court to court order before a Hong Kong court will subpena any financial records from a Hong Kong bank. This presents difficult problems for United States law enforcement authorities because before an American court can issue an order to a Hong Kong court for execution, an indictment against the accused must already be filed. This obviously frustrates the investigative process. Hong Kong needs greater access to banking and financial records and improved asset seizure laws to make it more effective in the investigation of narcotic traffickers.

The Select Committee was pleased to learn that the People's Republic of China has cooperated with the Hong Kong Government in improving its border patrols and disrupted a heroin trafficking route from Bangkok, via the People's Republic into Hong Kong.

Although the officials with whom the delegation met seemed to minimize the role played by Hong Kong in heroin smuggling to the United States, some ominous facts do surface that may belie a passive role, and cause greater attention by narcotic intelligence analysts. Hong Kong's accessible coastline and open ports and borders make it a prime target for smugglers. Further, Hong Kong has a tremendously large addict

population and the colony is flooded with heroin, particularly #3 heroin—that which is consumed by smoking. Hong Kong drug trafficking is controlled by local, organized Chinese groups. The close-knit character of the Chinese community internationally can facilitate contact among narcotics traffickers worldwide. That Hong Kong could again develop into a major heroin transshipment center to the United States is a matter that should be closely watched by the Drug Enforcement Administration.

THAILAND

In Thailand the delegation met with Deputy Prime Minister General Prachuap Suntharangkun; Police Major General Chavalit Yodmani, Secretary-General of the Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) and other ONCB officials; as well as Ambassador John Gunther Dean and members of the American Embassy staff involved in narcotics matters. While in Thailand the delegation participated in a field trip to the Doi Yao and Pha Mon crop control projects along the Thai-Laotian border.

The delegation, while pleased with the progress made by the Thai Government in forcing major heroin manufacturers and traffickers to retreat from Thailand into Burma, concluded that the Thai Government should be moving more firmly to phase out all opium production in areas under its control and in containing the international opium and heroin traffic that moves through Thailand.

During the past three years the Thais have moved very aggressively against drug traffickers along the Thai-Burmese border. During this period of time the Bangkok Government has been able to extend its authority over northern areas that were formerly in control of insurgent groups, some of whom were involved in drug trafficking. As the insurgency problem diminishes, the Thai Government is able to end poppy cultivation in the hill tribe areas. It is estimated that Thailand is capable of producing between 50 and 100 tons of opium annually.

It is reported that 5 percent of the poppy grown in the Golden Triangle comes from Thailand, with the bulk of the remainder cultivated in Burma in insurgent areas beyond control of the Rangoon Government. Thailand's 5 percent, however, was responsible for the estimated production of 35 tons of opium in 1983. In addition, Thailand's excellent roads, communication and transportation system built with U.S. economic assistance, while contributing to economic development, has also facilitated narcotics trafficking. Major trafficking routes exist from Burma through Thailand for distribution to the rest of the world.

Deputy Prime Minister Prachuap emphasized the Thai commitment to the elimination of poppy cultivation in his country but he cautioned that the hill tribespeople in the North have been involved in both insurgency and the growing of opium for many years. He indicated that in the past few years the Thai Government had made many great gains in bringing these people into the orbit of Thai society and that all this could be lost if the government moved too fast in the total elimination of all poppy cultivation and opium production.

General Chavalit pointed out to the delegation that the Thai Government did not have crop substitution projects in 37 percent of the poppy growing and opium production areas within the Thai territory

of the Golden Triangle. He called for increased bi-lateral and multi-lateral assistance to Thailand to accomplish full eradication. The General described a $70 million, 5–10 year crop substitution plan which would be introduced into 8 major opium producing areas. The $70 million plan would mandate ending non-commercial production of opium immediately, then the elimination of hill tribe village consumption, and then finally complete elimination. The delegation took General Chavalit's plan and funding request under advisement and cautioned that the Thai Government should insure that U.S. and U.N. agricultural and rural development assistance should not be used to facilitate poppy cultivation or opium production.

The Select Committee concluded that the Thais must begin to move more firmly to phase out the remaining poppy cultivation that exists in the country. While opium production in Thailand has hit a low point, it could explode dramatically. Most crop substitution projects are only demonstration programs at this point and increased efforts must be directed to finding markets and transportation for the new substitution crops. Similarly, the Thai Government must initiate an aggressive and sustained effort to disrupt opium and heroin trafficking through its territory. This will require increased law enforcement, as well as new conspiracy and asset seizure laws to be utilized against major traffickers.

Burma

On early morning January 12, 1984, the delegation left Bangkok for a full day visit in the Union of Burma. In addition to meeting with Ambassador Daniel O'Donohue and his staff in Rangoon, the delegation also met with Hhin Maung Win, Deputy Minister for Home and Religious Affairs and Secretary General of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control; U Thein Aung, Director General of the People's Police Force; U Chit Hlaing, Minister for Foreign Affairs; and H. E. Ye Goung, Minister for Agriculture and Forests.

Burma is by far the largest opium and heroin producer in the Golden Triangle. It is estimated that over 550 tons of opium were produced in Burma in 1983. The major opium growing and heroin refineries are along the Chinese, Laotian and Thai borders in Eastern and Northeastern Burma. These same areas are under the control of various insurgent groups which are fighting the Rangoon Government, and for the most part, are involved in drug trafficking.

The insurgent involvement with drug trafficking creates the "Burmese Dilemma" in its desire to aggressively combat opium production and drug trafficking and seek the assistance of other nations in this endeavor. The Burmese view the insurgency issue as strictly an internal one. The involvement of other nations in that effort, and the concomitant issue of opium control, would undermine Rangoon's credibility with the native populations in the area it wishes to bring under its control. Deputy Minister Hhin Maung Win strongly pointed out to the delegation that the Burmese Government views the issue of opium production and drug trafficking as separate and distinct from the insurgency issue and that poppy eradication efforts are not seen as viable options until the insurgent areas are brought under control.

Recognizing Burma's strong insistence on non-alliance in world affairs, and its almost xenophobic reaction to requests by other nations

to assist it in internal problems, the delegation sought to explore how the Burmese capability to control opium production could be improved with American assistance. It must be remembered that official Burmese policy, as well as Buddhist religious precepts, condemn drug use. The Burmese have put in place an aggressive and successful mandatory drug abuse treatment program for its addict population. If ways can be found to assist Burma in effective narcotics control, the Select Committee believes they have the will to implement an effective program when political conditions permit.

Some areas identified where the United States can assist Burma in its struggle against the dual problem of insurgency and drug trafficking are:

1. Increased resources and equipment to suppress narcotic production and traffic by insurgents should be provided.
2. Burma requires continued U.S. assistance for aircraft maintenance. The greater portion of INM assistance presently going to Burma is for aircraft and aircraft maintenance.
3. Burma's narcotics intelligence capacity should be enhanced.
4. Burma expressed a willingness to explore the use of herbicidal spraying as a poppy crop eradication technique. The State Department, in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration, should provide to the Burmese Government technical, scientific, and other assistance and information it may need to develop a herbicidal eradication program.

Pakistan

From January 14-17, 1984, the delegation continued its study mission through meetings and field trips to crop substitution projects in Pakistan. Our Ambassador, Deane R. Hinton, and his embassy team provided excellent briefings, information and assistance to the delegation. In addition meetings were held with the following Pakistani officials: Chief Justice Abdul Haleen, who was serving as the Acting President of Pakistan in the absence of President Zia; General Mohammed Iqbal Khan, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Acting Chief Martial Law Administrator; Mahud A. Haroon, Minister of the Interior, Roeded Kahn, Secretary-General of the Interior; Mairaj Husain, Chairman, Pakistan Narcotics Control Board; and Lt. General Fazal Haq, Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.).

Pakistan recognizes the need for effective narcotics control. The increase in the number of heroin addicts from practically zero in 1980 to approximately 150,000 in 1983 caused alarm in Pakistan. Reacting to this problem, the government reduced opium production from an estimated 800 tons in 1978 to an estimated 63 tons in 1983. This came about as the result of the Hadd Ordinance of 1979 whereby Pakistan ended the quasi-medical use of opium and the production of opium for that purpose in the territory under its control. This action was required by the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 to be placed in effect by December 1979.

Implementation of the Hadd Ordinance was enhanced by agricultural and rural development assistance programs in the Buner Area by UNFDAC and in the Malakand Agency by the U.S. State Department, Bureau of International Narcotic Matters. Another similar project has been launched by U.S. AID in the Gadoon Area in late 1983. Pakistan is committed to phasing out opium production and is preparing to launch a program in the Dir District where 40 percent of the opium in the merged area of the N.W.F.P. is alleged to be produced.

Pakistan's dramatic decrease in opium production has not significantly reduced the problem of the illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin originating in the "Federally Administered Tribal Areas" (FATA). This is because Pakistani narcotic control laws have only recently been extended to these areas, but have not yet been applied. Opium production has continued in the area and there are allegations it has increased. Additionally, it serves as a "privileged sanctuary" for laboratories manufacturing heroin from opium originating in the tribal areas and Afghanistan for export worldwide. Increased opium production in Afghanistan since 1979 has caused Pakistan to become a major transshipment nation for Afghan-produced opium and reportedly some heroin. An estimated 400 tons of opium were produced in Afghanistan in 1983, half of this amount is allegedly smuggled into Pakistan. By 1983, networks of sophisticated Pakistani-U.S. drug trafficking organizations were operating with extensions in Frankfurt, London, New York, Baltimore, Detroit, and Los Angeles. The Pakistanis have not been effective in dealing with this serious international narcotic manufacturing and trafficking problem. The government's performance in arresting and prosecuting major drug traffickers, has been poor. Corruption is an ever increasing problem, and only recently has the government instituted substantial penalties for drug traffickers, as well as for abettors and financiers of the trade.

In meetings with Pakistani officials there emerged a clear recognition of the trafficking issue and the impact of failure to control drug traffic could have on United States-Pakistani relations. Interior Secretary-General Roedad Kahn pointed out to the delegation that the opium production and conversion that takes place in Pakistan occurs in the North West Frontier Province. The N.W.F.P. is organized into "settled areas" where all Pakistani law applies, "Provincially Administered Tribal Areas" (PATA) where Pakistani laws do generally not apply unless ordered so by the Governor of the N.W.F.P., and the FATA along the Afghan border where Pakistani law only applies when President Zia proclaims so.

Since the promulgation of the Hadd Ordinance in 1979, which applied the principles of Islam to narcotics, thus banning the cultivation of opium and the trafficking and use of narcotics, the production of opium has dramatically decreased. The recent decision by the government to extend all the drug laws to the tribal areas, if enforced, should further enhance the ability of the Pakistani Government to combat the trafficking threat. Secretary-General Kahn of the Ministry of Interior pointed out, however, that Pakistan is in dire need of intelligence to do an effective job against trafficking. Pakistani officials, including Mairaj Husain, Chairman of the P.N.C.B. called for increased assistance from the United States and specifically from Drug Enforcement Administration to assist Pakistani police authorities in building an effective investigative-intelligence network.

The delegation underscored the need to aggressively move against known trafficking networks. It was pointed out to Acting President Haleen that the mere extension of Pakistani law to the tribal areas will not provide deterrence if they are not enforced and that the major trafficking centers of Karachi and Lahore are settled areas where government authority is without question. In a meeting with the Governor of

the N.W.F.P., Lt. Gen. Fazal Haq in Peshawar, the delegation again emphasized aggressive law enforcement against both producers and traffickers. Genera Haq said he agreed this must be done and stated it was his intention to use military courts against apprehended violators. General Haq indicated he has made this intention publicly known and that in the N.W.F.P. one must "back up his words with actions" to maintain control.

The delegation concluded that while the Pakistani Government has made progress in reducing poppy cultivation to date, production could rapidly escalate if enforcement lags or if economic development projects are allowed to deteriorate, or fail to improve the standard of living in the poppy producing areas. Conversely, Pakistan must do a more effective job of controlling opium and heroin trafficking through its country, particularly that which is refined and smuggled along the border with Afghanistan.

Turkey

On January 17 and 18, 1984, the delegation was in Ankara, Turkey. In addition to Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupe' and the embassy team, the delegation met with the following Turkish officials: Prime Minister Turgot Ozal; Ecumel Baratcu, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Necmettin Karaduman, Chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly; Fethi Celikbas, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Grand National Assembly; General Ismail Selen Commanding General of the Jardarma; Fahri Gorgulu, Director-General of the Turkish National Police; and Ertugul Kumcuoglu, Under Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Customs.

Since the banning of opium production in 1972 and the subsequent licensing of poppy cultivation for the production of poppy straw for industrial conversion to morphine concentrate under governmental supervision, Turkey has effectively prevented any significant illicit production of opium in the country. While some illicit production of poppy exists in remote southeastern provinces of Turkey, the authorities are eradicating it. The major narcotics problem facing Turkey is the transshipment of opium, morphine base and heroin from Iran through Turkey into Europe and the United States, and the existence of opium conversion laboratories in Eastern Turkey along the border with Iran and Iraq. The opium, morphine base and heroin that transits Turkey or is processed in Turkey originates in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan and to some extent in remote areas of Southeastern Turkey.

Since 1980 the United States contributes about $1 million per year in law enforcement support to assist Turkey in combatting illicit narcotics manufacture and trafficking. The delegation expressed concern over not knowing how effective our assistance to Turkey has been because of the absence of intelligence on how much opium and heroin is being smuggled via Iran from the east into Turkey, and how much conversion to morphine and heroin is occurring in Turkey. The delegation stated that the Congress cannot measure what progress our efforts are obtaining in Turkey unless we have an intelligence estimate of the extent of the narcotic traffic moving across Turkey annually.

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In meeting with Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, the delegation made the point that Turkey, while shedding its image of the world's leading opium producer should not now allow itself to be labeled the transit center of the smuggled opium and heroin to the west. In meeting with Deputy Secretary Barutcu, of the Foreign Ministry, the delegation inquired if better intelligence concerning narcotics coud be obtained from Iran and Afghanistan. Barutcu stated this was a continuing problem in light of the facts that Turkey does not maintain diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, and Iran has not been responsive to its inquiries.

Discussions with Commanding General Ismail Selen of the Turkish Jardarma, Director General Fahri of the Turkish National Police and Undersecretary Kumcuoglu of the Ministry of Finance and Customs centered on the delegation's concern over Turkey being used as a transshipment and conversion center for morphine base and heroin produced from opium originating in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was pointed out by Director General Fahri that notwithstanding the difficulty of patrolling the barren and rugged Turkey/Iran-Iraq border, and the large amount of truck traffic that croses it, Turkey has been doing an effective enforcement job in making the border a less attractive smuggling point for traffickers. He said reports indicate that an increasing amount of traffic is being shifted southward from Iran into Syria via Iraq. This is somewhat surprising since the smugglers are mostly Iranian and a war between Iran and Iraq has severely disrupted that border. In its talk with Mr. Kumcuoglu the delegation called for more effective customs inspections at border crossings and at airports and sea terminals. The delegation insisted that these latter two points are prime interdiction areas and should be more aggressively pursued by Turkish authorities. The Customs ministry was urged to attempt the use of detector dogs at the airports and seaports to enhance its efforts at those locations.

Italy

The Select Committee concluded its study mission with two successful days of meetings with Italian officials, the American Embassy team in Rome, and an inspirational audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II. In addition to a productive session with Ambassador Maxwell Rabb and his associates, the delegation met with the following Italian officials: President of the Republic Sandro Pertini, Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, Vice Prime Minister Arnaldo Forlani, Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, and Interior Minister Luigi Scalfaro. The National Chief of Police, the Anti-Mafia High Commissioner and the Director of the Control Anti Drug Service participated in the meeting with the Minister of Interior. A meeting was also had with Justice Minister Mino Martinazzoli. In addition the delegation had sessions with the Commanding Generals and the staffs of the Guardia di Finanza and the Carabinieri. A meeting was also held with Giuseppe Di Gennaro, the Director of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), and the delegation visited the Italian Center of Solidarity, a counterpart to the American Daytop Village drug rehabilitation halfway house.

The Italian Government has undertaken an aggressive campaign against organized crime and drug trafficking. The Italians have completed a successful effort to suppress terroism in the country and is now turning the full weight of its law enforcement establishment against narcotics and traditional organized crime. In addition to narcotic enforcement that had led to the seizure of many heroin conversion laboratories in Sicily, the Italian Government has vigorously enforced the new anti-Mafia laws which resulted in substantial prison terms for members of leading Sicilian crime families, disrupted the entire Mafia hierarchy in Sicily, and led to the pre-trial detention of many narcotics and organized crime suspects. As a result of this activity, the heroin traffic from Italy to the Eastern United States has been reduced by an estimated 25 percent.

The Drug Enforcement Administration greatly assisted the Italian Government in this effort. Italo-American cooperation in narcotic enforcement has traditionally been of the highest professional order. This cooperation is scheduled to continue under a proposed joint cabinet-level committee on narcotics and organized crime that is to be established between the United States and Italy. It is envisioned that the U.S. Attorney General and the Italian Interior Minister will be the co-chairman of the group.

Meetings with President Pertini and Prime Minister Craxi convinced the delegation of the commitment of the Italian Government to aggressively fight drug trafficking and to cooperate with all interested governments in this pursuit. Both leaders expressed the need for closer international cooperation as the best protection against the spread of narcotics trafficking. This theme was continued by Foreign Minister Andreotti who called for all nations to increase significantly their contributions to UNFDAC.

The delegation had the esteemed honor of a private audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II at the Vatican on January 19. In his remarks to the Pope, Chairman Rangel expressed the delegation's deep admiration for the personal stands he has taken against the traffic and abuse of drugs, as well as against the power and influence of the Mafia in Italy. The Chairman specifically mentioned the Pope's strong support of Cardinal Pappalardo of Palermo, who has taken a forthright position against the Mafia in Sicily. His Holiness in a special message to the delegation praised its work and voiced his concern over the threat that drug abuse presents to the family and society.

In its final meeting of the study mission, the delegation visited the Italian Center of Solidarity, a drug abuse rehabilitation center modeled after Daytop Village in New York. The delegation shared the experiences of its trip with participants of the center and urged them to continue their own courageous fight against drug abuse.

Drugs in the Military—Pacific and European Commands

Since 1978 the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control has monitored the levels of drug abuse within the ranks of U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific and European commands. The Select Committee's earlier studies of this vitally important national security issue revealed critically high levels of drug abuse within the uniformed services.

These studies, as well as DOD independently contracted studies and a tragic jet fighter crash aboard the U.S.S. *Nimitz* in May, 1981 in which evidence of illicit drug use was found in the autopsies of the pilot and deck crew killed, prompted the military establishment to impose stringent drug abuse testing, disciplinary, and treatment and prevention programs in Fall, 1981 and Winter, 1982.

As part of the Select Committee's study mission to Hawaii, Asia and Rome, the delegation was fully briefed by the Unified Commands in Honolulu and Rome, as well as by representatives of the drug abuse programs of the four services, as to the progress made in combatting drug abuse in the Pacific and European commands since the institution of the new programs.

The Select Committee is pleased to report that all service branches; Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force have made substantial progress in reducing the abuse of all forms of narcotics and drug abuse within the ranks. Through the use of a number of programs; including urinalysis testing, peer pressure, strict enforcement of standards and penalties, and mandatory treatment and rehabilitation programs, and separation from the service where deemed appropriate, the services report that all indicators of drug abuse show a continuing downward trend.

While the Committee welcomed the military's report. the members raised a number of issues it hoped the Pentagon and the individual services would continue to examine. The Committee expressed concern over the recent controversy over the accuracy of urinalysis testing. The long-term validity of this program is of the utmost importance because in many respects is the underpinning of the entire detection/prevention program of all four services.

Concern was also expressed that while the services have done an effective job in reducing substance abuse, alcoholism and alcohol abuse remain a continuing problem in the ranks, affecting military readiness, productivity, and health and safety.

Lastly, members expressed the belief that the military justice system should attempt to identify all offenses that relate to substance abuse, and not just those that are identified through urinalysis or are directly related to the possession or sale of controlled substances. Military justice courts and tribunals should be in a position to account for all drug related offenses, violations, and incidents in the disposition of disciplinary charges.

HAWAII

On January 5, 1984, in Honolulu, the delegation was briefed by Federal, State and local drug enforcement agencies in the State of Hawaii. The Select Committee, in advance of its arrival, had asked the participating agencies to address the following issues: the trafficking of southeast Asian heroin through Hawaii to the mainland United States; the domestic cultivation of marihuana on the Hawaiian Islands; the use of Hawaii as a transshipment center for cocaine traffic from South America; the infiltration of Hawaii by foreign organized crime groups engaged in drug trafficking; and the efforts of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) and the organized crime drug enforcement (OCDE) program to combat drug trafficking in Hawaii.

The briefers included:

Mr. Daniel A. Bent, United States Attorney, District of Hawaii.

Mr. Michael A. Lilly, First Deputy Attorney General, State of Hawaii.

Mr. George Clemente, Acting Resident Agent-in-Charge, Drug Enforcement Administration.

Mr, George Roberts, District Director, U.S. Customs Service.

Rear Admiral Clyde Robbins, Commander, 14th Coast Guard District.

Mr. Guy A. Paul, Chief of Police, Hilo Police Department (Hawaii County).

Mr. Jimmy Leong, Intelligence and Enforcement Unit, Honolulu Police Department.

Mr. Bruce Harrison, Tactical Enforcement Division, U.S. Customs Service.

Mr. Bent opened the briefing by giving an overview of drug enforcement activities and problems in the State of Hawaii. Hawaii emerges as a major transshipment point for Southeast Asian heroin entering the United States. The geographic location of Hawaii, and the transient character of much of its population at any one time makes it a logical transshipment point. The State receives over 300,000 visitors per month, approximately 135,000 of which are from foreign nations.

In 1983 56 pounds of heroin were seized by the Customs Service at Honolulu International Airport. Bent described this as a "substantial" amount—most of which was destined for the mainland United States for delivery to West Coast entrepreneurs. The "airport profile" of heroin couriers is that of a low level mule, with a common Thai name, who often claims when apprehended to just be "delivering a package." Bent pointed out that increasingly middle to older-aged Thai women are being utilized in this traffic. Although the arrest of these low level couriers has little impact on the overall heroin traffic, DEA, in cooperation with the Thai Government, attempts to utilize information obtained from those individuals caught to build cases against Thai nationals who control the traffic.

Mr. Bent expressed the opinion that Hawaii was not being utilized as a major transshipment center for cocaine from South America destined to the mainland United States. Although cocaine trafficking does exist, Bent cited two recent seizures and conspiracies involving 30 and 150 pounds of cocaine, the U.S. Attorney asserted most of the cocaine entering Hawaii is consumed on the Islands. Bent indicated that the cocaine trade in Hawaii has been difficult to penetrate because most of the cocaine trading takes place among close knit groups. He identified two emerging crime problems related to the international cocaine trade. First, profits and proceeds from the cocaine trade are being heavily invested in Hawaii thus requiring the use of financial investigations to link investors to cocaine smuggling. Second, Hawaiian marihuana is being increasingly traded for cocaine.

Mr. Bent described the domestic production of marihuana in Hawaii as the State's most acute crime problem. It is estimated that the value of the Hawaiian crop is between $500 to $700 million dollars. This large amount of illicit cultivation is creating an underground economy which

is challenging the survival of the legitimate Hawaiian agriculture business which value is estimated at $650 million. The National Park Service has performed an effective job in eradicating the marihuana crop from within its jurisdiction. However, large scale cultivation exists throughout the outer, rural islands of Hawaii. In cooperation with the State of Hawaii, the U.S. Attorney's office has cross-designated a State prosecutor in the four rural outer islands to select major narcotics cases for prosecution in Federal court. Federal procedures permit stiffer prison sentences in marihuana cultivation cases and land forfeiture penalties are available in the Federal forum.

First Deputy Attorney General Mike Lilly described the drug problem as Hawaii's number one crime problem, with marihuana being the number one drug problem. Lilly then introduced a series of speakers that would address various aspects of Hawaii's drug enforcement effort.

Mr. George Roberts, District Director, U.S. Customs Service, gave an interesting presentation. He asserted that the 56 pounds of heroin seized and related arrests made in Hawaii in 1983 was an "unprecedented explosion" in heroin traffic through Hawaii. Mr. Roberts asserted that these seizures, which accounted for ten percent of the total heroin seized in the United States, are only a "harbinger of the future."

Seattle has gone from virtually no heroin seizures to seven in 1983; the most recent and significant being twenty-five pounds seized from a Thai doctor who arrived on Thai International Airlines. San Francisco and Los Angeles have experienced a similar rise in Southeast Asian heroin seizures. On November 4th, inspectors at Los Angeles International Airport discovered two Thai males carrying a half kilo of heroin apiece concealed in their tennis shoes.

Last year the Customs Mail Facility in Oakland, California, detected an eighty pound seizure of Thai heroin in two cartons. This seizure eclipsed all other heroin seizures ever made in the postal system.

Mr. Roberts expressed apprehension not only at the increased volume in heroin traffic, but particularly the "dramatic change" in the type of couriers being used. Roberts maintained that the bulk of heroin trafficking is now being performed by couriers of Chinese ethnic ancestry. He expressed the following concern:

> I can tell you from my personal experience of years in Vietnam and Thailand that this means a rethinking of our strategy if we are to successfully combat and stem the flow of heroin into the U.S. from Asia. The strategy of using traditional American investigative techniques to penetrate Chinese trafficking organizations simply will not work. The only workable alternative is a return to more sweat and plain hard work in covering as much international commerce and traffic as possible in order to deter further expansion of the heroin flow. More emphasis and commitment to the traditional, and often mundane, work of inspecting passengers and cargo, actually getting in there and rolling up sleeves to open vessel containers, visiting importer's warehouses and really inspecting passengers and their baggage are vital and essential. There is no workable replacement technique to deter heroin smuggling.

Roberts was critical of the fact that every heroin seizure made for the last two years by Customs Inspectors in Hawaii were all made without prior information. He emphasized the need for more intelligence from producing and transshipment nations in Asia to assist drug enforcement efforts in Hawaii.

Roberts called for full Customs and Immigration inspections on all travellers from foreign nations who pass through Honolulu. In the past passengers enroute to Los Angeles or San Francisco would be inspected at their final destination. Americans would board the Honolulu to California flight and be passed illegal narcotics from the foreign courier while in the air. The American passengers, of course, would not be subject to inspection on the U.S. mainland. On January 1, 1984, the Customs Service was to have eliminated this procedure. At the last minute, however, a decision was made to opt for progressive clearances of foreign travellers passing through Honolulu and increased inspection in California. Roberts believes even the progressive clearance is insufficient, citing an example on January 1, 1984, where a California male was arrested in San Francisco carrying three pounds of Southeast Asian heroin. The passenger had arrived in Honolulu on December 29 on Singapore Airlines. His inspection revealed no violations. He reboarded the aircraft on January 1st, on the Honolulu to San Francisco leg of the flight aboard the aircraft, as a transit passenger from Singapore, was his brother. Apparently, the brother gave the heroin to the passenger in flight, believing that there would be no reinspection in San Francisco for domestic passengers.

Roberts, as opposed to Mr. Brent, saw a greater threat in Hawaii being used as a transshipment point for cocaine from South America to the mainland United States. He maintained a great potentiality exists for cocaine smuggling from South America via Fiji and Tahiti into Hawaii en route the West Coast.

Roberts expressed deep concern over proposed reductions in Customs' manpower in Hawaii. Roberts stated from his present line personnel strength of 110, he faces a reduction of 25 (16 uniformed Customs officers and nine bonded warehouse inspectors). Roberts maintains he needs a 50 percent increase in Customs personnel in Hawaii in order to effectively carry out his mission.

In closing Roberts called for a more positive commitment from Washington to the drug enforcement needs of Hawaii in order for the efforts there to be more effective.

George Clemente from DEA discussed his agency's enforcement activities in Hawaii next. Clemente explained that DEA in Hawaii attempts to make major cases against Southeast Asian trafficking organizations by acting upon information developed in Custom Service seizures of heroin and arrests of heroin couriers. This approach, in cooperation with the Thai Government. has led to the arrest of several Thai nationals involved in drug trafficking.

Clemente expressed the opinion that no one single group dominates heroin trafficking in Hawaii. yet some organized crime was involved in heroin activities. Clemente indicated that most heroin sales in Hawaii are of the small scale, street level variety. He stated that heroin is readily available at the street level in Hawaii and DEA has limited resources to deal with those transactions, but must rely on the local police. The DEA contingent in Honolulu consists of nine special agents and the resident agent in charge.

Concerning cocaine trafficking, Mr. Clemente indicated that large scale smuggling operations did not exist on the Island; that most of the cocaine dealing was internal, involving independent entrepreneurs.

He expressed the belief, however, that cocaine may be being stockpiled on Hawaii for transshipment to the U.S. mainland. Mr. Lilly injected at this point that some coca plants had been found growing on the large island of Hawaii.

Mr. Guarini asked Mr. Clemente about the role of Japanese organized crime on the Island. Mr. Clemente conceded there was evidence of its presence and involvement in drug trafficking.

Jimmy Leong from the Honolulu Police Department Intelligence and Enforcement Unit gave the next presentation. Mr. Leong's remarks focused on the involvement of foreign organized crime in drug trafficking through Hawaii. At the outset he indicated, that there are a number of Hawaiian residents who are foreigners, or deal with foreigners, involved in drug trafficking. Leong indicated that many of these individuals are connected with Japanese organized crime syndicates, most notably the Yakuza.

Leong stated that the Yakuza is significantly involved in drug trafficking and uses the profits derived from that activity to invest in legitimate businesses and real estate in Hawaii. Leong stated this pattern of reinvestment had been verified by both Hawaiian and Japanese police authorities. He expressed the belief that other foreign organized groups are moving into the Islands, some of which are involved in moving LSD from the mainland U.S. to Australia and New Zealand.

Leong turned briefly to the resource issue. The Honolulu Police Department has thirty narcotics (vice) officers, and three narcotics intelligence analysts. He cited excellent cooperation with Federal law enforcement agencies on the Island but expressed his belief that Customs and DEA are in need of increased manpower.

Bruce Harrison from the Tactical Enforcement Division (TED) (formerly the Patrol Division) of the U.S. Customs Service was the next speaker. TED has the primary obligation to enforce U.S. Customs and related laws between the designated ports of entry. TED has sixteen officers in Hawaii, responsibilities are broken into two units; the Land Branch at Honolulu International Airport, which operates the Yakuza Documentation Center (YDC), and the Marine Intelligence/Interdiction program.

The YDC has been responsible for numerous interceptions, identifications and interrogations of Yakuza entering Honolulu. This information is shared with Federal and State law enforcement agencies and coordinated with Japanese law enforcement officials through the U.S. Customs Attaché at the American Embassy in Tokyo.

Elements of Japanese organized crime have initiated several drug trafficking ventures involving the attempted smuggling of heroin into the United States, according to Harrison. He cautioned that while these ventures may not represent an immediate serious threat of a sustained drug smuggling and distribution network in the United States, they are significant and must be closely watched. Harrison outlined instances where one Yakuza group, the Sumiyoshi Rengo, attempted to smuggle heroin to the West Coast and, in one instance unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a multi-kilogram heroin venture with the Mafia in Las Vegas. In April 1983 a boss of a major sub-

group of the Sumiyoshi Rengo was convicted in Honolulu Federal Court for visa fraud violations.

The Marine Intelligence/Interdiction program is operated by five Customs Marine officers. Using the Customs boarding authority, these officers board and search suspect vessels in an effort to interdict narcotic traffic. Harrison pointed out the formidability of this task considering that Hawaii has no natural vessel chokepoints and a combined shoreline of over 1,000 miles.

Working from a vessel outlook list that is drawn up in cooperation with DEA and Customs, the Marine unit attempts to board suspect vessels at sea. During fiscal year 1983 the Marine Branch arrested fifteen individuals for narcotic offenses, although all of these arrests were for small offenses. The Customs Marine Mission in Hawaii, according to Harrison, is frustrated by the vast waters it must cover, insufficient resources and intelligence, and the fact that vessels arriving into Hawaii from foreign nations will often pose as having arrived from the mainland U.S. thus obviating the need to report its entry to Customs. Harrison closed on the note that the recent creation of NNBIS should enhance the Marine unit's intelligence needs.

Admiral Robbins described the Coast Guard's drug enforcement role in the 14th Coast Guard District.

The 14th District covers the American Pacific area, including Hawaii, American Samoa, and Guam. To cover this large amount of water space the District has been assigned:

2 High endurance cutters (the Monroe & Jarvis),
4 Medium endurance cutters,
3 Buoy tenders,
2 Helicopters,
3 C–130 aircraft.

Robbins stated that while the Coast Guard has undertaken an aggressive boarding program in the area, because of the area's vastness and limited resources its drug enforcement efforts must rely heavily on DEA and Customs intelligence. Robbins expressed the opinion that bulk marihuana is not transshipped through Hawaii; enough is grown on the Islands and marihuana being shipped to the West Coast would normally bypass a Customs inspection in Hawaii. He stated, in response to a question from Mr. Gilman, that most Hawaiian marihuana goes to the mainland by mail. He expressed uncertainty to the extent that container ships are being used to transport marihuana from Hawaii. He also expressed the opinion that other narcotics from the Far East are not shipped via sea through Hawaii because the shipping routes are too long, and air traffic is readily available.

In response to a question from Mr. Guarini, Admiral Robbins stated that the Coast Guard has had no recent narcotic seizures from its boardings. He stressed the need for more intelligence to perform a more effective job in this area and pointed to the creation of the NNBIS unit based in Long Beach, California to accomplish that goal.

The Select Committee next turned its attention to a comprehensive discussion of the cultivation of marihuana in Hawaii. Mr. Lilly opened the discussion stating that marihuana production is "taking over our

environment." He cited instances of violence, the use of booby traps, and the deployment of hi-powered weapons in efforts to cultivate marihuana and profit from its production. He expressed criticism of the State court system for not imposing stricter sanctions on marihuana cultivators and on the State legislature for failing to pass laws that would mandate a more effective penalty system. Lilly attributed this reluctance to the fact that marihuana production has become an accepted way of life in Hawaii. Mr. Lilly cited the fact that of the 144,000 plants identified on the Island of Hawaii last year, 117,000 were on private residences. In 1983 127 tons of marihuana were confiscated statewide. Lilly also underscored the point that Hawaiian marihuana is of great cash value because of its high THC content. In October 1982, a pound of Hawaiian grown marihuana was valued at $2,000.

The Postal system is a major conduit for marihuana leaving Hawaii. Mr. Lilly explained that existing postal regulations prohibit the use of drug detection dogs in postal facilities. Mr. Michael Bollie, United States Postal Inspector in Hawaii, explained to the Committee that court decisions limiting the use of detection dogs absent probable cause prompted the postal regulations. However, the Committee was further informed that a recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in *U.S.* v. *Place* 462 U.S.—now may have sanctioned the practice. Chairman Rangel stated he would have the Committee staff review the issue, and he would make appropriate recommendations to the Postal Service based on Committee review of the legal issues.

Guy Paul, Chief of Police of Hawaii County, further discussed the marihuana production issue. He stated that in all of 1982 Hawaiian Police Departments eradicated 147,000 pounds of marihuana. In 1983, 254,000 pounds were eradicated, an increase of 72 percent. In 1982, Paul estimated 15–20 percent of the crop was eradicated. In 1983, despite increased eradication efforts, only 10–12 percent of the crop was destroyed. Thus, Paul said, "despite increasing seizures we are losing ground."

Paul echoed Michael Lilly's sentiment that marihuana production is simply becoming a way of life in Hawaii. Paul voiced concern over marihuana growers getting involved in State and local politics, halting building and improvement projects for fear their growing areas will be encroached, and creating an underground economy that has the potential of fully corrupting the State.

Mr. Paul called for increased Federal assistance to the State to combat the marihuana threat in Hawaii. He pointed to the effort launched by the National Park Service in the National Parks on the Island of Hawaii as evidence of Federal ability.

The National Park Service closed the briefing with a slide presentation on the effort in the Fall of 1982 on the island of Hawaii to eradicate marihuana cultivation in National Parks. Over a two and a half month period a team of National Park personnel and local police totally took out the marihuana in the parks on the "Big Island". Descending by helicopter to the remote marihuana growing areas, the plants were manually taken up and burned. Twenty-one people were arrested during the operation. In the last six months the Park Service reports few plants have been found growing in the National Parks on the island of Hawaii.

Conclusions and Recommendations

1. An aggressive Federal campaign is needed, including military assistance and equipment, to eradicate marihuana production in Hawaii. The U.S. Postal Service was identified as a frequently used channel to ship marihuana from Hawaii to the mainland United States. The Committee urges the Postal Service to reassess its policies limiting the use of detector dogs to ferret out parcels of marihuana being mailed from Hawaii. The Committee is pleased to learn that the Postal Service, in conjunction with the Department of Justice initiated a drug detector dog program under proper legal procedures in postal facilities and seized significant quantities of marihuana destined for the mainland. This program should be expanded and intensified.

2. The Hawaiian State legislature and court system must become more vigorous in combatting the production of marihuana in the State. The existing penalty structure and sentences meted out only serve to foster the permissive attitude in the State over marihuana production.

3. Steps should be taken to ensure that DEA in Hawaii has adequate manpower, equipment and operating funds to effectively suppress the movement of wholesale quantities of heroin and cocaine into the State for distribution and use. This manpower and support would also enable DEA to more effectively develop prosecutions against the major traffickers of marihuana in Hawaii. Additionally, it would enable DEA to ensure that Hawaii does not become a major entry port for heroin of Southeast Asian origin and cocaine from Colombia and Peru via Tahiti and Fiji into the United States.

4. This Committee is in receipt of reports from many sources alleging that sail and motor yachts are being used to smuggle large bulk quantities of marihuana from the various islands of Hawaii to the States of California, Oregon and Washington. Cargo containers aboard regularly scheduled merchant marine voyages to the United States are also said to be extensively used to move large bulk quantities of marihuana from Hawaii to the mainland. Since all of this is outside U.S. Customs' jurisdiction, it is recommended that DEA and the Coast Guard with the advice and technical assistance of Customs and the State and local authorities should organize a task force to address the interstate traffic of marihuana between Hawaii and the West Coast States.

5. The Committee's visit to Southeast Asia, following its initial stop in Honolulu, confirmed trends of an increasing production and traffic of opium and heroin in that region and the threat of heroin smuggling via Honolulu this poses to the United States. Rather than reducing narcotic inspection and control personnel as is now in process in the Hawaiian district, the U.S. Customs should increase it. This is essential to effectively prevent the movement of Southeast Asian heroin through U.S. Customs controls at the Honolulu International Airport and the State's seaports for onward movement to mainland States. Sufficient personnel and resources for Customs are also necessary to ensure against Hawaii being used as a penetration point for the smuggling of cocaine to the United States.

6. Drug trafficking intelligence available to narcotic enforcement units in Hawaii must be enhanced. All agencies operating in Hawaii, particularly the Customs Service and the Coast Guard, should seek

to obtain the specific forms of narcotics intelligence from other Federal and/or State enforcement agencies that would enhance the performance of their narcotics missions. Top priority should be given to the development of the Long Beach, California center of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) to increase narcotic smuggling intelligence from Hawaii to the West Coast via private yachts and container shipments.

7. Federal law enforcement must give careful attention to infiltration of Hawaii by foreign organized criminal groups engaged in drug trafficking. While this threat too is not presently large; the potential for foreign criminal groups, particularly from Japan, to utilize Hawaii to traffic drugs to the West Coast is great.

HONG KONG

On Monday, January 9, 1984, the delegation arrived at the American Consulate General in Hong Kong at 9:00 a.m. for a briefing by Consul General, Burton Levin, Resident DEA Agent-in-Charge, Robert J. Furey, Senior Customs Representative, Donald W. Mieger, and other Consulate staff.

Mr. Levin opened the briefing with an extensive and informative assessment of the future political status of Hong Kong.

Mr. Levin next turned to the issue of narcotics and advised that Hong Kong has a very efficient and relatively non-corrupt enforcement structure to combat narcotics trafficking. Despite this, however, the colony is "flooded" with heroin, especially #3 heroin (that which is consumed by smoking). The prices are at their lowest ever and the purity is at its highest. A daily supply of #3 heroin costs about the same as a pack of foreign cigarettes. In Hong Kong, the addiction problem is somewhat different than that of the United States. The average addict in Hong Kong continues to function and hold down a job in part.

Mr. Levin stated that because of the type of heroin consumed in Hong Kong and its large addict population he doubts that Hong Kong plays a significant role in the transshipment of heroin to the United States. In addition, he said there is no reason for the traffickers to go through Hong Kong customs if the heroin is destined for the United States. Heroin may be shipped through Hong Kong, but is not unloaded unless it is going to be consumed here. Some members of the delegation questioned this conclusion.

Mr. Levin pointed out that Hong Kong does play a significant role as a financial and banking center for heroin trafficking. There are few foreign exchange controls in Hong Kong, and the banking system assures depositor secrecy and privacy on a scale similar to Switzerland and Panama. Present Hong Kong law requires a court to court order to subpena any financial records from a Hong Kong bank. This, of course, poses difficult problems for law enforcement because before an American court can issue an order to a Hong Kong court, an indictment must be filed. This obviously frustrates the investigative process. Hong Kong does permit its enforcement authorities access to bank records if they have other evidence of a crime. This has proven to be of limited help. Hong Kong needs asset seizure laws

and greater access to bank records to enhance its financial investigation of narcotics traffickers operating internationally. Mr. Levin stated that Attorney General Smith is drawing up recommendations for legislation that is needed in Hong Kong to improve its ability to obtain evidence in the colony to prosecute Americans who launder money through Hong Kong. He was not optimistic, however, of the success of this effort.

Chairman Rangel inquired if there was any evidence of narcotic trafficking originating in the People's Republic of China through Hong Kong. Mr. Levin responded that in the past some traffickers were traveling from Bangkok, through the People's Republic into Hong Kong. Hong Kong authorities did not readily suspect this route because of the People's Republic draconian treatment of anyone involved with narcotics. When informed of the evidence, the People's Republic improved its border checks and the Bangkok trafficker no longer appears to be transiting the People's Republic.

The delegation was informed by Resident Agent-In-Charge, Robert J. Furey, that DEA personnel develop and mutually exchange narcotic intelligence with their Hong Kong counterparts. This mutual cooperation has developed narcotics arrests and seizues in the traffic affecting both Hong Kong and the United States. There is a good working relationship and excellent cooperation between the Hong Kong enforcement services and DEA. Furey told the delegation that there is an annual regional conference of DEA agents in Southeast Asia that coincides with the State Department's conference with its narcotics coordinators in the region. Mr. Furey also stated that DEA agents throughout Southeast Asia communicate with each other on an almost daily basis and often travel between countries to assist each other in developing investigations.

The delegation was then briefed by Hong Kong Government officials, Narcotics Commissioner, Gordon Mortimer, Police Narcotics Bureau Representative, John Gagley, Customs and Exise Representative, K. S. Tong and Solicitor General, Ray Astin.

Commissioner Mortimer informed the delegation that he was very pleased that the Hong Kong Government has closed a loop-hole in its law regarding the transportation of narcotic and dangerous drugs. While it has always been a crime to transport drugs into Hong Kong, a defendant, if found in possession of drugs at the airport, could interpose the defense that the drugs were in transit, and not destined for Hong Kong. The defendant merely had to produce an onward airline ticket as proof of another destination. Drugs in transit were not covered under existing law. Now, however, to interpose the "in transit" defense, it is necessary to produce an authorized importation certificate showing where the drugs are destined.

Mr. Mortimer stated that the abuse of opiate drugs is a serious problem in Hong Kong and has been since 1840. Hong Kong is a very densely populated area. With a population of 5.2 million, it averages from 29,000 people per square kilometer to as high as 165,000 per square kilometer. It is a country of free and open ports with a minimum of customs control. It has an indented coast line, stretching over 11,200 miles. Over twelve and a half million people enter each year by air (3.7 million) by sea (4.5 million) and by land (4.3 million),

and over 28 million tons of cargo come in and out. In addition, Hong Kong is within 1200 miles of the Golden Triangle of Laos, Thailand, and Burma. All of these factors make the colony an extremely favorable target for narcotic smuggling.

Mr. Mortimer described the sound computerized statistical base Hong Kong has developed to register its addicts. Between the period of September 1976 to June 1983, 43,835 individuals were registered. This translates into one out of every one hundred people in Hong Kong having some form of drug addiction—which is high by world standards. Additionally, the fact that each registrant has reported an average of 4.5 times indicates there is a serious problem of relapse after rehabilitation. The Central Registry receives its reports of addicts from the five principal groups: medical and health department (34 percent of total reports); The Royal Hong Kong Police Department (25 percent); the Society for the Aid and Rehabilitation of Drug Abusers (18 percent); the Correctional Services Department (15 percent); and small welfare agenices (8 percent).

The Action Committee Against Narcotics is the coordinating committee established by the Hong Kong Government to implement the programs to stop the illicit trafficking and abuse of narcotic drugs. The committee has developed a four-point strategy: (1) law enforcement; (2) treatment and rehabilitation; (3) preventive education and publicity, and (4) international action.

Trafficking in drugs is punishable by a maximum of life imprisonment and a fine of up to five million Hong Kong dollars. Over the last three years there has been a progressive increase in the number of arrests and seizures.

More trafficking in Hong Kong is done by local organized groups. The large syndicates were broken in the early 1970's. Heroin base is produced in labs along the Thai-Burmese border and transported to Hong Kong. It is processed with other chemicals in smaller labs to make #3 heroin (23-30 percent purity). The smaller Hong Kong labs produce about ten to thirteen kilos at a time, drying the final product in microwave ovens.

The close-knit character of the Chinese community internationally facilitates contact among narcotics traffickers. Much of the organized traffic in Hong Kong services overseas Chinese trafficking networks and communities. The Hong Kong networks supply the local street level drug trafficking organizations and also engage in protection and prostitution rackets. However, they maintain no significant ties to other organized ethnic crime networks.

Mortimer was asked by Congressman Guarini if he wasn't fighting a losing battle. He responded that he did not believe so. He felt that they were "containing" the drug problem in Hong Kong. Mortimer stated that in light of bumper opium crops from the Golden Triangle, the drug abuse situation in Hong Kong had worsened but probably would be much worse without their efforts.

Mr. Mortimer explained their voluntary methadone maintenance program. Once an individual registers, he then has to pay one Hong Kong dollar to receive a dose of methadone. Counseling services are

also available at the clinics. Approximately 6,400 individuals per day attend the 24 clinics.

Heroin is the number one problem of drug abuse in Hong Kong. Of the reported cases for the first six months of 1983, 96.2 percent of the cases were of heroin abuse, 2.4 percent of opium abuse, 1.4 percent of cannabis and 0.2 percent for the abuse of pills and tablets.

Regarding the preventive education and publicity program, Mr. Mortimer showed the delegation several posters which are used to educate the public about the dangers of drug abuse and to provide information to addicts as to where they can seek assistance. The delegation was impressed by the design and thrust of these posters. Additionally, public service announcements are shown on prime time television, local celebrities participate in the anti-narcotics campaigns and there is a program to give presentations at schools in areas where there is a high rate of drug abuse.

In terms of international efforts, Hong Kong participates in a regional conference which includes DEA, along with representatives from Australia, Canada, the Philippines and Japan. Mr. Mortimer said that there was no central data bank for regional intelligence gathering and that he would have reservations about the usefulness of such a bank.

Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Hong Kong has an excellent overall program to combat drug trafficking and drug abuse.

2. Available evidence suggests that heroin transshipment through Hong Kong to other parts of the world may not be a significant problem. However, as in the past, Hong Kong could be easily utilized as a conduit by trafficking organizations as a transshipment center.

3. Hong Kong plays a key role in the international trafficking of narcotics from the Golden Triangle and Goldent Crescent countries by being a financial and currency exchange center of this illicit industry. To counter this, Hong Kong authorities should develop greater legal access to banking and financial records to further cooperative international narcotic investigations. Legislation permitting the seizure of narcotic traffic assets would have a salutary affect.

4. The numerous offshore islands, coves, and small harbors in Hong Kong make it vulnerable to seaborne narcotic smuggling from Thailand. In addition to sustaining a serious, indigenous addiction problem, these supplies through the aegis of international ethnic Chinese trafficking organizations pose a constant heroin threat to the United States. Hopefully the Hong Kong authorities will continue to be able to ensure that heroin traffic from their territory to the United States does not become significant.

5. The Committee was pleased to learn of the cooperation developed by the Hong Kong authorities with the People's Republic of China to curtail the smuggling of heroin base from Thailand through Chinese territory to Hong Kong.

6. Hong Kong should continue its efforts to pursue regional narcotic enforcement cooperation with all the countries of Southeast Asia and particularly with Thailand, Burma, and Laos.

THAILAND

A. Country Team Briefing (January 10, 1984)

Ambassador John Gunther Dean explained to the delegation that he considered the narcotics problem to be one of the important issues confronting the United States in Thailand. He indicated that the Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, was in charge of coordinating DEA and State Department efforts addressing the narcotics problem. The delegation learned that the United States enjoyed a good working relationship with the Thais on narcotics control matters and that DEA personnel worked closely with their Thai counterparts in developing narcotic investigations in the traffic affecting the United States.

Ambassador Dean stated that he periodically raises the narcotic control issue with the Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanon. In addition the Prime Minister also discussed the subject in his October 1981 meeting with President Reagan. In response to the President's request for Thailand's very close cooperation on the drug issue, Prime Minister Prem said that he was a friend of the United States and that he could be counted on to help. The Ambassador indicated that during the past three years the Thais had been very cooperative, and had mounted several enforcement actions along the Thai-Burmese border to push the large heroin refineries and major trafficking organizations out of Thailand. More than 20 Thais were killed in these operations.

The Ambassador explained that the insurgency problem in the North had until recently been a significant problem facing the government. He indicated that that problem has diminished, and that this permitted the Thai Government to more effectively combat traffickers and eradicate poppy in the Hill Tribe areas.

At the briefing, the Committee delegation learned that the United States had its largest U.S. overseas interagency narcotics contingent in the world in Thailand; nearly 50 people in the Embassy and two consulates. It was pointed out that Thailand is a major producer of opium and heroin. Estimates placed the number of addicts in Thailand at between 100,000 to 500,000.

It was reported that 5 percent of the poppy grown in the Golden Triangle is coming from Thailand, 5 percent from Laos and 90 percent from Burma in insurgent areas beyond the control of the Burmese Government. Importantly, greater Thai friendship with China has led to decreased Chinese support for the Burmese Communist Party insurgents. This resulted in their increasing involvement in drug trafficking to support their insurgency. The Thais believe that if you stop the opium trade the insurgency problem will diminish. However, the Thais feel that more U.S. assistance is needed. U.S. anti-narcotics assistance to Thailand totalled $1.49 million in fiscal year 1981, $3.072 million in fiscal year 1982, $3.4 million in fiscal year 1983, and $2.5 million is planned for fiscal year 1984.

The Committee learned that while figures on opium production in Thailand are weak, estimates placed 1973 production at 100 tons and 1984 production, as the insurgency has come under control, at about 35

tons. The Government of Thailand believes that more progress must be made to eliminate opium production and to suppress illicit heroin manufacturing and traffic. The Thais have launched 15 major operations against traffickers on the border areas over the last two years. The most important trafficking group, the Shan United Army (SUA), and its leader Chang Chi-Fu (Khun Sa) retreated into Burma.

The Committee learned that Thailand's excellent roads, communication and transportation system developed through U.S. AID assistance, while contributing to economic development, has also facilitated narcotics trafficking. A description as given of several major trafficking routes including one originating in the Shan states in Burma to the border. Opium is converted to heroin in the border areas, moved through Northern Thailand to Bangkok for international distribution. Opium or heroin base is also moved to Malaysia for conversion into heroin #3. Other heroin or heroin base routes go through India directly from Burma or south through Burma to South Thailand for transport by Thai fishing trawler to Hong Kong, and to the Adamen Sea to Singapore.

Chairman Rangel asked if any eradication efforts were underway and whether the Thai eradication program was successful. The response was that the Thais believe their program is working; however, many observers think it is not working effectively. While opium production in Thailand has hit a low point, it is still significant and could explode dramatically. It was indicated that opium surveys are conducted by aerial photography and ground observation. Most crop substitution efforts are only demonstration programs at this point. The civilian, police, military districts (CPMS), which were established to combat the insurgents and which now serve as an organizational framework for crop substitution programs, were described. In several of these areas, an insurgent presence prevented crop substitution efforts up until 1982 when a large segment of the insurgents made peace.

Congressman Gilman observed that greater cooperation between Thailand and Burma was necessary. The delegation observed, however, that no official police or military cooperation against traffickers exists between Thailand and Burma. In response to Congressman Guarini's inquiry, it was explained that DEA works very effectively with its Thai counterparts to develop narcotics intelligence in Thailand which results in important narcotic arrests and seizures in Thailand and abroad in the traffic affecting the United States.

Chairman Rangel pointed out that the U.S. expects a greater effort against the narcotics problem from those nations, including Thailand, which are our friends. He referred to recently passed legislation which requires governments receiving U.S. assistance to develop an effective plan to phase out narcotic crop production and suppress illicit manufacture and traffic. He added that because of the critical problem of narcotics in the United States, Congress expects Thailand to develop and implement such a plan.

Discussion centered also on the need to enact effective narcotic laws, including conspiracy and asset seizure laws, to be utilized against major traffickers in Thailand. In addition, it was explained that the Thai Government needed to better understand the importance of end-

ing the Hill Tribe tradition of personal opium consumption which is contrary to the requirements of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which provides that this practice be ended by December 1979. The Thais, it was pointed out, "are very successful at doing anything they make a priority." The Thais should understand that the longstanding Thai-U.S. friendship can be damaged if more meaningful initiatives against opium production and drug trafficking are not undertaken.

B. Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister General Prachuap Suntharangkun

(January 11, 1984)

The delegation was received by Deputy Prime Minister General Prachuap Suntharangkun. He described several significant narcotic seizures and arrests in Bangkok including one involving 41 kilos of heroin. The drugs had been transported from the North. He pointed out that Thailand had launched an aggressive campaign to eliminate the availability of the chemicals necessary for heroin manufacture in the South and had generally received good cooperation from the Malaysian Government in this regard.

General Prachuap explained that in Thailand sentencing for drug trafficking was left to the discretion of the judge depending on the plea of the accused. A maximum penalty of up to life imprisonment or death could be handed down in any case involving over 100 grams. Sentences for over 10 grams included 10 years imprisonment with the possibility of probation after 5 years. Thai law presumed that the possession of 20 grams or more indicated an intent to sell leading to the imposition of stricter penalties. He explained that in Malaysia the penalty for possession of 15 grams or more was death.

Chairman Rangel emphasized the delegation's appreciation for Thailand's help on the narcotics issue, and underscored his desire for furthering mutual Thai-United States understanding on the drug problem. He said he hoped that Thailand would not suffer from the drug problem as the United States had suffered and that the two countries could elevate the narcotics issue on the national agenda of both nations. The Chairman explained that the members of the delegation served on different committees in the Congress and that were all concerned with the problem of narcotics. While he recognized that the Thais had committed resources and manpower to the drug problem, he stated "much remained to be done."

General Prachuap stated he was pleased that the delegation was willing to observe first hand the Thai narcotic problem. He said that the Thais have a good understanding with the United States on the issue, and that he had received congratulatory notes from the United States recognizing the Thais' good work. The General stated that his government wanted the United States to understand its problems and referred to the need to work with other nations as well to eliminate drug traffic.

The Thais, he said, have a definite policy to eliminate opium production. Any rumors to the contrary are not true. With regard to crop substitution, he explained that some opium growing occurred in in-

accessible areas and that crop substitution must be done in stages. Several tribes are addicted and there is Communist insurgency in some of these areas. These people needed to be brought to the Thai side, and out of insurgency, before crop substitution can be effective. Crop substitution can be a valuable tool; opium does not make the villagers rich. the traffickers receive the profit.

Chairman Rangel asked how the Thai Government was proceeding to introduce farmers to alternative cash crops and, referring to the recently enacted U.S. legislation that would suspend aid to nations which fail to take steps to eliminate production, he explained that for the members of the delegation the drug problem was a serious issue to their constituents. The Deputy Prime Minister stated there is a quasi-medical use of opium by the Hill Tribes people. The Thai Government has a problem with the Communists on the borders and does not have enough resources to deal with them and insurgents in the North. The people in the North have grown opium for many, many years and the Thai Government does not want to create a third enemy, the Tribespeople.

Mr. Gilman followed up on the Chairman's inquiry about Thai efforts in crop substitution. The General said the Thai Government was doing much in this area; however, much could be lost, if expansion came too fast. The people would have to learn from their mistakes in the implementation of agricultural reform and needed more training before large-scale crop substitution expansion is undertaken. Many people, he stated, wonder about the profitability of growing coffee. Because returns from that crop will not materialize until the end of a five-year period, many villagers continue to grow opium as a source of income. However, the Thai Government definitely intends to expand coffee production.

Congressman Guarini raised the issue of transshipment of narcotics through Thailand and the need for effective conspiracy laws to combat this traffic. The General responded that the government is reviewing the best approach to that problem, and that a drafting committee is exploring several possibilities. Mr. Guarini asked about any efforts to pursue a regional approach to the problem and was told that the Deputy Prime Minister had gone to Burma to discuss a prisoner exchange program in which Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia would participate. General Prachuap outlined Thai participation with the United Nations, INTERPOL, and ASEAN, organizations in narcotics control cooperation.

Congressman Sawyer raised the possibility of lessening resistance to the conspiracy laws, by tailoring such laws so they are applied only to drug crimes. The General said the conspiracy law concept is new to the Thais and will require considerable explanation. Congressman Rogers stated that as much as we appreciate the Thai efforts, we must emphasize the terrible problem of drugs in the United States and that our nation attaches a very high priority to resolving the problem. People in the United States, he indicated, are becoming impatient. More must be done to fight transshipment or problems could develop with the United States-Thai relationship. General Prachuap stated that his nation's short term programs demonstrate Thailand's commitment to eradicate and to fight the drug problem.

C. Office of the Narcotics Control Board Briefing (January 11, 1984)

The current Narcotics Control Board (NCB) was established by the Narcotics Control Act of 1976 and is an independent department in the Office of the Prime Minister, and is responsible for carrying out all activities in accordance with the resolutions of the NCB. Included within the ONCB's mandate are: giving recommendations to the NCB on policy, measures, plans, and projects concerning narcotics control; also coordinating and encouraging the performance of the work of government agencies included in narcotics control. The ONCB's policy and approach are divided along the following lines: (1) planning and coordination, (2) narcotics law enforcement, prevention and education and information, (3) treatment and rehabilitation, (4) development promotion and narcotics cultivation control, (5) research and management information systems, (6) laws and narcotics offenses, and (7) international cooperation.

Ex officio members of the NCB include the Prime Minister, Ministers of the Interior, Education, Public Health, Directors General of the Police Department, the Public Prosecution Department, and the Customs Department, and the Secretary-General of the NCB. Among the Board's functions are formulating plans and dedicating resources to prevent and suppress offenses under the narcotics laws, and controlling the investigation and prosecution of offenses under the narcotics laws.

Police Major General Chavalit Yodmani, Secretary-General, ONCB, conducted a briefing of the delegation at ONCB Headquarters. Assisting him were Police Lieutenant General Pow Sarasin, Commissioner, Central Investigation Bureau and former Secretary-General of the ONCB; Police Colonel Koson Limpichart, Assistant Secretary-General, ONCB; Mr. Narong Suwanapian, Director of Narcotics Cultivation Control; Mr. Prija Champaratna, Director of Preventive Education Division; and Mr. Payont Phantsri, Director, Office of the Secretary.

General Chavalit indicated that 90,000 square kilometers of the Golden Triangle was within Northern Thailand. Burma accounts for 80 percent of the Golden Triangle opium production. He stated that within its area, Thailand still faces an insurgency problem. However, the problem is abating. For example, 5,000 well-armed insurgents turned themselves in during 1982. In May 1982, Thailand received from the United States $50,000 to support opium elimination efforts. Opium production before the project stood at 1,750 Rais.[1] In 1983, production dropped to 300 Rais. The Thai Government still permits some opium growth for personal use of the villagers. He indicated that the recent Thai success stemmed to a large degree from the fact that Khun Sa had been driven back, and referred to 5 CPMs; 31, 32 in Northeast Thailand, 33 in the Southeast, 34 in the Southwest, and 35 in the Northwest, where crop substitution programs were in effect or anticipated. The General pointed out at this time that the government did not have projects in 37 percent of the opium growing territories. He referred also to assistance received by UNFDAC and mentioned that the government was concerned about the adverse envi-

[1] 6.2 Rais equal 1 hectare.

ronmental effects of the use by growers of slash and burn land clearing methods, and the need to continually obtain new plots for opium cultivation because it depletes soil nutrients so rapidly.

Concerning crop substitution, General Chavalit stated that excellent crop substitutes such as upland rice, kidney beans, ginger, maize and millet have been introduced which produce a crop within a few months after planting. Other profitable crops such as coffee, fruit orchards and nuts often require as much as five years before a profit is realized.

The General believes that the government, through its sincere efforts, was gaining the confidence of the Hill Tribes people in its opium replacement efforts. He stated that while the U.N. has helped to develop and support the projects, more needs to be accomplished by putting into place more effective crop marketing and transportation systems. The crop substitution program will mean little if the crops cannot be moved to market.

The General described a $70 million, 5-10 year crop substitution plan which would be introduced into 8 major opium-growing regions. The Government of Thailand will be requesting funding from interested governments and the United Nations plans to finalize the plan this year. Congressman Sawyer reminded the General of their meeting last year at which General Chavalit had indicated the plan would be ready by this time. The General indicated that there had been some delays but hoped to have the plan ready soon.

The General described Thailand's two initial lines of defense against drug trafficking. The first is along the border where the Thais, under the aegis of its Security Council, had destroyed trafficking and refining targets. The second is the gathering of narcotics intelligence in Thailand's more than 700 cities. Drugs coming through central areas are intercepted as the problem is fought on the streets, and at middle and higher levels of trafficking. He stated that while there were more than 20,000 arrests per year, some loopholes remain in Thai law. He referred to two recent major cases where on appeal the traffickers were released. He estimated that odds were 50–50 regarding passage of a conspiracy law. He indicated that there are many parties in Parliament who were suspicious of such a law, and others who argue that Thailand already has a conspiracy law.

General Chavalit discussed legislation which in 1959 banned opium use and that heroin then became a considerable problem. Thai officials often mention this. Apparently the implication is that had opium smoking not been banned in 1959, heroin would not have become a problem. The fact is that heroin manufacture and use was introduced by Shanghai-Chinese elements from Hong Kong about 1960. Heroin in the illicit traffic competed with opium in Thailand and eventually, as it did worldwide, displaced opium as the drug of choice in Thailand. Some Thai Government officials now argue that Hill Tribe opium addicts should be permitted to produce and use their own opium lest they become heroin addicts. Once their areas are opened up, however, they will become heroin addicts if heroin becomes available whether opium is available or not. A safeguard against their becoming heroin addicts is to wean the Hill Tribe people away from the quasi-medical use or smoking of opium now. Another positive step would be phasing out

the opium production in the Hill Tribe area of Thailand that is essential for heroin manufacture. Heroin of 80-90 percent purity, has a market price of $4,000 per kilo in Thailand.

The General explained that the Thai Government has high hopes for crop substitution and that the yield, under ideal conditions, for one Rai of coffee was estimated at $300, while one Rai of opium would bring up to $200. He indicated that the $70 million plan would mandate ending non-commercial production of opium immediately, then the elimination of Hill Tribe village consumption, and then finally complete termination of production. He estimated that under the best circumstances, the plan would require five years. He referred to the United States, U.N. and private foundation assistance programs as bieng of considerable assistance to Thailand. Chairman Rangel commended General Chavalit for the positive efforts undertaken by the ONCB. The Chairman stated that if the Thai proposed $70 million program can be shown to work in a free nation without injuring the poor, Thailand could become a showcase and model for other nations. Informing the United States about the specific plan would help to demonstrate progress is being made. Members of the delegation expressed concern, however, that adequate steps be taken to assure that United States and U.N. agricultural and rural development assistance not be used to facilitate any form of opium production and that efforts be intensified to interdict Thai fishing trawlers trafficking to Hong Kong. General Chavalit responded that they would guard against any diversion of assistance, but expressed some frustration with the difficulty of coordinating interdiction efforts with the British relating to trafficking through Hong Kong. He felt the fact that Hong Kong authorities are unwilling to intercept Thai trawlers in international waters off Hong Kong enables them to slip through controls into the offshore islands and hundreds of coves that exist in the territory.

D. Chiang Mai Field Trip (January 13, 1984)

The delegation visited the Doi Yao and Pha Mon crop control projects located about 100 miles east of Chiang Mai along the border of Laos. Doi Yao and Doi Phay Mon are located in a densely forested and heavily mountainous area. The areas are situated within the boundary of Theong and Chiany Khong districts, Chiang Rai province. The project area is comprised of seven villages with 288 Hmong families numbering 1,859 tribespeople. The project is located within CPM 31 and is administered by the CPM 31 authorities and the ONCB.

The delegation was briefed at a CPM 31 military facility on the progress being made at the projects. The principal achievement was described as a reduction in opium poppy cultivation within one year of approximately 80 percent. For the 1983 opium crop, 1,750 Rais were grown. For the 1984 crop only 350 Rais were cultivated. This amount is for the personal consumption of the projects' 140 addicts in accordance with the project agreement. It is anticipated that for the 1985 opium poppy cultivation for village consumption will be reduced by 20 percent more to 280 Rais.

General Chavalit, who had accompanied the delegation, indicated that approximately 74 areas were responsible for opium production in

the region. Eight projects are planned for 14 of these areas, while 20 areas are not fully under control of the Thai Government because of the presence of insurgents.

The Tribespeople in the Doi Yao and Pha Mon area, until 1982, had been a part of a Communist insurgency against the government. They surrendered their arms to the government in late 1982 and turned over to the government approximately 530 kgs of the opium they had cultivated. This action demonstrated their sincere intention to eliminate opium growing and to devote their villages to cultivation of licit crops such as kidney beans, upland rice, millet, maize, ginger root, coffee and chickens.

The Thai Government has assigned $50,000 for agricultural inputs, medical assistance, and dwellings. Another $30,000 has been utilized to prepare land for cultivation. Total assistance to the area, including that for roads and other training, and agricultural inputs, during 1982–83 totalled approximately $3 million.

The delegation travelled by helicopter to the hillside village of Bon Rom Po Thai. That village has a population of 397, with 60 families and 7 opium addicts. The members surveyed the coffee seedlings which had been planted recently and examined one area where opium poppies, to support the villages' addicts during the first phase of the program, were still permitted to be cultivated. It was explained that one Rai would support between 1-2 addicts per year.

The produce from the village's crop substitution efforts, including kidney beans, ginger roots, millet, upland rice and chickens, were displayed for the delegation.

In a warm cordial exchange in the center of the village, the tribespeople thanked the delegation for American assistance for their project. Chairman Rangel commended the villagers for their decision to abandon opium cultivation and praised them for their hard work and determination to develop their village by cultivation of alternative crops.

Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The United Nations Crop Replacement and Community Development Pilot Program in the northwest opium growing region of Thailand has identified successful substitute crops and market possibilities for poppy growers. Host country funds, United States and other bilateral assistance contribute to this work.

The Committee received the impression that up until now there has be disappointment on the part of the international technicians assisting the Thai authorities in this work over the failure of the government since 1976 to phase out opium production as the replacement crops come on line. Reports have also been made that fertilizer provided for substitute crops has been used to enhance opium production. Also permitting villages to continue to produce for their opium abuse needs is contrary to the Single Convention and invites the creating of new addicts or a reversion to renewed commercial production.

The time has come for the Government of Thailand to finalize a plan that will progressively phase out poppy production, eradicating where necessary to end the production of the opium in the region and to wean the village opium addicts off the drug simultaneously.

The Government of Thailand has had a master plan to phase out opium production in preparation for about 2 years. It is being developed with the United Nations Development Program and is now scheduled to be presented to a conference of potential multilateral and bilateral donors scheduled to meet in the spring of 1984.

The Committee looks forward to the presentation of this plan and will strongly support bilateral and multilateral assistance on the part of the United States for its implementation. It is hoped that it will include a schedule for the complete phase out of opium production within five years with substantial reduction made each year. This Committee is most anxious that the Government of Thailand present its "master plan" to phase out opium as scheduled for the spring of 1984, so as to avoid any question of eligibility for U.S. economic and military assistance under the Hawkins/Rangel/Gilman Amendment which requires termination of such aid for any country not preparing and implementing a plan to gradually eliminate the illicit cultivation, production, trafficking and smuggling of illicit drugs affecting the United States.

2. The Committee was very favorably impressed with the successful operations waged by the Government of Thailand against the large and very sophisticated heroin laboratories along the Thai-Burmese border. The seizure and destruction of those installations, as well as major seizures of heroin, morphine base and opium has significantly disrupted this traffic. Unfortunately, the heavy production of opium and heroin in Burma and to some extent in Laos provides ample replacements for what is seized in Thailand. Hopefully, once Thailand leads the way in ending illicit opium production, Burma and Laos notwithstanding technical and political difficulties will be obliged by international public opinion to follow.

Meanwhile, the United States, other Pacific nations, and Western European countries now so heavily and tragically affected by the heroin traffic originating in, or trafficked through, Thailand should support that country's narcotic suppression effort through bilateral or multilateral narcotic enforcement assistance funds and direct narcotic enforcement cooperation between their respective drug enforcement services.

3. The Committee, in meetings with the Thai authorities, was pleased to learn that discussions were underway on the possibility of enacting legislation that would provide for a conspiracy law and also for the seizure and forfeiture of assets accrued from drug trafficking. The effectiveness of those measures was supported by the delegation and they urged the Thai officials to adopt this legislation. The Committee was elated to learn that the Thai Office of the Narcotics Control Board has now presented draft legislation for those measures to the appropriate Parliamentary Committee.

4. More than a half million people in Thailand are addicted to opium and heroin. While much of this addiction is caused and sustained by opium and heroin production in the country, the traffic from Burma and Laos also victimizes Thailand. Locally produced high grade cannabis and illicitly diverted supplies of psychotropic drugs are also heavily trafficked and abused in the country.

The Government of Thailand has 71 treatment centers in the country and a well oragnized national treatment program going back to 1972. Ending the production of opium and heroin in Thailand, Burma and Laos provides the best hope of bringing heroin and opium addiction in Thailand under control by eliminating its unlimited availability. Thailand recognizes this and the Committee urges the international community of nations to increase its support of Thailand's efforts to bring the traffic and abuse of opium, heroin, and other drugs under control in its territory and the region.

BURMA

A. Briefing by Ambassador O'Donohue and the Country Team

Early in the morning of January 12, 1984, the delegation left Bangkok on a full day visit to Rangoon, Burma. On its arrival the delegation was briefed at the American Embassy by Ambassador Daniel O'Donohue and the Country Team. In addition to Ambassador O'Donohue, the briefers included: Charles B. Salmon, Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission; Hugh C. MacDougall, Counselor for Political and Economic Affairs; Jerry E. Kyle, Counselor for Public Affairs; Col. Robert L. Helvey, Defense and Military Attaché; Richard B. Nelson, Deputy Aid Representative; Donald F. Ferrarone, Political Officer; Albert L. Bryant, Political Officer; Douglas K. Rasmussen, Political Officer.

It is estimated that over 550 tons of opium were generated in Burma in 1983, making it the largest opium and heroin producer in the Golden Triangle and worldwide. The major opium growing and heroin refining areas are along the Chinese, Laotian, and Thai borders in Eastern and Northeastern Burma. These same areas are under the control of various insurgent groups which are fighting the Rangoon Government and, in many instances, are also involved in drug trafficking. Drug trafficking is the means by which various insurgents finance their operations against the legitimate Burmese Government. The major insurgent groups identified are:

1. Burmese Communist Party (BCP).—Its primary objective is the overthrow of the Rangoon Government. Drug trafficking is used to finance their insurgency.

The Burmese Communist Party began its involvement in narcotics trafficking after the Peoples' Republic of China reduced its assistance to the BCP in 1979. Initially the BCP encouraged the cultivation of poppy and the processing of opium in areas under its control and delivered the opium to refineries operated by various Shan rebels along the Thai border. In 1982, however, the BCP organized their own conversion laboratories within their territories and is emerging as a major trafficking organization.

2. Kachin Independent Army (KIN).
3. Shan United Army (SUA).
4. Shun United Revolutionary Army (SURA).
5. Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF).

It is said that while each of these four groups may have come together originally in a political cause, once they started to use the production and traffic of drugs to support their mission they gradually

degenerated into groups exclusively devoted to this criminal narcotic trafficking activity to maintain a comfortable livelihood in the territories under their control, with their original political objectives all but forgotten. The SUA is headed by the notorious drug trafficker Khun Sa-aka Chang Chi Fu and is the largest producer of finished heroin in the region. The SURA, which is headquartered in Thailand and controlled by the CIF, is the second largest producer of heroin in the area.

The CIF are remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang Nationalist party that retreated in 1949 from the Yunnan province of China to Burma and Thailand and have been involved in the drug trafficking for many years in Burma and Northern Thailand.

6. Karen National Union (KNU).—The KNU does not appear to be directly involved in narcotics trafficking. However, this group is primarily responsible for running a black market of smuggled goods out of Burma into Thailand, as well as moving currency illegally in and out of Burma. These black market and money laundering operations serve to facilitate the operations of the drug trafficking insurgent groups.

The insurgent involvement in drug trafficking creates the "Burmese Dilemma" in its desire to combat opium production and drug trafficking, and seek the assistance of the United States and other friendly nations in this endeavor. The Burmese view the insurgency issue as strictly an internal matter. The involvement of other nations in that effort, the government believes, would undermine Rangoon's credibility with the native populations in the areas it is attempting to bring under its control.

On the other hand notwithstanding its strict policy of non-alignment Burma, as a party to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1968, has recognized that the heavy production and traffic of opium and heroin in its territory is of great international concern. Further, that the Single Convention requires that countries cooperate with each other to address such problems that may be affecting them. In this light, Burma has accepted technical assistance and funding from UNFDAC for crop substitution and drug abuse prevention programs and from the United States for aircraft to support illicit poppy eradication and heroin suppression efforts.

Effective phasing out of opium production is not seen as achieveable until such time as the problem of insurgency can be ended. The Government of Burma in talks with the committee delegation recognizes that with perhaps one exception the rebel groups are totally dependent on the production and traffic of opium and heroin to sustain their insurgency. Given their international obligation to suppress the illicit production and traffic of narcotics there was much reason to believe the Government of Burma might be interested in more international assistance to enable them to curtail narcotic production and traffic. They recognize their obligation to do this. If a side effect was the weakening of insurgency, so be it.

The Burmese commitment to controlling opium cannot be underestimated. It has virtually eliminated illicit poppy production in areas under its control. Last year alone the Burmese eradicated 8,000 acres of poppy cultivation. One hundred Burmese soldiers are killed in action monthly fighting the insurgents. Further, the Burmese have an

extensive addict registry and mandatory drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation program, and Buddhist religious precepts condemn drug use.

The critical area of concern remains, however. How can the substantial opium production in the uncontrolled territories be checked pending Burmese military and political control of those areas?

Recognizing Burma's strong insistence on non-alliance in world affairs, and its almost xenophobic reaction to requests by other nations to assist it in internal problems, the delegation sought to explore how the Burmese capability to control opium production could be improved with American assistance. If ways can be found to assist Burma in effective narcotics control the Select Committee believes they have the will to implement a program which could become gradually more effective as political conditions permit.

Some areas identified where the United States can assist Burma in its struggle against the dual problem of insurgency and drug trafficking are:

1. Burma requires increased resources to combat the illicit production and traffic of opium and heroin in the insurgent areas. Past Congressional policies restricted the weapons available to Burma by the United States. As a result the Burmese have not made recent requests for the military equipment and arms from the United States necessary for them to combat the narcotic production and traffic in the insurgent areas. Burma is in need of aircraft, helicopters, and a modern rifle. A reexamination of our policy toward Burma is necessary.

2. Burma's narcotics intelligence capability should be expanded and intensified. The country's strong commitment to non-alliance and self-containment prevents a meaningful DEA presence within the country. Yet, the sharing of intelligence between drug enforcement agencies in Thailand, Hong Kong, and Burma would do much to disrupt the trafficking organizations operating in Burma.

3. Burma requires continued United States assistance for aircraft maintenance. The greater portion of United States narcotics assistance presently received by Burma ($54 million) is aircraft and aircraft maintenance funds.

4. Burma must remain vigilant in its fight against public corruption, it is a major problem faced. Recently, the former Home Minister U Bo Ni, fell from his position as a result of corruption charges, and the Army intelligence unit which is heavily involved in narcotic control has had serious integrity problems.

Concerning Burma's relationship with Thailand, the delegation noted that while Thailand's narcotic control officers had started to build a working relationship with Former Home Minister U Bo Ni, relations with the newly appointed officials have not yet commenced. When asked if the Burmese would join with the Thais and other neighboring countries in formulating a regional plan to combat drug trafficking, the delegation learned that the Burmese are "not interested in joint planning" with other nations.

The delegation was informed that the Burmese Government might consider the spraying of herbicides over poppy fields as a crop eradication technique. In order for the program to be successful the eradica-

tion effort would have to be publicly announced and have strong environmental guarantees. The program should be structured in such a way as to prevent it from being interpreted as an "assault" on the inhabitants of the insurgent areas whose allegiance the Rangoon Government is attempting to win. The involvement of a third party such as the U.N. in a spraying project was suggested as a means to totally assure the narcotics objective of the program.

B. Briefing at Rangoon Psychiatric Hospital

The delegation met with Drs. Ne Win and Khant at the Rangoon Psychiatric Hospital; they described for the delegation the Burmese program for the identification, treatment and rehabilitation of opium and heroin addicts. Since 1905 the Burmese have attempted various laws and regulations to govern the consumption and use of opium. These measures have included the establishment of opium zones in 1905, 1923 and 1937; as well as the promulgation of two five year plans in 1948 and 1953, respectively, that had the objective of the full eradication of poppy cultivation.

In 1969 heroin addiction began developing rapidly in the Shan States where illicit manufacture had begun and spread to larger Burmese cities. A growing domestic addiction problem was the major catalyst in the Burmese decision in the 1970's to embark upon an aggressive narcotics control policy. It is estimated that there are anywhere from 100,000 to 200,000 opiate addicts in the country. In 1974 Burma enacted the Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Law which made opiate drug abuse and addiction criminal offenses. Under the 1974 Act prison sentences of up to three years were provided for drug abusers. Addicts, however, were provided the option of registration, but once registered, treatment and rehabilitation became mandatory. In March 1983 the Burmese Government amended the law and increased the penalties for unregistered addicts from 3 to 5 years imprisonment.

Approximately 43,000 addicts are presently registered in Burma; this figure breaks down to approximately 70 percent opium and 30 percent heroin addicts. The initial addictive relapse ratio in the Burmese program is high, but over a series of treatments the program is effective for a high proportion of addicts. Over 300 hospitals nationwide have become detoxification and rehabilitation clinics, and five major rehabilitation centers have been established in the cities of Rangoon, Mandalay, Keng Tung, Namla, and Lashio. The program segregates opium and heroin addicts. Opium users are treated in the countryside; heroin addicts in urban centers. The Burmese Government has also opened treatment facilities for the long-term rehabilitation of addicts who have become readdicted after three previous attempts at the regular treatment regimen. Included in this long-term treatment is 10 weeks of drug rehabilitation therapy and then assignment to a work-camp for 42 weeks. Repeat offenders are found through urinalysis.

Drs. Ne Win and Khant then described the treatment program for heroin addicts. It is a chemotherapeutic detoxification and rehabilitation modality that utilizes tincture of opium, chlorpromazine hydrochloride (a tranquilizer), and aspirin. Methadone detoxification

or maintenance is not employed in the Burmese program. The doctors pointed out the benefits of their treatment regimen; it has a high success rate, the medicines administered prevent severe pain or harsh withdrawal symptoms during detoxification, and it is an inexpensive program—it costs as little as $2 per day, per addict. The delegation was impressed with the program and told Drs. Ne Win and Khant they would urge American drug treatment professionals to examine this method of detoxification and rehabilitation. The committee delegation also thought the Burmese program would be particularly effective in developing countries with serious addictive problems such as Thailand, Malaysia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.

C. Meeting With the Deputy Minister for Home and Religious Affairs and the Director-General of the People's Police Force

Leaving the Psychiatric Hospital the delegation went to a meeting with Khin Maung Win, the Deputy Minister for Home and Religious Affairs and Secretary of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control, and U Thein Aung, Director-General of the People's Police Force. Minister Maung Win opened the meeting by stating there is "no need for diplomacy when it comes to discussing narcotics". He stressed Burma's commitment to eliminating drug abuse and poppy cultivation but emphasized that full eradication cannot be attained until the insurgencies in the major narcotics production areas are brought under control. The Minister outlined a number of operational reasons why the Burmese Government is unable to move against poppy cultivation in the insurgent areas at the present time. Amongst them were the lack of good intelligence in the insurgent areas concerning poppy cultivation and opium conversion locations, the continuous shifting of poppy growing sites by the insurgents involved in drug trafficking, the high mountainous terrain where the growing fields and conversion labs are located often prevents entry by helicopter, and the absence of an indigenous intelligence network in the insurgent areas requires the use of Burmese military units to undertake narcotic information gathering missions in those areas.

One recurring theme mentioned by Minister Maung Win was that once the insurgency is contained, poppy cultivation will be controlled in Burma. He pointed to the fact that in the 1982–83 growing season 35,000 acres of poppy cultivation were estimated to exist in the country. Approximately 8,000 of those acres were in areas under the control of the Rangoon Government and that average was substantially eliminated. Maung Win insisted that the insurgents force poppy cultivation on the farmers in the contested areas, and while the farmers do not derive much income from this labor, it is a source of income. The Minister expressed fear that recent good weather in the poppy growing areas should increase the poppy yield in the 1983–84 season. Chairman Rangel expressed apprehension that a bumper poppy crop would only strengthen the insurgents' control and determination within their present territories.

The members of the delegation turned to areas where the United States could possibly be of increased assistance to the Burmese in combating poppy cultivation and opium production. Mr. Gilman inquired

if the United States could supply narcotics control experts to assist the Rangoon Government. Minister Maung Win answered that Burma prefers to use its own personnel in combating drug abuse and drug trafficking. He stated that Burma sends its drug abuse specialists abroad for training, who in turn train their counterparts in Burma.

Mr. Rogers inquired whether the Burmese Government would consider the aerial spraying of herbicides over poppy fields. By way of background, Mr. Rogers explained that at first he had opposed the aerial spraying of paraquat over marihuana fields in his home state of Kentucky, but that after he observed the safe manner in which the spraying was carried out, and the effectiveness of the results, he now concludes that it is a sound and efficient method of eradication. Minister Maung Win stated that he was aware of the Mexican and American experiments with paraquat, but he questioned whether the terrain and constantly shifting poppy fields in Burma would make aerial spraying a suitable technique for his country to employ. The Minister expressed, however, a willingness to discuss the issue with other Burmese officials and to receive U.S. technical advice on the subject.

In closing the meeting with Minister Maung Win, Chairman Rangel called for increased cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia in combating opium and heroin production and narcotics trafficking. Mr. Rangel, summing up for the delegation, stated that "narcotics production and trafficking is not the problem of any one nation but a global misery that affects every nation in the world".

D. Meeting at the Burmese Foreign Ministry

The delegation next met with U Chit Hlaing, the Burmese Minister of Foreign Affairs. Also in attendance at this session were the following Burmese officials: U Hla Shwe, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; U Tin Tun, Director General of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; U Thein Aung, Director General of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Daw Than Han, Director General of International Organizations and Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; U Ngwe Win, Director of the Americas Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; U Khun Oh, Deputy Assistant Director of the Americas Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Foreign Minister U Chit Hlaing welcomed the delegation and indicated that he looked forward to a frank and open discussion of mutual concerns. The Foreign Minister stated that he "recognized that it is difficult to separate the issues of insurgency and narcotics" but that Burma must keep them separate for fear of having other nations become involved in the insurgency issue. He explained the difficulty the Burmese military has in combating the insurgency and poppy cultivation at the same time. The Minister pointed out that in the insurgent areas the Army must "walk, fight, and work against the poppy, all at the same time".

The delegation was encouraged by U Chit Hlaing's interest in the aerial spraying of herbicides over poppy fields as an eradication technique. He stated that the mountainous terrain in poppy cultivation areas make manual eradication efforts extremely difficult. The Minister

asked for U.S. technical information on the use of herbicides on narcotic crops. Chairman Rangel offered through Ambassador O'Donohue to send American experts and information on the issue. Chit Hlaing expressed his appreciation for this offer and stated he would urge his Government to seriously consider the spraying option. Congressmen Guarini and Rogers emphasized the delegation's encouragement of the use of herbicides with both members pointing out the safety and effectiveness of the proper utilization of these chemicals.

Mr. Gilman queried the Foreign Minister on whether the Burmese have developed a plan for the long-term eradication of poppy. The Minister stated that plans are developed area by area, but that they fluctuate because of the transitory nature of poppy cultivation in the insurgent areas, and the need to adjust narcotics control efforts to political considerations in the contested territories. U Chit Hlang again emphasized the Burmese need for caution in addressing the narcotics issue but pointed to the nation's aggressive drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation program as evidence of his nation's commitment to combating drug abuse.

Mr. Rangel inquired whether other nations in Southeast Asia, most notably Thailand, have been cooperative with Burma in narcotics control. The Foreign Minister stated that because of the insurgency issue Burma is disinclined to involve other nations in the containment of narcotics production in Burma. Concerning Thailand he stated that although there is some exchange of information with Thailand concerning narcotics, no joint operations against the trafficking groups are planned by Burma. The Minister expressed displeasure with past Thai performance in narcotics control by stating that it took the Thais 20 years to move against the Shan United Army. U Chit Hlang closed the discussion by pointing out that the narcotic traffic the delegation was concerned about does not move through Burma but through Thailand.

E. Meeting at Burmese Ministry for Agriculture and Forest

The delegation's last meeting in Burma was with the Minister for Agriculture and Forests H. E. Ye Goung. He was accompanied by the following of his associates: U Hlaing Myint, Deputy Minister; U Kyaw Htain, Deputy Minister; U Khin Win, Managing Director; U Hla Moe, Head of the Office; U Khin Maung, Staff Member.

The discussion with the Agriculture Minister centered around the technical and rural development assistance programs in Burma that are directed toward the elimination of poppy cultivation, and United States assistance to these efforts. The Minister stated that his department had responsibility for the implementation of crop substitution programs in Burmese controlled areas. A two phase program was initiated in 1979; the first phase from 1979 to 1981, the second phase from 1982 to 1986. He stated that the program had accomplished a great deal in substantially controlling poppy growth in areas under Rangoon control.

The Burmese agriculture program involves providing fertilizer and technical assistance to farmers in crop substitution projects. The ministry is encouraging the cultivation of rice and wheat in lieu of opium.

Minister Ye Goung expressed the frustrating reality, however, that there is little technique needed to grow poppy.

The Agriculture Minister seemed less receptive to the idea of utilizing paraquat in an eradication campaign against poppy cultivation than the Foreign Minister or the Deputy Home Minister. Ye Goung pointed to the debate in the United States over the pros and cons of using paraquat in narcotic crop eradication efforts. The delegation pressed the positive aspects of this method of poppy crop control. The Minister at the conclusion of the meeting conceded that his government would consider the spraying of herbicides as traditional methods of poppy control have been ineffective.

Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Increased resources and equipment to suppress narcotic production in insurgent areas and traffic by insurgent groups in Burma should be provided to the government. Requests for military and armament assistance from the United States in this regard should be reexamined.

2. Burma requires continuing assistance to maintain the aircraft it has been provided for narcotic enforcement. The bulk of U.S. assistance has been expended for this purpose and it should be continued.

3. Burma expressed a willingness to explore the use of herbicidal spraying as a poppy crop eradication technique. The State Department, in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration, should provide to the Burmese Government technical, scientific, and other assistance and information it may need to explore the feasibility of a herbicidal aerial spray opium eradication program.

4. Notwithstanding Burma's political and cultural preference for non-alignment it has an obligation to cooperate under the Single Convention with all governments in campaigns against the illicit traffic of narcotic drugs. Under the Single Convention it can do just that without conflict with its non-alignment policy.

Burma is not maintaining its obligation under the Single Convention to work with and assist its neighbors and other governments to suppress the heavy traffic in opium, morphine base and heroin originating in Burma that is seriously affecting other nations.

Neighboring Thailand and Malaysia are the countries most seriously affected by the traffic from Burma. It addicts hundreds of thousands of the Thai and Malaysian people. Burma supplies the heroin trafficked through their territory and the raw materials processed into heroin in their countries for internal consumption and trafficking abroad. Under Articles 4 and 35 of the Single Convention, Burma has a solemn obligation to cooperate with the governments of Thailand and Malaysia to suppress this activity. If Burma cooperated directly in active narcotic enforcement operations with Thailand and Malaysia, they could regularly immobilize clandestine heroin refineries and seize ton quantities of opium, morphine base and heroin. The lack of direct and active narcotic enforcement cooperation by Burma with Thailand and Malaysia is a major impediment to more effective narcotic suppression in the region and worldwide given Burma's major world supplier role.

The Committee urges Burma to develop direct and active narcotic enforcement cooperation with Thailand and Malaysia as a means to

stem the flow of heroin and opiate raw materials from Burma to and through those countries.

5. The Committee recommends the Government of Burma seek the assistance of the Government of Thailand to work jointly along the Thai-Burmese border to detect and seize the heroin refineries operated along the Thai-Burmese border.

In addition to that critical area, Burma should increase and intensify its narcotic intelligence collection and enforcement efforts within the country to uncover the major organizations responsible for the internal and international trafficking activity and bring them to justice.

There are reports that due to the Thai Government's aggressive disruption of the traffic from Burma into Thailand, some of the criminal groups are moving heroin westward into India and Bangladesh for smuggling to Western Europe and North America as well as for consumption in India. The Government of Burma should also develop direct narcotic enforcement cooperation with those governments to stem this new threat to the region and the international traffic.

6. For decades we have been told that the illicit cultivation of opium in the Shan and Kachin States of Burma and its conversion into morphine base and heroin to supply a worldwide traffic was the work of insurgent groups. The problem of the illicit production and traffic of opium and its derivatives has steadily increased. This situation has gone on for over 35 years and the Government of Burma has neither been able to subdue the so called insurgents or to negotiate some form of agreement for their peaceful coexistence as part of the Union of Burma.

Insurgency does not grant the right to produce and traffic in narcotics. While insurgency is universally recognized as an internal political matter. It ceases to be completely so when the insurgents are a major factor in the international illicit narcotic traffic. This activity is a flagrant and very serious breakdown in the international narcotic control convention system administered by the United Nations and ratified by 134 nations, including Burma.

If, as statements by Burmese leaders indicate, long-term and effective elimination of the production and traffic of opium and heroin in the Shan and Kachin States will only come when insurgency ends, the world community ought to consider helping Burma solve this problem. Given the fact that the insurgency is responsible for a serious breakdown in the control mechanism of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, the United Nations might be invited by the Government of Burma to use its good offices to define and arbitrate the objectives sought by the insurgents. Possibly concessions could be made by all parties that would bring peace to the area and control of the narcotic traffic. The good will and support of such a United Nations mission by the neighboring countries, Thailand, Malaysia, India, Bangladesh, and most importantly of all, China, is essential to its success.

The Committee urges that the Government of Burma seek the understanding and support of its neighbors and all friendly countries to end the problem of insurgency in the Shan and Cachin States through the negotiation process. This would create an environment for the socio-economic development and narcotic enforcement controls in the region

29-222 O - 84 - 11

necessary to end the production and traffic of opium and heroin so tragically affecting much of the world, but particularly the Southeast Asian countries.

INDIA

India, as the world's largest and now the only producer of gum opium for legal pharmaceutical purposes, has historically been remarkably free of opium diversion and the illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin. This has been largely due to an effective opium production control system.

The Government of India is vigilant in preventing leakage from legal opium production and from the large stockpile of opium which currently exists. There are also reports of some illicit opium production. In recent years India has been a source for methaqualone originating in, or transiting, the country. There are indications this traffic has leveled off during 1983.

Because of its geographic location between the two major illicit supply regions of Southeast Asia and the Near and Middle East, India, in the last two years, has developed into a major transit route for heroin, whereas heretofore only hashish originating in Nepal and Pakistan transited the country.

In Thailand and Burma, the Committee received reports of a new trend in the smuggling of heroin, morphine base, and opium from Burma to India for onward smuggling to Western Europe and North America and consumption in India.

The Committee has noted that in 1981, 9 kilos of heroin were seized in India; in 1982, 29 kilos; and during the first 9 months of 1983, 92 kilos were seized. During the same period of 1983, 1.3 tons of opium were confiscated coming from Pakistan, although most of it may have originated in Afghanistan. Two clandestine heroin laboratories were also seized in India in 1983. It is estimated that about one ton of heroin from the Khyber Agency of Pakistan is now entering India annually, mostly for transit to Western Europe and North America.

During the first 8 months of 1983 in Western Europe, 50 cases were developed involving a seizure total of 123 kilos of heroin, where the smugglers had begun their journeys in either Bombay or New Delhi. At Kennedy International Airport, New York City, on April 9 and 10, 1984, Customs officers seized a total of 40 kilos of heroin from couriers originating in New Delhi. This was the largest heroin seizure made in the United States since 1974. The principals of the organization originating in New Delhi were also apprehended. They were delivering the heroin to associates in the United States, who had immigrated from India.

The Government of India is greatly concerned with these developments and is carrying out a vigorous suppression effort and cooperating with other concerned governments affected by this traffic.

The Committee is greatly concerned with these relatively new illicit traffic trends occurring in India and urges that the Governments of India and the United States ensure that their narcotic enforcement cooperation is brought to maximum effectiveness to meet this threat.

Recommendations

1. Experts believe that because of its geographic location, the Government of India's legal narcotic control system for the production and manufacture of narcotic and psychotropic substances is now being severely tested. Ruthless and resourceful international narcotic trafficking organizations are now targeting India for supplies of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and as a base for their international trafficking operations. The government should ensure that its regulatory narcotic and psychotropic control mechanism remains equal to the challenge.

2. The Government of India should also take measures to provide for more stringent penalties against convicted traffickers and to increase and intensify narcotic enforcement operations in this new and rapidly developing illicit traffic phenomenon.

3. The Committee is pleased that DEA is assigning one additional agent to the two agents already stationed at New Delhi. The Committee urges DEA to follow illicit traffic trends in India closely with a view to further increasing the agent staff at New Delhi, or assigning agents to the Consulate General at Bombay should the need arise.

PAKISTAN

As part of British India, the territory now known as Pakistan had a heavy quasi medical use of opium as well as a problem with the abuse of ganga (the flowering tops of the cannabis plant) and cheras, the resin more commonly known as hashish. Cannabis for the production of ganga and cheras has traditionally been grown extensively in what is now Pakistan. In fact, the plant, "cannabis sativa" or "cannabis indica" or "indian hemp" according to legend is said to have originated and first been abused in the area which is now Pakistan.

Opium poppy cultivation had not been widespread in the region until after partition from India in 1947. Prior thereto, opium users in what is now Pakistan were supplied by the Government Opium Monopoly of British India at Gazipur.

Following partition, the new Government of Pakistan (GOP) established its own opium monopoly to license and purchase opium from farmers for distribution and sale in the "licensed" opium vends. While licensed production never averaged more than 7 to 10 tons, the GOP purchased an average of 168 tons annually from India. These purchases from India continued until 1955 when ratification by India of the 1953 Opium Protocol prevented opium exports for purposes other than medical and scientific use or under the transitional measures of Article 19 which required that countries which did permit the quasi medical use of opium declare the intention to end that practice by a certain date but not later than 15 years after that Protocol came into effect. Pakistan did not meet this requirement in 1955.

At this point, the GOP should have taken steps to gradually eliminate the quasi medical use of opium and expanded the licensed production of opium in the territory it controlled to supply the licensed

vends and authorized sale only to a registered list of current users. Instead, the vends were supplied with the 7 to 10 tons from the licensed production and vends owners themselves or enterprising middlemen were tacitly allowed to buy up opium from the uncontrolled producers in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), for distribution and sale to users by the vends.

This resulted in a considerable expansion of opium production in the NWFP. This "arrangement" was contrary to both the 1953 Opium Protocol and the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The GOP was in further conflict with these conventions through its failure to limit sale by the vends to persons registered by a certain date. In fact, just about anyone could obtain opium in the vends. All of this placed the GOP in open and flagrant conflict with the Single Convention. The only explanation provided was that the Government of Pakistan did not have sufficient control over the NWFP to bring opium production under control.

Following the ending of opium production in Iran in 1956, that country began to be supplied by Turkey and Afghanistan. By 1957 the NWFP began to contribute a share in the traffic to Iran but much less than the other two countries. Another factor which encouraged an increase in opium production after 1956 in the NWFP was the market created in the Persian Gulf for opium formerly supplied by Iran which was considerable. When supplies from Turkey to Iran began to rapidly decline between 1969 and 1972, production in the NWFP was increased as well as in Afghanistan to supply Iran. By 1977, uncertainty and insurgency in Afghanistan followed by the Soviet invasion has reportedly reduced production in that country, and the NWFP responded to that situation by increasing production.

The GOP over a period of almost 25 years purchased illegal opium for sale in legal vends to the people who for the most part should not have been authorized to purchase it. No steps were taken to begin to phase out the quasi medical use of opium which "must be abolished within 15 years from the coming into force" as per the Single Convention of 1961 (Article 49, paragraph (d)). This would be December 13, 1979, as the Single Convention came into force on December 13, 1964.

Through the 1970's it is estimated that opium production in Pakistan ran from 300 to 400 tons annually. The GOP permitted the purchase of 150 to 200 tons of opium annually from the NWFP producers for domestic quasi medical consumption. Some officials said this prevented it from entering the international illicit traffic.

However, the GOP had created an opium production problem where the government allowed middlemen to buy and sell through the vends 150 to 200 tons of opium annually at illicit traffic prices. The remainder of the approximate 300 to 400 tons of opium was consumed in the tribal area or went on to Iran and the Persian Gulf.

Since late 1971 with the forthcoming termination of opium production in Turkey scheduled for a year away, Pakistan became the subject along with Thailand, Burma, and Afghanistan of efforts on the part of the United States Government to prevent it from replacing Turkey as the primary source of opium raw materials affecting the United States.

These United States efforts. in pressing the GOP to restructure. increase, and improve its narcotic enforcement services, improved illicit traffic suppression. But this activity could never be sufficient to meaningfully curtail the illicit traffic as long as the illicit production of opium and cannabis remained uncontrolled. Nevertheless, the American efforts to revitalize, equip, and train the GOP narcotic control agencies has been useful and done much good in disrupting and harassing the traffic in opium and hashish. United States efforts to provide socio-economic assistance, particularly in the agricultural area, for crop and income substitution for poppy produced little or nothing in the way of results, until 1982, largely because of what was described as GOP indifference. This is excused on grounds of the government's inability to establish a control system in the semi-autonomous tribal areas of the NWFP.

As has been the case in several other countries, UNFDAC, after several years of effort, was able to initiate a pilot project program about 1976 looking into agronomy and animal husbandry for poppy substitutes as well as land leveling to facilitate improved farming and addict treatment and rehabilitation in the Buner area of Swat District in the NWFP. This project achieved its objectives and opium production was ended there with the 1982 crop of about 8 tons for which growers earned an estimated $168,000 in the illicit traffic.

In the years just prior to Turkey ending the production of gum opium with the 1972 crop, Turkish guest workers began to smuggle morphine base to Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden from Turkey. At first they used this morphine for themselves, but then began to traffic it extensively and built a large market for the product. The ending of opium production in Turkey dramatically reduced the availability of morphine base for trafficking by Turkish workers.

Taking advantage of this market opportunity, organized Pakistani traffickers who had entrenched themselves in Germany as major hashish suppliers devised a scheme whereby they arranged for the legal importation of very large quantities of legal pharmaceutical morphine sulfate tablets to Pakistan to establishments from which they could be diverted for smuggling to Western Europe. Complaints by the affected European countries and the International Narcotic Control Board (INCB) caused the GOP to correct this diversion problem.

Narcotic trafficking organizations in Pakistan then began to use pharmacies and small pharmaceutical factories to clandestinely manufacture morphine sulfate tablets from illicitly produced opium in Pakistan for smuggling to and distribution in Western Europe. While the Pakistani criminal organizations involved in this activity maintained their market for the morphine sulfate tablets they were illictly manufacturing, by about 1979 they recognized that the more lucrative market in Europe and elsewhere was for heroin. The chemical techniques developed in producing morphine sulfate from crude opium were used to advance the process to producing heroin hydrochloride.

The escalating market for heroin in Western Europe and intermittent poor opium crops in Southeast Asia gave the Pakistani operators an opportunity to penetrate much of the market held by Southeast Asians. At the same time in 1977 and 1978 dramatic progress was

achieved by the Mexican Government in its opium eradication program to reduce the availability of Mexican heroin. Pakistani traffickers, well connected in the United States after a decade as important hashish suppliers, began supplying heroin.

In 1977 an estimated 300 tons of opium were produced in the Northwest Frontier Province which was about average. The 1978 crop is estimated to have been 500 tons to meet the demand of the trafficking organizations in Pakistan to capture the heroin marketing opportunities in Western Europe and North America. The revolutionary developments in Iran resulted in curtailment of opium production and traffic in that country and increased the market for Pakistan's opium, heroin and heroin base. This market was further enhanced by the political unrest and coups in Afghanistan which disrupted organized trafficking and opium production. In Pakistan the price paid to the growers reached an all time high of $200 per kilo in 1978. Those incentives led to a dramatic increase in poppy cultivation in the NWFP of Pakistan in the fall of 1978 resulting in a 1979 harvest of an estimated 800 tons of opium.

In 1978 heroin of Southwest Asian origin (Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan) comprised 3 percent of the United States supply. By 1980 this had increased to 51 percent and by then was almost exclusively of Pakistan origin.

The laboratories producing both heroin and heroin base are centered around the village of Landi Kotal in the Khyber Agency of the NWFP. This is less than 10 miles from the border with Afghanistan. Prior to becoming a center for heroin manufacture, it has historically been a center for the collection and trade of opium originating in both the NWFP and Afghanistan. The Khyber Agency is a Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) one of seven similar areas where until December 1983 the "Hadd Ordinance and Dangerous Drug Laws" did not apply. In that environment the FATA area of the NWFP evolved into a major world center for the production, collection, stockpiling and traffic of opium and heroin.

Western European governments and the International Narcotic Control Board (INCB) began to diplomatically press Pakistan by 1977 to bring the uncontrolled production of opium in the NWFP under control. The INCB continued to point out that under the Single Convention, Article 49, Paragraph 2(d), "The quasi medical use of opium must be abolished within 15 years from the coming into force of this Convention as provided in paragraph 1 of Article 41" (December 13, 1979).

Recognizing that the uncontrolled production of opium in its NWFP territory had increased from 300 tons in 1977 to 500 in 1978 and on the basis of the fall plantings would be about 800 in 1979 in February of that year, the Government of Pakistan placed in effect the Hadd Ordinance and Dangerous Drug Laws. This prohibited the production and use of all addictive drugs. The vends where opium could be purchased for cuasi medical usage were closed.

The poppy ban was, however, enforced selectively on the basis of the agro-economics and political realities. The enormous 800 ton crops of 1979 caused the price of opium that year to drop from a 1978 high of $200 per kilo to $70. From 1980 through 1982 the price continued

down as low as $16 to $25 per kilo to the grower. The deeply depressed price of opium due to stocks from the 1979 crop and a resurgent supply of Afghan opium facilitated farmer compliance with the GOP prohibition against opium poppy cultivation.

Poppy cultivation was ended in the settled areas of the NWFP with the exception of the Gadoon, Amazai and Hazara areas of Mardan District. These were underdeveloped sectors of the settled Mardan District more akin to conditions in the merged districts. A U.S. AID program launched in September 1983 will expend $20 million in agricultural and rural development project assistance over a 5 year period to facilitate the GOP phase out of poppy production in this area. It reportedly contains about 1,550 hectares of poppy cultivation as of 1983 said to be the most intensive in country.

Since 1979 considerable poppy cultivation has also continued to exist in 6 of the merged districts, known as Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). The hectares cultivated through 1982 were: Buner Area of Swat District, 424; Swat District (exclusive of Buner), 48; Kohistan District, 280; Chitral District, 22; Dir District, 536; Malakand Agency, 332. An agricultural development project implemented by the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) beginning in 1976 was advanced to the point in 1982 that opium production was ended in Buner with that crop.

A 3-year development program sponsored by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotic Matters, INM, in the Malakand Agency is now in its third and final year at a total cost of $4.6 million. Substantial reductions have been made to date in poppy cultivation and it is scheduled to end entirely following the 1985 crop.

Notwithstanding the ban on opium production, the GOP appears reluctant to enforce the ending of poppy production in the PATA (merged) and the FATA (tribal) district without substantial international assistance despite the fact that the hectares cultivated are not great. The plea is that agricultural and rural development assistance will make the poppy prohibition easier to enforce and maintain should the price of opium rise again. Given the GOP strong declaration on enforcing and maintaining the poppy cultivation ban, the expenditure may be worthwhile. However, to experts, the development funds sought from donors to initiate and maintain the ban seems very high given the limited hectares under cultivation and the GOP obligation under both religious national and international law to end the production as of 1979.

In November 1983 the GOP presented its "Special Development and Enforcement Plan for the Opium Producing Areas of Pakistan" (SDEF). This is an official request for funding totaling $25 million for agricultural and rural development, poppy eradication, narcotic enforcement and interdiction.

What this amounts to is a continuation of a policy by the GOP of not moving to end poppy cultivation in the merged PATA and tribal FATA areas without international financial assistance.

Experts have mixed reactions to this. Many believe that the key to ending opium production, where it still significantly exists 5 years after the total ban, is a more forthright attitude on the part of the government in dealing with the tribal leadership to end production.

There is a concern that opium poppy production declined mostly because of the collapse in price, not because the government made it clear to farmers that they could no longer grow it.

Reports also indicate that the price of opium in the fall of 1983 has had unusually large increases in the bazaars of the FATA area of the NWFP. This may be the beginning of a trend that will test the will of the GOP to maintain the ban where it has been accepted and to move forward to ending production where it still exists.

There are also reports that opium poppy production has increased in the areas where the GOP has let it continue pending foreign development assistance. Higher opium prices will exacerbate this problem.

The agricultural and rural development assistance that has been provided in the Buner, Malakand and Gadoon areas is designed to raise the level of agriculture and rural life rather than directly assisting the individual poppy growers. There are a variety of substitute crops that can be grown in place of poppy. The government's role is to suggest the most marketable substitute and assist in developing the market. In the region where poppy is still being grown there are 3 million Afghan refugees who provide an excellent market for grain and vegetables in place of opium.

The SDEP of November 1983 proposes to phase out poppy production in the merged PATA districts of Dir and Chitral; also curiously in a tribal area of the settled Mansehra District, which presumedly should have been phased out in 1979.

Also production would be gradually eliminated in two tribal area FATA Agencies: Bajaur and Mohmand. Both of these are the heaviest producers in the tribal area.

Production would be ended in those areas following the 1986 crop presumedly if $25 million in international assistance can be obtained. What is surprisingly lacking from the SDEP are plans for the phase out of opium poppy cultivation in the merged PATA Districts of SWAT (exclusive of Buner) and Kohistan and the tribal FATA Agencies of Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram and South Waziristan. Obviously there may be political reasons for not finalizing opium production in those areas by 1986, but plans and a start should be made. It is in the tribal areas where the reports of increased production originate. The reported number of hectares now cultivated in the Tribal areas are so few they should be relatively easy to phase out.

The Khyber Agency, a tribal FATA, from which the legendary Khyber Pass runs through to the Nangahar Province of Afghanistan is the center for the collection, and sale of opium of both Afghan and Pakistan origin and for the illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin base and heroin. The area around Landi Kotal has been well documented since 1981 as the center for nearly all the heroin illicitly manufactured and trafficked from Pakistan.

In November 1982 Pakistani authorities were successful in having the tribal leadership at Landi Kotal surrender the equipment and paraphernalia of 27 illicit laboratories. In June 1983, the parts and elements of 14 more laboratories were turned in. All of this unfortunately has produced no measurable diminution in the flow of heroin from Pakistan up until now. This is probably because no opium, morphine or heroin base or heroin was surrendered, nor were any of

the chemicals necessary to make heroin turned in. This is all the more surprising given the record breaking number of seizures made by the GOP during 1983: 10.9 tons of opium; 18 tons of morphine; and 2.5 tons of heroin.

There is reported to be 30 to 40 major drug trafficking organizations in Pakistan, many consist of Pathans from the NWFP tribal areas. There is an attitude in general among those people that they can operate with impunity in the tribal areas.

On the basis of narcotic intelligence indicators the bulk of the remaining opium production in Pakistan and what is moved into Pakistan from Afghanistan for conversion to heroin is carried out in the Khyber Agency, particularly around Landi Kotal. This remains largely a privileged sanctuary for the illicit collection of opium and manufacture and traffic of heroin continuing to supply the bulk of heroin affecting Western Europe and North America. The need to bring this problem under control is obvious. The Khyber Agency and Landi Kotal offer a unique "choke point" opportunity to cut off the opium raw material supplies from Afghanistan as well as any morphine, heroin base or heroin that might be produced in Afghanistan or the Khyber Agency for smuggling abroad.

A. Country Team Briefing

The delegation's study of narcotics control in Pakistan began with a country team briefing at the residence of U.S. Ambassador Deane R. Hinton on Saturday evening, January 14, 1984, in Islamabad, Pakistan. In his opening remarks, Ambassador Hinton highlighted the importance of Pakistan's strategic location and its good relations with the Persian Gulf states, most notably Iran.

Analysis of several issues outside of the narcotics field were provided by the Ambassador. In particular, the continuing threat of nuclear development by Pakistan is diminished by General Zia-Ul-Hag's—President Zia—assurances of non-development and by the good relations between the United States and Pakistan. The lengthy presence of a military dictatorship has raised human rights issues and resulted in some political agitation. In response to these martial law problems, President Zia has promised elections for an Islamic, Democratic Government in March of 1985. This short timetable will be difficult for the government to satisfy, however. Another serious problem for Pakistan stems from particularly poor relations with India. Ambassador Hinton also discussed the impact of the war in Afghanistan, in which the Soviet Union has suffered heavy losses. The Pakistan Government is hopeful that the Soviets will set a timetable for withdrawal. In response to the invasion, Pakistan has received approximately 2.8 to 3 million Afghan refugees.

The Pakistani economy is good for an emerging nation. The economy is aided in a surprising amount by the remittance of $3 billion from Pakistani Nationals in foreign countries to their families. Economic development is a major priority, aided by a five year, $3 billion assistance program from the United States. U.S. economic aid equals 15 percent of the foreign aid sent to Pakistan. Technological transfers from the United States have not recently posed a problem. The Ambassador

assured the delegation that tight controls remain over the transfer of nuclear technology.

The DEA Agent-In-Charge, Mr. Harold D. Wankle, presented an analysis of the narcotics control situation in Pakistan. Mr. Wankle praised the Government of Pakistan for its real progress in the eradication of the poppy cultivation and highlighted need for greater emphasis on the controlling of the trafficking of narcotics through Pakistan.

The people of Pakistan, including President Zia, are beginning to recognize the danger to society posed by opium cultivation and the production and trafficking of heroin in Pakistan. Opium addicts, who consume 50–100 tons annually, and the quasi-medical eating of opium by as many as 300,000 people prior to the Hadd Ordinance of 1979 was never considered a problem in Pakistan because of the users ability to function in society. However, the increase in heroin addicts from zero in 1980 to 150,000 in 1983 has caused great alarm in Pakistan. The delegation took note of the fact that government awareness of the problem has grown geometrically within this time frame. As a result of the new awareness, a joint United States-Pakistan Commission on Narcotics Control has been created.

Opium and hashish have been traditionally available in Pakistan and for over a decade about 40 percent of the 200 tons of hashish entering the United States originated in Pakistan. Heroin made its appearance in Pakistan in the late 1970's and the nation developed an expanded addict population by 1981. In 1979, 800 tons of opium was cultivated in Pakistan. That year the Pakistan Government imposed the Hadd Ordinance which based on Islamic Law ended the quasi-medical use of opium and for that purpose in areas it controls. This action was required by the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs of 1981 to be placed in effect by December 1979. By 1983, opium cultivation had been reduced to 63 tons, despite the inaccessibility of the growing areas. Much elimination of opium poppy is the result of continued low prices at the farm level for opium; these prices have been depressed by the existence of an opium surplus as a result of the 1978 and 1979 bumper crops, bad weather in 1982, and also government enforcement of the Hadd Ordinance and rural development programs, including road improvement, school construction and the introduction of alternative crops.

Of growing concern is the development of an active and increasingly sophisticated domestic heroin refining capability which has produced heroin for the rapidly expanding Pakistani addict population as well as the international market, and permitted Pakistan's ready involvement in international trafficking.

Implementation of the Hadd Ordinance was enhanced by agricultural and rural development assistance programs in the Buner Area by UNFDAC and in the Malakand Agency by the U.S. State Department, Bureau of International Narcotic Matters. Another similar project has been launched by the U.S. AID in the Gadoon Area in late 1983. U.S. funded programs require a commitment on the part of the grower to refrain from cultivating poppies in return for development project funding. Pakistan is committed to phasing out opium production and in preparing to launch a program in the Dir District

where 40 percent of the opium in the merged area of the N.W.F.P. is alleged to be produced.

The Pakistanis will require additional foreign aid to phase out opium production in the federally administered tribal area where a start has yet to be made and where there are some reports production and illicit heroin manufacture is increasing. At this time, it has not been decided whether the funding should come solely from the United States Agency for International Development (AID) or from a multilateral source such as the United Nations. The Minister of Finance, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, prefers United Nations funding. Ambassador Hinton explained to Chairman Rangel that the only drawback to multilateral funding is an extensive delay prior to implementation.

Although the dramatic decrease in opium poppy cultivation cannot be overstated, its impact on the narcotics problem remains minimal. This is due in large part to the regional nature of the narcotics problem. Increased cultivation of opium in Afghanistan in 1983 was estimated to be over 400 tons and at least one-half of this amount is smuggled into Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan's dramatic decrease in opium production has not significantly reduced the problem of the illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin originating in "Federally Administered Tribal Areas" (FATA). This is because Pakistani law and administration do not fully apply to these areas. Opium production has continued in the area and there are allegations it has increased. Additionally, it serves as a "privileged sanctuary" for laboratories manufacturing heroin from opium originating in tribal areas and Afghanistan for export worldwide. 8.9 kilos of heroin were seized in Pakistan during 1980. This amount rose to 350–400 kilos in 1981, 1.7 tons in 1982, and at least 1.7 tons in 1983. Heroin base, used for smoking, became available in 1981 in the tribal areas and around the Khyber Pass. It was carried from Pakistan through Turkey or Iran to the United States and Europe. Seizures of heroin hydrochloride, or water soluble heroin, bound by air for Europe and the United States occurred in 1982 in Karachi and Lahore. This heroin was also trafficked into India and by ship to other nations. By 1983 networks of sophisticated Pakistani-United States drug trafficking organizations were operating with extensions in Frankfurt, New York, Baltimore, Los Angeles and Detroit.

The chemicals needed for heroin production are readily available in Pakistan. At least eight labs, and possibly as many as fifty labs, exist along the Afghanistan border. Afghan refugees are involved in trafficking through Pakistan and India. In response to a question by Congressman Gilman, however, Ambassador Hinton stated that no hard evidence exists of Afghan freedom fighters exchanging opium for arms.

The Government of Pakistan has been slow to recognize the trafficking problem. Halting the traffic in and through Pakistan has not been a law enforcement priority. A November, 1982 visit by Attorney General William French Smith forced discussion of the trafficking issue. Pakistan customs interdiction has resulted in increased seizures and courier arrests. However, within the previous three years only one important trafficker has been arrested despite the Government's knowledge of the identities of many key traffickers and smuggling organizations. Karachi and Lahore major shipping and transportation

hubs and areas of heavy illicit narcotic movement have received little attention, or effective enforcement, notwithstanding the fact that both Karachi and Lahore are in settled areas.

The delegation identified three reasons why Pakistanis have been slow to move against drug trafficking organizations. First, the problem of corruption exists and is increasing. Second, Pakistan law enforcement has operated under ineffective laws. On December 4, 1983, Pakistan adopted an amendment to existing law increasing the punishment for trafficking. Under this amendment, the possession or trafficking of 10 grams of heroin or opium will result in a two year minimum sentence. Repeated offenses will result in a four year minimum mandatory sentence. Life imprisonment may be imposed as the highest penalty. The amendment, which also punishes abetters and financiers of traffickers, has the capacity to reduce trafficking through Pakistan.

The final limitation on Pakistan's enforcement efforts is the inaccessibility of the tribal areas, in which opium is cultivated and heroin is manufactured. This, too, is being addressed. The Pakistani Government informed Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters, Dominick DiCarlo, in early January 1984, that it would now apply its Customs laws fully to the tribal areas. Actual enforcement of those laws, however, cannot be considered imminent. In 1982, Pakistan entered into treaties with various groups in the tribal areas which resulted in the surrender of twenty-seven labs and a battle between tribes willing and unwilling to terminate heroin manufacturing. In June of 1983, fourteen additional labs were surrendered. In another instance, DEA informed Pakistani Law Enforcement Officials of a heroin lab located in Dera in February of 1982. 500 Pakistan troops used to raid the lab found strong resistance under confusing and disorganized circumstances. An additional 3,000 troops were required to surround the city and obtain control. This experience too points out the depth of the problem and what is required for increased effective narcotic enforcement throughout the FATA tribal areas of Pakistan.

At the conclusion of the briefing, the delegation sought to explore ways the delegation could assist Pakistan in its narcotics control efforts. Two areas were identified. First, Pakistan must stress the need for strong enforcement of its laws particularly in the trafficking centers, Karachi and Lahore. This has been somewhat difficult due to the independent prosecution by each Department (Interior, Finance, etc.) of offenses within their respective jurisdictions. When the Pakistani Government is aware of notorious traffickers, those individuals must be aggressively investigated and prosecuted. The delegation in its subsequent meetings with Pakistani officials sought to determine how the United States could best assist Pakistan in improved enforcement activity against traffickers as well as on continued emphasis on eliminating opium and heroin conversion.

B. Meeting with the Secretary General of the Interior

On Sunday, January 15, 1984, at 8:00 a.m., the Delegation called on the Secretary General of the Interior, Roeded Khan, in Islamabad, Pakistan. Secretary Roeded, began the meeting by stating unequivocally that the Government of Pakistan is fully aware of the narcotics

problem in Pakistan, as well as internationally; the Pakistan commitment against production, processing, trafficking and consumption is total and unqualified, both legally and under the dictates of Islam.

This excellent briefing by the Secretary began with a discussion of the genesis of the complex narcotics problem in Pakistan. Some background of the various political subdivisions in the country is helpful. "Settled" areas are those which had been under direct British administration before independence, and are now under the administrative and political jurisdiction of the Government of Pakistan. "Merged" areas are those which, while subject ultimately to British authority, had remained the domains of local traditional rulers, e.g., the "princely states," or are provincially administered tribal areas. After independence, the Pakistani Government concluded agreements with these rulers, whereby their territories were "merged" into central government control. The "tribal" areas are those over which the British did not exercise authority and are now Federally or Provincially administered areas where a "political agent" is the Governor's representative to tribal leaders. The central government has concluded agreements which give considerable autonomy for local affairs to tribal leaders.

Traditionally, small amounts of opium were cultivated in the North West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.). This area is divided into provincially administered tribal areas (PATA) such as the Malakand Division, Federally administered tribal areas (FATA) along the Afghanistan border and settled areas. In the FATA, Pakistan law applies only when President Zia proclaims so. In PATA, Pakistan laws do not apply unless so ordered by the Governor of the N.W.F.P. These tribal areas are both geographically strategic and politically sensitive. Opium was produced in the N.W.F.P. for quasimedical purposes before Pakistan gained its independence. The cultivators were poor and faced a lack of employment opportunities in the villages. Secretary Roeded stressed that the narcotics problem is hardly the fault of the farmer.

An influx of Afghan opium, and imported western technology permitting the conversion of opium to heroin and morphine; thus leading to the establishment of conversion labs in the N.W.F.P. By 1978–1979, cultivated acreage soared to 30,778 in the settled areas, 36,000 in the PATA, and 24,000 in the FATA.

In response to this expanding narcotics problem, the Government of Pakistan has instituted a four part strategy: (1) Meaningful crop substitution; (2) effective law enforcement; (3) reduction of local demand through addict treatment; and (4) prevention of use through education.

On February 9, 1979, the principles of Islam were applied through the Hadd Ordinance to narcotics, thus banning the cultivation of opium and the trafficking and use of narcotics. This legislation has religious sanction and public support. Since the application of the Hadd Ordinance, opium production was reduced to 67 tons in 1983 as follows: Gadon (settled area) 44 percent; Chitral 27.7 percent (merged area); Malakand 15 percent, and (merged area); FATA 13 percent of the total (tribal area).

By 1982–83, cultivation had been reduced to 3,809 hectares in settled areas, 3,314 in the PATA, and 300 in the FATA. A committee to coordinate and oversee drug abuse policy at all levels, The Pakistan

Narcotics Control Board (PNCB), operates under the Chairmanship of the Secretary General of the Interior. The PNCB is responsible for law enforcement, intelligence collection, international coordination, and the treatment and rehabilitation of addicts.

In 1983, seizures of opium amounted to 10,960 kilograms, seizures of morphine equalled 18,017 kilograms, and seizures of heroin amounted to 2,528 kilograms. This presents an increase in seizures from 1980 when 4,936 kilograms of opium, 955 kilograms of morphine, and 8.5 kilograms of heroin were seized. In addition, the Government of Pakistan seized 1 lab in Dera in February of 1982, another 27 labs located in the Khyber Agency were surrendered in November, 1982. In May of 1983, fourteen more labs were surrendered in the Khyber Agency.

This activity will be enhanced by the recent decision to extend the Pakistan drug laws to the tribal areas. These laws include the Customs Act of 1969, the Export-Import Law of 1950, and the Dangerous Drug Act of 1930. The Opium Act of 1978, and the enforcement of the Hadd Ordinance of 1979 (including a five year sentence and lashing not to exceed 30 lashes) also apply. These laws were made more stringent on December 4, 1983. Life imprisonment is the maximum sentence for trafficking, abetting and financing of trafficking, and possession of over 10 grams. The minimum mandatory sentence is two years for the first offense, and four years for repeated offenses. Representative Sawyer at this juncture asked for a clarification on parole, to which the Secretary explained there is a potential reduction of the sentence by one-third for good behavior. The Secretary stressed the importance of the mandatory minimum sentence in light of the failure of the Judiciary to impose strict sentences. Secretary Roeded Khan also stressed the need to concentrate on arresting the financiers and leaders of drug trafficking.

The Secretary then turned the presentation to the subject of the United States assistance for narcotics control, a valuable, but limited aid to Pakistan. In 1982, the United States contributed $520,000 to Pakistan, including $20,000 in training; $60,000 for a drug abuse survey; and $440,000 for agricultural outreach programs. In 1983, United States assistance increased to $22.225 million. $1.7 million was applied to the Malakand Area Development Project; $435,000 to strengthening law enforcement, $70,000 for a forensic laboratory; and $20 million for the Gadoon Area Development Project. Proposed aid for 1984 is expected to be substantially increased. These figures will be supplied to the Committee at a later date.

In response to a question by Chairman Rangel concerning dual jurisdiction, the Secretary emphasized that the leaders of trafficking organizations should be tried and convicted either in the United States if possible and in Pakistan if necessary. The key to such convictions, said the Secretary, is good intelligence. The Pakistani law enforcement community has created a customs barrier on the Afghanistan Border, barriers around the settled areas, and barriers in the major cities to contain trafficking offenders. Although this effort has been impeded somewhat by corruption, the Federal Anti-Corruption Agency works against this menace.

Now that legal penalties have been strengthened by the December 4, 1983, amendment, and by the application of the narcotics laws to the tribal areas, the Secretary assured the Chairman that the traffickers would be arrested and prosecuted. Because the problem is an international one, Secretary Roeded emphasized that every shred of available evidence must be shared in the effort to convict major traffickers.

Chairman Rangel asked whether Afghanistan refugees were used as a source of narcotic intelligence. While the refugees provide information, some are also involved in trafficking according to the Secretary. The Secretary also stated that there is no evidence of smuggling heroin in return for weapons by Afghanistan refugees. On a related topic Roeded stated that no opium comes to Pakistan from China.

The delegation proceeded from this excellent meeting to on-site observation of development programs with the firm conviction that the Secretary General of the Interior and the Government of Pakistan was committed to drug enforcement and was made aware of the delegation's desire for increased enforcement against traffickers.

C. On-Site Visit of the Gadoon Project

The Delegation visited the Gadoon Project, via helicopter, on Sunday, January 15, 1984, at 10:00 a.m. Upon arrival the delegation was met by several hundred farmers from the project area. The principal speaker at the briefing was Kamran Aslam, the local project Director. Mr. Aslam described Gadoon as located midway between Peshawar and Islamabad. Although Gadoon covers portions of three settled Administrative Districts, it is one of the most backward areas in Pakistan. Despite tribal disagreements, which have made execution of the program difficult, Mr. Aslam believes the people have been helpful as they realize the substantial benefit to be granted from the development program.

Although eighty percent of Gadoon is mountainous, the farmers, who all speak Pushtu, manage to cultivate 30,000 acres. Since there are 116,000 persons in the project, a livelihood must be earned on 0.26 acres per person. The enforcement agreement between the United States and Pakistan, however, requires the phase out of all poppy cultivation within four years. Three thousand acres were cultivated in 1983, with the elimination of 40–50 acres in the first year. 300 acres are to be eradicated in the second phase, 1,500 in the third phase and 1,200 in the fourth phase. The area surrounding the delegation was barren of poppies, although one year previously it was stated, the cultivation could be viewed everywhere. This poses an economic issue for the farmers which is stronger than the Islamic religious influence. Significantly, Gadoon's addiction rate is reportedly less than 0.5 percent.

In return for this poppy reduction commitment, the Gadoon area will receive: (1) 33 miles of new roads; (2) 150 miles of new paths; (3) Electricity in 30 villages; (4) Drinking water in 27 villages and repairs in 28 other water systems; (5) New schools in 30 villages and repairs on 35 existing schools; (6) Assignment and support of existing governmental structure; and (7) Training for 10,000 farmers.

The objectives of the program are to eradicate opium cultivation and to replace such cultivation with an alternative crop. To this end the

United States pledged $2.5 million in the first year and $4.5 million until the end of 1984. Thirty four percent of the funding is applied to infrastructure development, 13.5 percent of funding is used to develop agricultural alternatives, 9 percent of the funding is applied to training and the remaining 43.5 percent provides management and technical assistance. The program will also require a health component.

Under the program, winter wheat, summer maize, and mustard are grown in the Gadoon Project as alternatives to opium production. The farmer may often see no individual benefit from the program, even though his village may be much enriched by collective improvements. The lack of livelihood in Gadoon has resulted in significant migration from the area. Mr. Aslam stressed a need for foreign jobs either abroad or in Gadoon. Mr. Aslam also stated that the farmers would stop poppy cultivation, which violates both the law and Islamic principles, if another source of livelihood becomes available. Mr. Aslam stated there are no simple solutions, only intelligent answers.

The delegation then heard a presentation by Dr. Richard Smith, the Advisor to the local government and the Leader of the Technical Assistance Team. In response to a question by Mr. Guarini, Dr. Brown elaborated on his role. Dr. Brown is under contract with the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM), from his District of Colombia Firm, Development Alternatives, Inc. Dr. Brown and two employees organize local government programs to develop infrastructure under a grant of $876,000 for a one year project. Other improvements sought by Dr. Smith include range management, animal husbandry, and agricultural changes.

Chairman Rangel asked Dr. Smith what are the assurances that the farmers would not supplement their legitimate crops by growing poppies illicitly using the new technology. Dr. Smith emphasized strict enforcement of the non-cultivation treaty and the law irrespective of the fact that no single crop will yield the same return for poppy. Wheat will yield approximately 50–70 percent of the poppy cultivation return. Mr. Rangel stated unequivocally that the United States does not want to be a partner in poppy cultivation.

D. On-Site Visit to the Buner Agricultural Development Project

The delegation arrived by helicopter and then by bus at the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) Agricultural Development Project in Buner, Pakistan on Sunday, January 15, 1984, at 11:30 a.m. At the Project Site the delegation was briefed by UNFDAC Advisor, Mr. Gale Day, UNFDAC Project Director, Mr. Mohamid Galls, UNFDAC Economic Analyst, Mr. Jan Poulisse, and the Assistant District Commissioner for the Buner Area, Mr. Ajmal Ali Khan.

Project Director Galls began the briefing by stating that the Buner Project is the first in Pakistan to reach zero cultivation of poppy. This is of particular importance to the delegation since, when the Project began in 1976, Buner was responsible for one-third of the illicit poppy grown in Pakistan. The UNFDAC Project, lower prices as a result of an opium surplus from the 1978 and 1979 bumper crops, and law enforcement are the three factors responsible for zero cultivation.

The actual figures of poppy cultivation are summarized as: 1975–76=7,072 acres; 1976–77=5,341 acres; 1977–78=7,073 acres; 1978–79=9,938 acres; 1979–80=3,900 acres; 1980–81=2,576 acres; 1981–82=1,528 acres; 1982–83=0 acres.

The Development Project includes: (1) Crop substitution of wheat and maize; (2) horticultural development of apple, walnut, almond, persimmon peach, apricot, plum and citrus orchards; (3) irrigation development; (4) livestock improvements; (5) credit facilities; (6) land leveling; (7) construction of a residential area; (8) road improvements; and (9) improved drinking water supplies.

Chairman Rangel requested information as to whether the farmers were better off today without poppy cultivation than they were in 1976. Mr. Galls stated that the farmers do not think that they were better off because they remember when opium sold for $220 per kilo in 1978. The price of opium per kilo had dropped to $30 per kilo. The farmers would be much poorer today than in 1976 if they had remained in poppy cultivation. By comparison, Mr. Poulissi told the Committee that so long as the price of opium remains below $100 per kilo, the substitute crops of tobacco and sugar cane will remain economically competitive with opium.

Mr. Day described the program funding as follows:

	UNFDAC	Pakistan
Phase I (May 1976 to December 1981)	$2.5 million	$710,000
Phase II (January 1982 to December 1985)	$4.2 million	$750,000
Project personnel	12	Over 100

Mr. Day stated his belief that the Project should be extended an additional 3–4 years to be effective in preventing the resurgence of poppy cultivation. This Agricultural Extension Phase would require a budget of $3–6 million, depending on the length of the phase, and would entrench the Agricultural Development in the region. The viable economic alternatives under the project greatly assist the law enforcement goal of zero poppy cultivation.

In response to Chairman Rangel's question on the relationship between the Federal Pakistan Government and the farmers, Mr. Day explained that in the PATA of Buner, local elections decide who will serve as Elders in the Parochial Government. Mr. Ajmal Ali Khan, as Assistant District Administrator, is the medium of communication between the people and the Government of Pakistan.

The Delegation concluded its briefing in Buner with an appreciation for the Pakistani efforts to eliminate the cultivation of opium poppies in the Buner area and of the pioneering financial and technical assistance role of UNFDAC in this great success.

E. On-Site Visit to the Malakand Area Development Project

On Sunday, January 15, 1984, at 1:00 p.m., the delegation arrived by helicopter in Chakdara, within the Malakand Agency. The delegation received a briefing by the Assistant Commissioner of Malakand, Mr. Gulam Habib, the Deputy Commissioner Director, Mr. Mir Laiq Shaw, and the Assistant Political Officer, Mr. Habib Ullah Khan.

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The Malakand Project, organized in Chakdara, is an eighteen month old United States Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) Project. INM funding for the three year project will reach $5.5 million. With this funding, Pakistan accepted a restrictive "poppy clause" which commits the government to keep the development project area free of opium poppy. This clause provides assurance that opium cultivation will not be enhanced by U.S. economic assistance. In the Malakand Project, Mr. Ghulman Habib explained that Pakistan has honored the clause by eradicating poppy in the region, despite armed resistance.

Malakand Agency cultivation in 1982, when the project began, involved an estimated 830 areas of opium poppy. The 1983 harvest included only 536 acres of opium poppy. 150 acres of this advanced crop were destroyed by bulldozers, leaving a remaining crop of 376 acres. In November of 1983, the Government of Pakistan plowed an additional 400 acres of newly planted opium poppies. This was done in the face of opposition by the farmers and required the military assistance of 600 troops. An armed guard was placed on each tractor. Since there is no opium addiction in the area, the resistance has a solely economic basis. Opium production is scheduled to end entirely after the 1985 harvest.

This positive coordination between law enforcement and development is expected to continue throughout the balance of the program. The two main objectives of the development project are agricultural and road development projects. Each farmer is assisted in the successive cultivation of wheat, maize and potato each year. Beets and other vegetables can also be produced. The development of a road network in the program area is accomplished using only local labor. Additional feeder roads, irrigation projects, drinking water supply schemes, and land leveling are expected to be included in proposals for additional funding in the near future.

The delegation was impressed with the commitment of Pakistan to eradicate the poppy in the Malakand Project area, despite armed resistance.

F. Tour of the Nasir Bagh Refugee Camp

The delegation arrived by helicopter at the Nasir Bagh Refugee Camp outside Peshawar, Pakistan on January 15, 1984, at 3:00 p.m. Nasir Bagh is actually a collection of five refugee camps including one for widows and orphans. A total of thirty thousand refugees are housed in this small city. The refugees are free to come and go from the camp.

The delegation was led to a courtyard within the camp where approximately 400 Elders were seated. Their presentation began with an Islamic Chant after which Elder Malik Mohamad Nazir gave an impassioned speech on behalf of the refugees and their native land. The Elder spoke of the determination of the Afghan people to fight to the death for the freedom of their country, and of their need for assistance in this mission. The Elder also praised Pakistan for treating the refugees as guests. The speech was interrupted several times by an Islamic Chant spoken in unison by the Elders. At one point a

young boy stood and chanted an Ancient Afghan Poem. In paraphrasing the poem, the boy stated that the U.S.S.R. may be able to swallow Poland and Czechoslovakia, but it will choke to death on Afghanistan.

In response to the presentation, Chairman Rangel stated that the refugees fight not only for Afghanistan, but for the entire free world; it is the free world that is also held hostage by the Soviet invasion. As citizens of the free world, the Chairman, on behalf of the delegation, pledged its continuing support for the refugees, and the Nation of Afghanistan. The Chairman also praised the Government of Pakistan for hosting the refugees in such generous fashion.

The delegation was visibly moved by the presentation. The Elders' commitment of their lives to their country is an example of the fierce independence of the Afghan peoples. The delegation was struck by the character and sincerity of the rugged Afghan tribesmen. It was hard to conceive that their fellow countrymen are driven to expand opium production in order to subsist in their war-torn country, opium that contributes significantly to addiction in the United States. From fiscal year 1980 to date in fiscal year 1984, $354.5 million has been contributed to the Government of Pakistan for the care and feeding of the refugees through direct bilateral assistance or as part of multilateral refugee assistance programs.

G. Meeting With Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq, Administrator of the NWFP

The delegation's final meeting on Sunday, January 15, 1984, was with Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq, Governor and Martial Law Administrator of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). General Haq warmly greeted the delegation and explained that he had just returned from the tribal areas of the NWFP and as such the scheduled meeting with the delegation would be informative.

General Haq began by describing the structure of the tribal areas of the Northwest Frontier Province and how they are administered. The Members by this time were very familiar with the structure of these territories.

General Haq pointed out that the NWFP is a very poor area, with little infrastructure, inadequate irrigation, a per capita income which is one-third that of of Pakistan as a whole and a literacy rate of 5 percent. There is large migration to other parts of the country because of the lack of jobs and industry in the area. These factors, in addition to historic tribal traditions, contributed to continued poppy cultivation.

General Haq described the success of Pakistan's efforts to reduce this cultivation. He pointed out that in 1979 Pakistan was cultivating over 800 tons of opium and that by 1980 that had been reduced to 100 tons. In 1983 cultivation was down to 63 tons.

This reduction is the result of three factors: First, the imposition and strict enforcement of the amendment to the Hadd Ordinance of 1979. The second factor was the reduction of poppy in Gadoon and Malakand agencies and the closing of 41 laboratories.

The third contributing factor for the decline in poppy cultivation is the development projects for substitute crops and infrastructure development in Buner and Malakand. The Buner Project, which is

UNFDAC funded, has improved irrigation, and raising of livestock, in addition to building the areas infrastructure.

As a result of their efforts, General Haq observed that "you cannot find a poppy grown in Buner."

Mr. Rangel congratulated General Haq on the success that has been achieved in poppy eradication. However, he pointed out that the main problem in Pakistan is not now with production but a lack of effective enforcement and prosecution of those who traffic in narcotics. Few, if any, major figures or financiers are ever apprehended or prosecuted. The Chairman pointed out that even if all cultivation in Pakistan was eliminated, including the tribal areas of the Northwest Frontier Province, it would be meaningless due to two very significant factors.

One is that narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan comes into Pakistan virtually unimpeded. There seems to be no attempt to stop the flow of drugs which cross Pakistan's borders even when it reached the controlled settled and merger areas of the country it remains unchecked. Two, opium is processed and refined into heroin in laboratories located in Pakistan. Pakistan is emerging as an oasis for illicit drug laboratories and rendering meaningless Pakistan's success in poppy eradication. The amount of heroin produced and coming out of Pakistan remains high.

General Haq responded to these observations passionately stating "Narcotics trafficking is a scourge on Pakistan as well as the United States." The efforts to eliminate this cultivation and trafficking are not for the law of America, he stated, but for the law of Pakistan.

He suggested that no government has done in four years what Pakistan has done in reducing the cultivation of poppy and opium. Other governments would not take the steps Pakistan has taken because of the political risks involved.

General Haq stated that he believes we should see a substantial drop in the amount of Southwest Asian heroin finding its way to the United States. Laboratories in Pakistan have been destroyed. If intelligence reveals the existence of others, they will also be destroyed.

With regard to arrests and prosecutions, General Haq pointed out that Pakistan is governed by the same Anglo-Saxon laws that govern the United States. These laws are heavily weighted in favor of the accused, which makes it very difficult to reach the real culprits. He observed that he had recently announced his intention to use military courts against apprehended drug traffickers. He noted that this intention was made widely public because in the NWFP one must "back up his words with actions to maintain control."

General Haq asked the members of the delegation what success the United States has had in combatting drug trafficking and abuse. "With all of your resources, all of your expertise, all of your technical know how, all of your power—what is your score?"

General Haq had just returned from his tour of the province. He said that he made it clear to the tribal heads that even if he had to wage a "blood bath" poppy cultivation was going to be eliminated. These were not empty threats, he stated, because you never give empty threats to the tribal areas.

General Haq assured the delegation that his commitment to this fight was fierce and that he welcomed all of the assistance that has

been given by the United States. What is needed is time and patience, he stated, but the results in Pakistan will be better than those of other countries.

H. Meeting With Gen. Iqbal Khan, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Acting Chief Martial Law Administrator

On Monday, January 16, 1984, at 10:00 a.m., the Members of the Committee delegation made a courtesy call on General Mohammed Iqbal Khan, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Acting Chief Martial Law Administrator, at Joint Staff Headquarters, Rawalpindi.

General Khan welcomed the delegation to headquarters and commended its narcotic control mission to Pakistan. The General provided a short briefing on the military appraisal of Pakistan's national security situation.

Khan inquired about the field trip the delegation had taken the previous day to narcotic crop replacement and rural development programs in the provincially administered tribal areas of Gadoon, Buner, and Malakand. He said he wanted to emphasize that in addition to the narcotic control laws enacted to address the poppy cultivation and narcotics production problem, the Muslim faith imposes strict moral and ethical prohibition on the use, production and traffic of all intoxicating substances and this reinforces the government's ability to implement the law.

General Khan spoke of a recent meeting with General Hollingsworth of the U.S. Army whom he had known several years back when Hollingsworth was assigned to the embassy as the Defense Attache. Hollingsworth had expressed great satisfaction at present relations between the United States and Pakistan. General Khan said it was a "new old environment" that our two nations had not lost touch, but now that we had renewed our relationship it would be long lasting.

General Khan said he also recently met with four retired generals and a civilian official from the Department of Defense. He indicated that they had said that they could offer little tangible assistance to Pakistan. The General said he told them to the contrary that Pakistan was in need of their experience, their thoughts and ideas. Khan stated Congressman Joseph Addabbo had also been a most welcome visitor, recently.

General Khan indicated Pakistan welcomes United States visitors and he wanted to extend a special welcome to Chairman Rangel and every hope that the delegation enjoys its visit. He said he was confident the Foreign Office and Ministry of Interior was looking after the delegation.

Chairman Rangel said the delegation's visit had been both very informative and enjoyable. Mr. Rangel said he was glad to hear of the visit of other delegations and their ability to improve relations between Pakistan and the United States because a press editorial in the morning paper. The Muslin, took some exception to the delegation's visit. Chairman Rangel went on to say that he wanted to tell the General how deeply the Committee was touched by its visit to the Afghan refugee camp. those brave people who have been driven from their homeland, and how Pakistan has opened its arms and hearts to them.

Mr. Rangel went on to say that on the basis of the briefings we have had and our field visits no one can question the commitment of the Government of Pakistan to ending the production of opium in its territory. Notwithstanding the progress in eliminating opium production and the more stringent narcotic enforcement laws that have been enacted, many in the United States are having a difficult time with heroin originating in and being transshipped from Pakistan. Mr. Rangel said it is difficult for Members of Congress to explain to our people why more heroin is entering the United States. "We are hopeful that the offer by the Minister of Interior to exchange narcotic intelligence with DEA and other countries will help Pakistan arrest and prosecute the major drug violators and help us do the same in the United States," Rangel emphasized.

General Khan said he was pleased at the Rangel offer of mutual cooperation in narcotic enforcement. He stated that Pakistan wanted to improve its capability with United States assistance. The General said, "We should work together to track the narcotics from the source. Pakistan is trying, it has extended its laws now into the tribal areas where the problem has been."

Chairman Rangel said this visit to Pakistan and particularly the tribal area has been a tremendous help to having the delegation understand the problem. He went on to say the Committee was very pleased that one of the best Members of our diplomatic corps had been assigned by the President to serve as an Ambassador to Pakistan and the Committee wished to express its strong support for him.

Ambassador Hinton said Pakistan and the United States have had their ups and downs but our relationship is now once again on course, enabling us to cooperate and assist each other in all areas and particularly narcotic control.

General Khan agreed with this and said Pakistan had a serious drug abuse problem involving its own children which is worrying the government greatly.

Chairman Rangel said that time was of the essence in addressing the problem. The Committee Members only have two years between elections and the requirement to respond to their constituents is urgent. It is becoming increasingly difficult for Congress to explain why they cannot curtail the heavy traffic in heroin affecting their constituencies so tragically.

I. Meeting With Minister of Interior, Mahud A. Haroon

On January 15, 1984, at 12:30 p.m., the delegation continued its mission with a meeting with the Minister of the Interior Mahud A. Haroon. The Members continued to press the issue of eradication success versus trafficking failure with Minister Haroon. Mr. Gilman particularly wanted Minister Haroon, to address the Afghanistan border traffic problem. He advised the Minister that the United States has a $90 billion drug industry and 50 percent of the heroin that fuels that industry came from or through Pakistan.

Minister Haroon began by explaining that Pakistan's commitment towards eliminating both cultivation and trafficking is total. That is

because of the Islamic religious faith. "That faith is no mumbo jumbo," he pointed out. In the Islamic faith every human being, be he Muslim or not, has the highest importance in life. Narcotics will destroy human beings. Therefore, we will carry on to win this battle."

The Minister stated that, "because we are determined and committed is not to say that we won't ask for help. We will accept any help you can give us. But not just economic help. We need your narcotic intelligence. We need you to come here and work with us."

Haroon explained that the tribes in the NWFP are fiercely independent; the land belongs to the tribes and not to the individual. Therefore, Pakistan is careful not to create a problem with the tribal territory by upsetting tribal tradition. Minister Haroon explained that this does not mean that the Government of Pakistan is not making an effort to prevent trafficking, but rather that the efforts are made through the tribal system to break up the narcotics traffic.

Minister Haroon pointed out that they cannot seal the Afghan border; that it is an impossible task. The Soviet Union has tried to get Pakistan to seal the border to prevent the freedom fighters from travelling back and forth. The Soviets were told that this could not be done. Thus, not only freedom fighters travel back and forth, but narcotics trafficking is facilitated.

Minister Haroon reiterated that Pakistan was a poor country, which has many problems to address. Pakistan is in need of resources and assistance—"You cannot just give us a helicopter and the parts to repair it—what is also needed is the people to teach how to fly it, the technology to maintain it. You have your own problems and your own limitations—understand ours."

Mr. Rangel stated that the delegation was impressed with the candor of the Pakistani leadership and its willingness to ask others for help. He pointed out that other countries, visited by the delegation, stated that trafficking was a domestic problem that would be solved internally and that the United States should not interfere. Minister Haroon stated that Pakistan welcomes any cooperation and help. He observed that narcotics abuse is a global problem requiring the help of all countries. "Words are not enough;" he observed, "it should be assured that action is taken."

J. Meeting with Acting President Abdul Haleen (Jan. 15, 1984, 11:15 a.m.)

The delegation paid a courtesy call on Abdul Haleen, who was serving as the Acting President of Pakistan in the absence of President Zia, in addition to being the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Mr. Rangel again warmly complimented President Haleen on the generosity that Pakistan has shown to the Afghanistan refugees and described the effect the visit to the refugee camp had on the delegation.

Mr. Rangel informed the President that the Committee's primary interest was in helping to prevent Pakistan from becoming the center of illicit narcotics trafficking in this part of the world.

Mr. Rangel suggested that in his capacity as Chief Justice, Mr. Haleen might raise the issue of narcotic trafficking with the world court; since it is a world wide problem, requiring the efforts of all nations.

President Haleen responded that Rangel's idea was a sound one, and that he would raise this issue when the world court next convened in 1985.

The Members repeated to President Haleen their concerns that while Pakistan was strong in its efforts at internal poppy eradication, it was very weak in its law enforcement efforts. Traffickers were rarely prosecuted and therefore there was little impact on the supply of illicit narcotics.

The Members inquired about various aspects of the legal system in Pakistan and learned of the great similarities to that of the United States. The President informed them that there are special courts for narcotics cases which meets, however, a few days a week.

Pakistan does have conspiracy laws, but never the less, it is still difficult to prosecute the main culprits. The Acting President pointed out that the law, as is that of the United States, is weighted towards the presumed innocence of the accused.

The delegation learned that Pakistan permits the use of wiretaps without court order and that it can be used as a law enforcement tool. However, wiretaps are not permitted as evidence in courts. The difficulty in proving the identity of the voices is the major reason for inadmissibility.

The spirit to work is dying around the world the president observed. It has been replaced with a desire to get rich overnight. Trafficking in narcotics is a method of achieving quick wealth. However, Pakistan is committed and will do what is necessary to end this menace.

Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The Committee wishes to commend the Government of Pakistan for its action in reducing the cultivation area for opium poppy from about 34,360 hectares (80,900 acres) in 1979 to about 3,600 hectares (9,000 acres) in 1984. The Committee is equally impressed with the Special Development and Enforcement Plan (SDEP) for the opium producing areas of Pakistan presented on November 18, 1983, which invites international donor assistance to help phase out opium production where it has been allowed to continue.

The Committee is very favorably impressed with the excellence of this plan which provides for ending opium production in the merged PATA districts of Dir and Chitral Districts and the tribal area of the settled Mansehra District. It would also phase out production in two tribal area FATA Agencies; Bajaur and Mohaand which are the heaviest producers of record in the tribal area.

Opium production would come to an end entirely in those areas with the harvest of 1986 crop and the Committee urges the State Department to give every consideration to supporting the SDEP project.

The Committee wishes to particularly compliment the GOP on that portion of the SDEP which provides for a program of "Aerial Reconnaissance of Poppy Growing Areas." This is the most effective means of ensuring farmer compliance with the Hadd Ordinance and detecting non-compliance for the purpose of eradication. The Committee urges this element of the SDEP to be implemented as envisaged in March and April 1984 and that international assistance be provided as much as possible.

It is the belief, however, of the Committee that the Government of Pakistan, taking into consideration the Hadd Ordinance and Dangerous Drug Laws placed in effect in February 1979 prohibiting the production, and use of all addictive drugs, should prepare, as soon as possible, a plan providing for the gradual elimination of opium production throughout its entire territory, including the PATA (merged areas) and the FATA (tribal areas), where opium has continued to be illegally produced through the 1984 crop year and which were not included in the phase out, programmed by the SDEP, of November 18, 1983. The plan the Committee urges the Government of Pakistan to prepare and implement should schedule an annual phase down of production and set a date for ending it entirely. It should also include suggested agricultural and rural development projects which can be supported by bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance programs to facilitate the transition to substitute crops and other agricultural pursuits by farmers. This would include the phase out of opium poppy production in the merged PATA Districts of Swat (exclusive of Buner) and Kohistan, and the tribal FATA Agencies of Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram and South Waziristan. Given the rising price for opium in late 1983, expanded opium production is reportedly developing in FATA areas. This could cancel out the hoped for opium reduction gains through the $25 million SDEP program and cause prospective donors to withhold donations.

A similar program covering the remaining areas where opium reduction has been allowed to continue would encourage donors to contribute to the SDEP.

2. Justifiable praise has been given to the Pakistani authorities for significantly reducing the area and tonnage of illicit opium production since it began implementing its obligations under the Single Convention with the Hadd Ordinance and Dangerous Drug Laws in February 1979. However, the augmentation of the remaining opium production in Pakistan with as much as 200 to 400 tons of opium from Afghanistan has permitted the enormous illicit production and traffic of heroin to continue and increase in Pakistan. The government is constantly urged to increase and intensify its efforts to suppress this illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin by striking at the trafficking centers of Karachi and Lahore to immobilize the major organizations through drug seizures, arrests and prosecutions. Seizures have been commendable but the quantity and quality of the arrests and prosecutions have been disappointing.

Much information and some evidence has been received by the Committee that the bulk of the opium and opiates that enter Pakistan from Afghanistan for processing and smuggling abroad does so via the Khyber Pass and in the Khyber Agency. Together they form the single most vulnerable "choke point" in the history of narcotic smuggling. Controlling the Khyber Pass can prevent the bulk of opium, morphine or heroin movement from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Controlling the Khyber Agency can prevent the overwhelming bulk of clandestine heroin manufacture in Pakistan that spreads worldwide.

In December 1983 the government extended the Hadd Ordinance and Dangerous Drug Laws to the FATA tribal areas which, of course, includes the Khyber Agency and Pass. The Committee urges the Gov-

ernment of Pakistan to give the highest priority to establishing measures to bring under control the enormous smuggling of opium and opiates through the pass from Afghanistan. Highest priority should also be given to implementing with the tribal leadership in the Khyber Agency, particularly in the vicinity of Landi Kotal, full enforcement of the Hadd Ordinance to seize and destroy the operating heroin laboratories and the stocks of opium, morphine and heroin as well as the chemicals needed for heroin manufacture. The Hadd Ordinance is now in force over 5 years, the time has come for its application at the very core of the problem in Pakistan, the Khyber Agency.

3. The Committee urges the Government of Pakistan to increase and intensify its narcotic enforcement cooperation with its neighbor, Afghanistan, to enhance efforts to suppress the heavy smuggling of opium and opiates from the latter into Pakistan. A similar cooperative enforcement program should be pursued with the Government of Iran to prevent the movement of opium and opiates from Pakistan into Iran. As all three countries are party to the Single Convention, all have regularly participated in the work of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and, along with Turkey and Sweden, are members of the Subcommission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East, thus the mechanism for assisting each other in campaigns against the illicit traffic is well established.

4. The Committee is concerned with the continuing traffic of hashish directed at the United States, estimated to average about 200 tons annually. Investigation indicates that about 40 percent, or 80 tons, originate each year in Pakistan. The Committee learned that, notwithstanding the reemphasis against the illicit production of hashish in Pakistan in 1979 by the Hadd Ordinance, substantial production continues to exist. The Committee urges the GOP to take the necessary measures to eradicate this production and intensify its efforts with DEA to develop important arrests and seizures in this traffic affecting the United States.

AFGHANISTAN

While it was not possible for the Committee to visit Afghanistan in the course of its visit to the countries in the region, it was able to document that the production of opium and the illicit manufacture and traffic of morphine and heroin in Afghanistan have increased dramatically over the past 4 years.

The rate and quantity of the seizures made by the authorities in Iran and Pakistan in the traffic from Afghanistan have increased substantially. The Afghan Government has informed the International Narcotic Control Board that, within country, law enforcement personnel over the period 1979–1983 have seized multi-ton quantities of opium, as well as large quantities of morphine, heroin, methaqualone, and cannabis. The abuse of opiates and psychotropic drugs is growing. The government reports handing down severe sentences for drug violations through special courts. Afghanistan has also continued to regularly participate in the meetings of the Subcommission on Illicit Drug Traffic in the Near and Middle East of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

Recommendations

1. In connection with the problem of the production of illicit drugs becoming a part of the local economy, albeit illegal, the Subcommission on Illicit Drug Traffic in the Near and Middle East recommended that urgent consideration must be given to the need for heavy investment in infrastructure and other development in areas where narcotic raw materials are being produced. The Subcommission recommended that the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and all potential donor states should examine these needs, not only in the context of contributions to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control or other parts of the United Nations system, but by considering a coordinated approach with the World Bank and other major international financial institutions.

The Committee supports this recommendation and urges the Government of Afghanistan to initiate discussions with the International Narcotic Control Board, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control leading to international, financial and technical assistance to bring the illicit production and traffic of narcotic and psychotropic substances in its territory under control.

2. The Committee also recommends that the Government of Afghanistan increase and intensify its narcotic enforcement cooperation with Iran and Pakistan under the aegis of Article 35 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. Cooperative campaigns against the illicit traffic between those countries would make a great contribution to reducing the worldwide availability of heroin and the tragic addiction of millions, particularly those in Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

IRAN

The Committee learned that there has been substantial destruction in recent years of opium production detected by the authorities in the eastern and western provinces of the country bordering Afghanistan and Turkey respectively. In the eastern and central provinces, heroin and morphine base laboratories have been seized. In addition, opium, morphine base and heroin are reported to be entering the country from Afghanistan, and Pakistan in substantial quantities. This traffic is destined for internal consumption in Iran and westward via Turkey and Syria for trafficking to Western Europe and North America. These trends continued through 1983 as the Iranian authorities made seizures of ton quantities of opium and morphine base entering their territory from the east. Opium addicts in Iran are estimated at 500,000 and heroin at 100,000.

Recommendations

1. The Committee urges the Government of Iran to increase and intensify the cooperation in the east with Pakistan and Afghanistan to stem the flow of opiates from those countries destined for consumption in Iran and trafficking westwards. Expanded cooperation should also be developed with Turkey for joint narcotic enforcement opera-

tions to suppress the movement of opiate raw materials into Turkey. The friendly relationship Iran has always had with its neighbors, Turkey. Afghanistan, and Pakistan and their joint membership on the Subcommission in Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East is most conducive for developing effective drug enforcement cooperation.

TURKEY

A. Country Team Briefing (January 17, 1984)

The delegation began a 2-day visit to the Republic of Turkey on January 17, 1984. After arriving at the airport in Ankara, the delegation immediately went to a briefing given by U.S. Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupe and the embassy staff. Turkey has had a long history of poppy production and served for over 300 years as the major source of opium to Europe. Turkey has now emerged as a major narcotics transshipment nation; a problem stemming from Turkey's geographical location between Europe and Middle Eastern sources of opiate raw materials and heroin. In the late 1960's and early 1970's Turkey continued as a major legal producer of gum opium for pharmaceutical purposes until 1972 when this production was ended. Turkey began to gradually eliminate opium production in 1968 when it was established that large portions of the legal crop was being diverted for smuggling to Iran and for the clandestine manfacture of morphine base in Turkey. It was also established that the morphine base manufactured in Turkey was smuggled into France for conversion into heroin and ultimately trafficked to the United States, Canada and Western Europe.

In 1974, for internal political reasons Turkey lifted the opium ban and in its place established a program of opium poppy cultivation for straw in 7 provinces. Growers are licensed and the cultivating of more than a prescribed amount of land for poppy can subject the grower to face jail and a loss of their license to grow poppy; incision for opium was banned. Under the 1974 law, the government collects the poppy straw, stores it in warehouses and extracts the morphine concentrate through an industrial chemical process. Turkey recently completed a $70 million plant at Bolvadin in Afyon province where the poppy is processed into poppy straw concentrate for the licit pharmaceutical market. The plan is designed to process 20,000 tons of poppy straw per year producing 90 tons of opium derivatives, an amount which would far exceed world demand. However, the factory is operating at less than one-half capacity, and is expected to produce between 30–40 tons of poppy straw concentrate in 1984. The Turkish Government looks to this new plant as a means for regaining their market position which they claim diminished due to the opium ban in the early 70's and the delay in bringing their factory into production. Turkey now wishes to recapture a significant share of that market. It looks to the United States as a principal pharmaceutical consumer and has been negotiating sales for its morphine concentrate with several American firms.

However the American pharmaceutical manufacturers have been purchasing the bulk of their poppy straw concentrate from Australia, France, and the Netherlands and it is thought Turkey will have a difficult time competing with those countries which through years of

experience have developed highly cost effective methods for the cultivation of poppy straw and its manufacture into poppy straw concentrate. The market for poppy straw concentrate is limited to estimated medical requirement levels by the Single Convention and is highly competitive given the industrial skills of the three other major producers. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) describes the annual legal world requirements as stabilized at about 200 tons of morphine equivalent, with an over abundance of raw materials, and slumping prices over the past 7 years.

In this environment there is some concern with the Government of Turkey increasing poppy cultivation from 16,987 hectares in 1983, capable of producing 18 tons of morphine equivalent, to 22,950 hectares in 1984, capable of yielding 39 tons of morphine equivalent. Turkey has 70,000 tons of poppy straw capsules in stockpile, 49,000 tons under shelter and 21,000 tons stored underground.

The question has been raised as to why the Government of Turkey continues to annually produce large quantities of poppy straw in preference to drawing down the poppy straw in the stockpile. The Government of Turkey also reports that it costs $15 million annually to properly control poppy production in the country and prevent any illicit incision for opium. Production controls are so costly because of the large area authorized for poppy cultivation (22,950 hectares in 1984), and the licensing of tens of thousands of growers spread over a wide seven province area.

The Jandarma, a para-military force responsible for maintaining internal border security, monitors opium production to assure that only licensed amounts are cultivated. The Turkish national police (TNP), the principal law enforcement agency in Turkey's 67 provinces, operates against narcotics traffickers primarily in Turkey's urban areas; and cooperates with D.E.A. The TNP has approximately 1,300 specialized narcotics investigators. The United States has assisted Turkish narcotics enforcement efforts through training, equipment and direct funding since 1968. During the past 3 years, three illegal processing laboratories were seized.

The effectiveness of the TNP's enforcement effort is tied to political conditions in Turkey. For example, after the American arms embargo of 1974, in response to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, narcotics enforcement in Turkey decreased. The arms embargo was lifted in 1978, however at that point the TNP was occupied with combatting a terrorist problem confronting Turkey

As the terrorism problem abated, the TNP began to devote more of its energies towards the narcotics trafficking problem. In 1980, the United States contributed about $800,000 to the TNP and Jandarma for narcotics control efforts and each year since then about $1 million. Indeed, U.S. assistance is credited with helping Turkish authorities seize significant quantities of illicit narcotics destined for Western Europe and North America.

Special narcotics units have been expanded to encompass all of Turkey's 67 provinces, with a narcotics headquarters in Ankara. Instanbul has its own very large narcotics unit. The domestic addiction problem in Turkey, is reported as small; there are approximately 1,000 addicts in a population of 47 million. Thus, Turkey has stressed the con-

comitant importance of the United States and Western European nations taking increased measures to diminish the demand for narcotics.

The delegation was told that the D.E.A. cooperates in narcotic investigations affecting the United States. The TNP has about 1,350 narcotic enforcement personnel collecting drug intelligence, and the Jandarma has recently initiated its own narcotic intelligence program. Substantial rewards are given to Turkish police who apprehend traffickers. In addition, "smuggling courts" have been established recently to facilitate drug convictions and, as a result, more prominent traffickers have been apprehended and convicted. However, it was pointed out that information concerning drug trafficking networks is often difficult to obtain from less significant traffickers and couriers who are apprehended because under Turkish law there is no system for a reduced sentence based on cooperation with the authorities.

A recently signed, but not ratified, treaty on extradition and mutual legal assistance between the United States and Turkey was explained to the delegation. Under Turkish law, citizens of Turkey cannot be extradited. However, under the new treaty, Turkish citizens may be tried in Turkey for crimes committed in the United States. It was explained that there were several indictments pending in the U.S. District Court for Southern District of New York charging Turkish citizens with drug trafficking violations in the United States and that these indictments would be provided the Turkish authorities for prosecution.

Chairman Rangel expressed concern on behalf of the delegation about the paucity of intelligence concerning the amount of opium and heroin entering and smuggled through Turkey, especially from Iran, as well as the amount of illicit heroin manufacture being done in Turkey. Mr. Rangel asked how an effective drug interdiction effort could be mounted, or know how well our narcotics enforcement dollars are spent, if there were not reasonable estimates on the amount of narcotics produced in or smuggled through Turkey or transshipment. Mr. Sawyer made the point that criminal intelligence estimates are made in a variety of areas, and there was no reason using a number of indicators (e.g., narcotic seizures, laboratory confiscations, arrests, drug seizures in Western Europe and the United States originating in Turkey) that an estimate of the narcotics traffic along with the Turk/Iran-Iraq border can't be made. While the delegation noted with approval that narcotic intelligence efforts by the TNP and Jandarma would be intensified in Turkey with D.E.A. assistance, they remained dismayed about the present lack of intelligence concerning narcotics trafficking in Turkey. D.E.A. headquarters in Washington must move immediately to assist the TNP and Jandarma improve their intelligence gathering capability in Turkey, particularly because of the growing of illicit heroin manufacture in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

B. Meetings With Turkish Officials

The delegation on January 18 met the entire day with Turkish officials involved with various aspects of Turkey's narcotics control efforts. In addition, it had the opportunity to exchange views on narcotics and United States-Turkish relations with members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

1. The delegation first met with Ecmel Barutcu, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Barutcu stated that Turkey has made considerable progress in controlling the cultivation of opium poppy. He referred to assistance that Turkey received from the United States and UNFDAC to further its control efforts.

Quoting from reports of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) for the years 1979–1983, Mr. Barutcu pointed out Turkey's success in controlling poppy cultivation and his country's strong commitment to continuing the program. He stated that the INCB's 1983 report indicated that some narcotics trafficking is moving southward into Syria from Iraq and Iran because of Turkey's anti-trafficking efforts. Mr. Barutcu, who is also Chairman of the Subcommission on Narcotics and related matters in the Near and Middle East, explained that he had received international praise for Turkey's cultivation control program.

Chairman Rangel indicated his support for the Turkish program, stating that while he was originally skeptical of the poppy straw process, he was pleased it had succeeded and that Turkey, the United States and the United Nations had been able to work together effectively to implement the program. Chairman Rangel inquired about Turkey's ability to obtain information about trafficking from Afghanistan and Iran. In response, Mr. Barutcu stated that Turkey did not recognize the Government of Afghanistan, and had received no response from Iran concerning earlier Turkish proposals relating to the narcotics trafficking problem. Mr. Barutcu, however, underscored the direct connection between narcotics trafficking and weapons smuggling.

Barutcu indicated his willingness to come to the United States to brief appropriate officials and Members of Congress about narcotics intelligence operations. The Chairman stated his intention to help facilitate such meetings. After Under Secretary Barutcu concluded his briefing the delegation also met briefly with Ambassador Oktay Cankardas, Under Secretary, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and discussed American-Turkish relations within the context of the narcotics problem.

2. The delegation visited the Jandarma narcotics laboratory where drugs are analyzed for evidentiary purposes in criminal cases, and for determining the type and origin of narcotic being transshipped through Turkey. This visit began with a call upon Commanding-General Ismail Selen of the Jandarma.

During the delegation's tour of the narcotics laboratory Chairman Rangel questioned about the amount of illicit opium poppy grown in Turkey. It was explained that the amount was very minimal; approximately below eight hectares. The delegation was told that while intelligence indicated narcotics entering for processing or being shipped through Turkey originated in Iran, Afghanistan or Pakistan and it was impossible to determine how to break it down by country. It was pointed out that approximately 1,500 trucks enter Turkey from Iran per day and a similar number come in from Iraq. It is not feasible for the border security units to inspect all these vehicles. A pilot detector dog program has been tried at border crossing locations with the assistance of the United States. The program was unsuccessful largely,

Jandarma officials claimed, because the dogs were trained to work with one handler who would have to remain with the dog, thus making promotion for the handler difficult. The delegation expressed the view that more U.S. technical advice in the use of detector dogs be extended to enhance their program.

Jandarma officials explained that narcotics trafficking through Turkey always involves Turkish citizens. The delegation urged the Jandarma to intensify operations to investigate, apprehend, and prosecute known narcotics traffickers and organizations.

The narcotics laboratory was established in 1977 with United Nations funding. Much of the laboratory's equipment was financed with American narcotics assistance and includes sophisticated equipment such as infraspectometers. When narcotics are seized, a sample is sent to the Ministry of Justice, another to the lab where it is subjected to forensic testing. The lab prepares specimens for the courts. The Jandarma laboratory cooperates in exchanging narcotic data and information with the laboratory of the U.N. Division on Narcotic Drugs at Vienna, Austria.

In 1983, 159 samples were analyzed at the laboratory including heroin, morphine, hashish, opium and psychotropic drugs. The lab seeks to identify different conversion methods used in clandestine narcotics processing labs. Representative Rogers asked if testing could determine source, and was told that such techniques exist. A-type heroin from Southwest Asia was described as the most prevalent type found smuggled into Turkey.

3. At a meeting with Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, Chairman Rangel praised the success of Turkey ending gum opium production and of the Turkish poppy straw control program but pointed to the enormous amount of narcotics processed or trafficked through Turkey as the major problem. He stated his hope that United States-Turkish cooperation could be enhanced so that the perception of Turkey as a major transshipment point for heroin could be erased. The Prime Minister agreed that further cooperation was needed, and said that he hoped United States firms would become a large market for licit Turkish opiates produced at the Bolvadin plant. Mr. Ozal indicated that a changing Turkish society had contributed to the increase in the number of heroin addicts in his country. Chairman Rangel stated he hoped that Turkey could learn the need for effective narcotics control from the problem of heroin addiction in the United States, and be spared from a similar plight. Representative Guarini added that the Select Committee's trips to major producing countries had revealed increasing addiction problems in those countries with very serious health and social consequences.

The Chairman pointed to the need to attach a "national security priority" to the narcotics trafficking problem. The Prime Minister indicated that drug traffickers were very sophisticated; and although no evidence existed tying these traffickers to other governments, there was a definite and increasing correlation between terrorism and drug trafficking. Representative Rogers stated that the United States would be willing to increase its narcotic intelligence assistance in the effort to quantify the amount of narcotics entering Turkey from Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

4. Mr. Neemettin Karaduman, Chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, met with the delegation and underscored points raised earlier by other Turkish officials. He voiced his concern about those who raise the drug issue in an attempt to undermine United States-Turkish relations. Karaduman stated he hoped the delegation would tell the American people about Turkey's strong campaign to combat narcotics. The delegation again reiterated to Mr. Karaduman the need to take strong steps to eliminate narcotics trafficking through Turkey, so Turkey's stigma as an illicit narcotic processor and a major transshipment route would be eliminated.

5. After its meeting with Chairman Karaduman, the delegation was hosted at a lunch given by Mr. Fethi Celikbas, Chairman of the Grand National Assembly Foreign Relations Committee. At this luncheon the Members exchanged their views on international narcotics control, and Turkey's obligation to control narcotics traffic, with members of the National Assembly.

6. At its meeting with Fahri Gorgulu, Director General of the TNP, the delegation was told that although it had very limited resources, Turkey has devoted $15 million per year towards combating narcotics trafficking. It was pointed out by Director General Gorgulu that notwithstanding the difficulty of patrolling the barren and rugged Turkey/Iran-Iraq border, and the large amount of truck traffic that crosses it, Turkey has been doing an effective enforcement job in making the border a less attractive smuggling point for traffickers. He said reports indicate that an increasing amount of traffic is being shifted southward from Iran into Syria via Iraq. The delegation viewed this conclusion with skepticism since the smugglers are mostly Iranian and the war between Iran and Iraq has severely disrupted that border. Also the traditional land route from Iran to Syria is via Southern Turkey.

Turkey's geographical situation has made increased surveillance and narcotic intelligence gathering along Turkey's border necessary. Gorgulu stated, and members discussed, that an increase in United States assistance would enhance Turkish efforts in the border area.

Mr. Gorgulu pointed to several bilateral protocols Turkey had signed with other nations in the region to combat narcotics trafficking. In response to Chairman Rangel's question about the effectiveness of these agreements, Mr. Gorgulu admitted that they were only a first step and more would have to be done.

The Director General described the importance of controlling the manufacture and distribution of acetic anyhdride, a chemical essential to manufacturing heroin. Chief of Staff John T. Cusack stated that this would be extremely difficult because acetic anyhdride is one of the most widely used chemical products and is produced in enormous quantities for a wide variety of industrial purposes ranging from pharmaceuticals including aspirin, to textiles, films and plastics. Mr. Gorgulu agreed that production was great, but stressed that sales should be only to countries where sale and use of the chemical are highly controlled. Mr. Cusack agreed and said the League of Nations in 1928 and the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs on several occasions has recommended that where illicit heroin manufacture exists, the government should monitor the importation and distribution of acetic anhydride as a means to detect illicit heroin laboratories. Mr. Cusack

29-222 O - 84 - 13

said that so much acetic anhydride was produced it far exceeded the entire world opium supply, making it more practical to control opium rather than acetic anhydride to prevent illicit heroin manufacture. Mr. Rangel stated that the Committee would inquire into the matter.

7. During his discussion with the delegation, Mr. Ertugrul Kumcuoglu, Under Secretary, Minister of Finance and Customs, explained that Turkey was doing its best to control narcotics trafficking particularly along the Iranian border. He indicated that he looked forward to increased U.S. assistance to combat the problem.

Representative Guarini underscored the critical role that customs authorities play in intercepting narcotics. Mr. Kumcuoglu explained that his agency shared that responsibility with the Jandarma. Mr. Guarini stressed that we are dealing with sophisticated criminals and asked about the feasibility of using dog detection teams along the border with Iran. The Under Secretary stated that there had been a problem with that approach because the dogs used in the past were trained in Germany and did not respond favorably to Turkey's climate. Moreover, training these dogs was expensive. Kumcuoglu indicated that Turkey hoped to breed its own dogs to be used for detection, and the Ministry has initiated a project to establish a dog training center. Mr. Guarini discussed the possibility of Turkey receiving technical assistance from United States Customs and D.E.A. on the training and use of detection dogs, and urged that Turkey also increase its interdiction capabilities at likely choke points such as airports and sea ports.

Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The Committee has established that opium, morphine, heroin base and heroin are being produced in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan in enormous quantities. While great quantities of these narcotic drugs are being consumed in those producer countries, much of this production is smuggled to Western Europe and North America to create and sustain serious heroin addiction problems. An important route for this traffic is west from Iran via the excellent Turkish highway system or the railroad link via Lake Van. One highway route west is used to bring morphine and heroin base to Diyarbakir in Southeastern Turkey for conversion to heroin. This heroin usually is smuggled westward via Istanbul to Europe. Another route favored by traffickers is via Hakkari along the southern tier of Turkey to the cities of Gaziantep and Kilis where processing laboratories have historically existed. Heroin is produced from the smuggled opiate raw materials and is either moved south to Aleppo, Syria for smuggling to the west or to Istanbul for the same purpose. Opiate raw materials coming from Iran are also smuggled from Gaziantep and Kilis and nearby Urfa to Aleppo for conversion to heroin in that city and for smuggling to Western Europe and North America directly or via Lebanon.

The Government of Turkey has vigorously addressed the problem of illicit manufacture and traffic within the country that supplies heroin to Western Europe and North America by increasing and intensifying the narcotic suppression activities of the Turkish National Police, Jandarma and Customs. However, the source of the problem

is the unlimited supplies of opiate raw material and heroin entering the country via Iran.

The Committee recommends that the Government of Turkey use its leadership role on the U.N. Subcommission on Narcotics and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East to improve mutual cooperation leading to more intensified eradication of illicit opium production and suppression of illicit manufacture and traffic in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Turkey is a victim of this traffic and its territory is being used for the illicit processing and transit of opium, morphine and heroin from those countries to the west. Turkey is highly respected by its fellow Member States and the Subcommission and has a long record of experience and success in active international narcotic control cooperation.

In this connection the Committee strongly supports the Subcommission's recommendation that the Commission on Narcotic Drugs request the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to authorize the Secretary General to convene annual meetings between the heads of national drug law enforcement agencies from States in the Near and Middle East, from Europe and from State Members of the League of Arab States immediately following the sessions of the Subcommission, which are held in the fourth quarter of every year under the authority of Council Resolution 1776 (LIV) of May 18, 1973, and preferably at the invitation of a Member State in the European region.

2. The Turkish National Police narcotic enforcement capability has reached a point where it can begin to develop joint prosecutions with European, United States, and Canadian narcotic enforcement services of Turkish nationals in Turkey identified in prosecutions abroad as participants, suppliers, financiers or directors of a narcotic smuggling operation. The Committee urges the Turkish authorities to make every effort to vigorously prosecute narcotic violators in Turkey on the basis of evidence that can be supplied by Western European and North American narcotic enforcement services.

3. As a start in increasing and improving its narcotic intelligence collecting and distribution capability, the Turkish National Police supported by the Jandarma and Customs should increase the volume of information it exchanges annually with all countries related to the problem of illicit narcotic manufacturing and traffic in Turkey. Experiences demonstrate that the more information a country such as Turkey transmits to other countries, the more actionable intelligence they receive in return from other countries.

4. Because it is used as a transit country for the processing and movement of narcotic drugs from the Near and Middle East to the west, the Committee believes that as a means of improving narcotic enforcement effectiveness the Turkish National Police, Jandarma and Customs should increase and intensify their narcotic enforcement cooperation with counterpart agencies in Iran, Syria, Iraq, Greece, and Bulgaria.

5. Recognizing that either acetic anhydride or acetylchloride are chemicals essential to transforming morphine base to heroin hydrochloride the Committee urges the Government of Turkey have its nar-

cotic enforcement services monitor the movement of this substance within Turkey as a means to detect and seize clandestine heroin laboratories.

Recommendations for DEA

1. On the basis of the visits to Pakistan and Turkey, the Committee is concerned with the paucity of DEA special agents assigned to these two countries through which over 50 percent of the heroin affecting the United States originates or transits. Six special agents in Turkey and 11 in Pakistan do not appear to be enough to cover both their host country and to keep informed of developments in narcotic production and trafficking in Afghanistan, Iran, Syria and Lebanon. This becomes evident when it is realized that 26 agents are assigned to Thailand and 26 to Mexico.

The Committee perceived a need for increased and intensified joint drug enforcement operations by DEA and the police services in Pakistan and Turkey to seize clandestine heroin laboratories and to make important seizures of opium, morphine base and heroin including the arrest and prosecution of the major violators, identified in Pakistan and Turkey as involved in the traffic affecting the United States. Pakistani and Turkish officials expressed a strong desire to have as much narcotic intelligence and investigative assistance as possible from DEA. The extent of narcotic drugs processed in and transiting Turkey should not be underestimated. In August 1983, Iranian Police seized 1,049 kilos of morphine base and 918 kilos of opium on route to Turkey. Indications were that it originated in Afghanistan or Pakistan. In October 1983, Turkish Police and Jandarma seized a heroin laboratory near Lice in Diyarbakir and 190 kilos of heroin.

ITALY

A. Briefing by Ambassador Maxwell Rabb and Staff at the U.S. Embassy, Rome

On Thursday, January 19, 1984, the delegation arrived at 10:00 a.m. for a briefing at the U.S. Embassy. Ambassador Maxwell M. Rabb, Deputy Chief of Mission Peter S. Bridges, Political Counselor Charles R. Stout, Narcotics Coordinator Robert B. Bentley, and DEA Special Agent-In-Charge Michael Antonelli provided the delegation with an informative and thorough session on narcotics trafficking and drug abuse in Italy.

Ambassador Rabb explained that Italy has a serious problem in the existence of organized crime. In recent years Italy has been successful in its efforts to bring terrorism under control. However, the problem of narcotics trafficking and organized crime in general has increased in recent years; and because these criminal organizations are so deeply rooted in Italian culture and it will take time to curtail their activities and influence.

Mr. Bentley explained the organizational structure of the embassy with regard to anti-narcotics efforts. A group composed of DEA, Customs, IRS, FBI Legal Attache and the Consular Section Representatives meets regularly, and informal contact occurs daily.

Based on a 1982 survey of 37,000 addicts in 15 of Italy's 20 regions, Mr. Bentley provided some statistics regarding drug abuse in Italy. Heroin use and addiction is the leading drug abuse problem, but the use of cocaine is increasing. There were an estimated 90,000 to 110,000 heroin addicts in 1982—a 40 percent increase over 1980 figures. In 1983 there was an alarming high rate of heroin deaths—260. The major increase in drug abuse occurred in the Northern industrial cities such as Milan, Bologna and Turin. These areas have experienced a 50 to 80 percent increase in number of addicts from 1980 to 1982. A profile of the typical addict in Italy reveals that approximately 90 percent are 18 years of age or younger, 91 percent have finished or are finishing high school (although the study also indicates that more education correlates with less drug abuse); 99 percent are single; 96 percent live at home with their parents; 61 percent live in the suburbs; 50 percent are unemployed; 60 percent of the heroin users use other drugs; and the ratio of male to female addicts is 4 to 1.

In Rome alone there are an estimated 7,800 heroin addicts. Because it is not a crime to use heroin in Italy, it is not uncommon to see empty syringes, as well as addicts shooting up, on the streets. The delegation was informed that the United States is working with the Italian authorities in order to interdict the flow of money emanating from drug trafficking, seeking joint prosecution of organized crime families, and breaking the Silician connection of heroin trafficking to the East Coast of the United States.

Michael Antonelli of the DEA outlined the progress that has been made in reducing the trafficking of narcotics to the United States. Organized crime controls 80 percent of the heroin flow from Italy to the United States Eastern Corridor. In the past 15 months it is estimated this flow has been decreased by 25 percent. The traditional mafia hierarchy in Sicily has disappeared—either hiding or killed in fratricidal disputes. Between 1978 and 1983 ten operational heroin conversion labs were seized in Italy. It is estimated that 2 to 3 labs presently exist, but they are not as sophisticated as those previously seized. There have been hundreds of prosecutions of drug law violators throughout Italy, particularly in Sicily, and approximately 80 percent of the major prosecutions resulted partly from intelligence and assistance provided by DEA. There has been a 98 to 99 percent conviction rate on the cases in which DEA have been involved. Penetration has also been made into the N'Dranghita, the Calabrian Mafia.

The enormous powers of the Anti-Mafia High Commissioner and the strictness of the Anti-Mafia laws have contributed significantly to the progress made against organized crime. The Italian Government has been forceful in the implementation and enforcement of these statutes. United States-Italian cooperation on narcotics enforcement has always been of the highest order. Further, in a recent visit, Attorney General William French Smith proposed the creation of a bilateral cabinet level working group on narcotics and organized crime. The Attorney General will head the U.S. Delegation and it was anticipated at the Embassy meeting that Deputy Prime Minister Forlani and Interior Minister Scalfaro would be involved on the Italian side. In addition during the Attorney General's last visit a new treaty was signed with the Italian Government on judicial cooperation.

29-222 O - 84 - 15

Although the delegation realizes that there is room for further progress, they were extremely impressed by the devastating blow that has been dealt to the drug trafficking organizations in Italy in the past few years. Narcotics trafficking in Italy had decreased in the past year and has been substantially reduced from the 1978 level.

B. Meeting With Deputy Prime Minister Arnaldo Forlani

The delegation next met with Deputy Prime Minister Forlani, following its briefing at the American Embassy. Forlani opened the meeting by telling the group that at the cabinet meeting yesterday, new policies to combat drug trafficking were discussed. The Deputy Prime Minister described drug trafficking as one of the "most dangerous threats to democratic society," as well as the most lucrative supporter of organized crime. Forlani praised American-Italian narcotics control cooperation in the past, and voiced his belief that they will further improve in the future. He pointed to the formation of the joint cabinet level working group on narcotics control between the U.S. and Italy, as evidence of that improvement.

Chairman Rangel, speaking for the delegation, thanked Mr. Forlani for his comments and concurred with the Minister's description of drug trafficking as a corruptive force in democratic societies. Mr. Rangel expressed the hope that Mr. Forlani would be involved in the work of the new joint working group.

In closing, Forlani stated he hoped to come to the United States soon to discuss drug related issues and when he did, he would bring the Minister of Interior, who is directly responsible for narcotic control in Italy, with him.

C. Audience With His Holiness Pope John Paul II, the Apostolic Palace, Vatican City

In what became the high point of the study mission, the delegation had a private audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II at the Apostolic Palace, Vatican City on January 29, 1983. In remarks on behalf of the delegation to John Paul, Mr. Rangel praised the Pope for the moral leadership he has demonstrated on the issues of drug abuse and drug trafficking. In particular the Chairman pointed to the Pope's support for the Archbishop of Palermo, Cardinal Salvatore Pappalardo. Cardinal Pappalardo has led an aggressive fight against the power and influence of the Mafia in Sicily.

The delegation also urged His Holiness to call a special synod of bishops on the topic of drug abuse and drug trafficking to stress the importance of the problem not only to the worldwide Catholic community, but to the entire world. John Paul thanked the delegation for this suggestion and he appeared highly appreciative and receptive to the idea.

Pope John Paul, in response, delivered the following moving message to the delegation:

Dear Friends, it is my pleasure to welcome today the members of the United States House of Representatives Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. As public officials you are charged with promoting and safeguarding the common good of your fellow citizens, and thus it is your task to protect

the good of the whole of your society while at the same time preserving the rights and liberties of the individuals who make up that society.

Hence it is by no means extraneous to your work as public servants to foster social conditions in which individuals may grow and develop in a way commensurate with their human dignity, unencumbered by threats to their authentic realization as persons. Among those factors which menace the individual and impede the growth of a healthy social climate is the problem which brings you together in this assembly: Namely, the scourge of narcotics trafficking and drug abuse. Obviously this problem is not unique to the United States. The flow of narcotics has reached immense proportions, so that no nation is immune from its debilitating effects.

The Church's interest and pastoral concern, both for the individuals whose lives are marked by devastating personal tragedies and for the societies which must come to grips with an increasingly dangerous phenomenon, is focused on the crucial role that the family must play in the solution to the problem.

Faced with a world and a society that runs the risk of becoming more and more depersonalized and therefore dehumanizing, with the negative results of many forms of escapism—a principal one being the abuses associated with drugs—the family possesses "formidable energies capable of taking the individual out of his anonymity, keeping him conscious of his personal dignity, enriching him with deep humanity and actively placing him, in this uniqueness and unrepeatability, within the fabric of society." (*Familiaris Consortio*, 43).

The family stands at the very foundation of society, and through its role of service to life is vitally linked to society's advancement. It provides the primary forum for the fostering of authentic and mature communion between persons, and is the place of origin and the most effective means for humanizing and personalizing society (cf. ibid). With the conviction therefore that the good of the family is an indispensable value for the civic community, the Church encourages the public authorities to do everything possible to ensure that families have all the help that they need in order to fulfill their responsibilities.

I would invite you this morning to favor unhesitatingly all initiatives which aim at strengthening the family in American society. As you try to make your fellow ctizens more and more conscious of the dangers of drug abuse; as you promote legislation, on the national and international level, which seeks to draw up a comprehensive plan of deterrence against trafficking in narcotics, may you ever strive to meet the needs of the family, for it is a key element in establishing stable, loving relationships and in offering to every person the support needed for a fulfilling life.

May Almighty God bless you in your efforts.

D. Meeting With the Guardia di Finanza and the Cabarinieri

Following its audience with Pope John Paul II the delegation went to the Headquarters Academy of the Guardia di Finanza (Finance Guards). The Guardia di Finanza is charged with the responsibility to enforce all tax, fiscal, and excise laws, and to suppress smuggling on the high seas, as well as at borders and all ports of entry.

The Guardia di Finanza has approximately 41,500 officers and noncommissioned officers and is military in structure. This service dates back to 1774. Significantly, the Guardia di Finanza has a structured intelligence unit called the Information Service which greatly assists its narcotics control efforts.

During the year 1983 the Guardia di Finanza confiscated 2.055 kg of drugs: Hashish, marihuana, and cannabis—1.792 kg; oil of hashish—12 kg; cocaine—88 kg; opium—27 kg; heroin—109 kg; other drugs—27 kg.

The delegation was impressed by the work of the Guardia di Finanza and its longstanding cooperation with DEA and its predecessor agencies dating back to 1936. This service in many respects is a composite of functions that would be performed in the United States by DEA, Cus-

toms, Coast Guard, and the Internal Revenue Service. The Guardia di Finanza is a capable and dedicated organization which has made a significant contribution to reducing narcotics trafficking through Italy.

Departing the Guardia di Finanza, the delegation went to the headquarters of the Carabinieri. The Cabarinieri is a 82,000 manned-service charged with the investigation of all crimes in major cities along with the Polizia dello Stato (the National Police) as well as in the countryside where the National Police do not have a presence. The Carabinieri has taken a significant lead in investigating the Mafia and other organized crime groups in Italy, and has made a substantial contribution in rooting out these criminal elements in Sicily. The Carabinieri maintains significant intelligence on the Mafia's involvement in drug trafficking and traces the narcotic importation and distribution patterns engaged in by organized crime families. The Carabinieri has done an impressive job in identifying and pursuing the growing involvement of the N'Dranghita in Calabria in drug trafficking.

E. Meeting With Prime Minister Bettino Craxi at the Palazzo Chigi

The delegation's last meeting on January 19, 1984, was with Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi. Prime Minister Craxi, who is the first Socialist head of the government in Italy, warmly greeted the delegagation and voiced his strong support for the Select Committee's study mission to opium producing areas, and for its visit to Italy. Craxi called drug abuse a "deadly problem" pointing out that there had already been 23 narcotics related deaths in January, 1984.

Prime Minister Craxi asked Chairman Rangel to provide him with some information on the study mission thus far. Mr. Rangel, in describing the trip thus far, said that "common threads" appeared in all the opium producing and heroin transshipment nations; increasing domestic drug abuse problems, terrorist and illegal arms trade involvement with drug trafficking, and communist and other insurgent exploitation of the lack of central government control in opium production areas. Mr. Rangel concluded by stating that it is necessary for democratic nations to work together to successfully combat drug abuse and drug trafficking. Rangel further noted that Italo-American cooperation on narcotics-related issues could serve as a model for other nations to follow. The delegation uniformly praised Craxi for placing narcotics control high on Italy's national agenda.

In response, Prime Minister Craxi stated that in the past, Italian law enforcement units had concentrated their efforts on combatting terrorism, but this battle has been won. Craxi was particularly proud that Italy was able to do this while still preserving its democratic institution and traditions. The Prime Minister indicated that Italian law enforcement efforts will now be directed toward fighting drug trafficking. He concurred with Chairman Rangel's observation that international cooperation is essential in the fight against narcotics and that international crime organizations will only be toppled through nations and governments working together.

Both the delegation and Prime Minister Craxi praised the formation of the joint Italian-American Cabinet level working group on

drug trafficking. Craxi indicated that Italian Interior Minister Scalfaro would be his country's leading representative on the working group. In conclusion the Prime Minister informed the delegation that the Italian Cabinet will soon be considering new measures and programs to combat drug trafficking.

The delegation left its meeting with Prime Minister Bettino Craxi with the sincere belief that the highest levels of the Italian Government are committed to an aggressive and successful fight against narcotics trafficking.

F. Meeting With Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti

On Friday morning, January 20, 1984, the delegation had a breakfast meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti. Also in attendance was Dr. Giuseppe Di Gennaro, the Director of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). Andreotti reiterated the sentiments made by other Italian leaders, that his government, and particularly the Foreign Ministry, would cooperate wholeheartedly with the United States in an international war against drug trafficking.

The Foreign Minister pointed to Italy's recent $40 million pledge to UNFDAC for use in the Andean region of Bolivia and Peru for coca control projects. Coming from the Italian Government's "Hunger Fund", the funds will be used primarily for rural/crop development projects.

Chairman Rangel, in opening remarks, stated he was impressed with the Italian Government's commitment to narcotics control, particularly because that level of commitment is lacking in so many nations of the world. The Chairman went on to state that he hopes that the new Cabinet-level working groups recently established between the American Attorney General and the Italian Minister of Interior could be expanded to a similar dialog between Mr. Andreotti and Secretary of State George Shultz. Mr. Rangel stated that this would demonstrate most dramatically the commitment of both nations to attack the drug problem on an international level.

Mr. Guarini expressed the hope that other nations would follow the example set by the United States and Italy and increase the sharing of intelligence concerning narcotics trafficking. The Foreign Minister concurred in this sentiment.

Foreign Minister Andreotti concluded by stating that governments must work together to confront the campaign to liberalize drug use. He pointed out that strategies must be developed to combat the "false argument" that liberalization would destroy the illegal traffic and criminal organizations. Andreotti stated that "Political action and a public relations effort are needed."

G. Meeting With Italian Interior Minister Luigi Scalfaro

Departing the Foreign Ministry, the delegation went directly to a meeting with Italian Interior Minister Oscar Luigi Scalfaro. The Interior Ministry is an important one in narcotics control because it is the Cabinet office responsible for law enforcement and domestic security

within Italy. Accompanying Minister Scalfaro at the meeting were: Raffaele Costa, Under Secretary, Minister of the Interior; Emanuele de Francesco, Anti-Mafia High Commissioner; Prefect Giovanni Rinaldo Coronas, Chief on the National Police; Prefect Raimando Nicastro, Criminal Police Director; Alberto Sabatino, Director, Central Anti-Drug Services.

Scalfaro opened the meeting by recalling the visit in 1983 of Attorney General William French Smith and the work that had been done between Italy and the United States in establishing the Cabinet-level working group on narcotics control and organized crime. He indicated that he looked forward to working on the committee and stated his opinion that it would be a "decision making" body and not just a discussion group. The Interior Minister stated that he and Vice Prime Minister Forlani will visit the United States shortly and will propose a program for the joint working group.

Mr. Guarini responded on behalf of the delegation. He gave the Interior Ministry officials an overview of the study mission and called for increased international cooperation to combat drug trafficking and drug abuse. Minister Scalfaro replied that he viewed nations working together on narcotics control as "mutual assistance." Scalfaro stated that upon becoming Interior Minister he made narcotics control his priority issue. He pointed to the progress made against the Mafia in Palermo as evidence of the Ministry's determination to fight organized crime and narcotics.

Scalfaro also called for a reorganization and centralization of Italy's narcotics and crime control efforts to permit better coordination and efficiency. The Interior Minister concluded on the note that in addition to government enforcement action against narcotics trafficking, nations must convince their citizens to reject illicit drug use and its destructive lifestyle.

H. Call Upon the President of the Italian Republic Sandro Pertini, at the Quirinale

Leaving the Interior Ministry, the delegation went to the Quirinale, the official residence of the Italian President. Sandro Pertini has been President since 1978; he is the first Socialist to hold the Presidency of the modern Italian Republic. Pertini, who is 84 years old, is often referred to as the "grandfather" of the Italian people. He was imprisoned and subsequently had to live in exile for his anti-fascist political activity. He subsequently became a hero in the Italian Resistance movement during World War II and is greatly respected for his honesty, integrity, outspokenness, and dignity. He is a living symbol of Italian national unity.

Greeting the delegation, the President expressed his personal concern and involvement in drug abuse matters. He underscored his own personal and official effort by refusing to pardon any convicted drug trafficker. He pointed out that his wife is a psychologist and has spent many years working with substance abusers. President Pertini praised American efforts to control the worldwide problem of drug abuse and emphasized that nations, working together, can successfully combat drug trafficking.

Each Member of Congress in the delegation, in turn, responded to the sentiments of President Pertini and praised him for the national leadership and compassion he has exhibited on the drug abuse issue. The call on the President concluded with Pertini wishing the delegation success in its work and a continued pleasant visit in Italy.

I. Meeting With Dr. Giuseppe Di Gennaro, Director, United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC)

Following its meeting with President Pertini, the delegation went to the headquarters of the United States Information Service in Rome for a meeting with Dr. Giuseppe Di Gennaro, the Director of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC).

Director Di Gennaro has worked in closed conjunction with the Select Committee for several years. He expressed to the delegation the need to develop creative mechanisms to encourage bi-lateral and multi-lateral funding for narcotics control projects. Di Gennaro believes that narcotics control assistance from industrialized nations, as the United States and Italy, should be channeled through UNFDAC so that international cooperation on narcotics matters is preserved. UNFDAC will in turn assure donor nations that they will be able to earmark the distribution of their funds to particular narcotics control projects through UNFDAC.

The delegation told Dr. Di Gennaro that it would take his suggestion under advisement and convey his concerns to the State Department, particularly Secretary Shultz and Assistant Secretary Di Carlo. The delegation complimented the Director on the work he has done at UNFDAC and for encouraging a truly international approach to narcotics control and drug abuse.

J. Meeting With Italian Justice Minister Mino Martinazzoli

The last meeting with a member of the Italian Cabinet took place on Friday evening, January 20, 1984, with the Minister of Pardons and Justice Mino Martinazzoli at the Ministry of Justice. The Minister at the outset noted that in Italy a problem of overlapping jurisdiction existed between some Italian agencies involved with drug abuse matters but that the government had begun to address inter-agency problems. Martinazzoli stated that it has become vital for free societies to overcome the worldwide narcotics problem, particularly because of its subversive effects on youth, and its support of increased levels of organized crime.

Representative Stokes asked Minister Martinazzoli how the United States could assist the Italian legal system in better addressing drug trafficking and drug related crimes. In the ensuing discussion three areas of concern were raised where American legal principles could be of assistance to the Italian enforcement effort. These were: (1) The use of undercover police officers in obtaining evidence of drug trafficking; (2) witness protection services; (3) and, the use of controlled deliveries of illegal narcotics to purchasers.

Mr. Stokes stated that. on behalf of the delegation, he would arrange to have legal memorandum on these subjects prepared by the Drug

Enforcement Administration and sent to the Italian Justice Ministry. Martinazzoli thanked Mr. Stokes for this offer and indicated that the materials would be useful as Italy is presently reevaluating its narcotics control laws.

The meeting concluded with the delegation and the Justice Minister calling for continued Italian-United States cooperation on narcotics control issues.

K. Call on Fr. Don Mario Picchi and the Italian Center of Solidarity, Drug Abuse Treatment Center

The delegation's final meeting was with Father Don Mario Picchi, at the Italian Center of Solidarity, the Italian counterpart to Daytop Village Halfway House, a drug-free therapeutic community in Rome.

John T. Cusack, Chief of Staff, addressed a group of rehabilitated addicts and their families on behalf of the delegation. He lauded the group's family oriented drug free treatment modality, and in particular, he commended the staff and participants for their successful low drug abuse recidivism rate.

Mr. Cusack outlined for those present the delegation study mission, describing the countries visited and the limited amount of success the United States was having with crop substitution in the poppy producing nations. However, he encouraged the group to continue their hard work and their devotion to helping mankind stamp out the drug abuse menace that is tearing at the fibers of our society.

Father Don Mario Picchi, closed by stating that "A drug abuser is like a medal with two faces. I believe that we can destroy all poppy fields, but, if we don't build his heart, he will drug himself with mayonnaise. Therefore, it is important that suppression and eradication efforts be continued, however, centers like ours must continue working to save man."

Mr. Cusack said, "better that they drug themselves with mayonnaise than heroin; we had found that where we successfully restricted the availability of dependency producing drugs such as heroin, as we have done at different times in the past, we have dramatically curtailed drug abuse." He added that as long as society exists, efforts to control drug abuse must focus on restricting the illicit availability of narcotics and psychotropics, drug abuse prevention education programs and treatment for the victims of abuse.

Conclusions and Recommendations

1. In October 1983, Attorney General William French Smith, in a visit to Rome to sign a treaty on judicial cooperation, proposed the creation of a bilateral Cabinet-level working group on narcotics and organized crime. The Attorney General will head the U.S. delegation in the working group and the Committee delegation learned, in the course of its meetings in Rome, that Deputy Prime Minister Forlani and Minister of Interior Scalfaro would lead the Italian delegation.

The Italian officials were enthusiastic and very hopeful over the prospects of this working group enhancing mutual cooperation in narcotic and organized crime suppression. They were anticipating forma-

tion of the group and its first meeting to be scheduled shortly after the Committee visit to Rome on January 19 and 20. This, apparently, had to be set aside following the announcement on January 23 of Attorney General Smith's resignation to take effect following the confirmation of Attorney General-Designate Edwin Meese III.

The Select Committee recommends that, given the importance the Italian Government has attached to Attorney General Smith's proposal for working group on narcotics and organized crime, steps be taken to organize this initative as soon as possible.

2. The Select Committee was gratified with the excellent narcotic enforcement cooperation provided by the Government of Italy on an ongoing basis. Historically because of its strategic location astride the Mediterranean narcotic trafficking routes from source to victim countries; and a long tradition of contraband smuggling and trafficking by the Mafia of Sicily, the Camorra of Naples and the N'Dranghita of Calabria, Italy, has been periodically a source and transit country for the smuggling of opium, morphine and finally heroin to the United States since the 1920's. Cooperation to suppress this traffic dates back to 1928. Federal Narcotic Agents began active cooperation in Italy in 1936 and following World War II in 1948. A permanent presence was established at the Embassy in Rome in 1951.

Documentation indicates that the vigorous campaigns against the organized narcotic traffic in Italy between 1948 and about 1954 affecting the United States by Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Italian Guardia di Finanza, National Police and Carabinieri prevented Italy from becoming the manufacturing center for heroin that developed at Marseilles. The Italian underworld, particularly the Mafia elements, could have easily dominated illicit heroin manufacture instead of their Corsican associates at Marseilles, particularly since it was they and not the Corsicians who controlled importation and distribution in the United States and Canada. Vigorous joint cooperative narcotic enforcement operations in Italy unrelenting from 1951 to date have harassed, disrupted and effectively suppressed attempts and actual endeavors by Mafia traffickers to establish a heroin manufacturing capability in Sicily and Italy.

Failing this, Mafia organizations have been adept, however, in obtaining large shipments of heroin for trafficking to the United States from the French Connection between 1950 and 1972 and more recently from suppliers in Turkey and Syria. Demonstrating their great resourcefulness, they have also set up networks to obtain heroin in Thailand. One operation utilized a small cargo vessel for the sole purpose of transporting the heroin from the Southwest Coast of Thailand to Sicily. Fortunately it was intercepted, but there are reports this method of operation is continuing.

Narcotic trafficking organizations in Italy, particularly the Mafia elements, will continue to play an important role in the heroin traffic affecting the United States as long as unlimited supplies of heroin, or the raw materials to manufacture it, continue to be available in the Mediterranean area. They have demonstrated the ability to reach out as far as Thailand to obtain supplies. Their objective is to have a large and steady supply of high quality heroin steadily available in Sicily or Italy for sale at competitive prices to Mafia counterparts in the

United States and Canada, whether they manufacture it themselves or not. This situation will continue until such time as the uncontrolled production of opium in Burma, Thailand, Laos, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran is phased out.

The Select Committee wishes to commend the three Italian police services that have historically joined hands with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and its predecessor agencies to suppress the illicit manufacture and traffic in narcotic drugs in Italy affecting the United States. This unrelenting effort must continue and both the Governments of the United States and Italy must ensure that adequate manpower, resources and equipment are assigned to constantly increase the suppression rate against this traffic. Important narcotic arrests and seizures in both countries should be vigorously prosecuted and substantial prison terms meted out to convicted violators.

3. The Select Committee also wishes to commend the Government of Italy for its long term participation in the work of the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs and lauds the $40.8 million pledge of Italy to UNFDAC dedicated to addressing the problem of the uncontrolled production of coca leaf in the Andean region of South America.

4. The Committee was deeply impressed with the importance the Government of Italy is attaching to the need for concerted bilateral and multilateral initiatives to bring the unprecedented problem of the production, traffic and abuse of narcotic and psychotropic drugs under effective control.

This was evidenced by the fact that, in its meeting with Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, he had invited Dr. Giuseppe Di Gennaro, the Director of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control to the meeting. Minister Andreotti reiterated the pledges of his government, particularly the Foreign Ministry, to wholehearted cooperation with the United States and the United Nations in efforts to bring the illicit production and traffic of drugs under control. The Committee urges Secretary of State Shultz to place the item of narcotics control on his agenda for discussion at all meetings with foreign minister counterparts.

This Committee believes it is only through concerted action with our friends and allies, particularly the industrial nations of the Atlantic and Pacific, that negotiations and technical assistance programs necessary to phase out the uncontrolled production of opium, coca and cannabis will be possible.

Given the commitment of the Government of Italy and Foreign Minister Andreotti to this objective, the Committee believes the Secretary of State should sound out his counterparts in the Atlantic and Pacific industrial nations to join with Italy and the United States in devising a way they can negotiate the ending of illicit opium, coca and cannabis cultivation in the producer countries and support the modest socio-economic assistance that would make this possible.

DRUGS IN THE MILITARY—(1984)—UNIFORMED FORCES PACIFIC AND EUROPEAN COMMANDS

During the Select Committee's January 1984 Study Mission to Hawaii, Asia, and Italy, the Committee again reviewed the levels of drug abuse within the ranks of our Armed Forces in the Pacific and European Commands. The Select Committee's earlier studies of this vitally

important national security issue in 1978 and 1981 revealed critically high levels of drug abuse within the uniformed services. These studies, as well as other DOD independently contracted studies and a tragic fighter jet crash in May 1981 on board the U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier U.S.S. *Nimitz* in which evidence of illicit drug use was found in autopsies of the pilot and deck crew killed, prompted the military establishment to impose stringent drug abuse testing, disciplinary, and treatment and prevention programs in Fall, 1981, and Winter, 1982.

A. Honolulu, Hawaii

1. UNIFIED COMMAND—PACIFIC

On January 5, 1984, in Honolulu, Hawaii, the Select Committee received a briefing from the Unified Pacific Command under Admiral William J. Crowe (CICPAC), as well as from the drug abuse prevention officers of the three services and the Marine Corps on the status of forces in the Pacific.

Admiral Crowe opened the briefing by welcoming the delegation to Honolulu and stated that his concern over drug abuse within the ranks stems, in addition to the welfare and health of the troops, from the need for operational readiness in the area. Crowe stated drug abuse takes a heavy toll in the military: loss in productivity, health and safety threats, and impairment of military readiness. The Admiral stated that in 1981, the military had become extremely sensitive to the issue of drug abuse. He indicated that he felt the programs the military has put in place have been very effective, particularly the institution of peer pressure within the ranks. Admiral Crowe stated his belief that considerable progress has been made within the armed services in the Pacific in controlling drug abuse. The data subsequently presented to the Committee supported his position.

Lt. Col. Claude Jones, Head of Discipline, Law and Order Branch, Personnel Director, CICPAC, gave an overview of the role played by the Unified Command in drug abuse prevention. Jones described CICPAC's role of one assuring command readiness. The Unified Command coordinates the service programs and chairs the quarterly drug abuse council. The major objective of the council is the "cross-feed of information, and ideas, among the component representatives and the reporting of progress in the services suppression efforts." Most importantly CICPAC manages the Military Customs Inspection Program (MCIP). Military customs inspectors work aggressively to prevent military supply lines and the DOD transportation system from being used by drug traffickers. Jones cited a 30 percent reduction in controlled substance seizures since 1980, even though enforcement efforts and staff have remained the same, as evidence of the work of the MCIP.

Addressing present concerns of the Unified Command, Lt. Col. Jones stated, that although the level of abuse has significantly dropped since 1981, drug abuse, particularly marihuana, remains an ever present threat. He viewed as a primary mission of CICPAC to ensure that the high standards set by the individual services are maintained. Jones concluded by pointing out, "In the past two years documented drops in service statistics have been noted by the smaller numbers of military persons involved in incidents of drug abuse.

Similar parallels were drawn in the DOD-sponsored Triangle Institute report entitled, The 1982 Worldwide Survey of Alcohol and Nonmedical Drug Use Among Military Personnel. The 1982 Triangle report pointed out, overall drug use among DOD members had declined significantly since the earlier 1980 DOD-sponsored Burt Study."

2. ARMY, WESTERN COMMAND

Col. Dick Jewitt (United States Army Western Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel) briefed the Committee on the Army-Pacific drug abuse situation. The key indicators of urinalysis inspections, requests for treatment services, and drug related disciplinary actions all show a marked decreasing drug abuse trend.

Col. Jewitt discussed trends he saw in the Western Command based upon the latest Army surveys. He stated that levels of marihuana sales and trafficking in Hawaii were below that of the Army worldwide. However, while welcoming this finding, he cautioned its full accuracy because of the widespread availability of marihuana in Hawaii making it readily available to the user but obviating the need to possess large quantities. The easy availability of marihuana in Hawaii has lead to the Army in Hawaii to have a higher ratio of marihuana use and possession than the Army worldwide. However, the rate has been declining due to the use of narcotic detection dogs during unit sweeps and the implementation of an aggressive urinalysis testing program. The abuse of amphetamines and barbiturates in Army-Hawaii, although low, is above the worldwide Army average. A slight increase in cocaine use has been observed.

Col. Jewitt informed the Committee of the dramatic drop in cannabis abuse accomplished by the deterrent effect of urinalysis testing. In the fourth quarter of 1982, a quarterly average of 1,900 tests were administered with a projected positive showing of 2.5 percent. The following graph was provided:

US ARMY WESTERN COMMAND



Chairman Rangel at this point questioned Col. Jewitt concerning the scientific accuracy of urinalysis testing citing recently published reports that a Pentagon urinalysis expert has challenged the validity of the military's testing program. In response it was stated that the urinalysis program has "never been proven incorrect." Col. Jewitt indicated the Army goes to great lengths to insure that mistakes are not made in the chain of custody of urine samples, and in the testing procedures. Mr. Rangel asked the services to forward to the Committee information on the military's testing program and its response to the recent criticisms made. After its return to the United States the Committee was informed by the Department of Defense that an investigative team of Army Surgeon General is currently addressing questions raised concerning urinalysis and a report to the Department of Defense will be submitted shortly.

Concerning the forces in Korea, Col. Jewitt stated that the last positive results from the latest testing series were greatly down from levels in 1981. Army-Japan showed the lowest level of drug abuse. Jewitt, in part, attributed this to the low troop concentration in Japan, as well as strict Japanese laws and customs against drug abuse.

Concerning drug abuse treatment successes for the Army Western Command, Hewitt cited success rates (i.e., soldiers who return to duty and perform properly) of 80 percent for 1982 and 75 percent for 1983.

Jewitt concluded by pointing out the Army's two major areas of continuing concern were a continuing and in some cases increasing, alcohol abuse problem, and the need for a biomedical test for use of hallucinogens.

3. NAVY, PACIFIC FLEET

Lieutenant Commander Busseno (Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Programs Officer, CICPAC Fleet) presented the drug abuse prevention program of the Pacific Fleet. As with the Army, the Navy reported that all indicators showed downward trends in the level of drug abuse. What is encouraging according to Busseno is that this trend is continuing with the use of increased urinalysis testing. The Navy Pacific Command conducts 30,000 urinalysis tests per month, and will continue testing at that level. This number of tests per month covers 20 percent of the Pacific Fleet personnel. The following chart was provided:


PAGE 1 OF DRUG ABUSE LEVELS
DOD SUMMER 1980 SURVEY—18%
DODFACILITIES SURVEY—20.3%
MAY 1983—30,000/MO PACE TESTING

This graph provides a comparison of the numbers of urine specimen tests conducted (in the solid bar) along side the resultant percentage of laboratory confirmed positives for all drugs. The most significant point is the continuing downward trend in the number of positive tests. There are many reasons for this reduced usage; one being the increased number of tests conducted, which has had a deterrent effect on those either using, or thinking of using drugs. The initial growing phase in urinalysis testing was from October 1980 to October 1982, a period when a 48.3 percent drug abuse level was lowered to 15.6 percent and urine specimen testing levels increased along with major gains in drug detection dog placements, increased laboratory testing capability and firm law enforcement actions. Another dramatic decline was achieved when the 30,000 tests per month mark was reached between March and June 1983, from 10.7 percent positive to 4.4 percent. While the November 1983 mark of 2.71 percent is the lowest recorded yet, this percentage indicator is only viewed as a tic mark confirming the overall downward trend regarding drug abuse among Pacific Fleet personnel.

Busseno reported that in the Pacific fleet marihuana has consistently been the major drug illicitly used, approximately 86 percent of all drugs detected followed by cocaine, amphetamines, and PCP. Other drugs cited were abuse of illicit medications, and a small percentage of morphine, codeine, and phenobarbital.

Representative Stokes inquired whether any particular racial group stood out in the Navy's test results. Busseno stated statistics are not kept on that category. On the enforcement side of the drug abuse problem, zero tolerance and stringent reporting requirements have been widely publicized and firmly enforced within the Navy's Pacific fleet. The policy for E–7's and above is one time abuse and separate. For E–6 and below involved in a first or second drug abuse identification, commanding officers weigh an individual's potential for continued Naval service, discipline if appropriate, and initiation of education, counseling or treatment, or separation action as the individual case warrants. Third time offenders are disciplined if appropriate and separated.

Drug related discharge data:

1st quarter, fiscal year 1983 (officer/enlisted)	3/360
2d quarter, fiscal year 1983 (officer/enlisted)	5/479
3d quarter, fiscal year 1983 (officer/enlisted)	0/701

This chart view reflects Pacific fleet drug related discharge data for the first three quarters of fiscal year 1983. The progressive number of discharges parallels the Navy-wide trend, and is the result of increased detection of drug abusers, primarily through urinalysis, coupled with a willingness of military judges and court members to award punitive discharges in court-martial cases, as well as requirements for commanding officers to process for administrative separation drug abusers who do not go through the courts-martial system.

Representative Guarini inquired about the level of drug-related incidents in the total number of total offenses in the Naval criminal justice system. Busseno indicated that only offenses for trafficking, drug possession and use, and violators uncovered through urinalysis are

defined drug-related offenses within the Navy justice system. Mr. Guarini responded by indicating that unless all violators are subjected to urinalysis testing, there is no way of knowing what percentage of all violations in the Naval Justice System are drug related.

Lieutenant Commander Busseno concluded by pointing out the following areas of concern in the future. They are adequate staffing and funding for morale, welfare and recreation activities; and the increase in general availability of marihuana, cocaine, and LSD.

4. MARINE CORPS, PACIFIC COMMAND

Major Turner, (Fleet Marine Corps Command, Pacific) described the Marine Corps drug abuse prevention program in the Pacific. Reporting the same dramatic declines as the Army and Navy in drug abuse within the ranks, Turner indicated that the Corps was focusing the efforts on improving the turn around time on urine samples submitted for analysis. A faster procedure will prevent any erroneous accusations from being made, and provides a timely deterrent to drug use.

Turner also pointed out that the Marine Corps effort has not been all punitive in nature. He cited the fact increasing numbers of substance abuse seminars have been funded to enable both officers and enlistees to gain a better understanding of drug abuse problems and to seek positive solutions.

Major Turner stated that measures of the Marine Corps progress include significant decreases in drug use as reflected in the 1980 and 1982 DOD worldwide surveys, where non-medical drug use throughout the Marine Corps dropped from 37 percent to 20.6 percent and the use of marihuana dropped overall from 36 percent to 17.1 percent. Turner stated that, "Exact percentages of use are difficult to pinpoint, but our statistical base developed over the last two months indicates a level of less than 10 percent. The trend is favorable and we are continuing to refine our data as time goes on."

Turner concluded by pointing out concern about the rising popularity of cocaine and the revival of LSD as substances the Marine Corps must closely watch.

5. AIR FORCE, PACIFIC

Lt. Col. Wayne Gordon, (Chief, Social Action Division, Headquarters, Pacific Air Force) reported on the status of drug abuse prevention in the Air Force. The Air Force, which traditionally has had the lowest levels of drug abuse of all the services, has tremendously reduced abuse levels within its ranks. The Air Force Pacific population averaged between 26,000 and 27,000 military personnel in 1983. Of that population, 619 drug abusers were identified through urinalysis, enforcement, and drug related incidents. This represented approximately 2.5 percent of the total command strength. Gordon pointed out that marihuana use predominates among Air Force drug abusers, with the highest at-risk population being classes E1–E5.

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon, also pointed out that there were 451 participants in drug rehabilitation programs in 1983 and that a high per-

centage of first time users successfully complete rehabilitation programs. Gordon cautioned that rehabilitation is reserved for those who need it and can benefit from it. Those whose drug use represents only a disciplinary problem are punished, provided drug abuse education and returned to duty. All officers, NCO's repeat offenders, traffickers, addicts, and those that do not respond favorably to rehabilitation are appropriately disciplined and separated.

Urinalysis testing have shown consistent downward trends, with an increasing number of urine tests each quarter. The following chart outlines the Air Force's progress in the Pacific in testing for marihuana:



	Q1/82	Q2/82	Q3/82	Q4/82	Q1/83	Q2/83	Q3/83
# TESTS	1592	774	770	1144	2237	3811	3711
POSITIVES	48	128	56	120	222	225	104
% POSITIVE	3.0	16.5	7.3	10.5	11.1	5.9	2.8

Gordon also described "Commando Plug," the military customs program which has been effective in reducing the availability of drugs to the troops. Commando Plug is designed to strengthen customs procedures and eliminate the movement of drugs and other contraband by military members. The program applies to all inter and intra-theatre conveyances to include the Military Airlift Command and their chartered aircraft, as well as chartered surface vessels. Inspections and examinations under Commando Plug are conducted by thoroughly trained military customs inspectors and are monitored by assigned U.S. Customs Service advisers.

Gordon attributed the Air Force success to keeping to the standard of "rehabilitate where appropriate, separate where necessary" as the key to its success. Looking toward the future, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon expressed concern over alcohol abuse trends and the large availability of marihuana in the Philippines.

Chairman Rangel closed the briefing by praising the military for the effective job it has done in substantially reducing drug abuse within the ranks and urged the services to share with all Americans what it has learned from its experience in doing so.

B. Rome, Italy

1. UNIFIED COMMAND—EUROPE

Mr. Claude L. Martin, Special Assistant for Drug Enforcement Matters, Headquarters, United States European Command, opened the briefing for the delegation. Martin pointed out that the European command consisted of 316,000 Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel. The role of the joint command is to exercise oversight of the drug abuse programs of the individual services; chair the Human Resources Symposium, which meets twice annually; and review the status of drug abuse prevention and related personnel programs.

Urinalysis testing is conducted at the U.S. Army lab in Wiesbaden, Germany, and at Navy labs in the United States for opiates, barbiturates, amphetamines, cocaine, and cannabis.

Urinalysis testing has revealed that the use of all drugs, except cannabis, has decreased from 1980 through the third quarter of 1983. Cannabis detections greatly increased with the implementation of a test for THC, the active ingredient in cannabis, in October 1981. This detection capability has led to a resultant decline in cannabis use through the third quarter of 1983. The following chart was provided to the Select Committee:


IDENTIFICATION BY DRUG TYPE (ALL METHODS)
1st QTR CY 80 - 3rd QTR 83
PERSONNEL
5600
4900
4200
3500
2800
2100
1400
700
00
QTR/YR
2 80
4 80
2 81
4 81
2 82
4 82
2 83
4 83
INCTEST PHASE IN
3578
141
34
CANNABIS
OTHER DANGEROUS DRUGS
NARCOTICS

Concerning urinalysis testing for the detection of cannabis, during the first 10 months of 1983, there was a decrease in the detection rate in the Army and the Air Forces in Europe from 10.1 percent in January to 2.8 percent in November. The Navy detection rate, calculated in the European Command on a quarterly basis showed a drop from 4.02 percent, in the first quarter of 1983 to 1.47 percent in the third quarter of 1983. The Air Force and Army statistics from the Army testing lab at Wiesbaden are determined on a monthly basis; the monthly mean sample is approximately 30,000. The quarterly mean sample for Naval units is approximately 18,000.

Courts-martial for drug abuse in the European command have remained relatively stable since 1980, however, administrative separation and Article 15 actions (Commanding officer's non-judicial punishment) have significantly risen since 1980. The rise in use of the latter types of procedures is a reflection of both improved detection of cannabis through urinalysis and mandated actions. The following chart was provided the Committee:


PUNITIVE/ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS (DRUGS)
1st QTR CY 80 - 3rd QTR CY 83
ACTIONS
3000
2700
2400
2100
1800
1500
1200
900
600
300
0
QTR/YR
2 80
4 80
2 81
4 81
2 82
4 82
2 83
4 83
INCTEST PHASE IN
ARTICLE 15
ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATION
COURT MARTIAL
2427
1117
242

Discussing future areas of concern, Mr. Martin pointed out, the increasing availability and popularity of LSD in Europe has caught the attention of the unified command. This concern has been heightened by the fact that no viable and cost effective biochemical test is available for LSD, and techniques for using detector dogs to ferret LSD have not been developed. Rising supplies of cocaine and heroin in Europe have also prompted concerns by the unified command. German domestic seizures in 1983 of both drugs have increased markedly since 1981.

2. ARMY, EUROPE

Major Thomas J. Levitt, Chief of Drug and Alcohol Assistance Branch, U.S. Army, Europe provided the delegation an overview of the Army's drug abuse prevention and control programs in Europe. The program consists of biochemical testing, enforcement, treatment and prevention.

The U.S. Army Testing Laboratory—Wiesbaden currently tests more urine samples than any other military laboratory worldwide. About 30,000 Army samples are tested monthly. Samples are submitted for either entire units or individuals suspected of using drugs. Tests are also performed through physician direction, or as part of rehabilitation, or staff surveillance. The lab tests for cannabis, cocaine, heroin, amphetamines, and barbiturates. Commander-directed individual or unit urinalysis tests account for the majority of testing. Each commander has the authority to test suspected abusers, or in the case where performance indicators of his unit suggest drug abuse, he may test the entire unit.

Since January 1, 1983, all urinalysis samples have been tested for THC. The level of testing performed by the Army in Europe has lead to a dramatic reduction in cannabis use. Urine samples containing THC have declined from 11.9 percent of tests in January, 1983 to 3.0 percent in November 1983.

The success of the Army's program in Europe is also reflected in the quarterly average of drug offenses from calendar year 1979 through the third quarter of 1983. The trend between 1979 and 1981 was a gradual increase in the number of drug offenses. Since the new initiatives were implemented in 1981 and 1982, there has been a decline. Most significant is a shift in the type of drug offenses reported by Army law enforcement officials. In 1979, 15 percent of all offenses were narcotics offenses. In 1983, only 2.1 percent of all offenses were narcotics offenses. In 1979, 8 percent of all offenses were dangerous drug offenses. In 1983, only 6.6 percent of offenses were dangerous drug offenses. In 1979, 77 percent of all offenses were cannabis offenses. In 1983, 91.3 percent of all drug offenses were cannabis offenses. The Army views the rising cannabis offense rate as a positive change in the Army Europe drug abuse picture; it is attributed to effective law enforcement efforts along with 100 percent THC testing. Although cannabis offenses make up the overwhelming amount of Army-Europe drug offenses, the actual number fell from 2,014 in 1982, to 1,432 in 1983 (third quarter).

Finally, stricter policies were implemented by the Army on July 1, 1983, which generally require commanders to process for separation all

officers and E6–E9's who are illegal drug abusers, second time drug abusers, and personnel determined to be drug dependent. Beginning February 1, 1984, this policy was extended to include E–5's.

The treatment/rehabilitation program of Army/Europe has also shown significant progress. Inpatient and outpatient treatment is provided throughout the command. Army-Europe has five residential rehabilitation facilities with a total bedspace of 120. Noteworthy is that in 1979, 155 soldiers had to be detoxified each month; in 1982, only 67. The hepatitis hospitalization rate is now 10 percent of what it was in 1979.

The entire program is complemented by an aggressive drug abuse prevention and education program. This curriculum includes orientations for new arrivals, workshops and training conferences, public affairs presentations, and the promotion of alternative leisure activities.

3. NAVY, EUROPE

Commander Jeannie N. Todaro, Human Resource Management Program Coordinator, United States Navy, Europe, gave a description of the Navy's program.

Responding to reports of high levels of drug abuse within the fleet through the period of 1978–1981, the Navy embarked upon a "zero tolerance" policy. Promulgation of this policy comes directly from the Chief of Naval Operations.

As in the other service branches, urinalysis took a decisive role in monitoring and insuring fleet readiness. Unit sweep THC testing results, which formerly had been used only to assess the magnitude of substance abuse within the fleet, is extensively now used as a drug abuse control measure through disciplinary action. Unit sweep testing has been redefined to mean an entire unit or any identifiable segment of a unit, and second echelon commanders were authorized to delegate testing authority down the chain of command.

In conjunction with increased urinalysis testing, other drug abuse assets/initiatives have been increased in Navy—Europe during the last 2 years as follows:

Asset	December 1981	December 1983
Drug detector dogs	6	21
Portable urinalysis test kits	3	61
Alcohol rehabilitation services	1	2
Mobile substance abuse	.....	.....
Assessment team (4-person team)	[1] 0	1
Navy alcohol drug safety action program	5	14

[1] March 1982.

Note.—Postal inspection authorization—Received November 1982.

Coordination of the Navy's efforts have been further enhanced by the creation of the Navy Drug and Alcohol Abuse Advisory Councils (NDAAC) at the area coordinator, regional coordinator, and local coordinator levels. The councils meet quarterly, or at the call of the chain of command to assess the overall program, draft problem area counter measures, and direct corrective action.

The drug and alcohol program has also been consolidated under one command. The Command Substance Abuse Coordinator (SAC) replaced both the Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor (DAPA) and the Collateral Duty Alcoholism Advisor (CODAA). The Navy Europe Command's substance abuse mobile training team trains SAC's at five locations to insure the continuity of education and program direction.

Lastly, recreational and educational initiatives within the Navy—Europe have grown and improved, complementing the detection and enforcement efforts, and adding more emphasis to drug abuse prevention. In addition to bolstering drug abuse education a pilot program, Project Vanguard, was commenced in July, 1983, at the U.S. Naval Station in Rota, Spain. This program is designed to offer alternatives to substance abuse by enhancing recreational activities and participation by shore based units and visiting ship personnel. A central office arranges activities and publicizes activity schedules. The target group for Project Vanguard is single E1 through E5's, but plans are being formulated to expand the programs to include all ranks.

Commander Todaro pointed out two major areas of concern in the future of the Navy—Europe drug abuse program. First, LSD is gaining popularity among drug abusers in Europe. At present no viable means is available to detect this drug's presence either in the body or during shipment. The Navy is pursuing training in LSD detection for drug detector dogs by the U.S. Air Force and is also trying to find a urinalysis test suitable for LSD. The second major concern is the liberalization of Spanish drug laws which lowered penalties for possessing illegal drugs for personal use. The Navy fears that this change will make drugs more available to service personnel on liberty in Spain and create a pro-drug attitude which can undermine existing anti-drug use programs.

4. AIR FORCE, EUROPE

The final briefing on drugs in the military in Europe was by Lt. Col. J. P. Millikin, Chief, Social Actions Branch, United States Air Force, Europe.

The United States Air Force in Europe consists of 26 major functional units which operate primarily out of seven countries: England, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Greece, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The bulk of Air Force personnel in Europe is stationed in Germany and England; there are over 55,000 military personnel assigned to the Air Force in Europe.

The principal drugs of abuse within the Air Force—Europe, in descending order of frequency are: (1) Cannabis; (2) LSD; (3) cocaine; (4) amphetamines; (5) heroin; (6) barbiturates.

The abuse of cannabis products accounts for over 85 percent of the drug abuse pattern within the Air Force in Europe. The typical abuser is a young airman of grades E1 through E4 who uses cannabis for recreational purposes.

Although the Air Force has had the lowest level of drug abuse of the uniformed service in surveys taken during the period 1978–1981, the Air Force also responded with an aggressive program involving detec-

tion, enforcement, rehabilitation and prevention in 1981. As a result the drug abuse rate in the Air Force—Europe is declining.

Urine testing for THC began in the Air Force to a limited extent in October 1981. On January 1, 1983, all Air Force urine samples submitted to the Air Force lab in Wiesbaden are screened for THC. Testing has led to a dramatic increase in the proportion of total drug identifications and a corresponding steady decline in drug abuse in the command. The increased risk of apprehension, coupled with the firm actions taken with drug abusers, has resulted in a significant decline in drug abuse in the Air Force—Europe command.

Late in 1981, the Air Force came out with tougher policy guidelines on the question of retention for NCO's involved in drug abuse. Prior thereto, the policy for NCO's called for rehabilitation and return to full duty status whenever possible. The October 1981 change placed NCO's under the same standards as officers; retention being not usually appropriate. According to Air Force philosophy, because of the special position of trust occupied by NCO's, a serious failure to meet standards compromises their ability to exercise leadership. The Air Force has been aggressive in implementing this policy according to Lieutenant Colonel Millikin. Early in 1983, the Air Force instituted the Drug Abuse Response Tracking System (DARTS) to collate information on the disposition of drug abuse charges in the Air Force. Millikin reported that in the latter part of 1983, the number of NCO drug abusers being discharged increased significantly.

Lieutenant Colonel Millikin outlined a number of areas that are of future concern to the Air Force in Europe. First, the rate of alcohol identifications is being closely watched. Although the number of alcohol identifications increased slightly in 1983, the rate per thousand decreased slightly compared to 1982. This, in part, is attributed to a change in the Air Force Europe population since last year. Also, an intensive campaign has been initiated to reduce incidents of driving while-intoxicated; this has been another factor which the Air Force feels explains the increase in number of alcohol related incidents.

As expressed by Navy Commander Todaro, Lieutenant Colonel Millikin also stated that the liberalization of drug laws by Spain, as well as liberalized drug laws in the Netherlands, has the potential of creating a tolerant attitude toward drug use. The Air Force has asked its local offices and units to monitor any changes in identification trends as a result of these legal development. The Air Force indicated to the delegation that it will carefully track this information.

DRUG IDENTIFICATIONS BY YEAR



PERCENT OF DRUG IDENTIFICATIONS BY URINALYSIS



Recommendation

The Committee, in studies of the important national security issue of drug abuse in the military in 1978 and 1981, found critically high levels of drug abuse in our military services. The Committee had the perception that while the individual services and the Department of Defense recognized the problem and made a credible effort at prevention education and recreational programs to deter drug abuse activity, a serious and widespread problem persisted.

The Committee's studies, as well as other Department of Defense contracted studies and a tragic jet fighter crash in May 1981 aboard the Aircraft Carrier *Nimitz* in which unauthorized and illicit drug use was found in autopsies; coupled with evidence of other separate instances of drug use in operational situations, prompted the military to impose stringent drug abuse testing, disciplinary and prevention and treatment programs in the fall of 1981 and winter of 1982.

It is the belief of this Committee, on the basis of the briefings we have received corroborated with supportive documents and records, that the policies and programs initiated during 1982 have had meaningful and far-reaching impact in reducing the abuse of narcotic and psychotropic drugs in our military. The Committee commends the individual services and the Department of Defense for this record of achievement.

While it now appears that drug abuse in the military has been taken firmly in hand, given the incidence of drug abuse worldwide in the general population, and considering that the majority of our military personnel are in the 17 to 34 age group considered the most vulnerable to drug abuse, the threat will continue until availability and acceptability of drugs in the general population can be brought under control. The military services must exercise constant vigilance and maintain all their current drug abuse prevention programs at a high level of effectiveness if they are to prevent a recurrence of the unacceptably high rates of illicit drug use experienced by the services for far too long.

The Committee will follow future developments with much hope and great interest.

SPECIAL REPORT—KOREA

Congressman Ben Gilman, ranking Minority Member of the Select Committee, attended the Pacific Security Conference in Seoul, Korea from January 19 through 22. The Pacific Security Conference was sponsored by the Pacific Community Institute which is headed by former Chairman of the Select Committe, Lester Wolff.

While in Seoul, Congressman Gilman met with U.S. Embassy personnel to discuss the growing Asian drug trade which is affecting the Asian population, American citizens and American military personnel stationed abroad.

In his meeting with Joseph Braddock, the Narcotics Attaché to the American Embassy, Congressman Gilman learned that the narcotics problem in Korea had become very serious, and that Korea is a major narcotic processing and transshipment point in Asia.

The American Embassy works closely with the Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MHSA), the Korean National Police, Korean Customs, the U.S. Military's Criminal Investigations Division (CID), Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and Naval Investigations Service (NIS) on the drug problem in Korea. However, while in Korea, Congressman Gilman heard from several sources that an additional Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent should be assigned to Korea if there is to be a successful campaign against drugs in that nation.

Congressman Gilman in meetings with U.S. officials was told that methamphetamine and marihuana continue to be the most frequently abused drugs by the military stationed in Korea. There is also some barbiturate use and abuse of over-the-counter drugs, including cough syrup which in Korea contains a higher percentage of codeine than cough medicines available in the United States. There have been some reports of drug trafficking through the APO mail system.

Korea is the largest producer of illegal methamphetamine in Asia, and approximately 90 percent of the methamphetamine abused in Japan comes from Korea. Korea serves as a convenient transshipment point for narcotics coming from other Asian points of origin, including Bangkok. In 1983, 20 kilos of heroin were seized in Honolulu after being shipped through Korea; an additional two kilos were seized in Seoul.

While there is minimal cocaine or heroin abuse in Korea to date, there is a growing middle class with increasing money and opportunities for drug use and abuse. There is a large alcoholism problem in Korea, and health officials fear that there are many potential drug abusers in that nation. Most of the crime in Korea falls into the three categories of breaking and entering, rape, and white collar crime.

Marihuana grown locally has a low THC content, and is not as popular as other Asian-grown marihuana.

Recommendations made during the meeting were assignment of an additional DEA agent in Korea, the positioning of drug detector dogs at the airports to detect illegal narcotics and increasing the Korean Ministry of Health's staff and equipment budget.

The following is a list provided by the U.S. Government's Narcotics Attaché, Joseph Braddock, listing the Arrest and Seizure Information for 1983 as reported by the Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs:

Drug	Arrests	Amount
Marihuana	403	94,447 grams
Methamphetamine	289	57,363 grams
Heroin	2	2,000 grams
Opium	2	1,755 grams
Opium poppy plants	72	8,167 plants

Note.—15 clandestine methamphetamine laboratories were seized during 1983.

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